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  • section 72 of the Indian Contract Act.
  • rule 89 of Order XXI of the CPC
  • section 275 of the Code of 1882
  • section 73 of the Code of 1908
  • section 310-A the Code of 1882
  • provisions of rule 89
  • rule 92, sub-rule (2).
  • Order XXI, rule 5
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 72 of the Indian Contract Act.
  • rule 89 of Order XXI of the CPC
  • section 275 of the Code of 1882
  • section 73 of the Code of 1908
  • section 310-A the Code of 1882
  • provisions of rule 89
  • rule 92, sub-rule (2).
  • Order XXI, rule 5
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff paid Rs. 1,207 into Court under Order XXI, rule 89, together with Rs. 63 (five per cent of the purchase money payable to the auction-purchaser), in circumstances surrounding an execution sale ordered by a mortgage-decree obtained by the defendant in Suit No. 347 of 1909 before the Subordinate Judge at Athni. The present defendant had obtained a mortgage-decree against Shivgoada Daogouda Patil and the sale ordered to recover the decretal amount related to the land now in dispute.

The present plaintiff asserts that the land never belonged to Shivgoada, that the mortgage was executed fraudulently to defeat the plaintiff's rights, and that because he was obliged to pay the sums into Court in order to get the sale set aside he is entitled to a refund.

At trial the issues were: (1) whether the plaintiff's payment was voluntary; and (2) whether the defendant could be held liable to refund the amount. The learned trial Judge held that the payment was voluntary and dismissed the suit with costs. On first appeal the payment was held not to have been voluntary and the plaintiff's claim was decreed with costs throughout, though the appellate Judge did not consider or express an opinion on whether the plaintiff was entitled under rule 89 to apply to the Court to set aside the sale.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the payment made by the plaintiff into Court under Order XXI, rule 89 was voluntary or involuntary.
  2. Whether the defendant (decree-holder) could be held liable to refund the amount paid into Court by the plaintiff.
  3. Whether a person applying to the Court under rule 89 to set aside a sale can satisfy the conditions of the rule by paying money into Court "under protest" and subsequently recover that payment.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff alleged that the land never belonged to Shivgoada and that the mortgage to the defendant was made in fraud of the plaintiff's rights.
  • The plaintiff contended he had been obliged to pay the decretal amount into Court to get the sale set aside and therefore was entitled to have that amount refunded.
  • Before Shah, J., it was urged that the payment must be regarded as made under coercion and hence recoverable under section 72 of the Indian Contract Act; reliance was placed on authorities such as Dooli Chand v. Ram Kishen Singh and Seth Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India in support of the contention that the payment was not voluntary.

Defendant's (Respondent's) Position and Trial/Appellate Postures

  • The learned trial Judge held the payment to be voluntary because no express or implied obligation on the defendant to repay, nor express or implied authority from the defendant to the plaintiff to pay, was alleged.
  • The appellate Court (first appeal) held that the payment was not voluntary but did not consider whether the plaintiff was an eligible person under rule 89 to apply to set aside the sale; that reasoning or opinion was not expressed.
  • Although not presented as argument by counsel in full in the text, the courts considered the statutory scheme (Order XXI, rule 89 and rule 92, and related statutory provisions such as section 310-A and rules about earmarking deposits) and the effect of a deposit under rule 89 on the decree-holder's rights.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India Authority for the proposition that a payment made under protest to remove an attachment can be involuntary and recoverable. The Chief Justice cited this case (along with Bhicoobai v. Hariba Raghuji) as establishing that payments made under protest to remove an attachment are involuntary and a suit lies for recovery; but he distinguished such payments from deposits made under rule 89 to set aside a sale of a judgment-debtor's interest.
Bhicoobai v. Hariba Raghuji Same general principle as Kanhaya Lal: payment under protest to remove attachment is involuntary. Used together with Kanhaya Lal to show that payments to remove attachments stand on a different footing from payments under rule 89; the court treated these authorities as not controlling the present case.
Hari Sundari Dasya v. Shashi Bala Dasya That money deposited under section 310-A of the Code of 1882 is not subject to rateable distribution under section 275 because it was not money realised by sale or otherwise in execution of a decree but money to which the decree-holder was solely entitled. The Chief Justice relied on this authority (with Roshun Lal) to support the proposition that money expressly earmarked for particular purposes could not be treated as general assets available for rateable distribution.
Roshun Lal v. Ram Lal Mullick Similar to Hari Sundari Dasya: about non-liability of certain deposits to rateable distribution. Cited with Hari Sundari Dasya to support that earmarked deposits are not rateable assets; the CJ used this to critique the notion that money paid into Court could be treated as general assets.
Sorabji v. Kali Raghunath Decision that money paid into Court under Order XXI, rule 5 (and by analogy similar provisions) was not liable to rateable distribution despite statutory wording changes. The Chief Justice invoked this decision to support the view that money paid into Court for a specific purpose cannot be treated as general assets subject to rateable distribution, and used it to resist the argument that deposits under rule 89 could be redistributed as general assets.
Dooli Chand v. Ram Kishen Singh Authority relied upon by the plaintiff to show that payments made under protest (to remove attachments / prevent sale) are not voluntary. Shah, J. considered this authority but found that its ratio could not be extended to a payment made under rule 89 for a specific statutory purpose; he held the line of reasoning inapplicable to the present facts.
Seth Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India, Limited Another case relied on by the plaintiff in support of the proposition that a payment under protest to remove an attachment is involuntary. Shah, J. examined this decision, but concluded that the ratio of these decisions concerning payments to remove attachments could not be applied to payments made under the specific mandatory provisions of rule 89.
Ram Tuhul Singh v. Biseswar Lall Sahoo Contains observations supporting the view that, absent an express or implied obligation to repay, voluntary payments are not recoverable; cautions against deciding by "nice considerations" of fairness. Shah, J. regarded the observations in this case as favouring the conclusion that deposits under rule 89 (which are voluntary and made for a statutory purpose) are not repayable; he relied on it to reinforce that an express or implied obligation to repay must be shown to support a refund claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two judicial analyses (Macleod, C.J. and Shah, J.), which converge on the legal conclusion that a deposit made under Order XXI, rule 89 for the purpose of setting aside a sale is to be treated as voluntary and not recoverable once the applicant has obtained the benefit of having the sale set aside.

Chief Justice Macleod's analysis (step-by-step):

  1. Set out the factual posture: plaintiff paid decretal amount and five per cent into Court under Order XXI, rule 89 before the sale was confirmed and got the sale set aside.
  2. Recorded procedural history: trial judge found payment voluntary; appellate Court found it not voluntary but did not consider entitlement under rule 89.
  3. Explored three remedies available to a person claiming property wrongfully attached:
    • Make a claim under rules 58/59 (claimant must prove interest as of date of attachment);
    • Pay into Court under protest the decree-holder's claim to get an attachment removed — such payments are involuntary and recoverable (citing Kanhaya Lal and Bhicoobai);
    • Give notice and resist purchaser; if purchaser is resisted, apply under rule 97 to have the question decided.
  4. Distinguished payments under rule 89 from payments under protest to remove an attachment: the plaintiff had given notice but did not resist; instead he paid the decretal amount to get the sale set aside, which the Chief Justice regarded as an act of convenience and thus voluntary if the sale related only to the judgment-debtor's right, title and interest.
  5. Considered the statutory earmarking of deposits under rule 89: funds are specifically allocated (a) five per cent to purchaser and (b) to the decree-holder the amount specified in the proclamation; he noted authorities establishing that similarly earmarked money is not liable to rateable distribution (Hari Sundari Dasya; Roshun Lal; Sorabji).
  6. Interpreted legislative intent (section 310-A, Code of 1882 and rule 89): rule 89 was intended to enable certain co-interested persons to eliminate an auction purchaser's claim by paying the required sums into Court, but once the property had been sold the sale proceeds should be available to the decree-holder and the purchaser should get limited compensation (five per cent). Hence, the sale could not be set aside by a conditional or protest deposit that would deprive the decree-holder of the benefit of his execution sale.
  7. Raised practical policy considerations: allowing refund in these circumstances would deprive decree-holders of the fruits of their decree and might prevent them from realizing their decretal claims.
  8. Concluded that the appeal should be allowed and the suit dismissed with costs.

Shah, J.'s analysis (step-by-step):

  1. Focused on whether a deposit under rule 89 for payment to the decree-holder to have a sale set aside can be recovered.
  2. Addressed plaintiff's reliance on section 72 of the Indian Contract Act (payment under coercion) and authorities said to support that view, but rejected that contention.
  3. Interpreted rule 89 and rule 92(2): when the amount required by rule 89 is deposited the Court is obliged to set aside the sale; the deposit is therefore voluntary and unconditional in character.
  4. Reasoned that a party who obtains the benefit of having a sale set aside by depositing the statutory sums cannot subsequently go back on his act and claim the money back from the decree-holder; the deposit operates as satisfaction of the decree to that extent and the decree-holder must not be deprived of that benefit unless he can be restored to his former position under the decree (which may not be possible at the date of a refund claim).
  5. Considered and distinguished authorities relied on by the plaintiff (Dooli Chand and Seth Kanhaya Lal), holding that those cases concern payments to get rid of an attachment and do not establish a rule applicable to payments made under a specific statutory provision (rule 89) for a specific purpose.
  6. Relied on observations in Ram Tuhul Singh v. Biseswar Lall Sahoo to support the view that without an express or implied obligation to repay a voluntary payment cannot be recovered.
  7. Concluded that it would be unjust and contrary to the scheme and scope of rule 89 to admit a claim for refund after the person making the payment has had the benefit of the rule; therefore the deposit should be treated as voluntarily made and irrecoverable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed with costs throughout. The court held that the deposit made by the plaintiff under Order XXI, rule 89 for the purpose of setting aside the sale was voluntary and not recoverable from the decree-holder after the plaintiff had obtained the benefit of having the sale set aside.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the Rs. 1,207 (and associated five per cent payment) deposited under rule 89; the decree-holder retains the benefit of the deposit as provided by the rule and corresponding statutory scheme.
  • Interpretation of rule 89: deposits made under rule 89 for the statutory purpose of setting aside a sale are treated as voluntary and unconditional; they cannot be characterized as payments under protest of the sort that give rise to a recoverable claim (as payments to remove an attachment do).
  • Limits on applicability of decisions about payments under protest: the court distinguished prior authorities that make payments recoverable when made under protest to remove an attachment, holding that those authorities do not control payments made under a specific statutory rule (rule 89) whose operation produces a defined effect (setting aside the sale and satisfying the decree-holder to an extent).
  • Policy consideration: allowing refunds in these circumstances would risk depriving decree-holders of the benefit of execution sales and undermine the statutory scheme designed to balance the interests of decree-holders, auction-purchasers and third-party claimants.

No part of this summary invents facts or law beyond what appears in the provided opinion. Where the opinion did not provide a particular detail (for example, the proclamation of sale and whether the plaintiff in fact paid "under protest") the court expressly noted that the record before it did not contain that material and made its conclusions on the information available.

    Narayan Vasudevacharya Katti v. Amgauda Malagauda Patil

    Macleod, C.J:— The plaintiff filed this ait to recover from the defendant the sum Rs. 1,207 which he paid into Court in as following circumstances.

    2. In Suit No. 347 of 1909 in the Court of he Subordinate Judge at Athni the defendant obtained a mortgage-decree against as Shivgoada Daogouda Patil, which directed the recovery of the mortgage mount by sale of the present plaint land ??? Darkhast No. 608 of 1914 filed by the present defendant to execute his decree the property was sold. The present plaintiff on paid into Court, under Order XXI, ??? 89, the decretal amount of Rs. 1,207 id Rs. 63 being five per cent, of the ??? money for payment to the action-purchaser, before the sale was confirmed, and got the sale set aside.

    3. The present defendant—then plaintiff— ??? the auction-purchaser, As such ??? purchaser the Rs. 63 was paid to him ??? as decree-holder the Rs. 1,207 were ??? paid to him. The plaintiff alleged that the property ??? belonged to him, that is had never ??? to Shivgouda, that Shivgoada ??? mortgaged the property to the defendant in fraud of the plaintiff's rights, and ??? as the plaintiff had been obliged to pay ??? money to get the sale set aside he was ??? to have the amount refunded.

    4. Thus a question has been raised which, ??? as we have been able to discover, has never hitherto come before the Courts for decision.

    5. The issues in the trial Court were:—

    1. It Whether the payment made by the plaintiff was a voluntary one?

    2. Whether the defendant could be held liable to refund the amount to the plaintiff?

    6. The learned trial Judge held that the payment was voluntary. It would only be an involuntary payment if there was an obligation implied or express to repay or authority express or implied from the defendant to pay and neither of those circumstances were alleged in the case.

    7. It appears that the plaintiff had objected to the sale taking place, and that the Collector bad noted his objections and made them known to intending purchasers.

    8. Accordingly the suit was dismissed with costs.

    9. In first appeal it was held that the payment by the plaintiff was not voluntary.

    10. If that were correct the question would obviously arise whether the plaintiff was a person entitled under rule 89 to apply to the Court to set aside the sale.

    11. But the learned appellate Judge for some reason which is not apparent did not consider himself bound to consider that question or express any opinion thereon and decreed the plaintiff's claim with costs throughout.

    12. It is quite clear that decision cannot stand. Assuming that the plaintiff had no interest in the property and yet in contravention of the provisions of rule 89 was allowed to pay into Court the necessary sums of money for gabbing the sale sat aside, he could not be considered to have acted in any other capacity than a volunteer.

    13. Now a person whose property in his opinion has been wrongfully attached has various remedies at his disposal. He can make a claim that the property attached belongs to him and not to the judgment-debtor. Such a claim will be investigated under rule 58 and under rule 59 the claimant must adduce evidence to show that ab the date of the attachment he had some interest in or was possessed of the property attached. If the claim is disallowed the claimant may file a suit to establish his claim. But the claimant may pay into Court under protest the amount of the decree-holder's claim in order to get the attachment removed ab once from the property. There can be no doubt that such a payment would be involuntary and a suit would lie for its recovery, the question for decision being the same, whether the plaintiff could prove his title to the property which had been attached: Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India (1) and Bhicoobai v. Hariba Raghuji (2).

    14. There is a third course open to the person in possession of immoveable property which is attached. He may content himself with giving notice that the property attached belongs to him, so that all intending purchasers will know that the successful bidder will have to fight him for possession. If the purchaser is resisted or obstructed he can apply to the Court under rule 97, complaining of such resistance or obstruction, and the question who is entitled to the property will then be decided.

    15. The present plaintiff, though be gave notice before the sale that he claimed the property as his own, did not wait to resist or obstruct the purchaser but paid the decretal amount into Court in order to get the sale set aside.

    16. We have not got the proclamation of sale before us, but assuming that the Collector was a person of ordinary prudence he would have sold the right, title and interest, if any, of the judgment-debtor in the property, and not the property itself. If, then, the plaintiff, to suit his own convenience, got rid of the sale of the judgment-debtor's right, title and interest in the property by paying the decretal amount into Court, it is quite clear that he could not recover the amount as having been involuntarily paid. But assuming that the property itself was sold there may be a difficulty in distinguishing between a payment made under protest to get rid of an attachment and a payment made under protest to get a sale after attachment set aside. But we do not even know whether the payment was made under protest. Again it may have suited the plaintiff's convenience to get rid of the sale rather than resist the purchaser and involve himself in litigation. Money paid under protest would not, as a rule be paid out to the decree-holder until the legality of the protest had been decided.

    17. But there is another question, which is the most important, whether it was ever intended that a person applying to the Court under rule 89 to set aside a sale could satisfy the conditions of the rule by paying in money under protest.

    18. The money deposited is earmarked (a) for payment to the purchaser of a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase money:

    (b) for payment to the decree-holder of the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for recovery of which the sale was ordered less any amount received by the decree-holder since the proclamation of sale.

    19. It has been held that there could be no rateable distribution under section 275 of the Code of 1882 of money deposited under section 310-A as is was not money realised by sale or otherwise in execution of a decree but money to which the decree-holder was solely entitled; Hari Sundari Dasya v. Shashi Bala Dasya (3); Roshun Lal v. Ram Lal Mullick (4). In Sorabji v. Kali Raghunath (5) is was decided that in spit of the alteration in the wording of section 73 of the Code of 1908 money pay into Court under Order XXI, rule 5 was not liable to rateable distribution an though the correctness of that decision has been doubted by Mr. Mulla, who is also ??? opinion that money paid into Court under rule 89 would be liable to rateable distribution, it seems to me that when is expressly provided that the money should be paid in for a particular purpose sue money could not be treated as assets he by a Court.

    20. I should say that it was the intention the Legislature in framing section 310-A the Code of 1882 to enable judgment debtors, whose property had been sold an undervalue, to recover it if they ??? pay the decretal amount and five per can on the purchase price into Court before to sale was confirmed. For the first time rule 89 a person, jointly interested in the property sold by virtue of a title acquired before the sale, was enabled to get rid the common ownership of the auction purchaser, leaving it for future decision whether he could recover the amount enforcing a lien or otherwise from ??? judgment-debtor. But I thick it was also intended than once the property had been sold the price paid by the purchaser should be available for the decree-holder, leaving it to the purchaser to make what be could out of his purchase, and that if the sale was set aside by payment into Court under rule 89, the money should go to the decree-holder in execution of whose decree the property was sold. In other words, that once property has been sold, the sale could not be set aside by a payment into Court under protest. The auction-purchaser is entitled to the benefit of his purchase whatever it may amount to, and it is only under certain conditions that he can be deprived of that benefit, namely, that he gets five per cent, for the loss of his bargain, and the decree-holder gets the benefit of his execution sale. If the Legislature had intended that sales could be set aside if payment was made into Court conditionally, then it would have said so, It is a mere accident that in this case the decree-holder purchased the property himself. If the true owner allows the attachment to continue, and the property to be sold as belonging to the judgment-debtor, he can treat the sale as a nullity and resist the auction-purchaser. There is no necessity for him to get rid of the sale of what in his opinion does not exist. The attachment of the property itself is a different matter, that may seriously inconvenience him, bub if he is the true owner the sale of a non-existent interest in it does not affect him. If he pays in money to get that sale set aside it can only be treated as a voluntary payment.

    21. There is a further consideration, that if a decree-holder could be deprived in this way of the money which in effect resulted from the sale in execution of property alleged to belong to his judgment-debtor, he might be deprived of any further opportunity of realizing the fruits of his decree. He is entitled to what the auction-purchaser has paid and it makes no difference to him whether or not the auction-purchaser gets any thing tangible in return for his money. If he does not get what has been paid or agreed to be paid by the auction-purchaser be is entitled to get that which is paid to get rid of the auction-purchaser.

    22. In my opinion the appeal should be allowed and the suit dismissed with costs throughout.

    Shah, J.:— I need not recapitulate the facts which have given rise to this second appeal. The question is whether the deposit made by the present plaintiff under rule 89 of Order XXI of the CPC for payment to the present defendant as the decree-holder in order to have the Bale set aside can be recovered back from him. It is urged that the payment must be taken to have been made by the plaintiff under coercion, and that he is, therefore, entitled to recover the amount under section 72 of the Indian Contract Act. This contention cannot be allowed.

    23. Having regard to the terms and scope of rule 89 it is clear that the amount must be taken to have been deposited for payment to the decree-holder voluntarily and unconditionally. The sale to be set aside would be the sale of the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor in the property in question. There was no obligation upon the present plaintiff who claimed to be the owner on the property to make any application under that rule. But when an application to set aside the sale is made under that rule and the amount required by the rule is deposited, it is obligatory upon the Court to set aside the sale, as provided by rule 92, sub-rule (2). The result of setting aside the sale is generally speaking in favour of the judgment-debtor. This result can be ensured by any person interested in the property by satisfying the claims of the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser according to the provisions of the rule. I do not see how a person can be allowed to go back upon his own act and to claim the amount back from the decree-holder after he has secured the benefit of having the sale set aside. The Legislature has in effect provided that on condition that the decree-holder is paid the amount mentioned in the proclamation, be shall not be allowed to insist upon the sale being upheld. It is necessarily implied that the party seeking to take advantage of the rule shall not be allowed to deprive the decree-holder of the benefit which is secured to him under the rule as a substitute for the sale proceeds, which have been realised for the satisfaction of his decretal claim.

    24. If such a claim for refund as is now made by the plaintiff were allowed, the decree-holder would be deprived of the benefit, without being necessarily placed in his former position with reference to the judgment-debtor under the decree. It is clear that the payment to the decree-holder, of the amount deposited under rule 89 would mean satisfaction of the decree to that extent. He could not be justly deprived of this benefit unless, be could be restored to his original position under the decree. This may not be always possible ab the date of the claim for refund; and that appears to me to be a valid ground for holding that the claim for refund is not admissible. The deposit under the rule is in its very nature unconditional and voluntary. Mr. Gumaste for the plaintiff has relied upon the decisions in Dooli Chand v. Ram Kishen Singh (6) and Seth Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India, Limited In support of his contention that the payment made by his client is not voluntary. After a careful consideration, of these decisions and of the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council, I have come to the conclusion that a payment made under protest to get rid of an attachment or to prevent a sale in execution stands on a different footing and that the ratio decidendi of these cases cannot be applied to a payment made under rule 89 in support of an application to set aside a sale of the right, title and interest of a third party held in execution of the decree. No decision directly bearing on the point, which we have to decide, has been cited to us; and in the absence of any clear authority, I am unable to extend the doctrine of these decisions to the case of a payment made under a specific rule for a specific purpose. It seems to me that the observations in Ram Tuhul Singh v. Biseswar Lall Sahoo (7) favour this view. The facts in that case were different; bub as pointed out in that case the question is not to be determined by nice considerations of what may be fair or proper according Co. the highest morality. To support such a suit there must be an obligation express or implied to repay. It is well settled that there is no such obligation in the case of a voluntary payment by A of B's debt. Still less will the action lie when the money has been paid…against the will of the party for whose use in is supposed to have been paid.”

    25. On the whole I am of opinion that it would be unjust and contrary to the scheme and scope of rule 89 to admit a claim for the refund of the payment made under that rule after the person making the payment has had the benefit of the rule. It is a matter for him to consider before making an application under rule 89 whether under the circumstances it is to his benefit to have the sale set aside. But if he chooses to apply under that rule, I do not see why the payment should not be treated as having been voluntarily made.

    26. I concur in the order proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice.

    27. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Narayan Vasudevacharya Katti v. Amgauda Malagauda Patil
    (Nov 29, 1920)