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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from a decree in a partition suit. The central factual matrix as stated in the opinion: a partition occurred between Sham Narain and Jagat Narain; the plaintiff is the mother of Jai Gobind and Jagat Narain. The contested question concerns whether, in a partition between a son and a grandson of a female (the grandson being the son of a son other than the surviving one), the female is entitled to a share. No attempt was made on behalf of Sham Narain to uphold the decree below on the ground that the plaintiff possessed property sufficient for her maintenance. The Subordinate Judge relied on the Full Bench decision in Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad. The appellate Court considered applicability of texts in Yajnavalkya as interpreted in Mitakshara and related commentaries, and ultimately allowed the appeal, set aside the decree below and decreed the plaintiff a one‑third share, with costs awarded to the appellant in both courts.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the case of a partition between a son and a grandson of a female (the grandson being the son of a son who is other than the surviving one), the female is entitled to a share.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad Full Bench consideration of Yajnavalkya texts (Mitakshara) concerning partition: distinction between partition in father's lifetime (wife takes as such) and partition after father's death (mother takes as such); Vijnaneswara not contemplating partition between a father and his own sons for a share to the father's mother. The Court held the present case materially different from the Sheo Narain facts and distinguished it; concluded the Sheo Narain Full Bench text did not govern the present partition between a grandson and paternal uncle.
Kanhaiya Lal v. Gaura Held that a widow (grandmother of claimants) was entitled to a share when grandsons by a single son claimed partition; Sheo Narain was distinguished in that case. Noted to be brought to the Court's attention; the Court stated it need not consider that case for its decision and indicated it "may or may not support" the plaintiff, but primarily relied on the Yajnavalkya text in its reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the relevant Yajnavalkya text as interpreted in Mitakshara and related commentary. It considered translations (including Colebrooke's) and preferred the rendering: "When there is a partition on the death of the father let the mother take an equal share." The Court accepted that if this text applied, the plaintiff was entitled to a third share.

The Court analysed the scope of Vijnaneswara's discussion of separate and joint family property and concluded that references to division of the father's property were meant to include both separate and joint family property. The determinative question was which person should be regarded as the "father" in the present partition. The Court found that when Sham Narain and Jagat Narain divided the family property, they did not seek division of Jai Gobind's property; Sham Narain had stepped into Jai Gobind's position and claimed an equal share with Jagat Narain. Consequently, Jagat Narain's father Bhagirathi was the father on whose death the partition took place. Applying the Yajnavalkya text, the Court held that the plaintiff, as mother of Jai Gobind and Jagat Narain, was entitled to a share equal to that of her sons, i.e., one third of the property.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED

Holding: The appellate Court set aside the decree of the Court below and decreed the plaintiff's claim for a one‑third share of the property. The contesting defendant was ordered to pay the appellant's costs in both courts.

Implications: The direct effect is the reversal of the lower court's decree and award of a third share to the plaintiff; the opinion does not purport to establish a broader new precedent beyond the Court's application of the cited Yajnavalkya text to these facts.

    Babuna Kunwar v. Jagat Narain

    Mears, C.J and Mukerji, J.:— The judgement of the Court after stating the facts as above, thus continued:—

    No attempt has been made, on behalf of Sham Narain, to support the decree of the court below on the ground that the plaintiff possessed property sufficient for her maintenance. The only question which we have to decide in this appeal is whether in the case of a partition between a son and a grandson of a female, the latter is entitled to a share, the grandson being the son of a son who is other than the surviving one.

    The learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the present case was governed by the Full Bench case of Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad. In that case the facts were materially different, inasmuch as the partition was between the female claimant's son and his own sons. The learned Judges pointed out that there were two texts of the sage Yajnavalkya relied upon by the author of Mitakshara and these considered only two cases of partition. One case was when the father was alive and the partition proceeded in his lifetime and the other case was when he was dead and the descendants proceeded to divide the property among themselves. In the former case, they pointed out, the “father's wife” took, as such, a share. In the latter case, the “mother” took as such a share. It was further stated that Vijnaneswara did not contemplate the case of a partition between a father and his own sons, and did not provide for a share for the father's mother in, such a case. The case before us is, clearly, not the same as was submitted for the consideration of the Full Bench. Here, as already stated the partition is between a grandson and paternal uncle of the grandson. The case falls within the four corners of the text which contemplates a partition “on the death of the father”. Colebrooke in his translation of the Mitakshara translates the text of Yajnavalkya bearing, on the point in the following language: “Of heirs dividing after the death of the father let the mother also take an equal share”. Probably a better translation would be as follows: “When there is a partition on the death of the father let the mother take an equal share”. It is agreed on all hands that if this text applies, the plaintiff would be entitled to a third share. In our opinion there can be no doubt that this text is directly applicable. Although, strictly speaking, in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, every male member in the family is the owner of every portion of the joint family property, still it is the head of the family who is supposed to “own” the entire property. The passage quoted above occurs after Vijnaneswara has discussed the separate and joint family properties. It seems to us to be clear that when he was speaking of the division of father's property, he was speaking both as regards the separate and the joint family property. The only question material, therefore, is who is the person that should be called the father in the present case. The point seems to us to be so clear as not to admit of any two opinions. Sham Narain and Jagat Narain, when they divided the family property, did not seek the division of Jai Gobind's property. Sham Narain, stepping into the shoes of Jai Oobind, claimed an equal share with Jagat Narain. Jagat Narain's father Bhagirathi was therefore the father on whose death the partition has taken place. In this view the plaintiff, as the mother of Jai Gobind and Jagat Narain, would be entitled to a share equal to that of her sons. Thus she would be entitled to a third share in the property.

    The case of Kanhaiya Lal v. Gaura has been brought to our notice. In this case the grandsons of one Nam Suhh, by his only son Chhunni, claimed a partition between themselves. The question was whether Nam Suhk's widow (the grandmother of the claimants for partition) was entitled to a share. It was held that she was. The case of Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad was distinguished. But we need not consider that case. It may or may not support the case of the plaintiff before us. We are of opinion that on the text quoted in the Full Bench case aforesaid, the plaintiff is entitled to the share claimed.

    We allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the court below and decree the plaintiff's claim for a third share. The contesting defendant will pay the appellant's costs in both the courts.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Babuna Kunwar v. Jagat Narain
    (Dec 8, 1927)