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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-appellant, Pandit Sushil Chandra Chaturvedi, proprietor of Hanuman Glass Works at Firozabad, brought suit in 1936 for recovery of money said to be due for glassware sold in 1930 (with a small cash advance in 1931). The defendants were members of a Muhammadan family from Armara near Firozabad, alleged by the plaintiff to be partners in three firms that purchased the goods. The plaintiff relied primarily on a document dated 14 February 1933 (described in the plaint as a "note of hand") by which a liability of Rs. 1,781 was acknowledged and a promise to pay on demand with 2% monthly interest was recorded.

At trial the defendants contested liability, denied the partnership allegations, and pleaded, among other defenses, that the claim was barred by limitation. The trial court held the claim barred by limitation and found that the alleged partnership was not established; it did not decide some other pleas. The District Judge affirmed on the preliminary ground of limitation. The present matter is a second appeal in which the only question before the High Court was whether the courts below were justified in their findings on limitation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the document dated 14 February 1933 is to be characterised as a promissory note (within the meaning of the relevant statutes) or as a mere acknowledgment of debt.
  2. If the document is a promissory note, whether it is deficiently stamped under the Indian Stamp Act and therefore inadmissible in evidence, with the consequence that the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation.
  3. Ancillary questions arising from the characterisation of the instrument, including (a) whether negotiability or commercial form is necessary to constitute a promissory note, (b) whether reference to pre-existing accounts rendered the liability contingent, and (c) whether the payee was a "certain person" for identification purposes.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiff)

  • The plaintiff relied on the 14 February 1933 document as an acknowledgement which would save the cause of action from being barred by limitation.
  • Counsel for the appellant (Mr. M. L. Chaturvedi) argued that to be a promissory note a document must be negotiable, in a commercial form suitable for negotiation, and must contain an unconditional undertaking to pay. He submitted that the present document did not contain an unconditional undertaking because the liability depended on the validity of pre-existing accounts and could be challenged.
  • Appellant relied on two Privy Council decisions (Mohammad Akbar Khan v. Attar Singh, and Karam Chand v. Mir Ahmad Aziz Ahmad) to support the proposition that receipts or instruments not intended as negotiable instruments should not be treated as promissory notes.

Respondents' / Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants raised multiple defenses at trial, including denial of partnership and that the claim was barred by limitation. The limitation plea was common to all defendants.
  • Respondents' counsel (Mr. Banerji) provided a translation of the 14 February 1933 document for the Court's consideration.
  • Both courts below treated the 1933 document as a promissory note. They further held that because the instrument bore a three-and-a-half annas stamp (0-3-6) instead of the required four annas (0-4-0) for a promissory note of that value under the Indian Stamp Act, the document was deficiently stamped and therefore inadmissible; consequently the claim was barred by limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bibbo v. Gokaran Singh Used by the courts below in treating documents of this kind as promissory notes in previous decisions. The Court acknowledged that Bibbo supports treating the document as a promissory note but stressed that documents must be judged on their own language and circumstances; it held that Bibbo is not affected by the Privy Council pronouncements relied upon by the appellant.
Mohammad Akbar Khan v. Attar Singh (Privy Council) Authority cited by appellant for the proposition that documents which are receipts or not intended to be negotiable instruments should not be treated as promissory notes. The Court considered the decision but distinguished the facts: the instrument in that case was a receipt plainly intended as such; in the present case the 1933 document was held to be a promissory note and thus distinguishable.
Karam Chand v. Mir Ahmad Aziz Ahmad (Privy Council) Similar authority to the above Privy Council decision, used to argue that receipts/agreements are not promissory notes. The Court treated this precedent as distinguishable for the same reasons: the instrument before the Privy Council was a receipt, whereas the 1933 document was found to record a loan-like promise to pay.
Mortgage Insurance Corporation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (English Court of Appeal) Authority approvingly cited by the Privy Council to show that a statement of existence of debt in an insurance transaction was not a promissory note. The Court noted this authority as part of the Privy Council's reasoning but declined to accept that it requires treating the instrument before the High Court as a receipt rather than a promissory note; the Court focused on primary intention and substance.
Manick Chund v. Jomoona Doss An Indian case disapproved by the Privy Council for treating a transaction as a promissory note where it was in substance a sale transaction with other covenants. The Court referred to the Privy Council's disapproval of Manick Chund and used that to underline that instruments must be classed according to their substance and primary intention; the Court nonetheless concluded Bibbo remained good law for instruments that are promissory in substance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded methodically, focusing on the statutory definitions and the language and surrounding circumstances of the 14 February 1933 document.

  1. Statutory definitions: The Court quoted the definition of "promissory note" in the Indian Stamp Act (which incorporates the definition from the Negotiable Instruments Act) and the definition of "promissory note" as given by the Negotiable Instruments Act. It noted a key difference: the Stamp Act's definition can include a note promising payment upon a fund or condition, whereas the Negotiable Instruments Act requires an unconditional undertaking.
  2. Translation and text of the document: The Court considered translations (both the respondents' free translation and the Court's more literal translation). The instrument contained an acknowledgment of indebtedness for Rs. 1,781, and an express promise to pay on demand with interest at 2% per mensem.
  3. Application of statutory tests: On its face the document satisfied the elements of a promissory note under the relevant statute: it acknowledged a fixed sum, contained a promise to pay on demand, and was signed. The references to accounts and interest were not regarded as dispositive to convert the instrument into a mere acknowledgment.
  4. Surrounding circumstances and intention of parties: The Court emphasized the factual background — sales in 1930–31, meeting and final accounting on 14 February 1933, and the execution of the document on that occasion. The parties intended to close their accounts and the instrument was intended to record a loan-like obligation carrying interest. The Court regarded this intention and the character of the instrument as showing it to be a promissory note rather than a mere acknowledgment or receipt.
  5. Stamp deficiency: Both courts below had treated the document as a promissory note and found it bore an insufficient stamp (0-3-6 instead of 0-4-0). The Court regarded the incorrect stamp as a mere oversight but accepted that the parties had intended the document to be a promissory note. The analytical focus, however, remained on characterisation of the document as a promissory note for purposes of the Stamp Act and limitation.
  6. Precedent and tests of negotiability: The Court considered appellant's reliance on Privy Council decisions. It concluded those decisions concerned instruments that were plainly receipts and were not intended as negotiable instruments. The Court clarified that negotiability is a useful test but not the sole or determinative test; the primary question is the substance and the primary intention of the parties in each case.
  7. Contingency and identification: The Court rejected the appellant's submission that reference to pre-existing accounts rendered the liability contingent. It regarded the reference to accounts as a statement of consideration that did not make the liability contingent or otherwise prevent classification as a promissory note. The Court also held that the payee (Hanuman Glass Works, a trading name) was a "certain person" within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Act, relying on section 5 which allows identification by description.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed; the Court concluded that the 14 February 1933 document was, in substance and primary intention, a promissory note and that the lower courts' conclusions on limitation were correct. The opinion concludes: "The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The dismissal upholds the findings of the courts below that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by limitation (given the characterization of the 1933 instrument and the evidentiary consequences stemming from its stamping and admissibility as applied below). The plaintiff's appeal is unsuccessful and costs are awarded against the appellant.
  • Broader legal consequence: The Court emphasised substance and primary intention as the decisive criteria in characterising documents as promissory notes, and it distinguished Privy Council authorities that dealt with instruments plainly intended as receipts. The Court expressly held that Bibbo v. Gokaran Singh remains applicable to instruments that are promissory in substance. The opinion does not state that it establishes a new overriding precedent beyond these clarifications.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the opinion provided and does not add information beyond the text.

    Sushil Chandra Chaturvedi v. Wali-Ullah

    Bajpai and Dar, JJ.:— The plaintiff appellant Pandit Sushil Chandra Chaturvedi is the proprietor of a business known as Hanuman Glass Works at Firozabad in the district of Agra. The defendants are a Muhammadan family, resident of Armara close to Firozabad in Agra district. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 Wali-ullah and Niamat-ullah are own brothers and defendants Nos. 3 to 6 are their nephews, being sons of their deceased brother Abdul Hamid. There was a fourth brother Said, who thed before the institution of the suit out of which this appeal has arisen.

    According to the plaintiff the defendants are partners in three firms called Muhammad Said Abdul Hamid, Niamat-ullah Farid-uddin, and Zahir-uddin Ghulam Ahmad. In the year 1930, on various dates, these firms purchased certain glassware from the plaintiff and in the year 1931 a small sum of Rs. 5-8-0 was advanced by the plaintiff to these firms. In 1933, according to the plaintiff, accounts were made up of what was due to the plaintiff from these firms and it was found that the firms were liable to him for a sum of Rs. 1,781 on accounts. The plaintiff alleges that on the 14th of February, 1933, Wali-ullah defendant No. 1 acting on behalf of all the partners and on behalf of the firms mentioned above executed a document which has been described in the plaint as a note of hand by which a liability for Rs. 1,781 was acknowledged and a promise was made to pay it on demand with 2 per cent, monthly interest. This document has been filed in the case out of which this appeal has arisen and a little later we will give a translation of it.

    In 1936 the plaintiff commenced the action out of which this appeal has arisen for recovery of Rs. 3,000 odd principal and interest on the basis of the document mentioned above. In the plaint the transactions of 1930 and 1931 made between the plaintiff and the three firms were described, the accounting which took place between the parties in February, 1933, was set out and it was further stated that with reference to the accounting a note of hand was given to the plaintiff by the defendant which we have referred to above.

    The suit was contested by the defendants and they raised separate defences. One of the defences was that the defendants were not partners of the firms and they were not liable at all to the plaintiff for the amount claimed. The second defence was that the interest claimed was excessive and there were other defences which it is not necessary to mention in detail, but one defence which was common to all the defendants was that the claim was barred by limitation.

    The trial court came to the conclusion that the claim was barred by limitation. It also found that the alleged partnership was not established; on the question of interest it recorded no finding and it also left some other pleas in defence undecided. The plaintiff took the matter in appeal before the District Judge of Agra and the learned Civil Judge who decided the appeal has affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the preliminary ground that the claim was barred by limitation. He has left undecided other matters which were in controversy in the case. The matter is now here before us in second appeal, and the only question for consideration in the case is whether or not the findings of the court below on the question of limitation are justified.

    The transactions between the plaintiff and the defendants took place in 1930, excepting a cash transaction of Rs. 5-8-0 which took place in 1931. The suit was instituted in 1936 and the suit being one for recovery of money as price of goods would be obviously barred by limitation unless time could be saved by some acknowledgment or by some fresh cause of action. The plaintiff relies upon the document dated the 14th of February, 1933, mentioned above as saving that time. He calls it as a document of acknowledgment and if that be so his case will be within time. We may mention here that even if this document be accepted in plaintiff's favour the question of limitation would remain to be considered with reference to other defendants who did not execute the document. Now, this is an aspect of the matter which we are not considering for the time being. Both the courts below have taken the view that the document of the 14th of February, 1933, is a promissory note and not a mere acknowledgment and as it contains a stamp of 0-3-6, whereas under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act it should have contained a stamp of 0-4-0, it is deficiently stamped and under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act it is wholly inadmissible in evidence and cannot be examined even for the purpose of extracting an acknowledgment out of it. If this document be accepted as a promissory note then it is not disputed that the conclusion;arrived at by the courts below is correct and the sole question for consideration in this case is whether or not the document can or should be regarded as a promissory note.

    It will be convenient at this stage to give a translation of this document. Unfortunately there is no authorised translation: before us. Mr. Banerji who appears for the respondents has given to us a free translation which is as follows: “We, Abdul Hamid Muhammad Said, residents of Armara promise to pay on demand with interest at 2 per cent, per mensem to firm Hanuman Glass Works the sum of Rs. 1,781 due from us as per accounts regarding glass.”

    We have made a more literal translation for ourselves and it may be stated as follows: “Abdul Hamid Muhammad Safd residents of mauza Armara—whereas with regard to glass of Hanuman Glass Works account is due from us we therefore acknowledge and promise to pay on demand Rs. 1,781 with interest at 2 per cent per mensem.”

    In the Indian Stamp Act (II of 1899) there is a definition of “promissory note” which is as follows: “‘Promissory note’ means a promissory note as defined by the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; it also includes a note promising the payment of any sum of money out of any particular fund which may or may not be available, or upon any condition or contingency which mayor may not be performed or happen.”

    The definition of “promissory note” given in the Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) referred to in the Stamp Act is as follows: “A ‘promissory note’ is an instrument in writing (not being a bank note or a currency note) containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument.” Then follow certain illustrations and among them illustrations (b) and (f) are as follows:

    “(b) I acknowledge myself to be indebted to B in Rs. 1,000, to be paid on demand, for value received.

    “(f) I promise to pay B Rs. 500 seven days after my marriage with C.”

    According to section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act the document in illustration (b) is a promissory note and the document in illustration (f) is not a promissory note. But if we look to the definition given of promissory note in section 2(22) of the Indian Stamp Act, we find that the expression promissory note will also include a note promising the payment of any sum of money upon any condition or contingency which may or may not be performed or happen. According to the plain language of the two statutes it is obvious that a document which contains a promise to pay on a contingency will not be treated as a promissory note for the purposes of the Negotiable Instruments Act but it may be regarded as such for the purposes of the Indian Stamp Act.

    We have quoted the terms of the statute. It remains now to examine the language of the document in terms of the statute. The document before us clearly acknowledges indebtedness to the extent of Rs. 1,781. It contains a promise to pay that sum on demand and therefore on the face of it satisfies the conditions laid down in the statute to make it a promissory note. It is true that there is a reference in the document to payment of interest of 2 per cent, per mensem. It is also true that there is a reference in the document that under accounts the sum which was acknowledged was due. In our judgment these are not vital matters in the document. The sunrounding circumstances also favour the conclusion that the document was regarded by the parties as a promissory note.

    Certain sale transactions had taken place in the year 1930, the last of which—a cash transaction—was in 1931. In the beginning of 1933 the parties met and settled accounts. It is common ground that after this meeting on 14th February, 1933, there were no further transactions between the parties. Parties having met on 14th February, 1933 and having examined the accounts came to the conclusion that Rs. 1,781 was due from the defendants to the plaintiff and a document was executed on that day in the language which we have quoted above. On this document a stamp of 0-3-6 was put in. It will be noted that the stamp required for a receipt or acknowledgment is only one anna. Having regard to the value of the promissory note the correct stamp should be of four annas, but in our opinion it was a mere oversight not to put in a stamp of 0-4-0 and in using a stamp of 0-3-6 the intention of the parties undoubtedly was to treat the document as promissory note. In the plaint itself the plaintiff has described the document as a promissory note. In our judgment the true view of the transactions is that on 14th February, 1933, the parties closed their accounts finally. They found that Rs. 1,781 was due to the plaintiff from the defendants. The defendants were not in a position to liquidate this demand and in order to satisfy it they executed a document by which the defendants unconditionally undertook to pay the amount on demand and until the amount was paid, to pay interest of 2 per cent, per mensem. It was the intention of the parties that the accounts should be finally closed and henceforward the document which we are considering should be taken as a record of a loan transaction carrying interest between the parties. It is not suggested that this document was a receipt of any kind. The only other alternative is that it may have been a pure and simple acknowledgment or it may have been a promissory note. In the schedules of the Stamp Act acknowledgment is described in schedule 1, article 1 and it says: “Acknowledgment of a debt exceeding twenty rupees in amount or value, written or signed by, or on behalf of, a debtor in order to supply evidence of such debt in any book (other than a banker's pass book) or on a separate piece of paper when such book or paper is left in the creditor's possession: provided that such acknowledgment does not contain any promise to pay the debt or any stipulation to pay interest or to deliver any goods or other property.” It may be said that this is not an exhaustive definition of acknowledgment and we agree, but the fact remains that the document which we are construing contains an express promise to pay. It is a great deal more than mere acknowledgment and it will be a question of fact in each case whether a particular document is to be regarded as an acknowledgment or promise, and in order to decide this question it will have to be seen what was the primary intention of the parties and what were the real characteristics of the document. We regard in this particular case the reference to account, as matters of no primary importance; and we think that in its true characteristics the document was a promissory note within the meaning of the statute.

    Both the courts below have relied upon a decision of this Court in Bibbo v. Gokaran Singh(1) in treating this document as a promissory note. No doubt in a certain way the case does support the view which the courts below have taken of the document, but no useful purpose will be served by examining the language of the document in that case and comparing it with the present case. Each case has to be considered on the language of the document which is employed in it.

    Mr. M.L Chaturvedi, the learned counsel for the appellant, contends that in order to decide whether a particular document is or is not a promissory note it has to be shown that it is negotiable. Further, he contends that promissory notes must be in the form of a commercial document which can be easily negotiated in markets. Lastly he contends that it must contain an unconditional undertaking to pay and his argument is that in this particular document there is no unconditional undertaking to pay and the liability to payment depended upon the validity of accounts which could be challenged by the persons who had made them. For these contentions he has relied on the authority of two recent cases of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mohammad Akbar Khan v. Attar Singh, and Karam Chand v. Mir Ahmad Aziz Ahmad(2).

    We do not think that either of these two cases supports the argument of Mr. Chaturvedi in the form in which he has put it. The earlier of these two cases was a case in which a deposit was made by the plaintiff with the defendants of a very large sum of money and on the date when the deposit was made a document was passed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff which was called a receipt and which bore a one anna stamp— the stamp which is requisite for a receipt—and which was in the following words: “This receipt is hereby executed by Bhai Hira Singh Attar Singh Kharbanda, residents of Hoti for Rs. 43,900, half of which amount comes to Rs. 21,950, received from the firm of Lala Duni Chand Hari Chand Sethi for and on behalf of Captain Muhammad Akbar Khan of Hoti. This amount to be payable after two years. Interest at the rate of Rs. 5-4-0 per cent, per year to be charged. Dated this 20th day of Chetar, Sambat 1974, corresponding to 1st April, 1917. Stamp has been duly affixed.”

    With reference to this document their Lordships observe as follows: “Their Lordships prefer to decide this point on the broad ground that such a document as this is not and could not be intended to be brought within a definition relating to documents which are to be negotiable instruments. Such documents must come into existence for the purpose only of recording an agreement to pay money and nothing more, though of course they may state the consideration. Receipts and agreements generally are not intended to be negotiable, and serious embarrassment would be caused in commerce if the negotiable net were cast too wide. This document plainly is a receipt for money containing the terms on which it is to be repaid. It is not without significance that the defendants who drew it, and who were experienced moneylenders, did not draw it on paper with an impressed stamp as they would have had to if the document were a promissory note, and that they affixed a stamp which is sufficient if the document is a simple receipt. Being primarily a receipt, even if coupled with a promise to pay it is not a promissory note.”

    In the later case of Karam Chand v. Mir Ahmad Aziz Ahmad the document was more or less in the same form. The document which is now before us is wholly distinguishable from the document before their Lordships of the Privy Council. We have already stated above the circumstances in which the present document came into existence and we have already pointed out above that it cannot possibly be regarded as a receipt or a mere acknowledgment. On these two grounds alone it is wholly distinguishable from the case which was before their Lordships of the Privy Council.

    Under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act a promissory note, the payment of which depends upon a contingency, is permissible, whereas under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act it is not, and, as we have said above, there may be instruments which may not be regarded as promissory notes for the purposes of the Negotiable Instruments Act but may be regarded as such for the purposes of the Indian Stamp Act. In this country after the closing of account and in acknowledgment of liability which arises thereunder, often documents are passed which are variously called sarkkats or promissory notes. Many of these documents are inartistically drawn and it may not be possible to regard them strictly as mercantile documents. Very often in practice such instruments are not negotiated. We do not, however, think that their Lordship's intended to cast any doubt upon the validity of such instruments as promissory notes in the two cases mentioned above.

    It was further contended that the law as stated, in Bibbo v. Gokaran Singh, and cases of that kind, may now be taken as overruled, if not expressly, by necessary implication as a result of the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the two cases mentioned above. It is true that their Lordships in those two judgments have disapproved of certain cases decided by Indian High Courts. But those were cases, we take it, in which instruments under consideration were neither in name nor in substance promissory notes; they were cases of instruments like receipt, agreement and memorandum which were treated by the parties not as promissory notes and which recorded a different kind of transaction altogether; cases in which along with an acknowledgment of debt and a promise to pay there were other covenants also and simply because there happened to be in those documents a recital of acknowledgment of debt and a promise to pay they were held by courts in India to be promissory notes. Their Lordships in their judgment approvingly refer to an English case of the Court of Appeal,’ Mortgage Insurance Corporation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, in which a statement of existence of debt with a promise to pay occurring in a transaction of insurance was held not to be a promissory note and they disapprovingly refer to an Indian case in Manick Chund v. Jomoona Doss(3) in which a similar statement in a sale transaction was held to be a promissory note. The instruments before their Lordships in the two cases referred to above were clearly receipts and those receipts were not intended by the parties to be treated as promissory notes. In our view the main question in each case is to consider not whether the instrument is negotiable or not, though ordinarily negotiability of an instrument is a good test to determine whether a document is a promissory note or not; but to consider whether in substance and in primary intention of the parties the document was or was not a promissory note and whether it contained necessary recitals or whether it was intended to record a different kind of transaction altogether. In our view the law laid down in Bibbo v. Gokaran Singh is not in any way affected by the two pronouncements of their Lordships mentioned above.

    There remains to notice two other arguments of Mr. Chaturvedi. He contends that the reference to the pre-existing accounts in the promissory note makes the liability stated therein to be a contingent one. We do not agree with this contention. In our view the reference to account was with a view to state the consideration of the promissory note and such a statement of consideration does not make the liability in the promissory note a contingent one, nor does it make the instrument any the less a promissory note. It is further contended that the promissory note was not in favour of a person “certain” within the meaning of the statute. This point was not raised in the courts below and is not noticed in their judgments but we have permitted it to be canvassed and in our view there is no substance in this contention either. The promissory note is in the name of the Glass Works which is a trading name of the plaintiff. The transactions between the parties took place under that trading name and section 5 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides as follows: “The person to whom it is clear that the direction is given, or that payment is to be made may be a ‘certain person’, within the meaning of this section and section 4, although he is misnamed or designated by description only.” In our view, by the description given of the payee in the promissory note under consideration the plaintiff was clearly intended to be described and the description is sufficient for the purposes of identification.

    The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.

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    Comments

    Sushil Chandra Chaturvedi v. Wali-Ullah
    (Nov 28, 1940)