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  • article 110 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act while article 116
  • section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In Act IX of 1871, article 115,
  • article 65 or article 97 of the second schedule of Act XV of 1877
  • article 116 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act.
  • SECTION 25 PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
  • SECTION 68 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section 65 of the Indian Contract Act.
  • section 4 of the Indian Contract Act
  • article 116 of the Limitation Act
  • article 62 of the Limitation Act
  • SECTION 65 CONTRACT ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • article 110 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act while article 116
  • section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In Act IX of 1871, article 115,
  • article 65 or article 97 of the second schedule of Act XV of 1877
  • article 116 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act.
  • SECTION 25 PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
  • SECTION 68 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section 65 of the Indian Contract Act.
  • section 4 of the Indian Contract Act
  • article 116 of the Limitation Act
  • article 62 of the Limitation Act
  • SECTION 65 CONTRACT ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff brought a suit in the Court of Small Causes at Bulandshahr for recovery of Rs. 200 with interest, based on a bond dated 7 May 1934. The suit was filed on 6 May 1940. The defendant contended that the document dated 7 May 1934 was a zar-i-peshgi lease (a usufructuary mortgage) of exproprietary plots for seven years, which the defendant said was invalid; the defendant also pleaded that the plaintiff had been in possession for five years, had given up possession, and that the suit was barred by limitation. The learned Judge of the small causes court framed three issues; the first issue—whether the plaintiff had a right to sue—was decisive. The learned Judge held that the zar-i-peshgi lease was void, that the plaintiff could claim a refund under section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, but that a suit under that section should have been brought within three years and, because the suit was filed nearly six years after the contract date, it was barred by limitation. The plaintiff filed the present revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act seeking to set aside the dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff had a right to sue on the instrument dated 7 May 1934, given that the instrument was alleged to be a void zar-i-peshgi lease (usufructuary mortgage).
  2. Whether the personal covenant for repayment in the instrument was separable and enforceable as a simple bond despite the invalidity of the mortgage portion.
  3. Whether the suit was barred by limitation and, if so, which article(s) of the Limitation Act applied (in particular the applicability of article 62 versus article 116 where the document is registered).

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant / Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The principal submission was that a clause in the 7 May 1934 document provided that if the lessee could not obtain or retain possession for reasons attributable to the lessor or third parties or due to legal defect, the lessee was entitled to recover the lease money with interest; this covenant was separable from the illegal part of the instrument.
  • Even if part of the instrument constituted an invalid mortgage, the repayment covenant could be treated as an independent promise—a simple bond—on which a suit could be maintained.
  • The plaintiff also relied on the alternative remedy under section 65 of the Indian Contract Act to claim a refund if the contract were void; prior Judicial Committee decisions were cited in support of recovery under section 65.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The document of 7 May 1934 was a zar-i-peshgi lease (usufructuary mortgage) and therefore invalid; no cause of action arose on such an invalid document.
  • The plaintiff had been in possession for five years and had relinquished possession; consequently, the suit was barred by limitation.
  • Implicitly, where the mortgage/lease portion was illegal, any suit predicated on obligations arising from that illegal transaction should fail.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ghassu v. Babu Ram (Full Bench) The Court had consistently held that zar-i-peshgi lease transactions are invalid and the law should not be unsettled. The court took as a starting assumption that the zar-i-peshgi lease was a void transaction, citing the Full Bench's reluctance to unsettle settled law.
Tulshi Ram v. Sat Narain Principle that a suit on the personal covenant must fail where the main document is illegal and the alternative promise cannot be separated from the illegal document. The court considered this authority but distinguished it on facts (different type of suit and reliance on section 68 of the Transfer of Property Act) and held it did not control the present case.
Har Prasad Tiwari v. Sheo Gobind Tiwari Held that where a usufructuary mortgage was void under section 4 of the Indian Contract Act, the personal covenant in the mortgage was not enforceable. The court explained that Har Prasad Tiwari involved a suit under section 68 of the Transfer of Property Act with the mortgagee in possession; the present case was different and the cited principle was not applied to bar the claim here.
Sitai Rai v. Ram Khelawan Pande Distinction in cases where some of the mortgaged property was transferable and some not; refusal to grant decree for possession over non-transferable occupancy holdings and refusal to award proportionate share for properties not delivered. Discussed as part of the line of authorities on mixed-property mortgages; used to illustrate distinctions courts draw but not directly dispositive of the present case.
Rajendra Prasad v. Ram Jatan Rai Distinction between executory and executed contracts; when occupancy holdings are included they may be omitted and mortgage treated as of transferable property only. Referred to for the proposition that occupancy holdings can be omitted from consideration; discussed but not applied as controlling authority in this case.
Dip Narain Singh v. Nageshar Prasad (Full Bench) Distinction between executed and executory contracts and between contracts merely void and those expressly forbidden by law; decision turned on inclusion of two kinds of property. Cited and noted that its decision rested on the mixed nature of property in that case; the court declined to examine the matter further in the present appeal.
Tricomdas Cooverji v. Gopinath Jiu Thakur (Privy Council) Held that article 116 of the Limitation Act applies to claims arising from registered agreements and that the period of limitation for such registered instruments is six years. The court considered this authority in relation to whether article 116 extended the limitation period for a registered document; the court expressed doubt about extending Tricomdas to the specific situation where a contract is void ab initio, but did not finally decide the point because it held the covenant valid in this case.
Kishen Lal v. Kinlock Application of article 116 in a case falling under articles (such as article 65 or 97) of an earlier Act; used to support the view that article 116 can apply to registered instruments. Cited as part of the authority supporting the application of article 116 to registered documents.
Jhamman Singh v. Amar Singh Adopted the broader principle from Tricomdas that article 116 applies to registered agreements. Referenced as a Bench of this Court that followed the Privy Council's approach; used in discussing the period of limitation applicable to registered instruments.
Hanuman Kamat v. Hanuman Mandur (Privy Council) Held that article 62 of the Limitation Act applies where the consideration had entirely failed from the beginning; article 97 applies where consideration fails later. The court applied this principle to conclude that if the contract were void ab initio the appropriate article would be article 62 and the period would run from the date of the contract (7 May 1934).
Har Nath Kuer v. Inder Bahadur Singh; Annada Mohan Roy v. Gour Mohan Mullick (Judicial Committee) Judicial Committee decisions relied upon in relation to recovery under section 65 of the Indian Contract Act for refunds where contracts are void. The plaintiff relied on these cases to support recovery under section 65; the court observed that even if no personal covenant existed the plaintiff could have claimed refund under section 65 and then examined which article of limitation would apply.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by accepting the settled assumption—based on earlier decisions and a Full Bench ruling—that zar-i-peshgi lease transactions are void. Starting from that premise, the court addressed whether the repayment covenant in the 7 May 1934 instrument could nonetheless be enforced as a personal covenant separable from the illegal mortgage portion.

The court examined precedents (notably Tulshi Ram and Har Prasad Tiwari) that hold, in particular factual settings, that a personal covenant cannot be enforced where the main contract is illegal. Those cases involved mortgagees who had been put in possession and suits brought under section 68 of the Transfer of Property Act to recover on the ground of insufficiency of security; the courts in those cases held that the entire contract was illegal and the personal covenant was not enforceable. The present case, however, was materially different: the plaintiff had not brought the suit under section 68 of the Transfer of Property Act, had never been put in possession of the mortgaged property, and proceeded on the basis that he made a loan which, in the absence or failure of security, gave rise to a right to recover as on a simple bond.

On the facts before it the court concluded that the covenant as to repayment was entirely separable from the mortgage portion of the deed and could be treated independently. Because the deed was registered, the court held that article 116 of the Limitation Act would apply and therefore the suit, having been filed within six years, should be deemed filed in time.

The court also considered the alternative argument that, if the personal covenant were not enforceable, the plaintiff could claim a refund under section 65 of the Indian Contract Act. In that scenario the court analysed which article of the Limitation Act would govern: relying on Hanuman Kamat v. Hanuman Mandur, the court noted that where consideration fails from the beginning article 62 applies and the limitation period runs from the date of the contract (here 7 May 1934). The court discussed whether article 116 (six years for registered instruments) could extend the period applicable under article 62 (three years) but expressed doubt about extending Tricomdas to this precise situation; because the court found the covenant to be valid and enforceable, it did not decide that article-116-versus-article-62 question finally.

The court reviewed other authorities dealing with mixed-property mortgages (transferable and non-transferable properties) and distinctions between executory and executed contracts. Those authorities were discussed to show the jurisprudential landscape, but the court explained they were not determinative of the present appeal and did not require further examination in this case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court SET ASIDE the decree of the lower court and DECREED the plaintiff's suit for recovery of Rs. 200 with interest, awarding costs in all the courts.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiff's claim was allowed and the dismissal by the small causes court was reversed; the plaintiff obtains a decree with costs.
  • Limitation outcome: On the facts the court held the plaintiff's suit was not barred by limitation because the covenant was treated as a valid, separable obligation and, as the document was registered, the suit was within the applicable six-year period.
  • Scope and limits: The court distinguished earlier authorities that had refused to enforce personal covenants attached to illegal mortgages, and it expressly declined to finally resolve whether article 116 extends the limitation period applicable to cases where a contract is void ab initio—the court did not broadenly overrule prior law but applied the separability principle to the instrument before it.

    Ode Ram v. Chhida Singh

    Ismail and Malik, JJ.:— This revision has arisen out of a suit brought by the plaintiff for recovery of Rs. 200 with interest thereon in the court of small causes at Bulandshahr. The suit having been dismissed the plaintiff has filed this revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The suit was, according to the plaintiff, on the basis of a bond, dated the 7th of May, 1934, for Rs. 200 and the plaintiff brought the suit on the 6th of May, 1940, for the recovery of the amount and for interest thereon.

    The defendant alleged that the document dated the 7th of May, 1934, was a zar-i-peshgi lease of exproprietary plots for a period of seven years. The zar-i-peshgi lease or mortgage was, therefore, invalid and the plaintiff had no cause of action to maintain the suit. The defendant had further pleaded that the plaintiff had remained in possession for five years and had himself given up possession and that the suit was barred by limitation.

    The learned Judge framed three issues of which only the first issue is relevant, as to whether the plaintiff had a right to sue. On the other two issues the learned judge decided in plaintiff's favour. As regards the first issue the learned Judge held that the zar-i-peshgi lease was a void document and therefore no suit could be brought on the basis thereof but the plaintiff was entitled to a refund of the sum of Rs. 200 paid by him under section 65 of the Contract Act. But a suit under that section should have been brought within three years of the contract, the suit having been filed almost at the end of six years, he held that it was barred by limitation.

    Learned counsel for the applicant has urged before us that the suit was wrongly dismissed on the ground of limitation and that the suit should have been decreed.

    Learned counsel for the applicant relies on a term in the document, dated the 7th of May, 1934, to the effect that in case the lessee is not able to get possession of the property or is dispossessed on account of any action taken by the lessor or by any third party or on account of any legal defect or flaw, the lessee will be entitled to recover the lease money with interest thereon. Learned counsel argues that even though that part of the lease under which the plots were given as a sort of security for the loan may be bad, yet this part of the covenant was entirely separable from the first part and should be enforced. His argument is that the real transaction between the parties was that of a loan and if for some reason the security given under the document was not available to the plaintiff the document itself may be taken as a simple bond and a suit may be maintained on the terms contained therein.

    The question about the validity of such transactions has been agitated in the courts in this province now for a number of years and so far as we can find this Court has always held that such transactions were invalid. The Board of Revenue has taken the other view that a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding by a tenant was only voidable against the landlord and as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee it was a perfectly valid transaction. These cases were recently considered by a Full Bench of this Court reported in Ghassu v. Babu Ram(1) where this Court held that if the matter had been res integra the Bench might have examined the question in detail but it was no longer possible to unsettle the law and to go back to first principles.

    We have, therefore, to start with this assumption that the zar-i-peshgi lease was a void transaction. The first question for consideration is whether it is possible to base a claim on the personal covenant contained in the bond, the bond being invalid as a mortgage or a zar-i-peshgi lease. Two cases of this Court have been cited before us for the proposition that a suit on the personal covenant must also fail as the alternative promise cannot be separated from the main document which was illegal, see Tulshi Ram v. Sat Narain(2) (per Sulaiman and Gokul Prasad, JJ.), and Har Prasad Tiwari…(Plaintiff); v. Sheo Gobind Tiwari…(Defendant).*(3) (per Lindsay and Stuart, JJ.).

    In the case of Har Prasad Tewari a usufructuary mortgage had been executed of certain occupancy holdings. The mortgagee was put in possession of the property. He subsequently lost two-thirds of the mortgaged property as his mortgagor was the owner only to the extent of one-third. He thereupon brought a suit under section 68 of the Transfer of Property Act on the ground that the security had become insufficient and he was, therefore, entitled to recover the mortgage debt and claimed interest at 2 per cent per mensem in accordance with the covenant entered in the deed. The court held that the entire contract of mortgage was void under section 4 of the Indian Contract Act and the personal covenant in the mortgage was therefore not enforceable. The case of Tulshi Ram was almost a similar case. In that case certain occupancy holdings were mortgaged with possession on the 19th of August, 1909. The mortgagee being dispossessed from those holdings brought a suit under section 68 of the Transfer of Property Act and this Court held. “If the plaintiff cannot compel the mortgagor to put him in possession of the occupancy holding lie is not entitled to recover the money on the ground that the mortgagor has failed to carry out the illegal part of the contract.”

    The case before us is of an entirely different nature. Here the plaintiff has not brought the suit under section 68 of the Transfer of Property Act. He does not rely on the mortgage at all and was never put in possession of the mortgaged property. His case is that he made a loan of Rs. 200 to the other side on certain terms and on certain securities. The security having failed he is entitled to recover money as on a simple bond. In the cases cited above suits were filed on the ground that the mortgagors had failed to carry out their part of the contract and the court held that the contract was illegal and a claim on the basis of breach thereof was not maintainable. No such claim has been put forward in the case before us. Further we do not know what the terms of those deeds were as the terms of those deeds are not quoted in the reports. To our mind, the covenant as regards repayment in this case is entirely separable from the mortgage and can be treated as independent of it. The plaintiff has a right to base his claim on the agreement and as it is a registered document article 116 of the Limitation Act would apply and the suit having been filed within six years it should be deemed to have been filed within time.

    Cases have arisen in this Court where a mortgagor included in the mortgage occupancy or exproprietary holdings which were not transferable and other property which was transferable and the question has arisen how far such a mortgage was enforceable. In such cases courts have drawn a distinction between a mortgage or transfer in which the entire property included was not transferable and cases where a part of the property could be validly mortgaged or transferred.

    In Sitai Rai v. Ram Khelawan Pande where a suit was brought on the basis of a mortgage for possession of certain properties which the mortgagor was entitled to mortgage the court refused to give a decree for possession on the ground that he had obtained from the mortgagee possession over occupancy holdings and had retained possession thereof and also refused to grant to the mortgagee a decree for the proportionate share of the mortgage money claimed as against the properties possession of which had not been delivered.

    In Rajendra Prasad…(Plaintiff); v. Ram Jatan Rai…(Defendant).*, Richards, C.J, drew a distinction between executory and executed contracts and also stressed the point that by reason of the inclusion of the occupancy holdings in the mortgage all that could be said was that those occupancy holdings must be omitted from consideration and it must be deemed that the mortgage was only of the fixed rate holdings and a decree for sale of the fixed rate holdings to pay off the entire mortgage debt was passed. These cases were considered in a Full Bench case of this Court in Dip Narain Singh v. Nageshar Prasad. In the case of Dip Narain Singh certain occupancy holdings along with certain other transferable property had been included in a mortgage. The learned Chief Justice drew a distinction between executed and executory contracts and between contracts which were merely void and which were expressly forbidden or prohibited by law. He came to the conclusion that a mortgage of an occupancy holding was not expressly forbidden or prohibited by law but it was merely void. But after having made that observation, the learned Chief Justice did not consider the matter further and the decision is merely based on the fact that properties of two kinds (i.e, transferable and not transferable) were included in the transaction before him. It is not necessary to examine this matter further and in greater detail. In this case we have already held that the principle laid down in the cases of Tulshi Ram and Har Prasad Tewari does not apply and the plaintiff is entitled to bring a suit on the covenant contained in the deed.

    The learned counsel for the plaintiff applicant has urged that even if the contract is void he is entitled to claim the amount under section 65 of the Contract Act and relies on the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Har Nath Kuer v. Inder Bahadur Singh and Annada Mohan Roy v. Gour Mohan Mullick(4). To our mind, even if there was no personal covenant the plaintiff could have claimed the refund of the amount under section 65 of the Indian Contract Act. The question in that case would be as to what article of the Limitation Act was applicable and when should the cause of action for the recovery of the money be deemed to arise.

    In this particular case the parties should have known that the transaction was not authorised by law and therefore there is no question of the contract becoming void at a later date than the date of the contract itself. In the well known case of Hanuman Kamat v. Hanuman Mandur their Lordships of the Judicial Committee have laid down that article 62 of the Limitation Act will be applicable in a case where the consideration had entirely failed from the, beginning. If, however, the consideration failed later then the article applicable would be article 97. In the case before us article 62 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and the period of limitation would begin to run from the date of the contract which in this case was the 7th of May, 1934 The contract, however, being registered the question that we have to consider is whether the period of three years given in article 62 is not extended to six years under article 116 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act. The question how far article 116 applied where there were registered deeds was considered by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Tricomdas Cooverji v. Gopinath Jiu Thakur. That was a suit for recovery of certain rent which had been reserved under a registered document. The question argued before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee was that a claim for rent came under article 110 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act while article 116 must be confined to cases for “compensation for breach of a contract in writing registered.” Article 116 was, therefore, alleged to be applicable only to claims for unliquidated damages as in section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In Act IX of 1871, article 115, provided three years for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not herein specially provided for, but the words “not herein specially provided for” were omitted from article 117 which fixed a period of six years for suits on a promise or contract in writing registered. Similarly in Act XV of 1877, article 115, read as follows: “For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered, and not herein specially provided for,” but in article 116 the words “not herein specially provided for” were again omitted. Their Lordships pointed out the broad distinction between unregistered and registered instruments and held that if a claim arises on account of a registered agreement between the parties the period of limitation should be six years under article 116. Article 116 has also been applied in a case which fell under article 65 or article 97 of the second schedule of Act XV of 1877 in Kishen Lal v. Kinlock by a Bench of this Court. A Bench of this Court consisting of Sir Lal Gopal Mukerji and Rachhpal Singh, JJ., in Jhamman Singh v. Amar Singh observed as follows: “There is, however, a wider view of the case and which really concludes the matter. It had been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Tricom Das v. Gopi Nath Ju Thakore, that where an agreement is in writing and has been registered, article 116 would apply, though there might be a shorter period of limitation applicable in the case of a contract made in writing but not registered. The case before their Lordships of the Privy Council was a suit for recovery of rent reserved in a lease.” That was a case where the plaintiff Amar Singh had brought a suit for recover of Rs. 15,992-13-0 from Thakur Jhamman Singh. The amount was due under a decree from Rao Brij Raj ??? Singh. Allegations were that Rao Brij Raj Saran Singh transferred some property to Jhamman Singh for Rs. 69,000, but left a sum of Rs. 40,000 in the hands of Jhamman Singh for payment to Brij Raj Saran Singh and the plaintiff had in execution of his decree attached this sum of Rs. 15,992-13-0. Later on in execution of a decree against Brij Raj Saran Singh the right of Brij Raj Saran Singh to recover the sum of Rs. 40,000 from Jhamman Singh was sold at auction and was purchased by the plaintiff. He after the said purchase filed the suit. This Court held that article 116 of the Limitation Act was applicable and six years period of limitation ran from the date when the defendant undertook to pay the amount to Brij Raj Saran Singh under the sale-deed. In the case before us there was a contract entered into by the parties on the 7th of May, 1934, under which the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 200 to the defendant. If the covenant under which the amount is recoverable is also void then the money could only be claimed under section 65 of the Indian Contract Act. To such a suit where the contract was void in its inception article 62 of the Limitation Act will apply. We doubt whether the principle laid down in the case of Tricomdas Cooverji can be extended to a case of this kind. In view, however, that we have taken that the suit is based on a valid covenant in the deed this point need not be finally considered.

    In this view of the matter the plaintiff's suit was not barred by limitation and should have been decreed. We, therefore, set aside the decree, of the lower court and decree the plaintiff's suit with costs in all the courts.

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    Ode Ram v. Chhida Singh
    (May 9, 1944)