Dalal and Pullan, JJ.:— The suit has been decreed on two grounds: first, because the mortgage of 1898 has been held to have become merged in the mortgage of 1900, and thereby acquired the period of limitation applicable to that deed, and, secondly, because the order of the District Judge of Azamgarh passed in 1912 in Anpurna's own suit, to the effect that her claim was subject to the prior charge of the plaintiff's mortgage, operates as “practically” res judicata. We do not agree with either of those findings. The deed of May, 1900, although executed to satisfy the mortgage of March, 1898, is of an entirely different nature. Under the pimple mortgage the mortgagee had a right to sue for the principal after three years, under the usufructuary mortgage he could sue at once if he failed to get possession, or a claim was brought for exproprietary rights, but otherwise he could only sue on being dispossessed. This was an entirely new burden on the property of which the puisne mortgagee had no notice and we are not prepared to find that she should be bound by an agreement altering the period of limitation allowed for a suit on the prior mortgage. In Mahomed Ibrahim Hossain Khan v. Ambika Pershad Singh, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that when a suit was brought on a simple mortgage of 1888, seeking to make certain property covered by that mortgage and by a zarpeshgi deed of 1877, liable, for the decretal amount, the right of priority set up by the plaintiffs on the zarpeshgi deed was barred by limitation, as the suit should have been brought within twelve years of the date when the money due on that deed became repayable. The principle in that case is the same as in the appeal before us. The same view was, taken by Lindsay, J., when Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, in Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow v. Pandit Sukhnandan. It may be that the simple mortgage of March, 1898, was kept alive by the mortgage of May, 1900, but it was not given a second birth, and if the plaintiffs retained a right to sue on the simple mortgage of March, 1898, at all, they did so only in accordance with the rule of limitation applicable to that bond, and their suite became time-barred in March, 1913.
In order to meet this position the plaintiffs argue that the usufruct of the two villages enjoyed by them in accordance with the mortgage of May, 1900, should be regarded as a payment of interest on the simple mortgage of March, 1898. This objection is easily answered by a reference to the terms of the mortgage of May, 1900. This mortgage was for a sum of Rs. 22,500 and the usufruct of the two villages was given to satisfy the interest on that sum, and not the interest due on the prior mortgage for Rs. 13,200. In our opinion there has been no payment or acknowledgement which would bring the suit within time under section 20 or 19 of the Limitation Act.
As to the second finding of the learned Judge of the court below that the decree of 1912 has practically the effect of res judicata, we are of opinion that this view is mistaken. In 1912 the mortgage of March, 1898, was still within time, and still had priority to the mortgage of November, 1898, on which the plaintiff in that suit based her claim. The fact that the plaintiff's charge was then declared to have priority in no way prevents the claim from subsequently becoming barred by time.
Nor can the plaintiff base his suit on the deed of May, 1908, and obtain a decree for sale subject to the appellant's mortgage rights, because when an opportunity was given to the plaintiff in 1912 to redeem the intermediate mortgage, he refrained from doing so, and allowed the sale to be executed in favour of Musammat Anpurna.
In our opinion the plaintiff's suit as against the villages of Rajdharpur and Pura Sarwan was barred by limitation. We allow the appeal with costs against the contesting respondents and order that these two villages shall be exempted from the decree.
Appeal allowed.