This is an application filed by the Imphal Sporting Club, tinder Article 226 of the Constitution of India against (i) All Manipur Sports Association, Imphal, and (ii) Tiddim Road Athletic Union Manipur, for a writ of certiorari and other appropriate directions quashing the proceedings of the meeting of the Governing Body of the first respondent held on 17-11-1968 which decided against the protest lodged by the petitioner and which held that the second respondent won "Sir Churachand Singh, K. C. S. I., C. B. E. Memorial Gold Centered Shield Football Tournament" quarter final game on 17-11-1968 and for restraining the second respondent from playing the semi-final of the said tournament and for further restraining the first respondent from conducting the semi-final match.

2. The petitioner and the respondents 1 and 2 are associations registered under the Societies Registration Act (Act XXI of 1860) (hereinafter called as the Act) functioning in Imphal. The object of the petitioner's and second respondent's Association is to promote game and sports among the youngsters. The first respondent is organising and conducting every year a football tournament known as "Sir Churachand Singh K. C. S. I., C. B. E. Memorial Gold Centered Shield Football Tournament" since 1950. The first respondent printed the conditions of the play for 1968 in Ext. A/1.

3. The petitioner and the second respondent entered into the tournament on payment of entry fee of Rs. 40/- each. The tournament was to be played on the knockout basis till the semi-final rounds as prescribed by condition No. 9 in Ext. A/1. After winning two plays against its rival teams, the petitioner entered into quarter final play. It played against the second respondent on 3-11-1968. But, the game ended goalless on either side and in a draw.

4. The first respondent fixed 17-11-1968 as the next date on which both the teams should replay. At about 8-00 A. M. the Governing Body of the first respondent passed a resolution (Vide Ext. B/1) that, in case the match to be replayed again ended in a draw, then the match should be decided by lot. The Governing Body further resolved that the Referee who would supervise the replay on 17-11-1968 should be informed of this decision of the Governing Body, so that he might issue necessary instructions to the Captains of the two teams and that the decision might be announced before the start or during the half time of the match through the microphone fixed at the Pavilion.

5. It is the case of the petitioner that while replaying the game on 17-11-1968, the Referee gave his long whistle declaring that the petitioner's team scored the goal, but that the second respondent's captain protested, that the game continued, that the Referee awarded a 'penalty kick" to the petitioner's team against the second respondent and that the game ended in a goalless draw.

6. The petitioner further alleges that it lodged a protest within one hour of the conclusion of the match challenging the decision of the Referee by depositing a sum of Rs. 50/- in accordance with the condition No. 15 of Ext. A/1 (vide Ext. A/2), that it requested the first respondent to withhold the lot for deciding the match as provided in condition No. 8 (b) in Ext. A/1, until the final decision on the protest was given by the first respondent, but that, without considering the protest the first respondent proceeded with the lot as can be seen from Ext. A/8 and declared the second respondent as having won the game on the ground that the petitioner refused to join in drawing the lot. The petitioner avers that the first respondent should have at first considered the protest and then should have actually drawn the lot subsequently, even though the petitioner might not have been present. The petitioner, therefore, challenges Ext. A/3 resolution of the first respondent under which the first respondent declared the second respondent as having won the game.

7. According to the first respondent immediately after the match ended in goalless draw at about 4-30 P. M. the Captains of both the teams were called on to join in the draw of lot according to condition No. 8 (b) of Ext. A/1. But, the petitioner's team did not take part in the drawing of the lot while the Captain of the second respondent was present. The first respondent declared that the second respondent won the lot as the petitioner did not take part in the toss. The first respondent also alleges that its Governing Body considered the protest lodged by the petitioner and upheld the decision of the Referee that no writ petition lies against a "domestic tribunal", like the first respondent that its decisions are final under condition No. 17 of Ext. A/1 and that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

8. The first contention, which was raised and which arises for determination, is whether the present writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The preamble of the Societies Registration Act, (Act XXI of 1860) under which the Associations of the petitioner and the respondents 1 and 2 were registered reads that the Act was intended to provide for improving the legal condition of societies established for the promotion of literature, science, or the fine arts or for the diffusion of useful knowledge, the diffusion of political education or for charitable purposes. Section 6 of the Act lays down that every society registered under the Act may sue or be sued in the name of the president, chairman, or principal secretary or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society, and, in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the Governing Body for the occasion. Section 20 of the Act shows that the provisions of the Act are applicable to the Associations of the petitioner and the respondents 1 and 2.

9. Though the petitioner and the respondents 1 and 2 got their societies registered under the said Act, the first respondent is purely a "domestic tribunal". It was not constituted under any statute. Nor do any statutory rules apply to the first respondent. The mere registration of an Association under the said Act does not make it a statutory one. In this connection, the passages about "domestic tribunals" contained at pages 559 and 560 of Basu's Commentary on the Constitution of India, 4th edition Vol. III of 1963 are very pertinent. The phrase "domestic tribunal" is used to refer to committees of associations like trade unions, social clubs, professional bodies, who have a right to adjudicate upon the rights of or disputes between their members. Sometimes such tribunals are also set up by a statute, i.e., the Medical Council, Bar Council or the like. When created by statute or under statutory authority, they should strictly be called "statutory tribunals" rather than "domestic tribunals." In the case of a "statutory tribunals", the jurisdiction of the tribunal rests on the statute or the rules framed thereunder. But, the jurisdiction of a "domestic tribunal" is founded on the contract of its members, express or implied. The Rules of the association, subscribed by all the members, constitute the contract between the members and create the jurisdiction of the tribunal. A material difference follows from this : (a) In the case of a non-statutory "domestic tribunal", certiorari cannot lie, though other remedies, such as declaration, injunction or damages may be available in proper cases. (b) Where, however, a "domestic tribunal" is created by statute, certiorari would lie against it in the same manner as in the case of other statutory tribunals, e. g., (i) on the ground of defect of jurisdiction or (ii) on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. In the absence of a statutory provision, it is free to adopt any procedure, but it cannot use any material which was not disclosed to a party and to rebut which he was given no opportunity. But apart from observing the rules of natural justice, a "domestic tribunal", even when statutory, is not bound by the rules of evidence.

10. Article 226 (1) of the Constitution of India runs thus :

"Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders, or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purposes". All these writs are known in English law as prerogative writs, the reason being that they were specially associated with the King's name. The theory of the English law is that the King himself superintended the due course of justice through his own Court preventing cases of usurpation of jurisdiction and insisting on vindication of public rights and personal freedom of his own subjects. As our Constitution makers borrowed the conception of prerogative writs from the English law, the interpretation of Article 226 must, therefore, be considered in the background of English law. In the case of "statutory tribunal , the injured party has a remedy by certiorari and also a remedy by declaration and injunction. The remedy by certiorari does not lie to "domestic tribunals". But, the remedy by declaration or injunction does lie. These remedies are more effective, because they are not subject to the limitation that the error must appear on the face of the record. Vide the judgment of Lord Justice Denning in Lee v. Showmen's Guild of Great Britain, (1952) 2 QB 329. Vide also Jamalpur Arya Samaj v. Dr. D. Ram, AIR 1954 Pat 297. In Radheshyam Khare v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 107 also the scope of the writ of certiorari was well explained.

"It is a well-known ancient high prerogative writ, which was issued by the Courts of King's Bench to correct the errors of the inferior courts strictly so-called. Gradually, the scope of the writs came to be enlarged so as to enable Superior Courts to exercise control over various bodies, which were not really speaking courts at all but which were by statute vested with powers and duties, that resembled those which were vested in the ordinary inferior Courts."

The law is now well settled that a writ of certiorari will lie to control such a "statutory body" as it can be said to be quasi-judicial, entrusted with quasi-judicial functions. It is equally well settled that certiorari will not lie to correct the errors of a "statutory body" which is entrusted with purely administrative functions. Thus, mere are three requisites to be satisfied in order that the act of a body can be said to be quasi-judicial. Firstly, the body of persons must have legal authority; secondly they must have legal authority to determine the questions affecting the legal rights of parties and thirdly, they must have the duty to act judicially. Thus, the real and determining test to ascertain whether an act authorised by a statute is a quasi-judicial act or an administrative act is whether the statute has expressly or impliedly imposed upon the statutory body the duty to act judicially as required by the third condition. Vide also C. Lakshmiah Reddiar v. Perumbadur Taluk Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd., AIR 1962 Mad 169, wherein the Board of Directors of a Co-operative Society had to consider the objections to the nominations of the members for election to the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors was not a statutory tribunal with any authority to determine the rights of parties. The Directors discharged their functions under regulations framed by the Society itself, which had no statutory force. It was held that under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India no writ could be issued quashing the proceedings of the Board of Directors, but that the petitioner had an alternative remedy to seek redress under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act of 1922. In the present case, the first respondent was not constituted under any Act or statutory rules. It is purely a private domestic body or collection of some persons. Even Ext. A/1 contains only "conditions" of the match, which were not even styled as "rules." It is a purely domestic tribunal, which is beyond the purview of the high prerogative writ jurisdiction of this Court.

11. The various decisions relied on by the petitioner's counsel are all distinguishable and relate to cases filed against the Governments or "statutory bodies" as opposed to private "domestic tribunals." In re G. A. Natesan, AIR 1918 Mad 763, it was held that in the case of "statutory bodies" which have to perform public duties a writ of mandamus could be issued directing them to perform their duties. The case related to the Syndicate of the University of Madras, constituted under the Universities Act of 1904 and Regulations framed under the Act. In Sheoshankar v. State Govt. of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 Nag 58 (FB), the matter related to a petition filed for writ of mandamus directing the Madhya Pradesh State Government not to enforce the Central Provinces and Berar Prohibition Act (Act VII of 1938) and the notifications issued thereunder. In Bangalore District Hotel Owners' Association v. The District Magistrate. Bangalore, AIR 1951 Mys 14, an application was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the Bangalore District Hotel Owners' Association against the District Magistrate, Bangalore and the Government of Mysore for the issue of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ to cancel the order of the District Magistrate, Bangalore District directing that all the hotels, restaurants, milk bars and coffee clubs, etc. in Bangalore district should be closed. It was held that, though the application by the Association itself was maintainable, it was not maintainable by it with regard to the individual grievances of some of its members. So, the rule was sought for against the District Magistrate and the Mysore Government and not against any "domestic tribunal." In Motilal v. Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1951 All 257 (FB), it was held that where no order under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 was passed or where no reasons were given for refusal to grant permanent permits, a writ of mandamus would lie against the Government or the Road Transport Authority. In Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 220, the petitioner challenged the auction held by Collector of Excise, Ajmer in pursuance of the rules framed under the Excise Regulation I of 1915.

12. There are only two decisions, strongly relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that a writ lies even against a "domestic tribunal". In Oynam Birahari Singh v. Inspector of Schools, Manipur, AIR 1959 Mani 1, the Managing Committee of a private School called Raja Dumbra Singh High School, Imphal dismissed one of its teachers. The teacher filed a petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus or any other suitable writ for his reinstatement and promotion etc. The judgment shows that the School, which was managed by a private Committee, was a public institution. It was a recognised School, affiliated to the University of Gauhati. It received aid from the Government of Manipur. One of the conditions of the grant-in-aid was that the appointments, confirmations and dismissals of teachers must be approved by the Inspector of Schools. Another condition was that the grant-in-aid was liable to be withdrawn for breach of any of the conditions. But, there were no rules with regard to the promotion or punishment of teachers. It was held that the Managing Committee was in the position of a "domestic tribunal" and that its decision could be interfered with by the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when the tribunal acted without jurisdiction or when it did not follow the principles of natural justice or did not act in good faith or did not act according to its own rules. Thus, Raja Dumbra Singh School was a public institution affiliated to the University of Gauhati receiving grant-in-aid from the Government of Manipur, though it was managed by a private Committee. As such, this decision cannot be applied to a purely "domestic tribunal" consisting of a few individuals as in the case of the first respondent.

In Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044, a company by name the Oriental Gas Company was originally constituted by a deed of settlement and registered in England under the provisions of the English Joint Stock Companies Act of 1862. By the Act V of 1857 passed by the Legislative Council of India, it was empowered to lay pipes in Calcutta and other places. By Acts of the Legislative Council of India passed from time to time, special power was conferred upon the Company. Subsequently, Messrs. Soorajmull Nagarmull, a firm in India purchased 98 per cent of the shares, but floated a limited liability Company called Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Limited. It was registered in India. The Calcutta Gas Company was in charge of the general management of the Oriental Gas Company under an arrangement for 20 years for remuneration. The West Bengal Legislature passed the impugned Act under which the State Government wanted to take over for a period of 5 years the management and control of the undertaking of the Oriental Gas Company according to the Act. It was held that the Calcutta Gas Company was deprived of certain legal rights, that it possessed under the agreement right to manage the Oriental Gas Company for a period of 20 years and to receive remuneration, but that by virtue of section 4 of the impugned act, the rights of the Calcutta Gas Company were infringed. It was also held that Article 226 of the Constitution of India conferred a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purposes and that persons other than those claiming fundamental rights can also approach the High Court seeking relief thereunder. No doubt, the petitioner's team is deprived of their alleged right to play in semi-final. But, it was deprived of this alleged right by the first respondent which is a purely private and domestic body. Both the parties are governed by the terms of the contract mentioned in Ex. A/1 and the petitioner has got an alternative remedy to seek its redress in a Civil Court. But, it has no remedy by way of writ against the first respondent, private and "domestic tribunal" under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

13. As such, the writ petition is not maintainable.

14. The learned counsel for both the parties advanced their arguments on the merits of the case also. It appears that in the course of the second match, the Referee gave a long whistle, that on the protest of the Captain of the second respondent's team, the Referee awarded a penalty kick in lieu of the goal to the petitioner's team against the second respondent, that the petitioner's team missed the penalty kick and that, therefore, the game ended in a draw. These allegations of the petitioner are denied by the respondents. According to "Federation Internationale De Football Association" and its laws, the Referee has got supreme power to decide such disputes. These disputes are not justiciable in a Court of law.

15. Another contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, within one hour after the match ended, the petitioner filed a petition as per Ext. A/2 under condition No. 15 in Ext. A/1 accompanied by a fee of Rs. 50/- protesting against the decision of the Referee and requesting the first respondent to stop the toss. The petitioner alleges that the first respondent did not decide the protest but mala fide proceeded with the toss and decided against the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner did not take part in drawing the lot. Ext. A/2 shows mat the protest was filed at 5-15 p. m. The resolution book shows that the first respondent's Managing Committee passed the resolution as per Ext. A/3 at 6-00 p. m. The contention of the respondents is that immediately after the match was drawn at about 4-30 P. M., the Managing Committee wanted to hold the toss according to its resolution passed in the morning of 17-11-1968 as per Ext. B/1, that it called upon the petitioner's representatives to take part in the toss but that they did not take part in it and that, therefore, the first respondent declared the second respondent, who was present at the toss, to have won the game and that subsequently the petitioner filed protest petition as per Ext. A/2. Exhibit A/8 shows that the contentions of the respondents appear to be more reliable. For, the first paragraph of resolution No. 1 reads that the parties were called to attend the drawing of the lot immediately after the game ended in draw. The second paragraph of Ext. A/3 shows that as the petitioner's representatives failed to turn up for the lot the first respondent declared the second respondent having won the lot. Then, para 3 of Ext. A/3 shows that the protest lodged by the petitioner was considered and that the first respondent heard the reports of the Referee and the line Referees concerned and upheld the decision of the Referee. So, the sequence of the events narrated in Ext. A/3 shows that they must have occurred in the manner mentioned therein, though these events were reduced to writing in the resolution at 6 P. M. Condition No. 15 of Ext. A/1 entities any team to lodge a protest within one hour of the conclusion of the match. Condition No. 8 (b) of Ext. A/1 lays down that if

"the first replay of a drawn game till the semi-final round is drawn again, the Committee will have the option to decide by lot."

Naturally this decision by lot should follow the decision given on protest, of course, the conditions in Ext. A/1 do not lay down that the first respondent should wait for one hour after the drawn match ends, before lots are cast; for, none can foresee whether any protest would be lodged or not. Even otherwise, the first respondent could review the decision taken by lot after considering the protest, in case the first respondent considered that the protest was a valid one. In the present case, it is likely that the first respondent would have called upon both the parties to take part in the lot in view of its earlier resolution evidenced by Ext B/1. Still, the first respondent could proceed with the lot even though the petitioner was not present and decide the match. But, it did not decide by lot. In this regard, the first respondent committed an irregularity and breach of condition No. 8 (b). However, this cannot be gone into in the present writ petition, as the same is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

16. In the result the petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed, but, under the circumstance of the case without costs.

Petition dismissed.

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