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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ application challenges two orders: a letter dated 9.8.1990 issued by respondent no. 2 and an office order dated 20th September, 1990 issued by respondent no. 3. These orders resulted in the non-approval of the petitioner’s appointment as a teacher and the termination of his services by respondent nos. 2 and 3.

The petitioner applied for the teaching post at Gosher High School, a recognized minority institution, following an advertisement dated 26.8.1988. He held the necessary qualifications (B.Sc. and B.Ed.) and was appointed by respondent no. 3 on 31.1.1989, joining on 1.2.1989. The appointment was on a sanctioned post and required approval under Section 18 of the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management and Control) Act, 1981.

Subsequently, by letter dated 20th September 1990, the petitioner was informed that his appointment was not approved by respondent no. 2 and that his services would be terminated effective 22.10.1990. The reason given was that the petitioner’s name was second on the panel, and the first-named candidate, Sri Daniel Hari, had been appointed and had joined but later resigned.

The petitioner contended that in similar circumstances, other teachers’ appointments had been approved by respondent no. 2. Respondents filed counter affidavits asserting the appointment was illegal as approval from the School Service Board (respondent no. 2) was mandatory under the statute and that the managing committee realized its mistake in appointing the petitioner without proper approval, leading to termination.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appointment of the petitioner as a teacher at a minority institution required approval from the School Service Board under Section 18(3)(b) of the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools Act, 1981.
  2. Whether respondent no. 2 had jurisdiction to direct respondent no. 3 regarding the appointment and termination of the petitioner.
  3. Whether the petitioner’s termination without approval from the School Service Board was lawful.
  4. Whether the writ petition is maintainable against respondent no. 3, a minority institution, under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner was duly qualified and appointed on a sanctioned post at a recognized minority school.
  • Gosher High School being a minority institution, respondent no. 2 had no jurisdiction to interfere with its management.
  • The Education Department’s instructions limited the School Service Board’s role to verifying qualifications and procedure, not controlling appointments.
  • Respondent no. 2’s refusal to approve the appointment was inconsistent, as similar appointments had been approved in comparable situations.
  • Reliance was placed on various Supreme Court decisions affirming minority institutions’ rights and limits on State interference.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The appointment of the petitioner was illegal as his name was second on the panel and the first candidate had been appointed and joined.
  • The managing committee was bound to obtain approval from respondent no. 2 (School Service Board) under Section 18 of the Act.
  • Respondent no. 2 only suggested the managing committee re-advertise the post due to the irregularity.
  • Respondent no. 3 acted in accordance with the statute and the directions of respondent no. 2.
  • A preliminary objection was raised that no writ could be issued against respondent no. 3 as it is not a State under Article 12 of the Constitution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sidhrajhhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 SC 546 Affirmation of minority institutions’ rights and limits on State interference. Supported petitioner’s contention on minority institution autonomy.
W. Proost v. State of Bihar, AIR 1969 SC 65 Regulation of appointments and State authority under educational statutes. Used to explain statutory control over appointments.
Ramji Lal v. Ram Babu, AIR 1970 SC 2077 Scope of appointment approvals and procedural compliance. Reinforced procedural requirements for appointments.
St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389 Autonomy of minority institutions and scope of State regulation. Supported petitioner’s autonomy argument.
All Bihar Christian Schools Association v. State of Bihar, 1988 PLJR 7 (SC) Clarification that Sections 3 and 18 of the Act are regulatory and do not infringe minority rights under Article 31. Key precedent for interpreting Section 18(3)(b) as regulatory with limited interference.
Tejaswini Patil v. Bangalore University, 1991 Karnataka 352 Affiliated colleges governed by statute are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Supported maintainability of writ petition against respondent no. 3.
Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R Rudani, AIR 1989 SC 1607 Mandamus can be issued against bodies performing public duties even if private in character. Confirmed writ jurisdiction over respondent no. 3 due to its public duty.
Raj Soni v. Air Officer in Charge Administration, AIR 1990 SC 1305 Private aided schools must comply with statutory obligations and cannot defy statutes claiming non-State status. Supported that respondent no. 3 is bound by statutory provisions despite not being a State.
Smt. Manju Devi v. Dist. Supdt. Bhagalpur, 1987 B.B.C.J 598; 1987 PLJR 962 No writ lies against purely private schools not taken over under statutory provisions. Distinguished from present case where the school is recognized and aided.
Francis John v. The Director of Education, AIR 1990 SC 423 Private aided schools receiving government funds are subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Supported writ jurisdiction over respondent no. 3.
Manmohan Singh Jaitla v. Commissioner, Union Territory, AIR 1985 SC 364 Educational institutions receiving government grants are State under Article 12. Supported applicability of writ jurisdiction against respondent no. 3.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the statutory framework under the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management and Control) Act, 1981, particularly Section 18 and its sub-section 3(b), which governs minority institutions. It held that the managing committee of a minority school has the power to appoint and remove teachers with the concurrence (approval) of the School Service Board, whose role is limited to ensuring that appointments conform to prescribed qualifications and procedures. The Court emphasized that respondent no. 2 (the School Service Board) alone has jurisdiction over approval of appointments and terminations under the Act, and respondent no. 2 had no authority to direct respondent no. 3 (the minority institution) to terminate the petitioner’s services.

The Court rejected the preliminary objection that no writ lies against respondent no. 3, holding that as a recognized and aided minority institution performing public functions and governed by statutory provisions, it is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

The Court noted the petitioner’s hardship and found no statutory bar to appointing him despite his being second on the panel, particularly since the first candidate had resigned shortly after joining. The Court found that respondent no. 3 acted illegally by following directions from respondent no. 2 that exceeded statutory authority.

Accordingly, the Court held that the impugned orders were issued without jurisdiction and contrary to the statutory scheme, and that the petitioner’s appointment requires consideration and approval by the School Service Board in accordance with the statute.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is allowed. The Court quashed the impugned orders dated 9.8.1990 and 20th September 1990 (Annexures 5 and 4 respectively). Respondent no. 2 is directed to submit the petitioner’s case to the School Service Board for approval of his appointment within six weeks, and respondent no. 3 must act in accordance with the Board’s decision.

The direct effect is the restoration of the petitioner’s right to have his appointment considered and approved by the proper statutory authority. No new precedent altering the law was established; rather, the Court reaffirmed the statutory scheme and limits on State interference in minority institution management.

    Mubarak Hussain v. State Of Bihar And Others

    S.B Sinha, J.:— This writ application is directed against an order as contained in a letter dated 9.8.1990 issued by respondent no. 2 and as contained in Annexure-5 to the writ application as also the office order dated 20th September, 1990 issued by respondent no. 3 and as contained in Annexure-4 to the writ application, whereby the appointment of the petitioner as a teacher has not been approved and his services had been terminated by respondent nos. 2 and 3.

    2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass.

    3. The petitioner applied for appointment as a teacher pursuant to an advertisement issued by Gosher High School, Main Road Ranchi in Ranchi Express dated 26.8.1988 being an eligible candidate therefor as he had been holding a Degree in Bachelor of Science as also is a holder of a B.Ed degree.

    4. The petitioner appeared before the Interview Board and was appointed to the said post by respondent no. 3 by a letter dated 31.1.1989 and pursuant thereto, he joined his duties on 1.2.1989 The said letter of appointment is contained in Annexure-3 to the writ application. According to the petitioner, Gosher High School is a recognised minority school declared as such by respondent no. 1. The post held by the petitioner is a sanctioned post. According to the petitioner, his appointment was required to be approved in terms of the provisions of Section 18 of the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management and Control,) Act, 1981. By reason of a letter dated 20th September, 1990, he was, however, informed that his appointment has not been approved by the respondent no. 2 and thus his services shall stand terminated with effect from 22.10.1990

    5. The petitioner could obtain a copy of the letter dated 22.10.1990 wherein it has been stated that as the petitioner's name did not appear as the first-name in the panel but was second in the serial and in view of the fact that respondent no. 3 issued an appointment letter to Sri Daniel Hari who joined the said post, but resigned thereafter his name could not be approved.

    6. According to the petitioner, in similar situation respondent no. 2 has approved the appointment of other teachers.

    7. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no. 3 wherein it has been filed on behalf of respondent no. 3 wherein it has been contended that in terms of sub-section 3 (kha) of Section 18 of the said Act, approval of appointment has to be obtained from Vidyalaya Seba Board (School Service Board) and accordingly his name was sent for approval but as his appointment was not approved, respondent no. 3 had to act in terms of the provisions of the Statute.

    8. A counter affidavit has also been filed on behalf of respondent no. 2 wherein it has, inter alia, been contended that the appointment of the petitioner was prima facie illegal and by reason of the impugned order as contained in Annexure-4 he had merely made a suggestion to the Managing Committee for making appointment in the vacant post after issuing fresh advertisement. According to respondent no. 2, as Sri Daniel Hari joined his services, the panel prepared by the Selection Committee ceased to exist. It was further contended that the Managing Committee has realised its mistake and, thus, terminated the services of the petitioner.

    9. Mr. Sohail Anwar learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Gosher High School being a minority Institution, respondeat no. 2 has no jurisdiction to interfere with the management of the said School. It was farther submitted that the Education Department had issued specific directions that in the matter of grant of approval in respect of appointment of a teacher; only qualification for appointment of teacher can be fixed as is evident from the letter dated 3.2.1977 (Annexure-7) and further the School Service Board is required only to consider as to whether the proposed appointment is in accordance with Rules laying down the qualification prescribed by the Government and in accordance with the procedure of the Managing Committee on a sanctioned post as would appear from the letter dated 11.9.1981 as contained in Annexure 8.

    10. Mr. Anwar in support of his contentions has relied upon Sidhrajhhai v. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1963 SC 546; in W. Proost v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1969 SC 65; in Ramji Lal v. Ram Babu reported in AIR 1970 SC 2077; in St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1974 SC 1389; and in All Bihar Christian Schools Association v. State of Bihar reported in 1988 PLJR 7 (SC).

    11. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand submitted that the appointment of the petitioner by the respondent no. 3 by a letter dated 31.1.89 as contained in Annexure-3 to the writ application was itself illegal inasmuch as the petitioner's name was at serial no. 2 in the panel.

    12. It was further submitted that as the Managing Committee was bound to obtain the approval of respondent no. 2 in terms of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, the appointment of the petitioner having not been approved, the impugned orders as contained in Annexures-4 and 5 to the writ application cannot be said to be illegal.

    13. The said Act (Bihar Act no. 33 of 198?), was enacted inter alia for taking over of the management and control of the Non-Government Secondary Schools as also for the purpose of development of the secondary education in the State of Bihar.

    14. Section 18 of the said Act which occurs in Chapter V thereof provides that any minority institution established by a minority community based on religion or language may be declared and recognised as such in the event the said Institution had been established by a minority community and fulfils all the conditions for grant of such recognition. Sub-section (3) of section 18 of the said Act provides that all such minority Institutions declared and recognised by the State would be managed and controlled in terms of the conditions laid down therein.

    15. Clause (kha) of sub-section (3) of section 18 of the said Act reads as follows;—

    16. Section 2(ga) of the said Act defines ‘minority institution’ in the following terms:—

    17. From a perusal of the aforementioned provisions, it is evident that if approval is sought for by any minority Institution, such a matter has to be dealt with by the School Service Board. The jurisdiction of the School Service Board is also confined to the matters covered under section 18(3) (kha) of the said Act.

    18. In this view of the matter, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that respondent no. 2 on his own could not have given any direction or made a request to the respondent no. 3 to fill up the post upon making an advertisement 10 that regard once again.

    19. It is also now well settled that if an authority is to act in terms of the provisions of the Statute, he must confine his jurisdiction within the four corners of the Statute itself,

    20. It is also well settled that a statutory authority can neither give any opinion contrary to the provisions of the Statute nor any other authority which is bound by the provisions of such Statute can act in terms thereof.

    21. Mr. Jai Prakash learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 3 has also raised a preliminary objection to the effect that even if the order as contained in Annexure-5 to the writ application is quashed, no writ can be issued quashing the order of respondent no. 3 inasmuch as no writ can be issued against it as it is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.

    22. It is not in dispute that respondent no. 3 is a minority Institution within the meaning of Section 2(ga) of the Act and is declared and recognised as such by the State of Bihar in terms of the provisions of Section 18 of the said Act. It is also not in dispute that it is an aided school.

    23. The Supreme Court in All Bihar Christian Schools Association v. State of Bihar reported in 1988 P.L.J.R 7 (S.C) has held that neither Section 3 nor Section 18 of the said Act encroaches upon the guarantee of freedom of a minority under Article 31 of the Constitution, but the same are regulatory in nature.

    24. The Supreme Court in paragraph 13 of the aforementioned decision while considering the scope of Section 18(3)(b) of the said Act stated the law thus:—

    “Clause (b) provides for two things, firstly it requires, the managing committee of a minority school to appoint teachers possessing requisite qualifications as prescribed by the State Government for appointment of teachers of other nationalised schools, secondly, the managing committee is required to make appointment of a teacher with the concurrence of the School Service Board constituted under Section 10 of the Act. Proviso to clause (b) lays down that the School Service Board while considering the question of granting approval to the appointment of a teacher, shall ascertain if the appointment is in accordance with the rules laying down qualifications and manner of making appointment framed by the State Government. The proviso make it cleat that the School Service Board has no further power to interfere with the right of managing committee of a minority school in the appointment of a teacher. Under clause (b) the managing Committee is required to make appointment of a teacher with the concurrence of the School Service Board. The expression “concurrence” means approval. Such approval need not be prior approval, as the clause does not provide for any prior approval. Object and purpose underlying clause (b) is to ensure that the teachers appointed in a minority school should possess requisite qualifications and they are appointed in accordance with the procedure prescribed and the appointments are made for the sanctioned strength. The selection and appointment of teachers is left to the management of the minority school, there is no interference with the managerial rights of the institution. In granting approval the School Service Board has limited power. The appointment of qualified teachers in a minority school is a sine qua non for achieving educational standard and better administration of the institution. Clause (b) is regulatory in nature to ensure educational excellence in the minority school.”

    (underlining is mine for emphasis)

    25. In terms of clause (b) sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the said Act, the managing committee has the power to remove a teacher or to terminate his service or to dismiss or discharge him with the approval of the School Service Board.

    26. In this case, the petitioner has contended that he had resigned from the post of teacher in St. Anne's Jyoti Girls High School in order to join in the School in-question. He was 31 years of age at the time of filing of the writ petition and there was no chance of his being appointed as a teacher in any recognised School.

    27. We are further of the view that keeping in view the aforementioned facts into consideration, it will cause an undue hardship upon the petitioner if at least his case is not allowed to be considered for approval by the School Service Board in terms of clause 18(3)(B) of the said Act. In our opinion, prima-facie it cannot be said that only because one Daniel Hari was at serial no. 1 of the panel and only because he jointed the post for a short time, respondent no. 3 had no jurisdiction to appoint the petitioner out of the said panel.

    28. The petitioner has given several examples where in similar situations, the School Service Board has approved the appointment of a teacher out of the panel prepared by the Selection Committee of the minority institution when a post fell vacant by reason of resignation submitted by another teacher who was appointed out of the same panel within a short period.

    29. The submission of Mr. Jai Prakash to the effect that no writ can be issued as against respondent no. 3 has also no force. Respondent no. 3 School is a recognised institution and, thus, has a statutory duty to perform.

    30. Recently in Tejaswini Patil v. Bangalore University reported in 1991 Karnataka 352, it was held that when a college is affiliated to a Board and is governed by the provisions of the Act, it is amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    31. In Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R Rudani reported in AIR 1989 SC 1607, which was also followed by the Karnataka High Court, it was held:—

    “14. If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to mandamus. But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. It has to be appreciated that the appellants-trust was managing the affiliated college to which public money is paid as Government aid. Public money paid as Govt. aid plays a major role in the control, maintenance and working of educational institutions. The aided institutions like Government institutions discharge public function by way of imparting education to students. They are subject to the rules and regulations of the affiliating University. Their activities are closely supervised by the University authorities.

    19. The terms ‘authority’ used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Art. 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Court to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words ‘Any person or authority’ used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the ‘body concerned is not very much relevant’. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists, mandamus cannot be denied.”

    21. Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, professor De Smith states ‘to be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract.’ (Judicial Review of Administrative Act 4th Ed. p. 540). We shere this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available ‘to reach injustice wherever it is found’. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition.”

    32. Yet recently in Raj Soni v. Air Officer in Charge Administration reported in AIR 1990 SC 1305, it was held:—

    “The recognised private schools in Delhi whether aided or otherwise are governed by the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The respondent-management is under a statutory obligation to uniformly apply the provisions of the Act and the Rules to the teachers employed in the School. When any authority is required to act in a particular manner under a statute it has no option but to follow the statute. The authority cannot defy the statute on the pretext that it is neither a State nor an ‘authority’ under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.”

    33. It was held by the Karnataka High Court in the aforementioned case:—

    “Once we find that the activities of a private educational institutions is regulated by the provisions of the Act and the Universities Act, the mere fact that the institution is not receiving financial aid, makes no difference for the issue of a writ under Art. 226 for the enforcement of public duly and/or provisions of the Act.”

    34. In Smt. Manju Devi v. Dist. Supdt. Bhagalpur reported in 1987 B.B.C.J 598 : 1987 PLJR 962 upon which reliance has been placed by Mr. Jai Prakash, the School in-question was a middle school purely private in character and was being run by managing committee of its own. The said school was also not taken over under the provisions of Bihar Non-Government Elementary Schools (Taking Over of Control) Act, 1976 and in that situation it was held that no writ is maintainable. In that case, the Special Bench itself referred to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Radha Kumari v. The Governing Body of the Mahanth Mahadevanand Manila Mahavidyalaya reported in 1977 P.L.J.R 110 wherein it was held:—

    “Therefore unless there was an element of public employment or service, having support of any statute, or an office or status capable of protection, no writ can be issued against respondent no. 1 simply because it happened to be an affiliated college to the Magadh University.”

    35. In Francis John v. The Director of Education reported in AIR 1990 SC 423, it was held:—

    “Any private schools which received aid from the Government under the Grant-in-aid Code, which is promulgated not merely for the benefit of the Management but also for the benefit of the employees in the School for whose salary and allowances the Government was contributing from the public funds under the Grant-in-aid Code cannot escape from the consequences flowing from the breach of the Code and particularly where the Director of Education who is an instrumentality of the State is participating in the decision making process. Under these circumstances we find that the High Court was wrong in upholding that the orders of the Director of Education and of the Dispute Settlement Committee were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution since the matter squarely falls within the principles laid down by this Court in Taka Ram's case (AIR 1984 SC 1621).”

    36. In Manmohan Singh Jaitla v. Commissioner, Union Territory reported in AIR 1985 SC 364, the Supreme Court held:—

    “The educational institution receiving financial grant from the Government is a State as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution.”

    37. In is therefore clear that if the decision of a statutory authority in relation to the management of a private school is amenable to writ jurisdiction, this Court also may interfere with the decision of an authority who has exceeded his jurisdiction and/or assumes jurisdiction not vested in it by law.

    38. In this case, as respondent no. 2 has no jurisdiction to perform any of the duties as contained in Section 18(3)(b) of the said Act and the same is merely to be performed by the School Service Board constituted under Section 10 of the Act, this Court in our opinion, is entitled to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

    39. In paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit, the respondent no. 3 has clearly stated that it had acted in terms of the Statute as the name of the petitioner was sent to respondent no. 4 for recommendation and since his name was not recommended by respondent no. 2, he could not have been kept in service because in that case it would have amounted to violation of the statutory provisions contained in Section 8(3)(b) of the Act.

    40. In view of the stand taken by respondent no. 3 itself that it has acted in terms of the impugned order passed by respondent no. 2 as contained in Annexure 5 to the writ application, the order dated 20th September, 1970 issued by it (Annexure-4) must also fail if the order dated 9.8.1990 as contained in Annexure-5 is quashed by this Court.

    41. As noticed hereinbefore, in this case, the services of the petitioner has to be approved by the School Service Board in terms of the provisions of the Statute and the respondent no. 2 has exceeded its limit in issuing Annexure-4 and similarly respondent no. 3 who is bound by the terms and conditions laid down under section 18(3) of the Act committed an illegality in following the direction of respondent no. 3 which is in violation of the provisions of the said Act and, thus, respondent no. 3 although is bound by the term and conditions as laid down under Section 18(3) of the said Act, had acted in violation thereof by issuing the impugned order as contained in Annexure-4 in terms of the directions of respondent no. 2 as contained in Annexure-5 to the writ petition.

    42. The petitioner's service was protected in terms of Section 18(3) of the Act and his service could have been terminated only in the event the same was not approved under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act. Further the order of termination passed as against a teacher must also have the approval of the School Service Board in terms of Section 18(3)(b) of the Act.

    43. In this view of the matter, this writ application is allowed. The impugned orders as contained in Annexures 4 and 5 are quashed and respondent no. 2 is hereby directed to send the case of the petitioner in the School Service Board which shall decide the matter relating to grant of approval of the appointment of the petitioner in terms of Section 18(3)(b) of the said Act with utmost expedition and not later than six weeks from the date of raceipt of a copy of this order.

    44. It is needless to say that respondent no. 3 shall act in terms of the decision of the School Service Board. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

    45. R.N Sahay, J.:—I agree.

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    Comments

    Mubarak Hussain v. State Of Bihar And Others
    (Dec 13, 1991)