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  • section 10 of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875.
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  • section 10 of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Scott, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs sued to restrain the defendants from using and imitating various trade symbols alleged to belong to the plaintiffs and from representing that the defendants’ business is the business carried on by the plaintiffs. At the commencement of the hearing eighteen issues were proposed; the court eliminated ten as irrelevant and recorded eight issues, but the main questions identified by the court were whether the plaintiffs had abandoned their most popular trade symbol ("Berna") and whether the defendants had improperly represented that their business is the plaintiffs' former business.

Historically, the West End Watch Co. trade in Bombay began in 1884 (becoming named West End Watch Co. in 1887) and was initially connected to a St. Imier factory owned by Droz & Co. That factory later became the Fabrique D'horlogerie Berna (a joint stock company), in which the plaintiffs took a large shareholding. The Fabrique went into liquidation circa 1907 and was subsequently taken over by a new company in November 1908 styled the "Berna Watch Co." Louis Droz opened a place of business in Bombay for the new company and issued a circular (Feb. 1909) stating that the plaintiffs had been the former agents for watches made at the St. Imier factory and that the Berna Co. would henceforth deal directly.

The plaintiffs relied on their historical use in India of the word "Berna" to denote a particular quality of watch (roughly the twenty-rupee grade). The plaintiffs' catalogues from 1897–1907 used "Berna," but catalogues in late 1907–1908 showed a change of nomenclature from "Berna" to designations like "Service," "Railway Service," or "Secular" with statements explaining the change. The plaintiffs allege continued orders for "Berna" watches and claimed acquisition of rights by user in India. The defendants circulated the February 1909 circular and placed (through an agent) an advertisement in a Rangoon paper (Nov. 13, 1909) which the court found to be an improper representation.

Suit was instituted on 2 April 1909. The court considered evidence from company records, catalogues, dealer witnesses, and correspondence, and ultimately issued a decree granting a specific injunction against defendants' representations that they were carrying on the plaintiffs' business, with costs allocated between the parties as described below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs had abandoned the use of the name "Berna" as a trade symbol for a particular quality of watch sold by them in India, such that they no longer have exclusive title to that name.
  2. Whether the defendants improperly represented (by circulars, advertisements or otherwise) that their business was the business formerly carried on by the plaintiffs (i.e., whether there was actionable misrepresentation/passing off in that respect).
  3. Subsidiary: whether other marks and trade devices (the "West End Co. with Eagle", the "Matchless with Locomotive", and the plaintiffs' red watch boxes) entitled the plaintiffs to relief for passing off or imitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs alleged that the name "Berna" had become associated in India with a particular quality of watch sold by them (acquisition by user) and that they were entitled to protection in India for that mark notwithstanding Swiss registrations by successive owners of the St. Imier factory.
  • The plaintiffs relied on catalogue entries and long-standing use (catalogues 1897–1907 and subsequent catalogues) showing "Berna" as a product name and submitted evidence of orders sent to them calling for "Berna" watches.
  • The plaintiffs complained that the defendants' February 1909 circular and a Rangoon advertisement (November 1909) constituted misrepresentations that the defendants were successors or carrying on the plaintiffs' business and that the advertisement falsely claimed official adoption by certain Railway Companies.
  • The plaintiffs raised additional complaints about imitation of marks ("West End Co. with Eagle", "Matchless with Locomotive") and imitation of the plaintiffs' red watch boxes stamped with the St. Imier factory representation and medals.

Defendants' Arguments / Contentions

  • The defendants (through written statements and the conduct of Louis Droz and Amstutz) contended that the plaintiffs had changed the name "Berna" on instruction (allegedly in 1906/1907) and substituted names like "Railway Service" and "Secular," suggesting that the plaintiffs themselves had discontinued "Berna". The written statement alleged that such change was made on instructions (see para. 26 of the opinion).
  • Amstutz declared that his firm would claim ownership of the word "Berna" in India on the basis of twenty years' user; the defendants relied on registrations in Switzerland and continuity of factory ownership to support their position.
  • The defendants (through their agent Danker) placed an advertisement in Rangoon; the defendants admitted the circular was indefensible and offered to destroy it.
  • As to other marks and the red boxes, the defendants argued (by implication in the evidence and court's findings) that there was no established reputation attaching to certain marks (e.g., the Eagle) in India and that some marks (e.g., the Locomotive) were publici juris or belonged to the factory and had passed to the defendants by assignment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hey v. Lecouturier Illustrates that acquisition of rights by user in the country of importation is not affected by successive registrations abroad. The court cited this authority to support the proposition that the plaintiffs' claim based on acquisition by user in India is not defeated by successive Swiss registrations of the Berna mark.
Damodar Ruttonsey v. Hormusji Adarji (unreported) Recognizes that an importer who secures popularity for a mark by advertising and selling in the importing country may obtain protection in that country—even against the producer. The court relied on the principle to frame the plaintiffs' contention that they could be protected in India for the mark "Berna" by reason of their use and reputation there.
Lavergne v. Hooper Similar principle to Damodar Ruttonsey: protection for a mark acquired by the importer through use in the importing country; also cited regarding abandonment and intention. The court referred to Lavergne v. Hooper when discussing importer protection and later when treating abandonment as a question of intention to be inferred from facts.
Richards v. Butcher Concerned whether a word had been "used as a trade-mark" within section 10 of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875. The court distinguished Richards v. Butcher, holding that that decision (on statutory interpretation under s.10) was not applicable to the present question of whether the plaintiffs had acquired exclusive rights by user in India.
Braham v. Bustard Shows that use of a mark in conjunction with the user's own name does not necessarily preclude claiming the word as a trade-mark. The court cited Braham v. Bustard to reject the argument that the plaintiffs could not claim "Berna" because it always appeared with the name West End Watch Co.
Thorneloe v. Hill Authority for the proposition that there can be no property in a trade-mark in gross apart from the goods of which it is the symbol. The court invoked this principle to note that Amstutz's declaration of ownership could not by itself establish an absolute property in the word "Berna" separate from the goods to which it attached.
Mouson & Co. v. Boehm Supports the rule that abandonment of a trade mark is a question of intention to be inferred from the facts. The court relied on Mouson & Co. v. Boehm (and Lavergne v. Hooper) when treating abandonment as an inference of intention drawn from the plaintiffs' conduct and documentary evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the core contest as two questions: (1) whether plaintiffs had abandoned the name "Berna" as a quality mark for their watches, and (2) whether the defendants had improperly represented that they were carrying on the plaintiffs' business. The reasoning unfolded as follows.

  1. Issue-framing and approach: The court criticized the practice of raising many subsidiary issues and confined the real questions to legal issues and necessary factual questions for decision.
  2. Historical and documentary tracing: The court traced the relationship between the plaintiffs and the St. Imier factory, showing the origin and use of the word "Berna," the factory's registrations, the transfer of factory ownership, and the plaintiffs' catalogues and correspondence (including Exhibits referred to in the opinion).
  3. Nature of plaintiff's claim by user: The court accepted that acquisition by use in India can give an importer protection in the importing country even against the producer, citing Hey and other authorities. The court rejected the defendants' technical argument (based on Richards v. Butcher and s.10 of the Trade Marks Act) that use of "Berna" only in conjunction with "West End Watch Co." prevented a trade-mark claim.
  4. Evidence on abandonment: The court examined catalogue notices in late 1907 and 1908 indicating replacement of "Berna" with names like "Service," "Railway Service," and "Secular," correspondence (including the 11 Aug 1908 letter from De Goumois and the 13 Aug 1908 reply), dealer testimony about ordering and supply practices between 1908–1910, invoices and the last orders placed with the St. Imier factory (last order 1907; last invoice June 1908), and internal memoranda (e.g., Constant Droz's memo of 24 Apr 1909).
  5. Inference of intent to abandon: From the combination of (a) the plaintiffs' catalogue statements announcing the change of name, (b) the consistent substitution in practice of "Railway Service"/"Secular" for "Berna" in supplied goods, (c) dwindling stock and last supplies, and (d) dealer evidence about market recognition and reactions to different sources of "Berna," the court concluded that the plaintiffs had, for about three years, "evinced very clearly and consistently their intention to abandon the name 'Berna' as a quality mark" for their watches.
  6. Effect of abandonment on exclusivity: Because the court found abandonment, the plaintiffs could no longer claim exclusive title to the word "Berna" either alone or in a concentric-circle trade-mark.
  7. Misrepresentation and injunctionable conduct: Despite failing to establish exclusive rights in "Berna," the court found that the defendants had made an objectively indefensible representation in their February 1909 circular (and that they had offered to destroy it) and had published an advertisement in Rangoon (Nov. 13, 1909) which (a) used the heading "The Berna," (b) reproduced statements about railway adoption copied verbatim from the plaintiffs' catalogue, and (c) was approved by Louis Droz. The court found the Rangoon advertisement to be a direct misrepresentation as to the defendants' business and goods and a breach of an interim injunction dated 6 April 1909.
  8. Other marks and boxes: On the other complaints (the Eagle mark, the Matchless/Locomotive marks, and red boxes): the court found no evidence that the Eagle mark had acquired reputation in India; the Locomotive mark was publici juris and "Matchless" was adopted by plaintiffs to distinguish from "Maxim" (a registered factory mark now vested in defendants); the evidence did not show buyers attached importance to the red boxes. The court therefore refused relief in respect of those items.
  9. Swiss assignments: The court noted that, even assuming the Swiss assignments assigned the Berna mark to the plaintiffs absolutely, they would not assist the plaintiffs once abandonment in India was established.
  10. Relief and costs: The court concluded by passing a decree granting an injunction restraining the defendants (and their servants/agents) from representing that they had been or were carrying on the plaintiffs' business, and restrained from employing or circulating circulars/notices/advertisements that would lead to that belief. Costs were allocated: plaintiffs entitled to costs up to and including the first day's hearing; plaintiffs to pay defendants' costs of four days' subsequent hearing; each party to bear other costs not provided for.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The suit was decreed in part. The court found that the plaintiffs had abandoned exclusive use of the name "Berna" as a quality mark for their watches and therefore could not maintain an exclusive title to that name. However, the court granted an injunction against the defendants restraining them from representing (by circulars, advertisements, or otherwise) that they had been or were carrying on the plaintiffs' business or were successors to the plaintiffs' business. The court also found the Rangoon advertisement to be a direct misrepresentation and a breach of the interim injunction.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The defendants were enjoined from representing that they are the plaintiffs' successors or are carrying on the plaintiffs' business, and from circulating materials that would lead to such a belief.
  • The plaintiffs lost any claim to exclusive title in the word "Berna" in India due to the court's finding of abandonment.
  • Relief was refused for other marks (the Eagle, Matchless/Locomotive) and for the red watch boxes due to insufficient evidential support of reputation or distinctiveness in India.
  • Costs were apportioned: plaintiffs recover costs up to and including first day's hearing; plaintiffs to pay defendants' costs for four days' subsequent hearing; other costs to be borne by each party respectively.

Broader legal implications: The opinion applies established principles (importer-acquired rights, abandonment by intention inferred from facts, limits of foreign assignments) to the facts of the case. The judgment does not purport to establish a new legal rule; it applies existing authorities to the factual record.

Disposition

The court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs restraining the defendants from representing they are carrying on the plaintiffs' business (details as above). Costs were allocated as set out in the body of the judgment.

Suit decreed.

Attorneys for the plaintiffs: Messrs. Captain and Vaidya. Attorneys for the defendants: Messrs. Bicknell, Merwanjee and Romer.

    West End Watch Company v. Berna Watch Company

    Scott, C.J:— The plaintiffs sue to restrain the defendants from using and imitating various trade symbols alleged to belong to the plaintiffs and from representing that the defendants’ business is the business carried on by the plaintiffs.

    At the commencement of the hearing eighteen issues were proposed, very few of which touched the real questions in the suit. The first ten of those issues were founded on various statements in the narrative of facts contained in the plaint. This is in accordance with a practice which has grown up at the Original Side of raising a number of issues which do not state the main questions in the suit but only various subsidiary matters of fact upon which there is not agreement between the parties. The effect is very embarrassing and the practice has often been condemned by trying judges. In my opinion issues should be confined to questions of law arising on the pleadings and such questions of fact as it would be necessary for the judge to frame for decision by the jury in a jury trial at nisi prius in England.

    Having eliminated ten issues the Court recorded eight, but they do not specifically cover the questions chiefly in issue in the suit, which are, in my opinion, as will appear from this judgment, whether the plaintiffs have abandoned their most” popular trade symbol and whether the defendants have improperly represented that their business is the business carried on by the plaintiffs.

    At the outset it is necessary to trace the history of the plaintiffs’ firm in relation to the Watch Factory at St. Imier which is now the property of the defendants. In 1884 a watch business, the name of which in 1887 became the West End Watch Co, was started in Bombay by the Swiss firm of Droz & Co. and one Charpie. Droz & Co. were the owners of a watch factory at St. Imier, and it was chiefly their watches which were sold by the West End Co. Charpie retired in 1887 from the Bombay firm which then became the property of Droz & Co. exclusively, and so remained until 1891 when A. Amstutz was introduced as a partner with Droz & Co. In 1904 Droz & Co., the exclusive owners of the St. Imier Factory, got into difficulties and converted their manufacturing business into a Joint Stock Company under the name of the Fabrique Dhorlogerie Berna, The West End Watch Co. supported the flotation by taking up a large number of shares in the new Company.

    At the same time the firm of Droz & Co. retired from the West End Watch Co. and their interest therein was purchased by A. Amstutz and Constant Droz, the younger of the Droz brothers who are interested in this suit.

    The result of this arrangement was that the owners of the St. Imier Factory no longer had any interest in the West End Watch Co., but the partners in the latter firm were interested in; the factory as largo shareholders and by covenant with the Joint Stock Company became entitled to the monopoly of all the products of the factory sent to India for a period of ten years.

    The Joint Stock Factory did not prosper, and in or about December 1907 went into liquidation. The liquidators carried on the business till August 1903 when they agreed to sell it to a new Company of which the promoters appear to have been a watchmaker named De Goumois and Louis Droz, the elder of the two Droz brothers above mentioned, who had all his working life been interested or employed in the St. Imier Factory. It is probable that the ill success of the Fabrique Dhorlogerie was due to want of support from the Bombay firm upon whose custom they were very dependent. At any rate the Bombay firm complained in the year 1907 of the watches supplied by the factory and began to import watches largely from other manufacturers while, they ceased giving orders to the St. Imier Factory.

    In view of the importance of the Bombay connection De Goumois before buying the factory wrote to the plaintiffs (Exhibit G) on the 11th of August 1908, as follows:—

    “With reference to the conversation I hail the pleasure to have the other day with Mr. Amstutz I have the honour to inform you that I am on the point of buying the Fabrique Berna. Before deciding definitively however I wish to approach you once more because I have been able to ascertain that up to the present year you were one of the best clients of this factory.

    I have already given you express assurances as to the improvements which I am anxious to make to the products of the Berna and as your dissatisfaction arises from the defeats you have found in those products it appears to me that there should be nothing in the way of our continuing the business relations which you entertained up to recently with the Berna since I give you the assurance that I am able to remedy the defects in question. I am of opinion that the Indian market is necessary to the vitality of the Berna and I am persuaded that it would be to the mutual interest of both our houses if yours were to resume the old relations with the new house.

    In fact I would bo pleased to know—

    (a) If I can positively count upon you to be my regular customers for the articles which you previously took from the Berna.

    (b) From what date you could eventually give me your regular orders.”

    Amstutz replied, by Exhibit A 4, on the 13th August, that they were willing in principle to reserve a part of their orders for the eventual successor of the Berna, but that it would first be necessary for the latter to give an idea of what he was going to manufacture and what improvements he was going to make to the calibres and qualities the West End Watch Co. were taking from the Berna.

    In the following month it appears from Exhibit 13 that the relations between De Goumois and Amstutz had become strained in consequence of a dispute as to the right to use the word ‘Berna’ in connection with the sale of watches in India.

    De Goumois had complained to the liquidators, his prospective vendors, that Amstutz had declared he would prevent Do Goumois from using the word in India, and the liquidators warned Amstutz that, if he harassed De Goumois in India, they would take severe measures against Amstutz in Switzerland.

    To this Amstutz replied that his firm would claim in India by all means the ownership of the word ‘Berna’ as a trademark on the basis of a twenty years’ user of the same to designate one of their qualities of watches.

    The history of the use of the word ‘Berna’ in connection with watches sent from St. Imier to the plaintiffs in Bombay is as follows :—

    In the year 1887 a trade-mark was designed at the factory at St. Imier consisting of a bear and flag with the word ‘Berna’ and was marked on new watches sent to India. The bear was objected to by the West End Watch Co. as not suited to Indian tastes and was quickly abandoned for the Indian trade. The word ‘Berna’, however, was used on a certain quality of watch, and in 1901 was included in a new trade-mark, registered by Droz & Co. in Switzerland in that year, consisting of two concentric circles, the inner being occupied by a star and crescent and the outer by the words Berna and Swiss Made. This mark has been transferred on the Swiss Registry to the successive owners of the Factory including the defendants, and the defendants have also registered another mark with concentric circles, the inner being occupied with the initials B.W and the outer with the words ‘Berna Watch Co. Swiss Made.’

    Watches bearing the word ‘Berna’ on the dial whether alone or in the star and crescent trade-mark above described were styled Berna watches in the plaintiffs’ catalogues, exhibited in this case, for the years 1897 to 1907 inclusive. The watches so designated may be roughly described as the twenty rupee quality watches.

    In the extra edition of the plaintiffs’ undated Catalogue No. 43, which I take to have been published in the latter part of 1907, the Berna is called the Berna or Service Watch, the alternative designation being explained by the following remark : —

    “We make this opportunity of informing our customers that the name ‘Berna’ will he changed to ‘Service as soon as our present stock of these watches is sold out. The trade-mark will in other respects remain unaltered. This alteration of the name is done to secure a trade-mark which cannot be imitated in India or elsewhere.”

    Catalogue No. 44 is in the same terms as regards these watches, but in Catalogue No. 46 (the succeeding Catalogue relating to watches), which is the last one produced and probably belongs to the latter part of 1908, there is no Berna watch advertised but in its place the ‘Secular’ which is introduced with the following remarks:—

    “The Secular replaces the class of watches which we were formerly selling under the designation of Berna watches as the latter were watches which were designed twenty years ago and had become somewhat out of date.”

    The change from ‘Berna’ to ‘Service’ and ‘Secular’ is rather differently explained by the plaintiffs and the defendants: —

    9. In the year 1907 the plaintiffs discovered that the word “Borna” as used in their trade-mark for many years in India had without their knowledge been registered in 1901 by Droz & Co. as a trade-mark in Switzerland and the plaintiffs resolved to change the name of the particular quality of watch marked “Berna” to “Railway Service” and “Secular” and they notified in their catalogues the change of name. The plaintiffs however continued to receive and still receive orders for Berna watches. (Plaint).

    8. The allegations contained in para. 9 of the plaint are absolutely untrue. In 1906 when the said Constant Droz was in Switzerland he told Louis Droz, then delegate of the Council of administration of the said Fabrique Company, that as the word Berna had been the registered trade-mark of the Fabrique Company the plaintiffs had resolved to change the mark Berna on the watches imported by them into “Railway Service” and “Secular”. The change was on his instructions accordingly made from the year 1907. (Written statement).

    The plaintiff Constant Droz, however, is not prepared to deny that a conversation, such as is alleged in the written statement and sworn to in evidence by Louis Droz, did take place. Such a conversation is, moreover, consistent as regards the change to ‘Service’ with the remark in Catalogue No. 43 extra edition.

    I have come to the conclusion that the real reason of the change was the certainty that the plaintiffs had that they would have to sever their business relations with the Factory at St. Imier (which it may be noted is referred to by Amstutz on the 13th August 1908 (Exhibit A 4) as the Berna) and their desire to have a mark for their twenty rupee quality watch which would not involve them in controversy with the registered owners of the mark ‘Berna’ in Switzerland.

    On the 4th of November 1903, the new Company, started by De Goumois under the English name of the ‘Berna Watch Co.’, took an assignment of the factory and its properties, and on the 6th of November Louis Droz, as representative of the new Company, came to Bombay and opened a place of business. He then prepared and issued a circular, dated February 1909, in which, on behalf of the defendant Company, he referred to the plaintiffs as the defendants’ agents who had sold 600,000 watches made at the St. Imier Factory in past years and proclaimed that Berna Co.'s watches should no longer be sold by their former sole agents-importers (meaning the plaintiffs), as the defendants had decided to get rid of any middleship and to deal directly themselves. References are given at the close of the circular to every wearer of one of the 600,000 Berna watches in use in India and every maker who has sold one Berna watch.

    The immediate result of the circular was the institution, on the 2nd of April 1909, of this suit by the plaintiffs, who allege that one of the qualities of their watches was well-known as the Berna watch, that the name Berna came to denote to the public in India and Burma a particular quality of watch imported and sold by the plaintiffs, and that though the name has been changed by the plaintiffs they have continued to receive orders for Berna watches.

    The plaintiffs’ case, therefore, as originally framed, was based upon acquisition by user in India of the name Berna as a trademark. This is a case which is not affected by the successive registration in Switzerland of the Berna trade-mark as appearing on the plaintiffs’ watches by the different owners of the St. Imier factory : see Hey v. Lecouturier.

    That the importer, who by advertising and pushing the sale of goods under a particular mark secures a wide popularity for the mark in relation to the goods sold by him, is entitled to the protection of the Court for that mark in the country of importation, even against the producer of the goods, has been recognized by this Court in the unreported case of Damodar Ruttonsey v. Hormusji Adarji and by the Madras High Court in Lavergne v. Hooper.

    Although the word ‘Berna’ originated with the manufacturers, it is proved that buyers in India are not interested to inquire at what factory imported watches may have been made. Importing firms have acquired reputations by selling and advertising watches of grades suitable to different classes of Indian buyers, and by taking care that all but the very cheapest watches are properly regulated before they pass to the buyers. Amongst importing firms the plaintiffs’ reputation stands at least as high as any. It is contended that the plaintiffs never used the word Berna as a trade-mark because it is always found in conjunction with the name West End Watch Co. This argument is based upon the decision in Richards v. Butcher, where the Court was only concerned with the question whether a word had been “used as a trade-mark” in the sense contemplated in section 10 of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875. That case has no application here. The fact that the user of a word or mark always uses it in conjunction with his own name is not conclusive to show that the word or mark cannot be claimed as a trade-mark or that the user has waived his rights in it as a trade-mark. Thus in Braham v. Bustard and in Lavergne v. Hooper the successful owners of the marks used their own names in conjunction with them, and this is, so far as I am aware, the general practice.

    The evidence, I think, establishes that the word ‘Berna’ had up to the date of suit been associated in the minds of watch buyers in India with a very popular grade of watch sold by the plaintiffs, and it_follows that if there has been no abandonment, the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction against any other persons importing and selling watches under that name notwithstanding that the plaintiffs’ name has, in addition to the word or trade-mark Berna, always appeared on every one of their watches and is well-known to all dealers.

    I propose, therefore, to discuss whether the plaintiffs have abandoned their right in the name Berna as a symbol of a particular quality of watch sold by them. The matter is by no means settled by a reference to the declaration of Amstutz that his firm would claim in India by all means the ownership of the word Berna as a trade-mark, for there can be no property in a trade-mark in gross apart from goods of which it has become the symbol: see Thorneloe v. Hill(4). The question of abandonment is one of intention to be inferred from the facts of the case see Mouson & Co. v. Boehm(5) and Lavergne v. Hooper.

    In the first place the declaration of Amstutz may be met by the statements in the catalogues to which I have above referred in discussing the use of the word Berna prior to suit.

    Passing now to the other evidence on the point I gather that owing to the conservatism of Indian buyers the efforts of the plaintiffs to substitute watches named ‘Secular’ in place of those named ‘Berna’ were not at once successful, but the difficulties encountered in carrying out the change have not, so far as I can judge, interfered with the plaintiffs’ determination to discontinue the use of the word ‘Berna’.

    Baksh Elahi, the Calcutta dealer, says that when ho received orders for ‘Berna’ or ‘Secular’ he would send the plaintiffs’ watches. He has no Bernas in stock so has to supply Seculars, but they are only taken by the illiterate. Those who can read do not buy Seculars. In 1909 after he had learnt that the plaintiffs had discontinued the issue of Bernas he tried to sell some of the defendants’ Bernas to customers asking for Bernas but they would not buy on seeing that the watches were not West End Co.'s Bernas.

    The Lahore dealer, Tricumlal Lalla Motilal, proves orders sent by him to the plaintiffs Company as late as the 15th of November 1908 for Berna watches, but he also says that the plaintiffs have for the last two years invariably supplied Seculars or Railway Service in execution of such orders. He would now ask a wholesale dealer asking for Bernas whether he wants West End Co.'s Bernas or Berna Watch Co.'s Bernas.

    The Delhi dealer, Dhanamal Goela, proves many orders (Exhibits D and E) sent for Bernas to the plaintiffs during 1908, 1909 and 1910, but it is only in the 1910 orders that he shows by ordering Berna-Secular that he is aware of the new name introduced by the plaintiffs in place of Berna.

    The evidence of Mohundas Kamalsey, the other large dealer, is not very intelligible, but he seems to attach great value to the name ‘Berna’ in connection with the plaintiffs’ watches and says he finds it difficult to sell ‘Secular’ watches to illiterate people (which is the reverse of Elahi Baksh's experience).

    The evidence of the plaintiffs themselves establishes that their large customers, the Traffic Superintendents of the Oudh and Rohilkhand and the N.W Railways, continued to order ‘Berna’ watches for guards throughout 1908 and 1909 and into the present year, the orders being almost invariably executed by the supply of the ‘Railway Service’ watch (see Exhibit M, de bene).

    The last order for ‘Bernas’ was given by the plaintiffs to the St. Imier factory in 1907, and the date of the last invoice for Bernas sent to the plaintiffs from that factory was 80th June 1908 (see Exhibit N). The watches so invoiced would be received about September 1908.

    Between 1908 and the date of the institution of this suit 131 orders for Berna watches were satisfied by the supply of Bernas. Between the date of suit and March 1910 only thirty Berna watches were supplied to wholesale dealers.

    On the 24th April 1909, three weeks after the institution of this suit, the plaintiffs received from a dealer at Neemuch an order for twelve ‘Berna 3 watches. Constant Droz then made the following memo with regard to it (Exhibit 9) :—

    “Write Berna not made any more, those (i.e, Railway Service) are the watches we now supply in its stead to all the Railway and Government offices. They are of the most modern construction, etc., etc.”

    There are, it is said, a few ‘Berna’ watches still on hand but their number cannot be easily ascertained from the stock-book.

    It may, therefore, be taken that the plaintiffs’ stock of Berna watches is practically finished.

    The conclusion at which I arrive from this evidence is that the plaintiffs for the last three years both in their dealings with the supplying factory and with their customers evinced very clearly and consistently their intention to abandon the name ‘Berna’ as a quality mark for their watches, and it follows that they can no longer claim any exclusive title to the use of that name either alone or in a trade-mark with concentric circles.

    The plaintiffs’ case for relief, however, does not altogether fail with their inability to make out an exclusive title to the word or trade-mark ‘Berna.’ They complain that the defendants have been representing that they are now carrying on a business which was formerly carried on by the plaintiffs as their agents, in proof of which the circular of February 1909 is referred to. This circular is admittedly indefensible and the defendants have offered to destroy it. The plaintiffs also rely on an advertisement in a Rangoon paper of the 13th November 1909, which was inserted by the defendants’ agent Danker and is shown to have had the approval of Louis Droz, the defendants’ representative in Bombay. (See advertisement Exhibit A 2 and Exhibit Q.)

    The watch figured in the advertisement is a new watch introduced recently by the defendants under the name of Berna New D.P having a new adaptation of an old movement not found in the watches theretofore known in India as Berna watches through the business dealings of the plaintiffs.

    The advertisement is, however, headed in large type ‘The Berna’ and includes a statement as to the official adoption of the watch by certain Railway Companies, a statement which is wholly false as regards the defendants’ Berna New D.P and is copied verbatim from the plaintiffs’ unamended Catalogue No. 43.

    The relation of the defendants and Danker, the Rangoon advertiser, were those of principal and agent. Danker did not buy from the defendants but received watches of which he was bound to remit the proceeds when sold at the end of each month. The advertisement though paid for by Danker was approved by Louis Droz who said the defendants would pay Rs. 10 per month towards the cost of the advertisement translated into the Burmese language (see Exhibit Q).

    In my opinion the advertisement is both a direct misrepresentation as to the business and goods of the defendants and a breach of the injunction of the 6th April 1909 whereby the defendants, their servants and agents, were restrained from publishing or representing that the defendants’ business has anything whatever to do with the plaintiffs’ business.

    Other complaints of the plaintiffs relate to the marks known as The West End Co. with Eagle and The Matchless with Locomotive. As to the first it is sufficient to say that the evidence does not disclose that the Eagle mark has acquired any reputation among Indian buyers, and that the defendants are only using an eagle mark without the words West End Co. As regards the Matchless with Locomotive, it is common ground that the Locomotive mark is publici juris and that the word Matchless was adopted by the plaintiffs as distinctive from the word Maxim which in combination with a Locomotive was a registered trade-mark of the factory in Switzerland which has now passed by assignment to the defendants. In my judgment no case of passing off has been made out against the defendants in respect of either of these marks.

    The plaintiffs also complain that the defendants are imitating the boxes in which the plaintiffs’ watches have generally been sold. These are red boxes, having a representation stamped on them of the St. Imier Factory together with reproductions of certain medals awarded at Exhibitions for products of the St. Imier Factory. The evidence does not satisfy me that buyers attach any importaree to these boxes. If there were such evidence it is doubtful if the Court would grant relief to the plaintiffs in respect of them now that their business relations with the St. Imier Factory have ceased. Much time has been consumed in the discussion of various assignments, executed in Switzerland in the years 1901, 1904 and 1908. I do not think they help the plaintiffs’ case. The two matters seriously in dispute are the right to the use of the word ‘Berna’ and the question whether the defendants are or were improperly representing their business to be the business formerly carried on by the plaintiffs. The defendants can use the word ‘Berna’ in India only if the plaintiffs abandoned its use. Once the abandonment is established the Swiss assignments, assuming them to assign the Berna trade-mark to the plaintiffs absolutely, can be of no assistance to them.

    I pass a decree for the plaintiffs for an injunction restraining the defendant Company, their servants, agents, travellers, and representatives respectively, from in any manner representing or causing or procuring to be represented or doing anything which shall lead to the belief that the defendant Company have been or are carrying on the business carried on by the plaintiffs or are the successors in business of the plaintiffs, and from employing using or circulating or causing to be employed used or circulated any circulars, notices, or advertisements which shall in any manner represent or lead to the belief that the defendant Company are carrying on or have succeeded to the business of the plaintiffs, The plaintiffs will have their costs of suit up to and including the first day's hearing, and must pay to the defendants costs of four days’ subsequent hearing. Each party must bear their own costs not otherwise provided for.

    Attorneys for the plaintiffs : Messrs. Captain and Vaidya.

    Attorneys for the defendants: Messrs. Bicknell, Merwanjee and Romer.

    Suit decreed.
    B.N.L
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    West End Watch Company v. Berna Watch Company
    (Nov 22, 1910)