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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Ss. 222 and 276(1)(e) of the Succession Act in this connection. Section 276
  • SECTION 276 SUCCESSION ACT
  • Sec. 62 and other Sections of Evidence Act.8.
  • Section 19-H, sub-sec. (4).13. Article 11
  • Section 19-1 of the Court-fees Act
  • SECTION 19 I COURT FEES ACT
  • COURT FEES ACT
  • Sec. 124 of the Evidence Act.7.
  • Sec. 211 of the Succession Act,
  • Sec. 62 of the Evidence Act.6.
  • Sec. 62 of the Evidence Act
  • S. 62, Evidence Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Ss. 222 and 276(1)(e) of the Succession Act in this connection. Section 276
  • SECTION 276 SUCCESSION ACT
  • Sec. 62 and other Sections of Evidence Act.8.
  • Section 19-H, sub-sec. (4).13. Article 11
  • Section 19-1 of the Court-fees Act
  • SECTION 19 I COURT FEES ACT
  • COURT FEES ACT
  • Sec. 124 of the Evidence Act.7.
  • Sec. 211 of the Succession Act,
  • Sec. 62 of the Evidence Act.6.
  • Sec. 62 of the Evidence Act
  • S. 62, Evidence Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an order of the lower court granting probate of the will of the deceased testator, Sri P.I. Thakur Dass, who died on 2-12-1962. The respondent No. 1, the widow of the deceased, applied for probate under Section 276 of the Succession Act. The appellant, who is one of the children of the deceased, contested the grant of probate. The will dated 18th July 1957 was propounded as the last will of the deceased. The lower court found that the will was duly executed by the testator in a proper state of mind and granted probate to the widow. The appellant challenged this order in the present appeal. The original case record was destroyed in a fire, necessitating reconstruction of the record for appellate consideration.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether probate can be granted to the widow when she was not explicitly appointed as an executor in the will.
  2. Whether the document presented as the will was admissible evidence given the absence of the original will and existence of two simultaneously executed wills.
  3. Whether probate can be granted for only part of the property mentioned in the will or must cover the entire estate.
  4. Whether the application for probate was defective for not including all assets of the deceased and not paying court-fees on the full estate value.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • No probate could be granted as the widow was not appointed executor under the will; only Letters of Administration should be granted under Section 234 of the Succession Act.
  • The petition for probate did not state that the widow was an executor as required by Sections 222 and 276(1)(e) of the Succession Act, making the petition defective.
  • The document filed was not the original will but a copy, hence inadmissible as evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act.
  • Probate cannot be granted for only part of the property; it must cover the entire estate.
  • The application for probate was defective in not including all assets, such as a fixed deposit, and not paying court-fees accordingly.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The widow was expressly appointed executrix in the will, as shown in a certified copy filed in court.
  • The affidavit of valuation filed by the widow stated she was an executor, constituting substantial compliance with legal requirements.
  • The wills were simultaneously executed originals, both duly signed and attested, so the document presented was admissible as original evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act.
  • The fixed deposit claimed by the widow was not part of the deceased’s estate but her own, so it was proper to exclude it from the probate schedule.
  • Any issues regarding ownership of the fixed deposit or other disputed property should be decided by a civil court, not the Probate Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
T. Shivshankaram v. Agali Narayana Rao (AIR 1937 Mad 807) Requirement under Section 62 of the Evidence Act that a document must be made by one uniform process for admissibility. The court found this precedent not directly applicable because the will in question consisted of two simultaneously executed originals, not a copy.
Makhan Lal Sen Gupta v. The State (AIR 1958 Cal 517) Carbon copies with ink writings are not admissible under Section 62 if not produced by one uniform process. The court held that the will was not a mere carbon copy but an original duly executed, so the precedent did not apply.
Vrandavanlal Goverdhanlal Pitti v. Smt. Kamala Bai Goverdhanlal (AIR 1970 Andh Pra 109) Probate must be granted in respect of the entire estate under the will, not only part of it, except in special circumstances. The court relied on this to hold that the application for probate must cover the entire estate and rejected partial probate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed the appellant's contention that probate could not be granted to the widow as she was not appointed executor. The court found from the certified copy of the will that the widow was expressly appointed executrix, and the affidavit filed by her stated the same, constituting substantial compliance with Section 276(1)(e) of the Succession Act. The absence of an explicit statement in the original application was excused due to loss of records and no prior objection at trial.

Regarding the admissibility of the will, the court analyzed that two wills were executed simultaneously by the testator, both signed and attested. The will presented was not a mere copy but an original executed by carbon impression. The court distinguished the precedents cited by the appellant, holding that Section 62 of the Evidence Act permits such documents as originals. The appellant's argument on inadmissibility was rejected.

The court then considered the appellant’s argument against granting probate for only part of the estate. It held that probate must be granted for the entire estate as per Section 211 of the Succession Act and relevant provisions of the Court-fees Act. The court found the appellant's application defective for excluding the fixed deposit and not paying court-fees on the full estate value.

Although the respondent claimed the fixed deposit was her own property and not part of the deceased’s estate, the court emphasized that the Probate Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the validity of the will and not disputes over title, which are to be resolved by civil courts.

Since the probate had already been granted based on the defective application, the court directed the lower court to allow the respondent to surrender the existing probate and apply afresh with an amended schedule including all assets and pay the requisite court-fee. The question of ownership of the fixed deposit remains open for civil adjudication.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed on a technical ground. The court held that probate must be granted only when the application covers the entire estate of the deceased and pays court-fees accordingly. The existing probate granted to the respondent is to be surrendered, and a fresh application with complete valuation and court-fee is to be filed before the lower court.

The direct effect is that the lower court is directed to re-admit the application for probate with the corrected schedule and court-fee payment, and grant fresh probate without permitting further evidence. No new precedent is established beyond the application of existing statutory provisions and case law. The ownership dispute over certain assets is to be resolved in a civil suit. Parties are directed to bear their own costs in this court.

    Smt. Kamala Rajamanikkam v. Smt. Sushila Thakur Dass And Others

    1. This F.A.F.O is directed against the order of the court below granting probate to the widow of the deceased testator. The respondent No. 1 had applied for grant of probate of the will of her late husband under Section 276 of Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which was contested by the appellant before the court below. Parties are admittedly Indian Christians and Sri P.I Thakur Dass is said to have died on 2-12-62. He had executed a will on 18th July, 1957 which was propounded to be the last will executed by him. In her application the widow claimed to be one of the beneficiaries under the will and the opposite parties were the sons and daughters of the deceased. The court below, on the evidence before it, came to the conclusion that the will in question had been duly executed by late Sri P.I Thakur Dass in a proper state of mind and after fully understanding the same in the presence of the attesting witnesses. The court, therefore, granted probate of the will dated 18th July, 1957. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant has come up in appeal.

    2. At the very outset Sri A.K Banerji appearing for the appellant has contended that no probate could be granted in the present case as nobody had been appointed as an executor under the will and only Letters of Administration could have been granted to her in view of S. 234 of the Act. It may be recalled that there was a fire in the record room of the District Judge, Allahabad and it has been reported that the entire record of this case had been burnt at that time. This Court therefore, directed reconstruction of the material parts of the record and this has since been done and the parties have filed their paper books containing the necessary pleadings, documents and copies of statements, etc. The respondents in their paper book have filed the copy of the petition for the grant of probate in para 5 whereof the petitioner has claimed herself to be only a beneficiary under the will. In the main petition also there is no allegation anywhere that she had been appointed an executor under the will. On this basis it is sought to be argued that no probate could be granted to respondent No. 1. He has referred to Ss. 222 and 276(1)(e) of the Succession Act in this connection. Section 276 provides for the manner in which an application for grant of probate or for letters of administration should be made. Sub-clause (e) of sub-sec. (1) thereof provides that a petition for grant of probate must state therein that he/or she was an executor appointed under the will. This provision is mandatory and in the absence of such an averment the petition was liable to be rejected. Section 222 of the Act also provides that probate of the will can be granted only to an executor of the will. Thus Ss. 222 and 276(1)(e) read together lay down that probate can be granted only to an executor named in the will and the fact that the applicant was such an executor must be stated in the application.

    3. It appears that such a defect was never pointed out earlier nor any such issue was raised in the court below. In this court a certified copy of the will has been filed by the respondent before me which shows that the applicant has been appointed as an executrix therein. The actual words used in Paragraph 2 of the will are; “till such time as my wife Sushila is alive as my survivor even if my son Ajit attains majority, she is the sole owner and chief executrix of every thing mentioned above…… without the consent of my son Ajit.”

    4. From a perusal of above paragraph of the will it does appear that the testator had expressly appointed the applicant as an executor of his will. Apart from this along with the application for grant of probate an affidavit of valuation was filed in which it was stated that the applicant was an executor under the will. It is urged by the appellant that these words appear to have been copied out from the form which is prescribed under the Court-fees Act and as such it cannot be said that the word ‘executor’ had, in fact, been used by the applicant in the original application. As the original record has been destroyed in a fire I have no means of ascertaining whether a printed form of affidavit had been used by the applicant. No such objection had been taken in the trial court where it was possible to examine this aspect. Now I do not consider that it would be proper for me to hold otherwise. I would, therefore, treat that such an allegation was consciously made in the affidavit. Since this affidavit forms part of the main petition it must be held that there was substantial compliance of the legal requirements of Sec. 276(1)(e) of the Act.

    5. It was next urged that the original will had not been placed on record and the document filed in the case was not admissible in evidence. No probate, therefore, could be granted in respect of that will. The basis of this argument is a stray mention in the statement of the applicant herself that two wills were executed simultaneously and only one of them which is Ex. 1 on record was handed over to her by her late husband. The words ‘true copy’ had been noted by her husband at the time of handing over Ex. 1 to her and the endorsement was also initialled by him. On this basis it was urged that Ex. 1 was merely a copy of the original will and unless loss of the original will was proved no secondary evidence of the same would be admissible. However, this does not appear to be correct. The applicant does not claim to have been present when the will was executed. She only stated that two wills were executed. The first copy was given to their son Ajit and the carbon impression was handed over to her. At the time of handing over the deceased had mentioned the words ‘true copy’ on it and put his initials also. The attesting witnesses have, however, stated that both the wills containing identical matter had been executed simultaneously by the testator and were duly attested by them. If the will was prepared in this manner and both of them were duly signed by the testator and also attested by witnesses of the same then both of them would be originals and either of them could be used as primary evidence. The mere fact that on one of such original wills the words ‘true copy’ have been subsequently appended by the testator (after the same had been executed in accordance with law) would not turn it into a mere copy of the original. It will still remain to be the original will in view of Sec. 62 of the Evidence Act.

    6. Sri A.K Banerji, however, contends that Ex. 1 cannot be accepted in evidence in view of Sec. 62 of the Evidence Act. According to him before such a document is accepted in evidence it ought to have been prepared by some uniform process and the whole of the document must have been reproduced by the very same process. Since Ex. 1 admittedly had the signatures of the testator as well as the attesting witnesses apart from the endorsement, it cannot be said to have been prepared by uniform process in its entirety. In this connection he has referred to T. Shivshankaram v. Agali Narayana Rao (AIR 1937 Mad 807) where a learned single Judge of Madras High Court held:—

    “In order to bring the document within the meaning of Expl. 2 to S. 62, Evidence Act, the whole document with the signature must have been made by one uniform process. As only after the contents of the letter had been typed out b signed the document which was addressed to the Government and then initialled Ext. A, which was kept to the Taluk Board Office, the signature on the document addressed to the Government and the initials in Ext. A could not be said to have been made by one uniform process within the meaning of that Section. The document sent to the Government must be treated as the original as it constituted the communication between the Government and b and that therefore, Ex. A produced by the Taluk Board Office, was not admissible in evidence, being a copy of the original which was not admissible as being privileged document under Sec. 124 of the Evidence Act.

    7. He has also relied upon Makhan Lal Sen Gupta v. The State (AIR 1958 Cal 517) in which a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court held:—

    “A carbon copy of a search list with certain ink writings on it is not admissible under Sec. 62. When a mere glance of the document would show that even apart from the ink writings the whole of it could not have been made by one uniform process, it would not satisfy the requirements of Sec. 62 and other Sections of Evidence Act.”

    8. However none of these decisions really throws any light on the question involved here, nor any of them can be an authority for the proposition as contended by Sri Banerji for the simple reason that the will Ex. 1 is not a copy at all. In fact, the above two wills in identical language were prepared by the process of typing in which the second copy was obtained by a carbon impression. Both these wills having identical language were duly executed by the testator and also attested by the attesting witnesses in accordance with law. In these circumstances, none of them can be said to be a copy of the other within the meaning of Sec. 62 of the Evidence Act and both of them must be treated as the original wills. Merely because the contents of one of such original wills were obtained through the use of carbon paper, the one prepared on the carbon impression will not become a copy and this alone should not make any difference. Once we find that each of the two wills are separately executed, each one of them must be deemed to be the original will.

    9. Under these circumstances, the argument of Sri Banerji does not appear to be sound and has to be rejected.

    10. Besides the above, the appellant herself has admitted that the will dated 18-7-1957 Ex. 1 bears the signature of her father. She has not seriously questioned the due execution of the will nor does she contend that no will was executed at all. All that is questioned is that this will had been cancelled and another will was executed some times in 1963, but this fact has not been proved on the record. On the evidence, therefore, it is clear that the will in question had been duly executed by the deceased testator while he had a proper disposing mind and the same had been executed in accordance with law. In the circumstances, the argument of the appellant that the will was not legally admissible in evidence cannot be sustained and is hereby rejected.

    11. It was next urged that no application for probate can be allowed if it were only in respect of a part of the property devised under the will. The will, probate of which is sought, must be treated as one single indivisible document and the petitioner cannot be allowed to pick and choose the properties and claim probate in respect of some and to leave the rest. There is force in the contention, for, if a contrary view is taken, the result may be drastic. No one will then seek probate in respect of the entire property bequeathed under the will but may choose the least valuable or insignificant item of the properties bequeathed under the will and leave the rest. This could not be the purpose of the Act.

    12. Although under Sec. 211 of the Succession Act, the entire property of the testator vests in the executor or administrator appointed under the will and, in law, he is the legal representative of the deceased person for all purposes and he is entitled to administer the properties in any manner that he desires but once he decides to obtain probate of the will, he must do so in respect of the entire property devised under the will. Obtaining of probate may become necessary in order to establish any right in the property of the deceased or to establish executor's own right as an executor or as a legatee under Sections 212 and 213 of the Act. We should also consider Section 19-1 of the Court-fees Act (as amended in U.P) which reads as follows:—

    “19-I. No order entitling the petitioner to the grant of probate or letters of administration shall be made upon an application for such grant until the petitioner has filed in the Court, in the form set forth in the third Schedule, a valuation, according to the market rates current on the date of the application of all assets and liabilities of the deceased in India at the time of the latter's death, and the Court is satisfied that the fee mentioned in Article 11 of the First Schedule has been paid on such valuation.

    Explanation:— If at the time of his death, the deceased was a member of a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara Law, such portion of the assets and liabilities of the family as would have been allotted to the deceased in a partition made immediately before his death, shall be deemed to be the assets and liabilities of the deceased within the meaning of this sub-section.

    (2) The grant of probate or letters of administration shall not be delayed by reason of any motion made by the Collector under Section 19-H, sub-sec. (4).”

    13. Article 11 of Schedule I provides that when the total value of the assets increases, the court-fee payable also increases. In Schedule III form of valuation provided for mentioning moveable and immoveable property of the deceased refers to all the properties which the testator possessed of and the market value thereof will form the basis of the valuation of the probate. These provisions in the Court-fees Act, therefore, make it necessary for the grant of probate giving of full details of the properties with their market value as on the date of the application and to pay the court-fee thereon in accordance with Article 11 of Schedule I.

    14. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, urges that it is only the immoveable property which really belonged to the testator at the time of his death. In the will the mention about the fixed deposit was incorrect and the money lying therein belonged not to the testator but to the petitioner herself. In view of this, he urged that it would be improper to require her to pay any court-fee or to mention this property in the schedule of the deceased's property. This is, however, not correct. The probate of the will has to be granted in respect of the entire property of the deceased which the deceased was possessed of at the time of his death. All the assets have to be included in the schedule required to be filed under Section 19-I of the Court-fees Act. The mere fact that the petitioner lays claim to one of the items of the property mentioned in the will, will not entitle the petitioner to exclude such property from the schedule. It is well established that the jurisdiction of the Probate Court is limited only to the consideration of the validity of the will and it cannot concern itself with the disputed questions of title to the property which must be decided by a regular civil court.

    15. In a very well discussed case reported in Vrandavanlal Goverdhanlal Pitti v. Smt. Kamala Bai Goverdhanlal (AIR 1970 Andh Pra 109), a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court expressed itself thus:—

    “There is no section in the Succession Act dealing specifically with grants in respect of a portion of the estate of a particular item of property it is, therefore, clear that where a probate of a will is applied for, it must be of the entire estate which, under the will, vests in the executor, unless of course the court grants it subject to an exception.

    16. The general rule is that a probate should be granted in respect of the entire estate of the deceased because under section 211 the entire estate of the deceased vests in the executor appointed by the will. It is only in special circumstances that a probate in respect of a portion of the property can be justified.”

    17. In the instant case in the application for grant of probate schedule showed only residential house at Stanley Road, Allahabad but makes no mention of the fixed deposit amount of Rs. 40,000/- which was claimed as her own by the petitioner. This cannot be done and the argument of Sri Banerji to this extent is correct that the application for probate was defective inasmuch as it was not for the entire property left by the deceased, Shri S.N Verma, learned counsel for the respondent, however, made a statement that his client be permitted to correct the application and to pay the additional court-fee. This cannot be done by this Court now as the probate has already been issued to the respondent. The court below, however, is directed to entertain the application of the petitioner-respondent for amendment of the schedule after she first surrenders probate already granted to her and to grant her an opportunity of paying the additional court-fee. After this has been done, the probate may be granted afresh to her. The question whether the deposit of Rs. 40,000/- belonged to the deceased or not will remain open and may be got decided on the regular side in the civil court by any of the parties.

    18. In view of the above the appeal fails on all substantial grounds but has to be allowed only on a technical ground, as above, and I order accordingly.

    19. The matter will now go down to the lower court with a direction that it shall readmit the application at its original number and after the petitioner has surrendered the original probate granted to her before it the respondent No. 1 may apply for amendment of the petition and to pay requisite court-fee thereon. After this has been done, the court may grant a fresh probate to the petitioner without permitting the parties to adduce any further evidence either oral or documentary on any other points in the light of my decision on the points raised before me in this appeal.

    20. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs in this Court.

    21. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Smt. Kamala Rajamanikkam v. Smt. Sushila Thakur Dass And Others
    (May 27, 1982)