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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

B. Kailash Chand Bhargava, proprietor of "Kailash Electric Mart" at Aligarh, entered into a contract on 25th December 1939 with Pandit Tula Ram (defendant No. 1), who operated a cinema named Pearl Talkies in a building owned by defendant No. 3, B. Kailash Chand. Under the contract, the plaintiff was to install electric fittings in the cinema, with payment terms requiring Rs. 100 immediately, Rs. 100 on the cinema's start date, and the balance of Rs. 1,600 to be paid in monthly installments of Rs. 100. While initial payments were made, subsequent payments were defaulted on by Pandit Tula Ram. Defendant No. 2, Kr. Sushelendra Singh, either took over or partnered in the cinema business.

The plaintiff filed suit on 7th January 1941, seeking a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from using the electric installations and preventing obstruction to the plaintiff's removal of the fittings. The suit did not claim damages specifically but reserved the right to file a separate suit for them later. The suit was contested by all defendants on various grounds.

The court of first instance decided only the issue whether the suit was barred by section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, concluding the suit was not maintainable and that the contract could not be specifically enforced under sections 21(a) and 56(b) of the Specific Relief Act. Consequently, the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the District Judge agreed that an injunction could not be granted but held that under section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff was entitled to compensation. The case was remanded for enquiry into the existence and breach of contract and entitlement to compensation, directing the trial court to award damages if appropriate.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the lower appellate court had jurisdiction to remand the suit and convert it into one for damages simpliciter.
  2. Whether, in a suit where specific performance or injunction is not granted, the plaintiff can be awarded compensation under section 19 of the Specific Relief Act despite no specific prayer for damages in the plaint.
  3. The extent of the court’s discretionary power to award damages in lieu of specific performance or injunction.
  4. Whether the plaintiff can claim damages if he has not abandoned or disentitled himself from specific performance during the suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the lower appellate court acted illegally by remanding the suit and lacked jurisdiction to order a retrial and convert the suit into one for damages simpliciter.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents cited various rulings supporting the lower appellate court's view that when specific performance or injunction is not a proper remedy, the court should either award damages or order an enquiry for damages.
  • They relied on precedents establishing that a plaintiff is not obliged to specifically pray for damages in a suit for specific performance and that courts have discretion to award damages when appropriate.
  • They argued that section 19 of the Specific Relief Act aims to prevent multiplicity of suits and to do complete justice, allowing damages to be awarded even if not specifically claimed.
  • The respondents emphasized that damages can be awarded unless the plaintiff abandons or disentitles himself from specific performance during the suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Callianji Harjivan v. Narsi Tricum When specific performance or injunction is not proper, the court should award damages or order enquiry instead of dismissing the suit. Supported the appellate court’s discretion to remand for enquiry and award damages as an alternative remedy.
Arya Pradeshak Pritinidhi Sabha v. Lahori Mal Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act prevents multiplicity of suits and allows courts to award damages even if not specifically prayed for. Confirmed the discretionary power of courts to award damages in suits for specific performance.
Kalliandas v. Tulsidas Courts have discretionary power to award damages in suits for specific performance. Reinforced the principle that damages may be awarded at the court’s discretion.
K.H Skinner v. Rosy Skinner Plaintiff is not bound to pray specifically for damages; courts have discretion to allow damages as an appropriate remedy. Supported the view that damages can be granted without specific prayer in the plaint.
Ookerjee Cowasjee v. Sabhapathy Mudaliar Under section 21(a) and section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, compensation may be claimed in the alternative even if specific performance is not possible and no damages are prayed for. Validated awarding compensation despite absence of specific prayer for damages.
Krishna Aiyer v. Shamanna Court can award damages in the alternative even if not asked for in the plaint. Supported the discretionary power to award damages in lieu of specific performance.
U Aung Din v. B.K Haider Consistent with the principle that damages may be awarded in suits for specific performance. Reinforced discretionary award of damages.
Satyataran v. Jyoti Prosad Similar principle on awarding damages in specific performance suits. Supported the court’s discretionary power to award damages.
Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon Damages in lieu of specific performance cannot be awarded if plaintiff abandons or disentitles himself to specific performance during the suit. Defined the limitation on awarding damages in substitution for specific performance.
Hern v. Mill Similar limitation on awarding damages if plaintiff abandons specific performance. Supported the principle limiting damages award based on plaintiff’s conduct.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the legal framework under the Specific Relief Act, particularly sections 19, 21(a), 42, and 56(b), and relevant precedents. It noted that the original suit seeking injunction and specific performance was not maintainable due to the contract's incapacity for specific enforcement and the plaintiff’s failure to meet payment obligations.

However, the court emphasized the discretionary power of courts to award damages under section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, even if the plaintiff did not specifically pray for them, to avoid multiplicity of suits and to do complete justice between parties. The court found the lower appellate court's remand for enquiry into breach and compensation consistent with this principle.

The court also highlighted the limitation that damages cannot be awarded if the plaintiff abandons or disentitles himself from specific performance during the suit, but found no such act here. The court further noted parallel principles in English law supporting the discretionary award of damages in lieu of injunctions or specific performance.

On this basis, the court concluded that the lower appellate court had correctly exercised its jurisdiction and discretion in remanding the suit for enquiry and awarding compensation.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL and upheld the order of remand passed by the lower appellate court.

The decision confirms that where specific performance or injunction is not an appropriate remedy, courts have jurisdiction and discretion to remand the case for enquiry and to award damages, even if not specifically claimed in the plaint, provided the plaintiff has not abandoned the claim for specific performance. The ruling reaffirms the court’s power to prevent multiplicity of suits and to provide complete justice by awarding alternative reliefs. No new precedent was set beyond affirming established principles.

    Sushelendra Pal Singh v. Kailash Chand Bhargava

    Wali-ullah, J.:— This is a defendant's appeal against an order of remand passed by the learned District Judge. The relevant facts necessary for the purposes of this appeal are these.

    B. Kailash Chand Bhargava is the proprietor of “Kailash Electric Mart” at Aligarh. The defendant No. 1, Pandit Tula Ram, started a cinema of the name of Pearl Talkies. This cinema was housed in a building owned by B. Kailash Chand, defendant No. 3. The plaintiff and Pandit Tula Ram, defendant No. 1, entered into a contract on the 25th of December, 1939, where under the plaintiff was to put up electric installations in the cinema hall and it was provided that Pandit Tula Ram would pay Rs. 100 at once and Rs. 100 on the day that the cinema started and that thereafter the balance of the total amount of Rs. 1,600—the costs of installation—would be paid off by him at the rate of Rs. 100 per month. In case of even one default in payment, it was provided, that the plaintiff will have the right to remove his electric installation. It appears that Rs. 100 were paid at the time of the agreement. Rs. 100 was further paid on the day that the cinema started but thereafter no payment was made by Pandit Tula Ram. Subsequently it appears that Kr. Sushelendra Singh, defendant No. 2, either took over the cinema business from Pandit Tula Ram or entered into a partnership with him. On these facts the plaintiff filed the suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, on the 7th of January, 1941, and he prayed for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from using the electric installations in the cinema house and also restraining them from, obstructing the plaintiff in removing the electric fittings. He 1 prayed for no specific relief with regard to damages but said that he would file another suit later on if he considered it necessary (vide para. 6 of the plaint). The suit was contested by all the three defendants on various grounds. It is not necessary to go into the details of all the pleas set up in defence. The court of first instance decided only one issue, namely issue No. 10: “Whether the suit is barred by section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.” It found that the plaintiff's suit as framed was not maintainable. It also found in effect that the contract dated the 25th of December, 1939, between the parties could not be specifically enforced and therefore no injunction could be granted in view of the provisions of sections 21(a) and 56(b) of the Specific Relief Act. In view of these findings the suit was dismissed by the court of first instance. On appeal the learned District Judge concurred in the findings of the court of first instance and held that the prayer for an injunction could not be granted. He, however, held, in view of the rulings cited before him and the provisions of section 19 of the Specific Relief Act that although the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief specifically claimed, namely an injunction, he was nevertheless entitled to compensation. He accordingly set adide the decree of the court of first instance and remanded the case to the court of first instance for an enquiry (1) whether there was a contract between the parties which had been broken by any of the defendants and (2) whether the plaintiff was entitled to compensation for that breach. He directed the court of first instance to award compensation to the plaintiff, if the court found that he was entitled to compensation for the breach of the contract in question.

    In this second appeal before us it has been strongly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the lower appellate court has acted illegally in remanding the suit and that it had no jurisdiction to order retrial and to convert the suit into one for damages simpliciter.

    The learned counsel for the respondents has, however, cited before us various rulings which fully support the view of the law taken by the lower appellate court. In Callianji Harjivan v. Narsi Tricum(1), it has been held by a Bench of two learned Judges, in circumstances very similar to those of the case before us, that when the court holds in its discretion that neither specific performance of the agreement nor an injunction against the defendant would be a proper remedy on the ground that pecuniary compensation is an adequate remedy it ought not to dismiss the suit but should either itself award damages or order an enquiry with regard to the same. The plaintiff being held to be entitled to a remedy, the proper remedy should be awarded. Again in Arya Pradeshak Pritinidhi Sabha v. Lahori Mal(2), it has been held by a Bench of two learned Judges of the Lahore High Court with reference to section 19 of the Specific Relief Act that the object of the rule embodied in the section is clearly to prevent a multiplicity of suits and to do complete justice between the parties. It has been held, following the case of Callianji above mentioned and the case of Kalliandas v. Tulsidas(3), that the plaintiff is not obliged in a suit for specific performance to pray specifically for damages and the court has always a discretionary power to award damages in a suit for specific performance and ought to exercise that discretion when it is of the opinion that damages should be given. Their Lordships further referred to order VII, rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides that it is not necessary to ask in the plaint for general or other relief which may always be given as the court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for. Again it has been held in K.H Skinner v. Rosy Skinner(4), that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff is not bound to pray specifically for damages either in addition or in substitution. He has a choice of remedies open to him to apply for and the court has discretion to allow damages if it is of the opinion that damages are the appropriate remedy. Again in Ookerjee Cowasjee v. Sabhapathy Mudaliar(5), it has been held that in a case where the claim falls under section 21(a) of the Specific Relief Act and cannot be specifically enforced the plaintiff is entitled to claim compensation in the alternative under section 19 and under the explanation to that section the court is not precluded from granting it by the circumstances that the contract has become incapable of specific performance and that there is no prayer for such relief in the plaint. In Krishna Aiyer v. Shamanna(6) it was held that the court can in such a case award damages in the alternative though not asked for in the plaint. To the same effect are the decisions of the Rangoon High Court in U Aung Din v. B.K Haider and of two learned Judges of the Patna High Court in Satyataran v. Jyoti Prosad.

    The broad ground upon which these decisions rest may be stated thus: If upon the facts pleaded in the plaint a case is made out which would lay the foundation for the relief granted, although not specifically asked for, the plaintiff is entitled to the relief which those facts will sustain, under the general prayer contained in the plaint. But there is, however, one important limitation. As held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon if during the progress of the suit and before the final hearing the plaintiff abandons his claim to specific performance or disentitles himself to that relief by some act on his part, he cannot claim or be awarded by the court damages in lieu of the specific performance of the contract. Jurisdiction to award damages in substitution of the relief for specific performance remains so long as the plaintiff does no act on his part to disentitle himself to a decree for specific performance. To the same effect is the decision given as long ago as 1806 by Lord Erskinf, L.C, in Hern v. Mill.

    The position is substantially the same in English law. The High Court of Justice in England has, since the passing of the Judicature Act of 1873, power under its general jurisdiction to award either damages or an injunction. The power of awarding damages in lieu of an injunction is a discretionary power which must be exercised with an intimate knowledge of the facts (vide Halsbury, Hailsham edition, volume 18, para 27, pages 20 and 21). The court can exercise its discretion to award damages either in addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction, whether or not damages have also been specifically claimed (vide Halsbury, Hailsham edition, volume 18, para 33, page 23).

    In view of the above authorities we are quite clear in our minds that the court below followed the correct view of the law in passing the order of remand that it has done. There is therefore no force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. The cross-objections also fail and are dismissed with costs.

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    Comments

    Sushelendra Pal Singh v. Kailash Chand Bhargava
    (Mar 26, 1945)