Mulla, J.:— [After stating facts as set out above His Lordship proceeded.]
2. At the trial of the suit the following issues were raised::—
(1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to maintain this suit against the present defendant without leave to sue being obtained under clause 12 of the Letters Patent?
(2) Whether the plaintiffs' claim against the present deft, is barred by limitation?
(3) Whether the Hawala for Rs. 11,000 mentioned in para 3 of the plaint is binding on the defendant?
(4) Whether the High Court Suit No. 1070 of 1917 was compromised on the footing of the Hawala being a good one?
(5) If so, whether the present defendant as the representative of Kashiram, consented to the compromise an that basis.
3. After the issues were raised counsel for the plaintiffs stated that the amendment of the title as made was incomplete and he asked for leave to complete the amendment so as to bring it in conformity with the said order.
4. I granted leave and the title as finally amended is as follows:—
“Govrishankar son of Kashiram (Bhagwandas, proprietor of the firm of Beharilal Bisambhardas), a minor under the age of 18 years residing, at Amballa, etc.
5. The words within parenthesis are the words which I granted leave to add, the addition being in conformity with the order of amendment.
6. The first question to be determined is, whether, having regard to the fact that no leave was obtained under clause 12 of the Letters Patent before bringing Gavrishankar on that, record, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. This question can best be answered if the relation of a partner to a firm of which he is a member and the nature and effect of suits by and, against a firm have been determined. To begin with it may be observed that the law of England and well as of British India knows no thing of a firm as a body or artificial person distinct from the members composing it. In this respect a firm differs from a company incorporated under the companies Acts, such a company being a corporate entity separate from its shareholders, though the latter can control its action by passing resolutions in general meeting. The word “firm” is a short, collective name for the individuals who constitute the partners, and though under the Rules of the Supreme Court and under the Code of Civil Procedure actions may now be brought by and against partners in the name ??? their firm, the general doctrine the “there is no such thing as a fire known to the law” remains in ???. It follow from this ??? against a firm is essentially a site against the partners constituting the firm. If a suit is brought against firm in the firm's name and a ??? is passed for the plaintiff, it is decree against all the ??? constituting the firm assuming that they were all alive at the date of, the suit and decree. If a partner dies before suit, and the suit is against the firm's name, the suit is one solely against the surviving partners and judgment can only be obtained as against the surviving partners and be enforced against them and against the partnership assets. The judgment cannot be enforced against the private estate of the deceased partner unless his legal representative is added expressly as a defendant, for a dead man cannot be sued though his legal representative can be sued in a proper case. If a partner dies between service of the writ and the trial of the suit and judgment, in that case equally the dead man's estate is not bound and judgment can only be obtained against the surviving partners and enforced against them and against the partnership assets. But if his legal representative is brought on the record, judgment may be obtained against him also as such and execution enforced against his private estate. Supposing there were two parners both living at the date of the writ and both were served, and both died before the action came on for trial, no judgment could be obtained; Ellis v. Wadeson, (1).
7. Turning now to suits against a person carrying on business in a name other than his own, the Code of Civil Procedure, Order 30, rule 10, provides that he may be sued in that name as if it were a firm name. The words “as if it were a firm name” are used advisedly, for one man cannot constitute a firm. When a suit is brought against such person in the name in which he carries on business, the suit is essentially one against him and he is the sole defendant in the suit. If he dies before suit, and a suit is brought against him in the name in which he carried on business, the suit is against a dead man and it is a nullity from its inception. The suit being a nullity, the writ of summons issued in the suit, by whomsoever accepted, is also a nullity. Similarly, any order made in the suit allowing amendment of the plaint by substituting the legal representative of the deceased as defendant and alloying the suit to proceed against him is also a nullity. It is immaterial that the suit was brought bona fide and in ignorance of the death of such person; Mohun Chander v. Azeem Gazee(2); Veerappa Chetty v. Tindal Ponnan(3).
8. In the present case the plaintiffs were aware before the institution of the suit that Kashiram was dead. They were aware that he was the sole owner of the firm of Baharilal Bisambhardas. Notwithstanding that the suit was instituted against “Beharilal Bisambhardas a firm.” The suit ought to have been brought against Kashiram's legal representative, that is, Gavrishankar. The plaintiffs did not realise this until Gavrishankar's attorneys raised an objection to the suit as framed, and when the plaintiffs obtained the order for amendment they omitted to obtain leave to sue Gavrishankar under clause 12 of the Letters Patent. In the first place, I think that no amendment ought to have been allowed at all. In the next place, I am clearly of opinion that leave ought to have been obtained under clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Gavrishankar was to all intents and purposes a new party to the suit. The suit as originally instituted was not merely against a wrong person, but against no person at all. Though the plaint was amended by substituting the name of Gavrishankar for “Beharilal Bisimbhardis a firm” the case was not one of substitution at all. It was a new suit against a new defendant. After the plaintiffs' counsel obtained leave from me to add the words “proprietor of the firm of Beharilal Bisambhardas”, he founded an argument upon those words the argument being that the original suit was against “Beharilal Bisambhardas a firm”, that at the date of the suit Gavrishankar was the proprietor of the firm, and that the effect of the amendment was only to supply the name that was wanting in the original title. The answer to that is that the suit against “Beharilal Bisambhardas a firm” was in reality a suit against a dead man-Supposing the suit had been filed originally against the deceased Kashiram, it would have been clearly a nullity, and the defect could not had been cured by prefixing Gavrishankar's name in the title to the suit before Kashiram's name. Likewise the defect in the present case could not be cured by the amendment that was made. Gavrishankar could not be brought on the record except as the legal representative of Kasbiram. In fact he was brought on the record as the son and heir of Kashiram (see plaint, para 9A.) If he inherited the firm from his father along with his other assets, his liability would be in his character of legal representative of his father and the extent of the liability would be the entire assets inherited by him and not merely the firm's property which formed part of those assets. The description of Gavrishankar as “the proprietor of the firm of Beharilal Bisambhardas” is a mere blind, and it cannot mend matters. I therefore hold, following the decision in Rampertab Samratkrai v. Foolibhai(4), that the plaintiffs ought to have obtained leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent before Gavrishankar was brought on the record, and that no such leave having been obtained this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
[The rest of the judgment is not material for our report.]