Boys and King, JJ.:— The plaintiffs appellants are M.B Singh and Co., colliery proprietors, and it is admitted that they supplied coal to the defendants, Sircar and Co.
[A part of the judgment, not material for the purpose of this report, has been omitted here.]
A finding of fact is that the plaintiff company supplied coal at some date prior to the 5th of April, 1922. The suit on a balance of account was filed on the 6th of April, 1925. Prima facie, therefore, the claim was barred by limitation. The plaintiffs, however, relied on three payments alleged to have been made to them on the 12th of April, 1922, the 1st of May, 1922 and the 22nd of June, 1922. It is on the basis of the transactions evidenced by three cheques that the plaintiffs claimed that their suit was saved from being barred by limitation. We have seen these three cheques, Exhibits 9, 10 and 11 … The trial court's judgment proceeds on the view, and obviously correct view, that these cheques were drawn by the defendant company in favour of the plaintiff company. It says, while discussing the cheques:—“In the present case the plaintiffs received payments for the three cheques and the cheques being in the handwriting of the defendant himself, the requirements of section 20 of the Limitation Act are complied with.”. [The judgment, after pointing out that some of the facts relating to these three cheques were misconceived by the lower appellate court, and how such misconception arose, proceeded.] The trial court gave the plaintiffs a decree. The lower appellate court allowed the defendants' appeal and dismissed the suit, holding it to be barred by limitation and, relying upon the decisions in Mackenzie v. Tiruvengathan and Ram Chander v. Chandi Prasad, declined to decide the case in accordance with the decision in Kedar Nath v. Dina Bandhu.
Two questions have finally emerged for decision. The first question is: Did each or all of the transactions evidenced by these cheques amount to payments within section 20 of the Limitation Act, so as to save limitation? It is not suggested that the amounts of the cheques were to go towards interest and were paid as such. It is contended for the plaintiffs appellants that the admitted facts amount, in the first place, to a payment of part of the principal due. Those facts are that the cheques were drawn by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs presented the cheques immediately for payment and they were honoured and the plaintiffs' account was credited with the amounts of the cheques. It is contended for the defendants that the writing of a cheque and handing it over to the payee does not constitute the embodying of the fact of a payment in the handwriting of the person making the same. It is contended that a cheque only constitutes an order for payment and does not amount to payment. After hearing the arguments of the counsel for the parties and considering the cases to which we have been referred, we are of opinion that it would be laying down a proposition too broadly to say that the mere writing of a cheque and handing it over to and its receipt by the payee will and must always constitute a payment of the amount. It is a matter of common knowledge that a creditor sometimes receives a cheque refusing wholly to regard it as a payment, while, on the other hand, sometimes it is accepted by him as payment. This may be illustrated by what is within the common knowledge of all. A creditor will sometimes give a receipt for the cheque stating that his account has been paid by cheque. On the other hand, he will sometimes acknowledge receipt of the cheque and say that a receipt for the amount will follow when the cheque has been duly honoured and the amount paid to the account of the creditor. In the present case, there is no doubt whatever on the facts that the cheque was received by the creditors plaintiffs in payment of their account so far as the cheques are concerned. We are, therefore, of opinion that there was here a payment such as prima facie would save limitation. It is next urged on behalf of the defendants respondents that the writing, i.e, the cheques, did not comply with, the requirements of the proviso to section 20, It is contended that while the fact of the payment, in view of the answer to the first question, must be admitted to appear in the handwriting of the defendants, the document must further show that the payment was towards part of the principal of the debt due. In support of this contention for the defendants we are referred to the case of Muthiah Chettiar v. Kuttayan Chetty. That case certainly supports the argument of the defendants. It does not, however, discuss the question, but merely follows the decision in Mackenzie v. Tirvengadathan. We were further referred to the case of Ranchordas v. Pestonji. That case has, in our view, no bearing on the question, for in that case, so far as the payment of principal is concerned, there appears to have been no memorandum at all. Other cases referred to for the defendants do not call for mention. On the other hand, there is a decision of two Judges of this Court to which we are referred for the plaintiffs reported in A. Curlender v. Abdul Hamid. The view of the learned Judges in that case was that it was not necessary that in the document in the handwriting of the defendants there should be any statement that the payment was made towards the principal of the debt in question. It was sufficient, if it evidenced a payment. Agreeing with the decision in that case, we would state our reasons as follows. Section 20 provides for cases in which a payment towards interest or a payment towards principal may be proved to save limitation. If there has been nothing in the handwriting of the defendant, as required by the proviso, the only way in which the plaintiff can show that it is open to him to use the payment to save limitation is by proving that at the time it was made it was avowedly made and accepted as a payment towards interest. If it was so made, it does not come within the proviso and no writing is necessary. But if there is no question of the payment being proved to have been made towards interest at the time it was made, then it must be treated as a payment towards principal. This, we think, is the meaning of the words “paid as such” in the first paragraph of section 20(1). The effect then of the first two paragraphs is that unless the creditor can show that, at the time, the amount was paid as interest, it will be treated as having been paid towards the principal. If it is to be treated as having been paid towards the principal, the fact of the payment must be recorded in the handwriting of the debtor. But to hold that there must further be recorded in the handwriting of the debtor the fact that the payment is towards the principal, is to require that something should be inserted in the handwriting of the debtor which ex hypothesi is already presumed. To accept the contention that it is necessary for the fact that the payment is towards part of the principal to be included in the document in the handwriting of the debtor, would further be to read into the section after the words “the fact of the payment” the words “as such”. If the legislature had desired to insert these words, it could very easily have done so. We are, therefore, in accord with the decision of this Court already referred to. Allowing the appeal, we set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and restore that of the trial court. The appellants will have their costs of the appeal and in the court below.