Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit seeking a declaration that a house was debutter (a trust/endowment) property and therefore not alienable. The property originally belonged to the ancestor of Chittaranjan Mukherji, was sold at auction in 1878 to a stranger, and was later transferred to Chittaranjan's father. Chittaranjan's father died when Chittaranjan was a minor (five years old). Chittaranjan was brought up by his uncle Niranjan Mukherji, who acted as certificated guardian.

Around 1902 Chittaranjan attained majority though management and some Government securities remained in Niranjan's hands. On 2 June 1908 Chittaranjan executed a registered deed of release in favour of Niranjan and, on the same day, a deed of endowment dedicating the house in favour of three family idols and appointing his mother as shebait (manager) of those idols. The deed of dedication stated that Chittaranjan had ceased to be owner and that possession had been transferred to his mother, but it also reserved to the donor, his uncle and heirs the power to see that daily worship was duly performed using income from the house. There was no municipal name change or revenue mutation, and Chittaranjan continued to pay municipal taxes.

On 7 July 1909 Chittaranjan and his mother executed a mortgage deed over the property (purporting to act in their own rights and as shebaits), showing the deed of dedication to the mortgagee and stating the loan was for repairs and to pay debts for worship. On 7 March 1910 both executed a deed of revocation stating the 1908 endowment was procured by deception and was not enforceable; the mother signed. Registered notices of revocation were circulated and in 1911 Chittaranjan sought permission to put up scaffolding.

On 13 May 1914 Chittaranjan executed a second mortgage in favour of Shiam Sunder. That mortgage did not expressly mention previous documents but made the mortgagor liable if prior incumbrances were discovered. Shiam Sunder obtained a decree in March 1922 and the property was proclaimed for sale on 20 April 1923. Three days before sale (17 April 1923) Chittaranjan executed another mortgage in favour of the appellant for which he received Rs. 165 on registration and left the balance with the mortgagee to pay the prior mortgagee.

The plaintiff sought to avoid this last mortgage by asserting the property was not transferable (being dedicated). The contesting defendant (respondent in appeal) raised a series of pleas including invalidity of the dedication, undue influence, non-operation of the endowment, revocation, adverse possession for more than 12 years, and that the mortgage-money was for legal necessity and therefore binding on trust property. The Subordinate Judge decreed the plaintiff's claim, holding the dedication valid and not revocable and that limitation did not apply. The defendant appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the deed of endowment executed on 2 June 1908 created a valid and completed dedication (debutter) of the house in favour of the idols.
  2. Whether the deed of revocation executed on 7 March 1910 effectively revoked the 1908 dedication and, if so, whether the subsequent possession amounted to adverse possession sufficient to extinguish the endowment (i.e., application of the 12-year limitation).
  3. Whether mortgages executed by Chittaranjan (including the 1909 mortgage and later mortgages) were effective and binding, including whether any mortgage-money taken for legal necessity bound the trust property.
  4. Whether evidence such as omission to mutate municipal/revenue records, non-production of accounts, or continued acts (payment of municipal taxes, occupation, repairs) should negate the inference of a valid dedication.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff sought to avoid the last mortgage on the ground that the property was not transferable because it had been dedicated as a debutter (trust property) in favour of the idols.

Contesting Defendant's (Respondent/Appellant) Arguments

  • There had been no valid dedication: the deed of endowment was executed under undue influence and misrepresentation (a plea not pressed before the appellate court).
  • The deed of endowment was never acted upon or given effect to; in particular there was no mutation of names and no production of accounts showing income applied to the endowment.
  • The endowment had been duly revoked by the deed of revocation executed in 1910.
  • In any case, there had been adverse possession for more than 12 years against the idols.
  • The amount of the mortgage-money had been taken for purposes of legal necessity and was binding on the trust property.
  • The learned advocate for the appellant also relied strongly on the omissions (no mutation, no accounts) and on precedents to support the contention that these circumstances could negate a valid dedication.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sri Thakurji v. Sukhdeo Singh [1920] 42 All. 395 Cited by appellant's counsel to support the contention that omission of mutation and non-production of accounts may indicate a dedication was not real or effective. The court noted the appellant relied strongly on this Full Bench decision but treated the question of intention to dedicate as one of inference from surrounding circumstances rather than an abstract rule.
Ram Dhan v. Prayag Narain, A.I.R. 1921 All. 37 Followed the principle underlying Sri Thakurji; cited to support arguments about effect of omission to mutate and absence of accounts. The court observed the principle had been followed in this case but emphasized the determination of real intention depends on factual inference from surrounding circumstances.
Jadu Nath v. Sita Ramji, A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 177 Authority where dedication was upheld despite lack of mutation and non-production of accounts. The court relied on this authority to show that absence of mutation or accounts does not necessarily invalidate a dedication; it supported accepting the 1908 deed as a valid dedication given surrounding facts (mother living in house, worship continued).
Maharaja Jagadindra Nath v. Hemanta Kumari Dasi [1904] 32 Cal. 129 Authority establishing that adverse possession can be acquired against idols in respect of property dedicated for their use. The court cited this case in support of the proposition that adverse possession may be acquired against idols and applied that principle to hold adverse possession could run in favour of the donor (Chittaranjan) after revocation.
Man Singh v. Nawlakhbati, A.I.R. 1926 P.C. 2 Followed the principle that adverse possession can operate against property dedicated for idols. The court referred to this as a later following authority reinforcing that adverse possession against idols is possible.
Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das [1910] 37 Cal. 885 Another authority on the principle that adverse possession may be asserted against property dedicated to idols. Used to support the conclusion that adverse possession is available whether the possessor is a stranger or the donor himself.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court proceeded by addressing the issues sequentially and by focusing on the factual matrix surrounding the 1908 deed of endowment, the 1909 mortgage, the 1910 revocation, and subsequent events:

  1. Validity of the 1908 dedication: The court stated that validity depends on whether there was a real intention to dedicate and whether dedication was completed. It emphasized that mere execution and registration may not suffice and that language of the document, surrounding circumstances and subsequent conduct must be considered together.
  2. Weighing the surrounding evidence: The court observed that although there was no mutation in municipal or revenue records and no production of accounts, these omissions did not automatically negative a valid dedication. The court noted that for a city house in Benares mutation may be less important than for zemindari land, and oral evidence showed the mother (appointed shebait) actually lived in the house and worship continued.
  3. Effect of the 1909 mortgage: The court examined the 1909 mortgage deed's language and concluded that its peculiar phraseology reflected an attempt by the mortgagee to secure rights from both parties in both personal and trust capacities. The deed recited the 1908 document had been shown to the mortgagee and stated the loan was for repairs and debts of worship—purposes of the trust. The court did not find a clear assertion in that mortgage that the 1908 endowment was null or revoked; this supported an inference of real intention to dedicate.
  4. Impact of the 1910 revocation and adverse possession: The court accepted that the 1910 revocation expressly stated Chittaranjan had been in proprietary possession and that the endowment had ceased to be effective. From that moment Chittaranjan's possession was adverse as against the idols (for whose interests his mother was shebait). Subsequent acts—application for municipal permission, putting up scaffolding, creation of a 1914 mortgage asserting proprietary interest, a decree and public auction—demonstrated continued possession and assertion of ownership. For over 12 years no one (Niranjan or heirs) intervened to assert the endowment in municipal/revenue records or otherwise.
  5. Legal principle on adverse possession against idols: The court rejected the respondent's argument that the presence of idols in the house precluded adverse possession. Citing authorities (Maharaja Jagadindra Nath, Man Singh, Damodar Das), it held that adverse possession could be acquired against idols and that this principle applies whether the adverse possessor is a stranger or the donor himself. The court found that so long as the possession was to the ouster and knowledge of the shebait (mother), it would mature into title after the prescribed period.
  6. Right of intervention vs. vesting of trust property: The court noted a clause in the deed of dedication authorizing Chittaranjan to ensure proper worship. It held this conferred only a right of intervention and did not vest the trust property in him nor make him a trustee; thus it did not bar him from exercising or acquiring title by adverse possession.
  7. Procedural note on undue influence: The plea that the endowment was procured by undue influence or misrepresentation by Niranjan was not pressed before the appellate court; accordingly the court treated the deed of endowment as duly executed and registered on 2 June 1908 for the purposes of its analysis.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court allowed the appeal. It set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs. The core ruling may be stated as: APPEAL ALLOWED; DECREE SET ASIDE; PLAINTIFF'S SUIT DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the trial court's declaration that the house was an irrevocable endowment and not alienable has been overturned and the plaintiff's claim has been dismissed.
  • The court concluded that (a) the 1908 deed of endowment was not a nullity from its inception; and (b) the 1910 revocation, together with continuing adverse possession and related acts by Chittaranjan for more than 12 years, produced a title by adverse possession which defeated the claim of an unalienable trust in favour of the idols.
  • The opinion does not elaborate any broader doctrinal development beyond applying existing authorities; no new legal principle was announced beyond the application of established precedents concerning (i) the evidential approach to intention to dedicate and (ii) the availability of adverse possession against property dedicated to idols.

    Dasami Sahu v. Param Shameshwar

    1. This is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for a declaration that the house in dispute was debutter or trust property and was not alienable. It originally belonged to the ancestor of the defendant Chittaranjan Mukherji and was sold away at auction and purchased by a stranger in 1878. Later on it was transferred by the auction purchaser to Chittaranjan's father and has been held by the family since then. The father of Chittaranjan died when the latter was a minor five years' old. Ho was brought up by his uncle Niranjan Mukharji who was appointed a certificated guardian. About 1902 Chittaranjan attained majority, but the management and some Government securities, remained in the hands of his uncle Niranjan Mukharji. On 2nd June 1908 a registered deed of release was executed by Chittaranjan in favour of his uncle Niranjan, stating that he had received all the accounts and received back what was due to him. On the same day Chittaranjan executed a deed of endowment dedicating the house in dispute in favour of three family idols and appointing his own mother as the shebait of the said idols. The deed of dedication specifically mentioned that Chittaranjan had ceased to be the owner of the property which had passed to the idols, and that possession had been transferred to his mother who was the shebait. It went on to provide, however, that the donor and his uncle and his heirs would have full power to see to it that the daily worship of the said idols was performed duly and regularly with the income from the said house. It is an admitted fact that no application for change of names was made in the Municipal Board of Banares within the limits of which this house was situated, and it is also admitted that there was no mutation of names in the revenue papers with regard to the land on which the house stood. The subsequent conduct of Chittaranjan further shows that he was paying the municipal taxes.

    2. On 7th July 1909 Chittaranjan and his mother jointly executed a mortgage deed of this property. Chittaranjan described himself as the owner in possession of the premises, and his mother asserted that she had a charge of maintenance on it. They purported to mortgage the property in their own right as well as the shebaits if the idols; and the purpose for which the money was required was to carry out repairs of the house and to pay off the debt which had been contracted for carrying on the worship of the idols. The deed of dedication was shown to the mortgagee. On 7th March 1910 both Chittaranjan and his mother executed a deed, of revocation, stating that Chittaranjan had been in proprietary possession and in enjoyment of the property always, and that it was owing to a deception practised upon him by his uncle that he had been made to execute the document of 2nd Juno 1908, which is not enforcible, and he accordingly cancelled and nullified it by this deed of revocation, and that to this revocation his mother who had been appointed shebait under the deed had agreed to and affixed her signature. It is by one witness that registered notices announcing the revocation were circulated and one of them was sent to Niranjan Mukharji and in 1911 Chittaranjan applied for and obtained permission for putting up a scaffolding.

    3. On 13th May 1914 Chittaranjan made a second mortgage of this property in favour of Shiam Sunder. Neither the previous mortgage-deed nor the deed of endowment nor the deed of revocation was expressly mentioned in this document. But care was taken to make the mortgagor liable in case such prior incumbrances were discovered. Shiam Sunder instituted a suit on the basis of this mortgage-deed and obtained a decree in March 1922. This decree was put in execution and the property was proclaimed to be sold on 20th April 1923. Three days before the date fixed for the sale, a mortgage in favour of the appellant was executed by Chittaranjan, viz: on 17th April 1923. Under this document Chittaranjan received Rs. 165 at the time of registration, and the rest of the amount was left in the hands of the mortgagee for payment of the prior mortgagee, who was described as a creditor on the strength of a hand note as well as the decretal amount.

    4. The plaintiff wanted to avoid this last mortgage-deed by the declaration that the property was not transferable. The contesting defendant pleaded that there had been no valid dedication, that the said deed of endowment had been executed under undue influence and misrepresentation, and that it was never acted upon or given effect to. There was a further plea that it had been duly revoked, and in any case there had been adverse possession for more than 12 years against the idols. Lastly it was pleaded that the amount of the mortgage-money had been taken for purposes of legal necessity and was binding on the trust property.

    5. The learned Subordinate Judge has decreed the claim, holding that there was a valid dedication which could not have been revoked, and that there was no limitation. He has further held that although the amount borrowed might have been for legal necessity, the defendant had not established that he had paid the said amount. The plea of misrepresentation or undue influence alleged to have been exercised by Niranjan on Chittaranjan has not been pressed before us. We must therefore take it that the deed of endowment was duly executed and registered by Chittaranjan on 2nd June 1908.

    6. The question whether it created a valid dedication depends on whether there was a real intention to dedicate the property and the dedication was completed. No doubt there may be circumstances under which the mere execution and registration of a deed of endowment may not amount to a complete dedication and the proceeding may be merely a nominal one. On the other hand it is also clear that if a valid dedication has once been completed there would be no power left in the donor to revoke it, and no assertion on his part or subsequent conduct contrary to such dedication would have the effect of nullifying it. Not only the language of the document but the surrounding circumstances as well as subsequent conduct may be taken into consideration when finding whether there was a real intention to dedicate the property. The learned advocate for the appellant his strongly relied on the circumstance that no mutation took place on the strength of this dedication, and that no attempt has been made to produce accounts which would show that the whole of the income of the house was spent for the purposes of the endowment. He has strongly relied on the Full Bench case of this Court in Sri Thakurji v. Sukhdeo Singh [1920] 42 All. 395. The principle underlying that decision has been followed subsequently by two of the learned Judges in Ram Dhan v. Prayag Narain A.I.R. 1921 All. 37. But the question whether there was a real intention to dedicate the property is a matter of inference from the various circumstances and by no means an abstract question of law. We may point out that in the case of Jadu Nath v. Sita Ramji A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 177 there had also been a dedication not followed by mutation of names and there was a non-production of accounts showing that the wakf had been acted upon. Nevertheless in that case their Lordships of the Privy Council upheld the dedication. In the case before us the omission to apply for mutation of names can be explained to some extent by the circumstance that this was a house property situated in the city of Benares, as regards which the mutation of names may not be of the same importance as that with regard to zemindari property. In any case this omission by itself does not necessarily show that the deed was not acted upon. The oral evidence does indicate that the mother of Chittaran who had been appointed shebait actually lived in this house, and the worship of the idols had been carried on as it had been done before.

    7. We come next to the mortgage-deed of 1909. The phraseology of this document is very curious and in some respects it is contradictory. But it is quite clear to us that this is the result of an anxiety in the mind of the mortgagee to take the mortgage from both Chittaranjan and his mother in both their capacities of owners and trustees. It is on account of this double capacity that the document has been carefully worded. There is no suggestion that the deed of dedication was a nullity or that it has been cancelled. On the other hand it is recited that it was one of the documents which was shown to the mortgagee. The amount borrowed is also stated to have been required for the repairs of the house and to pay off debts incurred for carrying on the worship of the idols. These were purposes of the trust. Both Chittaranjan and his mother are described as shebaits. Although there are recitals to the effect that one is the owner in possession and the other had a charge of maintenance on the premises, we are not satisfied that there was any clear assertion in this document that the deed of endowment had been a nullity from the very beginning or that it had been revoked. From these circumstances the Court below has inferred that there had been a real intention to dedicate the property. We find ourselves unable to differ from that view. We must therefore hold that the deed of 1908 was not a nullity from its very inception.

    8. The next question to consider is whether adverse possession for more than 12 years has put an end to this endowment. Under the deed possession was to pass From Chittaranjan to his mother, who was entitled to live in the house or let it out on rent as the shebait of the idols, and was to spend the income on the worship of those idols. We have already pointed out that no mutation of names followed, and the payment of the municipal taxes continued to be made by Chittaranjan himself. In 1910 Chittaranjan and his mother both joined in executing the deed of revocation by which it was made clear that the executants had agreed that the endowment had ceased to be effective. That deed further recited that Chittaranjan had himself been in proprietary possession and in enjoyment of the property. From that moment therefore the character of the possession of Chittaranjan over the house must be deemed to have been adverse as against the idols, of whom his mother was the shebait. It was after this that Chittaranjan applied to the Municipal Board as owner of the house for permission to make additions, and he did put up a scaffolding presumably at his own expense. There is nothing to show that he surrendered possession to his mother in her capacity as the shebait of the idols after the revocation On the other hand, oven if she occasionally lived in the house she might well live in it because of her relationship with Chittaranjan. For over 12 years this state of things continued, and there was no assertion made on behalf of Niranjan or his heirs to intervene, or to see that the names of the idols were duly entered either in the municipal or the revenue papers In 1914 there was a further mortgage created by Chittaranjan on this property in assertion of his own proprietary interest. This also was a registered document. Decree was obtained on the basis of this document, and the property was put up for sale at a public auction. The present defendant advanced his money more than 12 years after the deed of revocation had been executed, and even if he had got the registration registers searched for 12 years he might not have discovered the earlier document. In any case the revocation itself had stood for more than 12 years and the possession of Chittaranjan over the house has remained for all that period without doubt.

    9. The learned advocate for the respondent has argued before us that in the circumstances of this case there could have been no adverse possession at all. The view of the Court below that there could not be any adverse possession because the idols themselves remained in the house cannot for a moment be accepted. As a matter of fact there can be adverse, possession, not only as against the idols but over the idols themselves. That adverse possession can be acquired against idols in respect of property dedicated in their favour is fully clear from several cases decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council. We may refer to Maharaja Jagadindra Nath v. Hemanta Kumari Dasi [1904] 32 Cal. 129, which was followed by this Court in the case of Man Singh v. Nawlakhbati A.I.R. 1926 P.C. 2. We may also refer to the case of Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das [1910] 37 Cal. 885. In our opinion the same principle applies whether the adverse possession is exercised by a total stranger or by the donor himself. So long as such possession is exercised to the ouster and knowledge of Chittaranjan's mother, who alone can hold the property on behalf of the idols, it would mature into title after the lapse of the prescribed period.

    10. The learned advocate for the respondent has drawn our attention to the clause in the deed of dedication authorizing Chittaranjan to see to the proper carrying on of the worship. That conferred on him a right of intervention but it in no way amounted to a vesting of the trust property in him nor did it constitute him a trustee. There was, therefore, no bar to his exercising adverse possession or acquiring title by adverse possession over this property. We accordingly allow this appeal and setting aside the decree of the Court below dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Dasami Sahu v. Param Shameshwar
    (Jan 24, 1929)