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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 33, Order XLI, as also the provisions of section 151
  • Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 107 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 96 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Order XLI, Rule 23,
  • Order XLI, Rule 27,
  • Rule 23, Order XLI.
  • Order XII Rule 23.
  • Order XLI, Rule 33,
  • Rule 25 of Order
  • Order IX, Rule 13;
  • Rule 23, Order
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 33, Order XLI, as also the provisions of section 151
  • Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 107 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 96 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Order XLI, Rule 23,
  • Order XLI, Rule 27,
  • Rule 23, Order XLI.
  • Order XII Rule 23.
  • Order XLI, Rule 33,
  • Rule 25 of Order
  • Order IX, Rule 13;
  • Rule 23, Order
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Macleod, C.J.; Shah, J. (concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Ahmedabad claiming ownership of a deposit receipt for Rs. 10,000. The hearing took place on 5 February 1918. The defendants' pleader applied to the trial Judge for an adjournment on the ground that the first defendant had gone to Bombay because his son had plague and the defendant himself had fallen ill; that application was refused. After hearing the plaintiff's evidence, the trial Court passed a decree on 16 February 1918 in favour of the plaintiff. The suit was effectively heard ex parte as the defendants' evidence was not heard despite their pleader being present.

Rather than applying under Order IX, Rule 13 to set aside the ex parte decree or seeking review, the defendants appealed under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. The lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal. The High Court (Macleod, C.J., with Shah, J. concurring) set aside that order dismissing the appeal and remitted the matter to the lower appellate Court to decide whether the first defendant could show sufficient reasons for his absence on 5 February 1918; depending on that finding, the appellate Court must decide whether to set aside the trial decree and direct a re-trial or to confirm the decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in an appeal from an ex parte decree where the defendant has not applied to the trial Court to set aside that decree under Order IX, Rule 13, the appellate Court has power to consider whether the trial Court's refusal to grant an adjournment was improper.
  2. Whether an appellate Court has power to remand a case for re-trial (or make other appropriate orders) when it concludes that an ex parte decree was wrongly entered because an adjournment should have been granted, particularly where the power to remand is not obviously covered by Order XLI, Rule 23.
  3. What is the scope of the appellate Court's powers under Order XLI, Rule 33 and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to remand and making orders necessary for the ends of justice.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Position

  • The defendants appealed against the ex parte decree contending that the trial Court wrongly refused an adjournment on the hearing date (5 February 1918), which led to the suit being heard without the defendants' evidence.
  • Evidence relied upon to explain absence included a medical certificate indicating that the first defendant was laid up with fever for three days from 2 February 1918 (as noted by the appellate Court).

Plaintiff's Position

  • The plaintiffs argued that the appellate Court had no power to remand the case except under Rule 23 of Order XLI. In other words, they contended that remand power was limited and that the appellate Court could not remand simply because it thought the trial Court ought to have granted an adjournment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Parvatishankar Durgashankar v. Bai Naval Discussed whether a District Judge could remand a case when the trial Court had refused an adjournment; the reported decision held that the District Judge should not remand under section 562 but should have proceeded under other sections of the older Code (sections 568 and 569 of Act XIV of 1882). The learned Chief Justice relied on this decision to show that an appellate Court may be concerned with refusal of adjournment; the decision was considered in relation to whether an appellate Court could remand when it finds an ex parte decree should not have been made.
Krishna Ayyar v. Kuppan Ayyangar (Madras Full Bench) Full Bench decision: the appellate Court can remand a case when it reverses an order refusing to set aside an ex parte decree. The High Court (Shah, J.) expressly preferred and accepted the view of the Madras Full Bench that the appellate Court is open to consider the correctness of refusal to grant adjournment and to remand where appropriate.
Hummi v. Aziz-ud-din Held that defendants who had applied for re-hearing (and been rejected) should have appealed against that rejection; in the appeal from the decree they had no right to raise the question of non-appearance in the lower Court (as recorded in the opinion). The Court observed those decisions but distinguished them: Hummi involved a party who had first sought re-hearing in the trial Court; its observations were noted as not conclusively barring the appellate Court from considering the adjournment question in all circumstances.
Ghuznavi v. The Allahabad Bank, Ltd. Held that power of remand under section 107 (CPC) is limited to the case described in Order XLI, Rule 23, but section 151 (inherent powers) is not restricted; thus the appellate Court may remand in cases other than those specified by Rule 23 where necessary for the ends of justice. The Chief Justice relied on this authority to support the proposition that the appellate Court's remand power is not confined strictly to Order XLI, Rule 23 and that inherent jurisdiction (section 151) may justify remand to serve ends of justice.
Narottam Rajaram v. Mohanlal Kahandas (Bombay High Court) Held that an appellate Court could remand only when the trial Court had disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point and the decree was reversed on appeal; the judgment referred to section 151 but treated it as not relevant on the facts. The High Court in the present case treated that decision as fact-specific and held it must be read in light of its particular facts; it did not regard Narottam Rajaram as laying down a universal bar to remand except under Rule 23.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Macleod, C.J. analyzed the powers of an appellate Court to deal with an appeal from an ex parte decree when the defendant had not applied at trial under Order IX, Rule 13 to set aside that decree. He rejected a narrow view that the appellate Court's power to remand is strictly confined to the circumstance described in Order XLI, Rule 23 (i.e., where the trial Court had decided the suit on a preliminary point). His reasoning proceeded as follows:

  1. He noted that under the Code of 1908 there are broader provisions (Order XLI, Rule 33; section 151) which empower an appellate Court to "pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made" and to make orders necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the court's process. Those provisions, he held, enable a wider exercise of appellate jurisdiction than a strict reading of the earlier Code might permit.
  2. He reviewed authorities: Parvatishankar Durgashankar indicated limitations under the old Code but was contrasted with the Madras Full Bench in Krishna Ayyar which recognized appellate power to remand when a refusal to set aside an ex parte decree was reversed. Ghuznavi v. The Allahabad Bank supported the idea that inherent powers (section 151) permit remand beyond the literal confines of Rule 23 where necessary for justice.
  3. He treated Narottam Rajaram as fact-specific. Although that decision set aside a remand, it did not, in his view, preclude remand in other factual circumstances where the ends of justice require it; the judges in that case could have resorted to section 151 had they thought it necessary for justice.
  4. He concluded that if an appellate Court comes to the conclusion that an application for adjournment had been wrongly refused, it clearly has the power to set aside the decree and order a re-trial. If the appellate Court lacks sufficient material to decide whether an adjournment should have been granted, it may allow further evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27.
  5. He acknowledged a difficult situation where there had been no appearance at all and no application for adjournment at trial; in such cases it may be hard for an appellate Court to entertain a request to allow evidence to account for the absence, but he did not rule out the appellate Court exercising discretion in favour of the absent party in appropriate circumstances.
  6. On the facts of the present case, the appellate Court had expressed the opinion that defendant No. 1 produced a medical certificate showing incapacity for three days from 2 February 1918; the High Court found it appropriate to remit the matter to the lower appellate Court to make a specific finding whether the defendant could show sufficient reasons for absence on 5 February 1918, because the plaintiff still wished to contest that factual question.
  7. Shah, J., concurring, accepted the view of the Madras Full Bench (Krishna Ayyar) and Parvatishankar to the extent that appellate Courts can consider whether refusal of an adjournment was proper. He also concluded that Rule 33, Order XLI and section 151 are wide enough to allow remand where the appellate Court thinks it necessary for the ends of justice and that Narottam Rajaram does not establish a general rule denying remand except under Rule 23.

Holding and Implications

ORDER SET ASIDE

The High Court set aside the order dismissing the appeal by the lower appellate Court and directed that the lower appellate Court must determine whether the first defendant had sufficient reasons for his absence on 5 February 1918. Depending on that finding, the appellate Court must either:

  • Set aside the decree of the trial Court and direct a new trial; or
  • Confirm the decree of the trial Court.

Implications drawn by the Court from this decision (as stated in the opinion):

  • The appellate Court has power to consider whether a refusal to grant an adjournment was proper in an appeal from an ex parte decree, even where the appellant has not first applied at the trial Court under Order IX, Rule 13.
  • Order XLI, Rule 33 and section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code operate to confer broad powers on an appellate Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, including remanding a case for re-trial in appropriate circumstances; remand is not strictly limited to the scenario described in Order XLI, Rule 23.
  • The precise form of relief (remand for re-trial, calling for further evidence, issuing issues for trial) is discretionary and must be determined with reference to the facts of each case; if the appellate Court lacks sufficient material to decide whether adjournment should have been granted, it may allow additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27.

Direct effect on the parties: the lower appellate Court must now decide the factual question about the defendant's absence and then take the appropriate step (re-trial or confirmation). The opinion also clarifies and affirms the broader scope of appellate powers under Order XLI, Rule 33 and section 151 as applicable to such situations.

Order set aside.
J.G.R

    Jethalal Girdhar v. Varajlal Bhaishankar

    Macleod, C.J:— The plaintiff filed this suit in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Ahmedabad, claiming certain relief from the defendants with regard to a deposit receipt for Rs. 10,000 of which he claimed to be the owner. The case came on for hearing on the 5th of February 1918. The pleader for the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 presented an application to the Judge for an adjournment on the ground that the 1st defendant had gone to Bombay as his son was affected by plague and as he fell ill there, he could not come. That application was refused and the Court proceeded, after hearing the plaintiff's evidence, to pass a decree on the 16th February 1918 in favour of the plaintiff. The result was that the case was heard ex parte without hearing the evidence of the defendants although their pleader was present.

    The defendants then had three remedies: they might have applied to the trial Judge to set aside the ex parte decree under Order IX, Rule 13; they might have applied for a review; or they could appeal under section 96. They chose to appeal. One of the grounds of the appeal was that the lower Court should have granted the adjournment asked for and not proceeded with the hearing of the case. The learned appellate Judge was of opinion that the first defendant should have been granted an adjournment since sufficient reason for his absence on the 5th February was shown and that if an application had been made under Order IX, Rule 13 the Court might have set aside the decree, especially as defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were minors. He considered that if the defendants, without making any such application to the trial Court, appealed against the decree as it stood and asked the appellate Court to set aside the decree and direct a re-hearing on the ground that the trial Court was wrong in proceeding to decide the suit ex parte, the appellate Court could not accede to that application. He relied on a decision of this Court in Parvatishankar Durgashankar v. Bai Naval. The defendant in that case had applied for an adjournment on the ground that she was ill and had not been able to file her written statement. The Court granted a month's adjournment. On the appointed day the defendant applied for a further adjournment which the Court rejected and proceeded to hear the case, passing a decree for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed and the District Judge reversing the decree remanded the case for trial, on the ground that the defendant's application for adjournment ought to have been granted. On appeal it was held, discharging the order of remand, that the suit having been tried on the merits, and not on a preliminary point, the District Judge could not remand the case under section 562, but ought to have proceeded under sections 568 and 569 of act xiv of 1882. That decision was dissented from by the High Court of Madras in Krishna Ayyar v. Kuppan Ayyangar. The Full Bench there decided that the appellate Court can remand a case when it reverses an order refusing to set aside an ex parte decree. It seemed to the learned Chief Justice anomalous to hold that there was no such power when the appellate Court allowed an appeal against a decree upon the ground that there ought not to have been an ex parte decree against the defendant.

    In Hummi v. Aziz-ud-din, the defendants against whom an ex parte decree had been passed first filed an application for re-hearing which was rejected. Then they appealed against the decree to the District Judge who dismissed the appeal. In second appeal it was held that the defendants might and should have appealed against the rejection by the Munsiff of their application for a re-hearing; but they had no right in their appeal from the decree to raise any question, as to their non-appearance in the Court of first instance. It may be that the fact that the defendants had in the first instance applied for a re-hearing influenced the Court in coming to the conclusion it did. Now the learned District Judge was of opinion that in appeal against the ex parte decision under section 96, Civil Procedure Code, the appellate Court could not deal with the question whether the lower Court was right in proceeding ex parte. The only ground on which the decree could be challenged in appeal was that the evidence which the plaintiff had adduced was not sufficient to justify the decree. It seems to me that the question really in this case has been unduly narrowed by considering that the appellate Court had power to remand the case only if it came within Order XII Rule 23. If there was no power to remand unless the lower Court had disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point, then undoubtedly the appellate Court could not have any power to set aside the decree of the lower Court and direct a re-trial because in the opinion of the appellate Court the lower Court was wrong in refusing the adjournment. It appears to me that would be taking a narrow view indeed of the powers of an appellate Court. However limited such powers were by the Code of 1882, there are certain new sections in the Code of 1908 which enable the Judges to take a wider view of their powers and prevent them from being restricted to the particular powers granted by particular sections. Order XLI, Rule 33, gives an appellate Court power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives the Court power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This question with regard to the power of remand of an appellate Court was dealt with in Ghuznavi v. The Allahabad Bank, Ltd. It was held that the power of remand under section 107 of the Civil Procedure Code was limited to the case described in Order XLI, Rule 23, but nothing in that section restricted in any manner the application of the principle of inherent power recognized by section 151 of the code. The learned Chief Justice at page 937 says:— “In my judgment, therefore, the powers of the appellate Court as regards remand are not restricted to the case specified in Order XLI, Rule 23, but the Court, by reason of its inherent jurisdiction…may order a remand in cases other than the case specified in Order XLI, Rule 23, if it be necessary for the ends of justice.”

    This question was also dealt with by the Bombay High Court in Narottam Rajaram v. Mohanlal Kahandas. It was held, setting aside the order of remand, that an appellate Court could remand a case to the trial Court only when the latter had disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point and the decree was reversed on appeal. Section 151 appears to have been referred to in the argument, and I do not think it can be inferred from the judgment that the learned Judges would not have had recourse to that section if they thought that the ends of justice required it. At page 294 Mr. Justice Batchelor says: “As to section 151, which Mr. Thakor relied upon, we think that it has no relevance to the present argument. It was not, in our opinion, necessary for the ends of justice to withdraw the decision of the case from a Court of higher jurisdiction and to hand it over to a Court of lower jurisdiction.”

    That decision, therefore, must be read in the light of the particular facts of the case. An order refusing an adjournment may form a ground of appeal at whatever stage of the hearing it may have been made and if the appellate Court comes to the conclusion that an application for an adjournment had been wrongly refused, it clearly has the power to set aside the decree and order a re-trial. If it has not sufficient material before it to decide whether an adjournment should have been granted, it has the power under Order XLI, Rule 27, to allow additional evidence to be produced.

    If, however, there has been no appearance at all and consequently no application for an adjournment has been made, it would be difficult for an appellate Court to deal with the case except on the merits. If the defendant instead of exercising his right to apply to the trial Court for a re-trial chooses to appeal, it might well be said that he has no right to ask of the appellate Court to allow him to produce evidence to account for his absence in the trial Court. Still I should not like to say that in no circumstances could an appellate Court exercise its discretion in his favour. It appears to me that the Legislature in the present Code intended to free an appellate Court from the restrictions imposed on it by the Code of 1882 and to give it powers to make such orders as it might think fit that justice might be done.

    The appellate Court in this case certainly expressed an opinion that defendant No. 1 having produced a medical certificate from a Bombay doctor to the effect that he was laid up with fever for three days from 2nd February 1918 had sufficiently explained his absence. But the plaintiff is still anxious to contest the question in the appellate Court, so that we must leave that question still open to be decided.

    The order dismissing the appeal is set aside and the lower appellate Court is directed to come to a finding on the question, whether the defendant could show sufficient reasons for his absence in the trial Court on the 5th February 1918. On the finding on that question it will depend whether the appellate Court should set aside the decree of the trial Court and direct a new trial or confirm the decree of the lower Court. Costs costs in the appeal.

    Shah, J.:— I concur in the order proposed. I desire to state briefly the reasons for the view which I take of the questions of law which have been argued in this appeal.

    The first question that arises is whether the appellate Court has power in an appeal from an ex parte decree to deal with the question whether the refusal to adjourn the case on the application of the defendant against whom the suit proceeded was for sufficient reasons or not. In this case the defendant against whom the suit is decided ex parte has not availed himself of the remedy provided by the Code by way of an application to set aside the ex parte decree under Order IX, Rule 13. The question arises with reference to the power of the appellate Court, when that remedy is not resorted to. The position may be quite different where the party appealing has already availed himself of the remedy by way of an application to set aside the decree and has failed in those proceedings on the merits. But in a case where he has not resorted to that remedy provided by the Code, can he question the correctness of the ex parte decree on the ground that the refusal to adjourn the case was not proper? It seems to me that it is open to him to raise that question in the appeal from the ex parte decree. On that point I accept the view of the Full Bench in Krishna Ayyar v. Kuppan Ayyangar. Undoubtedly the observations in Hummi v. Azis-ud-din are against this view. These observations were made with reference to a case in which the party appealing had already exhausted his remedy by way of an application to set aside the ex parte decree. The observations, however, are perfectly general and so far as they go are in favour of the contention urged on behalf of the plaintiffs. But that opinion, if it is to be taken without relation to the facts of the case, is opposed to the decision of the Madras High Court, to which I have already referred. With due respect I prefer the opinion of the Madras High Court. That opinion, so far as the power of the appellate Court is concerned, is in entire consonance with the decision in Parvatishankar Durgashankar v. Bai Naval.In form that decision relates to the nature of the order which the lower appellate Court may make; but by necessary implicacation the decision either accepts or acquiesces in the view that the appellate Court has the power to consider whether the adjournment was properly refused or not. To that extent, the decision is in accordance with the opinion of the Madras High Court. I am clearly of opinion that the lower appellate Court had the power to consider the question whether the suit was heard ex parte against the appellants on sufficient grounds.

    The second question relates entirely to the form of the order which the appellate Court may make, in case it is satisfied that the grounds for proceeding ex parte were not sufficient. That Court may reverse the decree and send back the case to the trial Court for a re-trial, or may send down issues and call for findings and may direct further evidence to be recorded under Order XLI, Rules 25 and 27. That of course is, generally speaking, a matter within the discretion of the Court. But it is argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that the Court has no power to remand except under Rule 23. I do not think, however, that if the appellate Court is minded under the circumstances of a particular case to reverse the decree of the trial Court and to remand the suit to that Court for a re-trial, it has no power to do so. It may be that a case may not fall within the scope of Rule 23, Order XLI. But the words of Rule 33, Order XLI, as also the provisions of section 151 are wide enough to save the power of the appellate Court to make an order suited to the circumstances of the case or in the interest of justice and, if necessary, to remand the suit for a re-trial. The decision in Narottam Rajaram v. Mohanlal Kahandas, which has been relied upon by Mr. Thakor, does not necessarily conflict with this view. The facts, with reference to which the power of remand by the appellate Court was considered, were materially different; and while, in that particular case, the remand order made was held to have been beyond the powers of the appellate Court, that decision cannot be read as laying down a general rule that except under Rule 23, Order XLI, there is no power in the appellate Court to make an order of remand if it considers it proper to do so, or necessary for the ends of justice to do so. The question whether the case should be remanded for re-trial or whether an order under Rule 25 of Order XLI, would meet the requirement of the case must be determined by the appellate Court with reference to the facts of each case.

    Order set aside.
    J.G.R
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    Jethalal Girdhar v. Varajlal Bhaishankar
    (Feb 21, 1921)