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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Acts
  • Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (forshort'lhe Act').
  • Section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • SECTION 138 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT
  • u/Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
  • SECTION 27 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • Section 138, clauses (b) and (c) of N.I. Act
  • Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Shops Rent Control Act, 1966,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Acts
  • Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (forshort'lhe Act').
  • Section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • SECTION 138 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT
  • u/Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
  • SECTION 27 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • Section 138, clauses (b) and (c) of N.I. Act
  • Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Shops Rent Control Act, 1966,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was filed to quash the complaint and proceedings in C.C. No. 31/97 before the III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kakinada. The petitioners are accused numbers A-3, A-4 and A-7 in the criminal complaint instituted by the first respondent under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

The complaint alleges that two cheques (one dated 17-10-1995 for Rs. 10.00 lakh and another dated 30-9-1996 for Rs. 10.00 lakh) issued in favour of the complainant were presented and dishonoured. For the second cheque (date of cheque 30-9-1996), the complainant presented it on 9-12-1996, it was returned on 11-12-1996 with endorsement "payment stopped by the drawer", and a statutory notice dated 14-12-1996 was issued. The complaint alleges that notices were sent and that neither the returned postal cover nor the acknowledgment were received by the complainant.

The petition sought quashing on grounds including that the first petitioner was not the Managing Director at the time of filing and that the statutory notice was not served on the accused (challenging sufficiency of proof of service). The trial court complaint was presented on 30-1-1997. The High Court heard submissions and dismissed the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be quashed under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that the statutory notice was not served on the drawer/accused.
  2. Whether a presumption of service arises where a statutory notice is sent by registered post acknowledgment due and neither the unserved postal cover nor the acknowledgement is returned to the sender (invoking Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act as referenced).
  3. Whether the first petitioner (A-3) can deny liability by claiming he was not the Managing Director of the company on the date of filing the complaint.
  4. Whether absence of production of the postal registration receipt with the complaint is fatal to maintainability of the complaint or whether that is a question of evidence to be weighed at trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The first petitioner argued he was not the Managing Director of the company at the relevant time because another person had been inducted as Managing Director with effect from 4-10-1996.
  • Primary contention: the complaint fails to show that any statutory notice was actually served on the accused. The complaint does not disclose service and the complainant did not enclose the postal receipt evidencing registration of the cover containing the statutory notice; therefore, service — a mandatory requirement — was not proved.

First Respondent's (Complainant's) Arguments

  • The complainant contended that statutory notices were sent by registered post acknowledgment due on 14-12-1996, neither the unserved postal cover nor the acknowledgement was received back, and the complainant waited the requisite fifteen days before filing the complaint.
  • The complainant relied on Section 27 of the General Clauses Act for the presumption that where a registered letter is sent and does not return, service is deemed to have occurred, subject to rebuttal. The complainant placed reliance on authorities supporting the deemed service principle.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A. Sudershan v. Mannan (Shabir), 1997 (6) Andh LD 202 Held that receipt of notice in writing is necessary for constituting the offence under Section 138; also noted that Section 27 GCA and Section 114 Evidence Act create a rebuttable presumption where registered post is not returned. The Court treated this decision as supporting the complainant's position: where notice was sent by registered post and neither returned nor acknowledged, a presumption of service may arise; but such presumption is rebuttable. The Court relied on the reasoning to refuse quashing here.
V. Satyanarayana v. A.P. Travel and Tourism Department Ltd., 1997 (2) Andh LT (Cri) 1 Discussed interpretation of "giving notice" under clauses (b) and (c) of Section 138 NI Act and noted that sending notice to correct address in time can amount to giving notice even if physical receipt is evaded. Cited for the proposition that "giving notice" by dispatch in the correct address within time is sufficient to prevent a wrongdoer from defeating the notice requirement by evading delivery; used to support that non-receipt does not automatically invalidate a complaint.
Madhu's case, 1994 (1) Andh LT (Cri) 603 (K.T. Thomas, J.) Interpreted Section 138 clauses (b) and (c): emphasized practical meaning of "giving notice" and that the law should not allow evasion of notice to defeat statutory purpose. Used to reinforce that evidence of dispatch to correct address is relevant and that failure of delivery due to evasion does not necessarily defeat the statutory requirement.
Prasanna case, 1992 Cri LJ 1233 (Madras High Court) Observed that deliberate avoidance of receipt by the accused would amount to constructive service of notice. Quoted to support the view that deliberate evasion resulting in non-receipt can be treated as constructive service.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Hiralal, JT 1996 (I) SC 669 Observed that if a respondent arranges to have a notice returned with postal remarks like 'not available in the house', it must be deemed that notice was served. Cited to demonstrate apex court support for treating returned-post tactics as evidence of constructive or deemed service in appropriate circumstances.
Attabira Regulated Market Committee v. Ganesh Rice Mills, 1996 (9) SCC 471 (AJR 1997 SC 1540) Held that where a notice was sent and neither acknowledgment nor unserved envelope was received, the notice must be deemed to have been served. Relied upon to support the presumption that non-return of registered post and non-receipt of acknowledgment justifies deeming service.
Indian Bank v. Datla Venkata Chinna Krishnam Raju, AIR 1991 SC 908 Where notice was sent by registered post but neither A.D. card nor unserved registered cover was received back, the court presumed service. Applied as authority for the presumption of service where registered-post evidence of return or A.D. is absent.
Madan & Co. v. Wazir Javir Chand, AIR 1989 SC 630 When a registered letter does not get served in the normal course and is returned, the failure can be attributed to the addressee's own conduct. Invoked to support the view that returned registered letters may reflect addressee conduct and thus support a presumption of service in some contexts.
Rajiv Kumar v. State of U.P., 1991 Cri LJ 3010 (1991 All LJ 994) Held that service of notice of demand and failure to pay after notice are conditions precedent for fastening liability under the NI Act; in absence of notice, no cognizance under Section 142. Noted by the Court but distinguished: the present question was whether presumptions arise where registered post and acknowledgments are not returned — a factual inquiry for trial rather than a ground for quashing at this stage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by addressing the main legal contentions in sequence and by applying settled principles referred to in precedent.

  1. Managing Director issue: The Court observed that Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act deems guilty every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. There was no dispute that on the date of the alleged offence the first petitioner was the Managing Director; hence his claim of non-liability on the basis of a later change in directorship (effective 4-10-1996) was rejected at the threshold.
  2. Nature of the statutory notice requirement: The Court accepted the legal proposition (derived from the cited authorities and Section 27 General Clauses Act) that when a statutory notice is sent by registered post acknowledgment due and neither the unserved postal cover nor the acknowledgment is returned, a presumption arises that the notice was served. The Court noted that such presumption is rebuttable.
  3. Effect of precedents: The Court analysed several precedents (including decisions of this Court and the Apex Court) to conclude that courts have treated non-return of registered post and absence of acknowledgement as grounds to presume service, and that where an accused deliberately avoids receipt, constructive service can be inferred. The Court found that those decisions supported the complainant's position rather than the petitioners'.
  4. Evidentiary posture in a Section 482 petition: The Court emphasized that in proceedings under Section 482 CrPC it must proceed on the assumption that averments in the complaint are true on their face. Thus, where the complaint specifically averred that the notice dated 14-12-1996 was sent under registered post acknowledgment due and that neither unserved cover nor acknowledgment were received, the Court could not, at this juncture, displace the complainant's averments without a trial of disputed facts.
  5. Rebuttable presumption and burden of proof: The Court noted that the initial burden rests on the complainant to prove dispatch by registered post acknowledgment due; failure to produce the postal receipt is a factual matter and may facilitate the accused rebutting the presumption at trial. However, absence of such a receipt in the complaint did not justify quashing the complaint because these are matters of evidence for the trial court.
  6. Conclusion as to quashing: Because the facts as averred in the complaint, if accepted, raise a permissible presumption of service and because the presumption is rebuttable (thus requiring factual inquiry), the Court held that summary quashing under Section 482 was not appropriate.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The petition to quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 31 of 1997 was dismissed; the criminal complaint under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act will proceed to trial before the III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kakinada.
  • The Court held that where a statutory notice is sent by registered post acknowledgment due and neither the unserved postal cover nor the acknowledgment is returned, a rebuttable presumption of service arises; whether the presumption is rebutted is a question of fact for trial.
  • The first petitioner could not avoid liability by claiming a subsequent change in directorship because he was managing the company's business at the time of the alleged offence.
  • The absence of the postal registration receipt in the complaint was characterized as a matter of evidence; its non-production does not automatically warrant quashing but may help the accused rebut the presumption at trial.
  • The Court permitted (in principle) the petitioners to apply to the trial court to allow one director to represent them on most dates (except when their presence is required for enquiry and trial); such an application must be made to and considered by the trial court.

Broader precedent: The decision applies existing principles concerning deemed service of registered-post notices and the rebuttable nature of such presumptions; the Court did not purport to lay down a new legal rule but applied established authorities and directed that disputed factual issues be decided at trial.

    G.S.Srikanth v. Sri Lakshmi Financiers & Anr.

    B. Sudershan Reddy, J.-

    This ap­plication is filed under Section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to quash the complaint and proceedings in CC No. 31/97 on the file of the III Addl. Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kakinada. The petitioners herein arc A-3, A-4 and A-7inthesaid criminal case.

    2. The first respondent herein filed a complaint against the petitioners herein and some others before the III Addl. Judi­cial Magistrate of First Class, Kakinada, under Sections 138 and 142 of the Nego­tiable Instruments Act, 1881 (forshort'lhe Act'). In the said complaint A-l is M/s. Talavadi Rock and Minerals Products Ltd., Chennai, a company represented by its Chairman and other directors. In the said complaint it is inter alia alleged that the accused issued a cheque for Rs, 10.00 Lakh on 17-10-1995 favouring the complainant towards part satisfaction of a debt incurred by the accused. The complainant presented the cheque for collection on 10-1-1996 and the said cheque, which was issued toward part satisfaction of the debt dishonored by the Bank with an endorse­ment "exceeds arrangement". The com­plainant was intimated about the same on 22-1-1996. The complainant thereafter got issued a statutory notice dated 24-1-1996 to the accused. It is further alleged that A-l received the notice on 29-1-1997 and A-7 refused to receive the said notice. The accused, however, issued a fresh che­que on 30-9-1996 for the said sum of Rs. 10,00 lakhs. The complainant presented the said cheque for collection on 9-12-1996 and the same was also dishonored with an endorsement "payment slopped by the drawer". Again the complainant got issued the statutory notice dated 14-12-1996. The time and date of offence, accord­ing to the complainant, are as follows:

    Dateofcheque:30-9-1996 -Date of presentation: 9-12-1996 Date of Return of cheque: 11-12-1996 Date of Legal Notice: 14-12-1996

    3. It is also specifically alleged in the complaint that A-l is represented by its Chairman ; A-2 is the Chairman of the company and A-3 is the Managing Direc­tor of the Company. A-4 is the whole time Director of the Company. A-5 to A-7 are the Directors of the Company. It is the seventh accused who executed the relevant and required documents. A-7 is alleged to have executed a personal guarantee bond and promissory note for the said amount and also issued cheque dated: 17-10-1995 for Rs. 10.00 lakh. The complainant presented the said cheque dated : 17-10-1995 for realisation of the debt due to the complainant. The said cheque was dishonored showing the reason "exceed­ing arrangements". The complainant got issued the registered notice dated : 24-1-1996 to pay the amounts and A-l received the notice and A-7 refused to receive the same.

    4. Finally, after receiving the notice, knowing full well of the consequences, it is alleged that, the accused issued another cheque on 30-9-1996 in favour of the com­plainant for the same amount towards part satisfaction of the debt due to the com­plainant. The said cheque was presented on 9-12-1996 by the complainant and the same was dishonored with an endorse­ment "payment stopped by the drawer" on 11-12-1996. The complainant got issued the statutory notice dated : 14-12-1996 to the accused. Neither the returned postal cover nor the acknowledgment from the accused were received by the complainant.

    5. At this stage, it is required to notice that there is a specific allegation in the complaint that "all the accused are jointly and severally liable and all the accused are managing the business." The cause of ac­tion for the complaint, according to com­plainant, arose on 30-9-1996 and sub­sequently thereafter when the com­plainant got issued the legal notices. The complaint was presented in the Court on 30-1-1997.

    6. In this application it is urged that the first petitioner is not the Managing Director of the Company, as on the date of filing of the complaint some other person has been inducted into the Board as Managing Director of the Company with effect from 4-10-1996. This argument is required to be noticed only for the purpose of rejecting the same. Not only the com­pany, but every person, who at the time the offence was committed, was incharge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company shall also be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. There is no dispute whatsoever that on the date of the alleged offence, the first petitioner was the Managing Director of the Company. Therefore, he cannot contend that he is not liable for the alleged offence com­mitted by the company.

    7. The only point strenuously urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is about the requirement of service of notice. The learned Counsel would urge that the complaint filed by the first respon­dent does not satisfy the requirement of law. It is urged that the complaint itself, does not disclose that any notice, as such, was served upon the accused. Service of notice is a mandatory requirement. The service of notice upon the company and the persons responsible for its manage­ment is the mandatory requirement. The learned Counsel for the first respondent would urge that notices were sent under registered post on 14-12-1996 to the ac­cused and neither the postal cover nor the acknowledgement from the accused was received by it. The first respondent had waited until expiry of fifteen days and then filed the complaint. The learned Counsel for the first respondent would further urge that the statutory notice was sent under the registered post acknowledgment due and service of notice shall be deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post, unless the contrary is proved. The learned Counsel for the first respondent would rely upon Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

    8. It may be noticed that the com­plainant filed an office copy of the notice dated 14-12-1996 along with the com­plaint, apart from other documents.

    9. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, however, relied upon a decision of this Court in A. Sudershan v. Mannan (Shabir), 1997 (6) Andh LD 202. In the said decision it is held by this Court that "from a combined reading of clauses (b)and(c)of Section 138oftheNegotiahlc Instruments Act, it is clear that unless a notice in writing is received by the drawer of such a cheque the offence would not be constituted. Therefore, the receipt of notice is absolutely necessary as a pre-con­dition for constituting such an offence. But, it is very important to notice that in the very same decision, while referring to Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, it is held that "in other words if such a docu­ment is sent by registered post and if it does not return back it is deemed to have been served. But such presumption is a rebut-table presumption and it is always open to the addressee to prove that in fact he did not receive such a registered post." It is only having regard to this kind of presump­tion found under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and also similar presumption found under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Courts in India have presumed the service of such a notice or document when such a registered post is not returned back. On further elaborate consideration of the matter, the Court in the said decision came to the conclusion that such presumption is not available when the notice is returned by the postal authorities because the addres­see was not available for seven continuous days and held that "therefore, only because a person is not found in his house by the postman, for seven continuous days, there cannot be a presumption of the service of the notice."

    10. The said decision in clear terms supports the case of the complainant and not of the accused. Here is a case, where it is clearly alleged that the notice was sent under registered post and the com­plainant did not receive the returned post­al cover or the acknowledgment from the accused. According to Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy, learned Counsel for R-l, the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act is available. The fur­ther observation of the Court that service of notice is a mandatory requirement would also not help the case of the petitioners/accused. Once it is established that notice was sent under Registered Post Acknowledgment Due and if neither the postal cover nor the acknowledgment is returned, the presumption available is that the addressed had received the notice. It would be a case of service of notice. In such cases requirement of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act shall be deemed to have been complied with.

    11. This Court in V. Satyanarayana v. A.P. Travel and Tourism Department Ltd. 1997 (2) Andh LT (Cri) 1, observed that:

    "In Madhu's case 1994 (1) Andh LT(Cri) 603 K.T. Thomas, J. considered the scope of Section 138, clauses (b) and (c) of N.I. Act and observed as follows:

    In clause (c) of the proviso the drawer of the cheque is given fifteen days from the date of 'of receipt of the said notice' for making pay­ment. This affords clear indication that 'giving notice' in the context is not the same as receipt or

    " notice. Giving is the process of which receipt is the accomplishment. The payee has to perform the former process by sending the notice to the drawer in his correct address, if receipt or even tender of notice is indispensable for giving the notice in the context envisaged in clause (b) an evader would successfully keep the postal article at bay at least till the period of fifteen days expired. Law shall not help the wrongdoer to take advantage of his tactics. Hence the realistic interpretation for the expression 'giving notice' in the present context is that, if the payee has dispatched the notice in the correct address of drawer reasonably ahead of the expiry of fifteen days, it can be regarded that the made the demand by giving notice within the statutory period. Any other interpretation is likely to frustrate the purpose for providing such notice."

    If the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that simply because as the notice was not served, the complainant is liable to be dismissed without enquiring into the cir­cumstances under which the notice was returned, is accepted, it would facilitate the evil minded persons to manage the postal authorities to return the notice and then to claim that the complaint under Section 138 is not maintainable and in such circumstances, the very object of incorporating Sections 138 to 142 would be defeated. The Kerala High Court in Madhu's case (supra) also took the same view that laws shall not help the wrongdoer to take advantage of his tactics. The Madras High Court in Prasanna case, 1992 Cri LJ 1233, also observed that if the accused deliberately avoids to receive notice, it would amount to construc­tive service of notice. ? The Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Hiralal, JT 1996 (I) SC 669, also observed that if the responded ob­viously managed to have the notice returned with postal remarks 'not available in the house', 'House locked' and 'shop closed' then it must be deemed that the notices have been served on the respondents.

    Therefore, the crucial question is whether the notices were sent to the correct address of the petitioner-accused and whether the petiti­oner-accused managed the postal authorities to return the notice with some false endorsements are questions of fact which can be decided during the trial of the case only. Complaint u/Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be quashed or dismissed merely because the notice was not served on the accused or drawer without enquiring into the circumstan­ces leading to the non-service of notice."

    12. The apex Court in Attabira Regu­lated Market Committee v. Ganesh Rice Mills, 1996(9) SCC471:AJR 1997 SC1540, observed that

    "though notice was sent to the respondent on 14-4-1992 till date neither acknowledgment nor unserved en­velope has been received. Under these cir­cumstances, the notice must be deemed to have been served on the respondent."

    13. In Indian Bank v. Datla Venkata Chinna Krishnam Raju., AIR 1991 SC 908, the Apex Court observed (at para 1):

    "Notice was sent by registered post but neither the A.D. card nor the unserved registered cover has been received back by the Court. We, therefore, presume, that the respon­dent has been served."

    14. In Mis. Madan & Co. v. Wazir Javir Chand, AIR 1989 SC 630, the Apex Court while interpreting the provisions of the J. & K. Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966, dealing with the requirement of a valid notice to terminate the tenancy, ob­served that (at page633):

    "..........if a registered letter addressed to a person at his residential address does not get served in the normal course and is returned, it can only be attribute to the addressee's own conduct."

    15. The decision of the Allahabad High Court in Rajiv Kumar v. State of U.P, 1991 Cri LJ 3010 : 1991 All LJ 994, upon which reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, does not im­prove the case of the petitioners. The Al­lahabad High Court merely held that:

    "Service of notice of demand and failure to pay in spite of notice are conditions precedent for fastening liability on drawer and in the ab­sence of notice no cognizance can be taken u/S. 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act."

    But, here we are confronted with the question as to what would be the effect when the notice sent under registered post acknowledgment due and neither the un­served registered postal cover nor the ac­knowledgment is returned to the sender.

    16. In my considered opinion, if the holder or the payee of a cheque makes a demand for payment by giving a notice, in writing to the drawer, of the cheque under registered post acknowledgment due and if neither the unserved postal cover nor the acknowledgment is received by the payee or the holder of the cheque, a presumption would arise about the service of notice upon the drawer of the cheque. The complaint filed after expiry of fifteen days from the date of the said notice would satisfy the requirement of law.

    17. But the crucial question that would arise for consideration is as to whether such a notice was at all sent under registered post acknowledgment due in the present case?

    18. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that there is no evidence whatsoever before this Court that such a notice was sent under registered post acknowledgment due. It may be noticed that a copy of the statutory notice dated 14-12-1996 has been filed along with the complaint and the list of documents would show the same. There is a specific averment in the complaint that the notice dated 14-12-1996 was sent under registered post acknowledgment due and the complainant has received neither the unnerved postal cover nor the acknowledgment. As observed by me, the presumption that is available that the notice is deemed to have been served, is a rebut table presumption. It is not as if for all practical purposes, the Court has to presume and proceed as if the notice was served as is required in law. It shall cer­tainly be open to the petitioners/accused to rebut the presumption and establish that, in fact, the complainant did not send any such notice under registered post ac­knowledgment due. At this stage, it is not possible for this Court to record any find­ing as to whether the notice was, in fact, sent to the petitioners/accused under registered post acknowledgment due. In a proceeding under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court has to proceed on the assumption that the aver­ments made in the complaint arc true on their face value.

    19. The learned Counsel for the petitioners further urges that the com­plainant did not enclose the postal receipt along with the complaint evidencing the registration of any cover containing the statutory notice. It is a matter of evidence. Failure to produce the postal receipt by the complainant may have its own conse­quences and may be, it would be, easy for the petitioners/accused to rebut the presumption of service of notice. There is no doubt that the initial burden would be upon the complainant to prove that the statutory notice was sent under registered post acknowledgment due. These are all the questions of fact which cannot be gone into by this Court. Further these are mat­ters for inquiry and trial by the competent Court of jurisdiction.

    20. For all the aforesaid reasons, it is not possible for this Court to accede to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners to quash the proceed­ings in C.C. No. 31 of 1997 on the file of the III Addl. Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kakinada. The petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed.

    21. After pronouncement of the judg­ment, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that all the petitioners need not be present during the course' of hearing of the case and one of the Direc­tors may be permitted to represent them during the course of enquiry and trial. The petitioners shall file an application to that effect before the trial Court, which shall be considered by the Trial Court permitting one of the petitioners to represent others on all the dates, except on the dates on which their presence is required for the purposes of enquiry and trial.

    Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    G.S.Srikanth v. Sri Lakshmi Financiers & Anr.
    (Aug 3, 1996)