Lindsay and Sulaiman, JJ.:— After stating the facts as above, thus continued:—
We are unable to agree with either of the views expressed by the court below. It is difficult to see how the claim can be barred by limitation. The real parties to the suit were the vendees themselves and all of them were impleaded within the time allowed. The mere fact that the guardian of one of the vendees was not appointed by the court till after the expiry of the period would in no case be fatal. Under order XXXII it is the duty of the court, when it is brought to its notice that one of the defendants is a minor, to appoint a guardian, and as has been held in the case of Rup Chand v. Dasodha, the subsequent appointment of a guardian is not fatal as a plea of limitation. As regards the question of custom the only evidence in support of it is the wajib-ul-arz of the year 1870. This settlement expired about the year 1900, when the new wajib-ul-arz, under the circular of the Board of Revenue, could not contain an entry either way. The heading of paragraph 8 which embodies a right of preemption is as follows:—
“Relating to transfer of property by means of mortgage, sale, gift, inheritance and custom of pre-emption.”
The opening portion of the paragraph which deals with the question of custom is as follows:—
“That, in future, every co-sharer has a right to transfer the whole or a portion of his property. Up till now no preemption suit was instituted on behalf of any co-sharer and decided. In future if any co-sharer likes to sell his property, he will at first sell it to his co-sharers and subsequently to the co-sharers in the village, and if they also refuse to purchase it, he may sell it to any one he likes. If there shall be any dispute between the vendor and the vendee regarding the difference in price, the co-sharer shall have to pay the same price which a stranger would be willing to pay.”
The rest of the paragraph deals with customs of adoption and inheritance with which we are not directly concerned. The concluding portion of that, paragraph indicates that the proprietors of the resumed land, who are Muhammadans, are governed, as regards inheritance, by the Muhammadan law. In our opinion there is nothing in the language of this clause which would rebut the primâ facie presumption that it is a record of a custom. The statement that no suit for pre-emption had been instituted so far is a mere statement of fact which is not conclusive either way. Similarly, the use of the words “in future” in no way indicates that it was for the first time that the co-sharers were expressing the desire that a right of pre-emption should exist. This expression found place in the wajib-ul-arz before their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Digambar Singh v. Ahmad Sayed Khan and in spite of its occurrence their Lordships were inclined to hold that there was nothing in the clause which militated against the existence of a custom. The opening portion of this clause is similar to the opening portion of the clause in the wajib-ul-arz in P.A.F.O No. 17 of 1925, decided on the 25th of June, 1925, by a Bench of this Court, of which one of us was a member. The Bench was inclined to hold that it was a record of custom. This view is now strengthened by the recent pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Sheobaran Singh v. Kulsum-un-nissa. We are, therefore, of opinion that the presumption arising from the entry in the wajib-ul-arz has not been rebutted, and there is no reason to suppose that the Settlement Officer in making the entry under the heading, “custom of pre-emption,” did not intend to record it as such.
As remarked above, the other issues have been left undisposed of by the Subordinate Judge.
[The judgement then dealt with the evidence and concluded as follows:—]
The result, therefore, is that we allow the plaintiffs' appeal, and setting aside the decree of the court below decree the plaintiffs' claim for pre-emption.
Appeal allowed.