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  • rule in S. 233(k)
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  • rule in S. 233(k)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit concerning possession of three quarters of a share in a zamindari. The plaintiff had mortgaged the entire share to the defendant's predecessor-in-title. The defendant acquired three quarters of this share by purchase at an auction-sale pursuant to a decree against another party. Subsequently, the defendant filed a suit for the sale of the remaining quarter to satisfy a proportionate amount of the mortgage debt. In 1917, a preliminary decree for the sale of the quarter was issued, followed by negotiations between the parties that resulted in a compromise agreement. Under this agreement, the plaintiff was to pay the full mortgage amount plus the price paid by the defendant at auction in exchange for regaining the entire share after the first installment payment. However, this compromise was not incorporated in the final decree, which only ordered the sale of the quarter share.

The plaintiff raised objections to this omission, which were eventually decided in his favor. Meanwhile, partition proceedings were initiated in 1922. During these proceedings, the plaintiff sought to have the decree amended to reflect the compromise but did not apply to the partition officer to give effect to it; instead, he requested postponement of partition proceedings pending the civil court's decision. This request was refused, and a final partition decree was passed in early 1924, allotting the disputed three quarters share to the defendant.

About six months after the partition decree, on August 2, 1924, the plaintiff successfully obtained an amended decree in the mortgage suit embodying the compromise and subsequently sued to recover the three quarters share. Both lower courts dismissed the suit, relying on Section 233(k) of the Civil Procedure Code, which bars interference with partition decrees.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 233(k) of the Civil Procedure Code bars the plaintiff's suit to recover the three quarters share after a partition decree has been passed.
  2. Whether a new fact arising after a partition decree can justify interference with or alteration of the partition decree under Section 233(k).
  3. Whether the plaintiff's failure to present the compromise to the partition officer during partition proceedings precludes subsequent relief.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The compromise agreement existed during the partition proceedings and formed the basis of the plaintiff’s title.
  • The plaintiff contends that had he presented the compromise to the partition officer, the officer would have declined to act on it due to ongoing civil litigation, effectively ignoring the compromise.
  • The plaintiff argues that a new right was declared by the civil court after the partition decree, clearing his title and justifying the suit to recover the share despite the partition decree.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant contends that Section 233(k) bars any interference with the partition decree.
  • The defendant argues that the plaintiff should have presented the compromise to the partition officer during partition proceedings and that failure to do so was the plaintiff’s fault.
  • The defendant relies on the principle that the partition decree is final and cannot be disturbed even if new facts arise.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Zorawar Singh v. Bhagwan Singh, A.I.R 1925 All. 590 Application of Section 233(k) barring interference with partition decrees. The court noted that in this precedent no new fact had arisen post-partition decree, distinguishing it from the present case where a new fact (amended decree embodying compromise) emerged.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged the clear statutory bar under Section 233(k) against interfering with partition decrees but emphasized that this bar is not absolute. The court reasoned that if no new facts had arisen after the partition decree, the suit would be barred. However, the facts showed that after the partition decree, the civil court amended the mortgage suit decree to embody the compromise, thereby creating a new right for the plaintiff and materially affecting the title to the disputed share.

The court analyzed the plaintiff’s failure to present the compromise to the partition officer, accepting the plaintiff’s argument that the partition officer would have rightly refused to act on the compromise due to ongoing civil litigation. The plaintiff had only sought postponement of partition proceedings, which was denied.

Given the new fact of the amended decree clarifying the plaintiff’s title, the court held that Section 233(k) does not bar the suit. The court illustrated this by analogy: if the defendant had sold the share back to the plaintiff and refused to transfer it, the plaintiff could sue despite the partition decree, because a new fact affecting title had arisen.

Consequently, the court distinguished this case from previous decisions that strictly applied Section 233(k) when no new facts had emerged.

Holding and Implications

The court ALLOWED THE APPEAL, set aside the decrees of the lower courts, and granted the plaintiff a decree in terms of the reliefs sought (reliefs (a) and (c)). The plaintiff was awarded costs throughout. Other reliefs were not pressed.

The direct consequence is that the plaintiff's title to the three quarters share, as established by the amended decree embodying the compromise, is recognized and enforceable despite the prior partition decree. The court clarified that Section 233(k) does not constitute an absolute bar where new facts materially affecting title arise after the partition decree. No broader precedent beyond this factual context was established.

    Bhajan Singh v. Nokhe

    1. This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for possession of three quarters of a share in a zamindari. The plaintiff mortgaged the whole of the share to the present defendant's predecessor-in-title. The defendant by purchase at an auction-sale in pursuance of the decree of another person became the owner of three quarters of the share. He subsequently brought a suit for the sale of the remaining quarter for a proportionate amount of the mortgage-debt. In 1917 there was a preliminary decree for sale of the quarter which was followed by negotiations between the plaintiff and the defendant for a settlement. These negotiations resulted in an agreement, according to the terms of which the mortgagor was to pay to the mortgagee the whole amount of the mortgage money plus the price which the mortgagee had paid at his auction purchase of three quarters of the share, and in return the plaintiff-mortgagor was to get back the whole of the share as soon as he had paid the first instalment. For some unexplained reason but apparently by some body's inadvertence the compromise was not embodied in the final decree which was simply for the sale of a quarter. The present plaintiff, the mortgagor, took objections; but before his objections were finally disposed of in his favour partition proceedings had been instituted in 1922.

    2. During this period of these partition proceedings it must be noted that the present plaintiff was endeavouring to get the decree amended so as to embody his compromise. He would naturally, therefore, make some application to the partition officer in this respect. He could have applied to the partition officer, whether successfully or otherwise, to give effect to the compromise. He did not do so but applied to the partition officer to postpone proceedings pending the result of the efforts he was making in the civil Court. It would appear (but it may be that we have not all the facts) that this was a very reasonable application, but it was refused and a final partition decree was reached under which in the beginning of 1924 the three quarters share in dispute went to the present defendant, the quondam mortgagee.

    3. On 2nd August 1924, that is about six months after the partition decree, the plaintiff was finally successful in getting the decree in the mortgage suit amended for as to embody the compromise and he now sues to get back the three quarters. Both Courts have thrown out the plaintiffs suit on the ground that S. 233(k) debars them from interfering or altering in any way the results embodied in a partition decree.

    4. The plaintiff appeals. The rule in S. 233(k) obviously does not require support from judicial authority. It is manifest that there must be number of cases that can be quoted in which that section has been applied. But it is equally clear that the rule cannot be applied in the sense that a distribution made by a partition decree can never at any time be disturbed whatever may have happened since the partition decree or, however, much new facts may have come into existence. It appears to me, therefore, that one should not blindly apply S. 233(k). If I were satisfied in this case that no new fact had come into being since the partition decree I should of course unhesitatingly hold that the suit was barred by S. 233(k), but the facts of this case require careful examination. At the date when the partition proceedings were going on the plaintiff had at his back a certain compromise, and it is argued for the defendant that compromise was the basis of his title and that he could have and should have put that compromise to the partition officer, that if he did not do so it was his own fault and he must stand the consequences. The case as it may be stated for the plaintiff-appellant is:

    “Had I put the compromise to the partition officer he would quite rightly have said I am not prepared to act on this compromise for it is the subject of legal proceedings now proceeding and it may well be that the civil Court will refuse to recognisze that compromise. In other words, the plaintiff would undoubtedly have been told your alleged title is under a cloud at present and the partition officer would have refused to assume that the final decree which did not embody the compromise was a wrong decree.”

    5. The very fact that there was in existence a final decree subsequent to the compromise which did not embody the compromise but decreed the relief as originally claimed would have justified any reasonable man in declining to pay any heed to the compromise in the situation in which it then was. The plaintiff could do no more than ask for a postponement to enable his title to be declared; and this he did. Subsequently to the partition decree which had ignored the compromise, the civil Court declared that the plaintiff, was entitled to an amended decree on the basis of the compromise. A new right of the plaintiff was thereby declared by the Court. His title became clear. I may illustrate my view as follows: If after this partition decree the defendant had sold the three quarters share which had been allotted to him back to the plaintiff and having received the consideration money had refused to Carry out the transfer, and the plaintiff had been compelled to sue, could the defendant have said:

    “I had this three quarters share allotted to me in the partition, you cannot disturb a partition decree, the most you can do is to sue me for the return of the money?”

    6. Manifestly not, and manifestly because a new fact affecting the title of the parties had come into being subsequent to the partition proceedings.

    7. Here as it seems to me a new fact very materially affecting the title of the parties had come into being since the partition decree, namely, the declaration of a title in the plaintiff, while the facts existing prior to the partition decree would have suggested to any reasonable cautious person that in the existing state of facts the title was with the present defendant, the mortgagee. For the above reasons I think that S. 233(k) is no bar to the suit.

    8. I was invited to consider the decisions referred by the lower Courts, and I in return invited counsel for the respondent to put the strongest of his cases. He referred me to Zorawar Singh v. Bhagwan Singh . A.I.R 1925 All. 590. But admittedly in that case there was no suggestion of any new fact having come into existence subsequent to the partition decree. I would utter a word of caution in reference to the view I have expressed. It is manifestly not any new fact coming into existence that will remove the bar contained in S. 233(k): I am concerned only with the present case; and where the new fact shifts the title, as in my view it does in this case, the alleged bar is not effective. The result is that I allow this appeal and setting aside the decrees of the lower Courts, grant the plaintiff a decree in terms of his reliefs (a) and (c). He will have his costs throughout. None of the other reliefs is pressed.

    S.N/R.K

    9. Decree set aside.

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    Comments

    Bhajan Singh v. Nokhe
    (Dec 13, 1928)