R.N Prasad, J.:—This application in revision is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23.3.1994 passed in Eviction Suit No. 66 of 1991 whereby the suit has been decreed on the ground of personal necessity.

2. The plaintiff-opposite party filed the above mentioned Eviction Suit against the defendants-petitioner stating therein that he is the owner of holding No. 120/99 and the suit premises having on area of 17.5′ × 9.5′ in the part of the said building. Defendant No. 1, the mother of defendant No. 2, was inducted as tenant in the suit premises in the year 1981. Later on a fresh tenancy was created in the year 1990 in favour of defendant No. 2 on a monthly rental of Rs. 500/-. Defendant No. 2 is the actual tenant but to avoid future complication and technicalities defendant No. 1 was also made party in the suit. The monthly rent was payable on or before the 7th day of every English calendar month. Defendant No. 2 is running a jewelery shop in the suit premises in the name and style of Matri Jewelers. The mother of the plaintiff died. He has four sons out of whom two sons Harendra Kumar Mehta and Arun Kumar Mehta after graduation are sitting idle. He requires the suit premises for the above named two sons or atleast one son may be engaged by starting a business of readymade garments with retail cloth shop in the suit premises. The above two sons are fully determined to start a business of readymade garments with a retail cloth shop in the suit premises. He has no other suitable space for starting the business. He requires the entire suit premises for his need and partial eviction would not satisfy his need.

3. The case of the defendents is that defendant No. 1 has unnecessarily been made party in the suit as she has no concern with the tenency in any manner. The plaintiff is not 16 Annas owner of the suit premises. Initially the mother of the plaintiff proclaimed to let the suit premises under the tenancy on rent for opening a shop. She was approached and on finalisation of the negotiation a shop was opened in the year 1981 and a lease deed was executed on 12.3.1981 for 11 month between the mother of the plaintiff and defendent No. 1. On demand defendant No. 2 paid Rs. 10,000/- for construction of a shop. On exipry of the said lease no lease was executed between them but defendent No. 1 remained in the premises doing tier business. On 31.1.1984 a fresh lease was executed between the mother of the plaintiff and the defendent No. 1. Subsequently, defendent No. 1 left doing business due to some personal problem. Defendent No. 2 wished to do the business in the said premises and as such an agreement was arrived at between defendent No. 2 and the plaintiff and the same was reduced in writing on 26.8.1990 by which defendant No. 2 was permanently inducted as a tenant on a monthly rental of Rs. 500/-. There was no term for payment of rent by the 7th day of every month. The tenancy with defendent no. 2 began on 26.8.1990 for indefinite period and there was no term of termination of the tenancy by the end of every English Calendar month. The sons of the plaintiff are not sitting idle rather they are still studying in Patna University and they are not in a mood to engage themselves in business rather they are intending to get some government job. He had spent huge amount on fitting and furniture etc. for starting the business when the shop was taken on rent. It was not speculated that the premises shall be a vacated within a short span of time, rather it was given to understand that the lease is permanent one. The sons of the plaintiff never intended to do any business rather they wanted to continue their study and to appear in the competitive examinations of the executive service. The plaintiff is not in bona fide need of the suit premises. The plaintiff is earning a good money from his employer as well as by rent from the said building.

4. The trial court after hearing the parties decreed the suit and held that the plaintiff is in bona fide need of the suit premises and the partial eviction would not satisfy his need by the impugned judgment and decree.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner at the very outset contended that the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’, has no application in the case as the vacant land was leased out to defendant No. 1 and accordingly the lease deed was executed. He pointed out that P.W 1 has admitted in his evidence that in the year 1981 Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 4,000/- was paid to his mother for construction of the shop. On the basis of the aforesaid evidence learned counsel argued that the Act has no application in the case. In support of his submission learned counsel for the petitioner produced a copy of the plaint, the written statement and the deposition of the witnesses of both the parties. From a perusal of the written statement it is mainfest that there is no pleading in the written statement that Parti land was let out to defendant No. 1 rather in paragraph 7 of the written statement it has been stated that initially the mother of the plaintiff proclaimed to let out the suit premises under the tenancy of defendant No. 2 on rent for opening a shop and on coming to know this fact the mother of the plaintiff was approached and on finalisation of the negotiation the shop was opened in the year 1981. Besides, no document was produced either before the trial court or before this court to show that Parti land was leased out to defendant No. 1 nor the defendants led any evidence to the aforesaid effect. Furthermore, in paragraph 4 of the written statement it has been categorically stated that defendant No. 1 has unnecessarily been made party to the suit as she has no concern with the tenancy in any manner and hence the suit is bad for misjoinder of the parties. In the written statement also it has been categorically stated that a fresh tenancy was created in the year 1990 with defendant No. 2. In paragraph 1 of the plaint also it has been categorically stated that defendant No. 2 is the actual tenant but to avoid future complication and technicality defendant No. 1 too has been made party in the suit. It is true that P.W 1, the plaintiff, has accepted in his evidence that Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 4,000/- was paid to his mother for construction of the shop, but on the basis of such evidence it cannot be said that the vacant land was leased out or the said amount was paid for construction of the suit premises in view of the categorical statement made in the written statement that the shop was opened in March 1981 itself. Furthermore, it is evident from the discussions made above that the defendants themselves admitted that the said tenancy came to an end and in the year 1990 a fresh tenancy was created between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2. However, learned counsel relied upon a decision in the case of Braj Kishore Sah v. Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division, Bhagalpur (1979 B.B.C.J 105) wherein it has been held that in the case where Parti land is leased out, the Act has no application. There is no dispute with regard to the law laid down in the aforesaid case. The provisions of the Act also say that it will apply only in a case where the building or part of the building is let out. In the instant case, it is manifest from the discussions made above that the shop was let out to the defendant not the vacant land. Thus, on consideration of the entire facts and as discussed above, I am of the view that the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application in the case, and the submission of the learned counsel is misconceived.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner next assailed the findings of the trial court on the question of personal necessity on the ground that two sons of the plaintiff are not sitting idle rather they are continuing their study and also the plaintiff has no money to start a business. With regard to the first ground that the sons of the plaintiff are not sitting idle learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out the evidence of P.W 4 and PW. 3. P.W 4 in paragraph 9 of his evidence stated that he has taken admission in M.A but his study is not continuing. In paragraph 6 this witness has stated that in the year 1989 he passed B.A (Hons) and he is not continuing his study. He is determined to start a business with his brother in the suit premises. It is, thus, obvious from the aforesaid evidence, as indicated above, that the witness has no doubt admitted that he has taken admission but he is not continuing his study. Furthermore, in para 4 of the plaint it has categorically been stated that he requires the suit premises for his both the sons or at least for one son who may be engaged by starting a business of readymade garments with retail cloth shop in the suit premises. P.W 3 in paragraph 7 of his evidence denied the suggestion of the petitioners that both the sons of the plaintiff are not sitting idle. Thus, on consideration of the evidence as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners it is manifest that P.W 4 is not continuing his study and even if it is accepted that one son is continuing his study then also it cannot be said that the need of the plaintiff has vanished as there is no evidence on the record that both the sons are continuing their study. So far the other ground is concerned that the plaintiff has no money to start a business, learned counsel pointed out the evidence of P.W 2 in paragraph 11. This witness stated in the aforesaid paragraph of his evidence that source of income is salary of his father and the rent of the shops. He cannot say the income of his father. There is no bank account in his name or in the name of his younger brother. However, this witness has admitted in paragraph 13 of his evidence the bank account is in the name of his father. In paragraph 4 this witness has further stated that his father is ready for giving financial assistance to start a business for which money is ready. He will spend rupees one lakh and fifty thousand (1,50,000/-) in the business. The trial court has also considered the evidence on the record in details and rightly came to a conclusion that the plaintiff has bona fide requirement of the suit permises. Thus, on consideration of the evidence, as stated above, it is obvious that the submission of the learned counsel has no force.

7. However, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision in the case of Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v. Bhushan Ram (1989 P.L.J.R 1188) wherein it has been held that in a case where there is no averment in the plaint with regard to the nature of business or about the fund for starting business and the plaintiff categorically admits in his evidence that he has no fund and has not made up his mind as to what sort of business he intends to start, the necessity cannot be held to be genuine. In the instant case, it has been categorically stated in the plaint itself that both the sons are determined to start a business of readymade garments with retail cloth shop. The evidence of the witnesses, as discussed above, is also consistent to the plaintiff's case. The witnesses categorically stated that the fund is ready for starting a business. Furthermore, the plaintiff is also ready to give financial assistance for starting a business. In such a situation, the decision relied upon by the learned, counsel for the petitioners, in my view, has no application at all. Furthermore, it appears from the judgment itself that the court below has considered the case of the parties and the evidence paragraphwise. Nothing was pointed out that the findings of the trial court are perverse or based on misconstruction of evidence. In such a situation, in my view, the same does not require any interference by this Court.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioners also pointed out that the suit premises was let out to defendant No. 3 in the year 1990 and the suit was filed in the year 1991 and hence the need of the plaintiff is not bona fide. In this regard P.W 2 has stated in his evidence that he was sitting idle after graduation. This witnesses further stated that he was trying to get job but he could not get the job and hence he took a decision to start business in the suit premises. Similar is the evidence of P.W 4 who stated in his evidence that after graduation in the year 1989 he was searching for a job but could not get a job and hence he took a decision to: start a business in the suit premises. The plaintiff and his other witnesses have also stated that he requires the suit premises for his sons. Thus, I find no substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the decree does not mention the ground of eviction and hence the judgment and decree are liable to be set aside. In support of his submission he placed reliance upon a decision in the case of Sri Niwas Fogla v. Singheshwar Sahu (1975 P.L.J.R 409) wherein in a suit for eviction the parties entered into a compromise and filed a joint petition in which the tenant agreed to vacate the suit premises. The judgment of the court below did not state any fact, namely, existence of ground of eviction on which the tenant was sought to be evicted. The trial court, however, decreed the suit for eviction. The High Court, while considering the scope of Section 11 of the Act, held that the provisions contained in the Act create a bar for passing a decree for eviction in favour of landlord on any other ground, except those mentioned in Section 11 of the Act. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that if a decree of eviction is passed without satisfying the existence of any of the conditions on which such a decree could be rested, cannot be supported in law.

10. In the instant case, it is evident from the judgment that the ground of eviction was personal necessity of the suit premises as enumerated in Section 11 of the Act, which has been discussed in details and the court has come to a conclusion that the plaintiff-opposite party is in bona fide need of the suit premises. Furthermore, decree is a part of the judgment and section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure which deals with the definition of the ‘decree’ says that decree is a formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as the court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that there is no requirement in law that a decree must contain the grounds of eviction, rather the requirement of law is that the decree for eviction must be passed only on the grounds enumerated is Section 11 of the Act. The decision relied upon by him does not say that the decree must contain the ground of eviction. Thus, I am of the view that the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is misconceived and the same cannot be accepted.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioners without assailing the findings of the trial court on the question of partial eviction contended that the area of the suit premises is 17′ 9″ × 9′ 5″ and he is ready to vacate the part of the suit premises and hence the petitioners be accommodated. In this regard proviso the Section 11(1)(c) of the Act is relevant which says that the court has to consider as to whether the partial eviction would satisfy the need of the plaintiff. It appears from the judgment that the question of personal necessity and the question of partial eviction has been taken up together and has been considered by the trial court together. The court has considered the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses in which they have stated that the partial eviction would not satisfy his need and he has no other suitable space for his need. On the other hand, there is no evidence on the record on behalf of the defendents to show that partial eviction would satisfy his need. There is no pleading in the written statement also to show that partial eviction would satisfy his need. The court has considered the matter in details and had recorded its finding that partial eviction would not satisfy his need. In that view of the matter, in my view, this court is not required to interfere with the findings of the trial court on the question of partial eviction.

12. On consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, as discussed above, I am of the view that there is no merit in this application. Accordingly, this application is dismissed but without cost.