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AMICUS AI
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citation codes
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  • section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • SECTION 147 INCOME TAX ACT
  • provisions of section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
  • SECTION 148 INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • section 147, Explanation C(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  • section 143(3). The Amending Act, 1987,
  • section 143(3) read with section 147
  • section 21 of the U.P Trade Tax Act
  • sub-section (3) of section 143
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • Amending Act, 1987,
  • section 34(1)(b).
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • SECTION 147 INCOME TAX ACT
  • provisions of section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
  • SECTION 148 INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • section 147, Explanation C(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  • section 143(3). The Amending Act, 1987,
  • section 143(3) read with section 147
  • section 21 of the U.P Trade Tax Act
  • sub-section (3) of section 143
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • Amending Act, 1987,
  • section 34(1)(b).
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.K. Gupta, J.) — Writ Petns. Nos. 31 & 32 of 2005

Factual and Procedural Background

Writ Petition No. 32 of 2005 (leading) and Writ Petition No. 31 of 2005 were filed seeking quashing of notices issued under section 148 read with section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03 (notices dated December 15, 2003 in one petition and January 8, 2004 in the other). The petitions were taken up together and disposed of by a common judgment and order.

The petitioner is a partnership firm engaged in manufacture and sale of RCC pipes. For assessment year 2000-01 the firm's return was accepted under section 143(1), later a notice under section 148 led to an assessment order dated February 26, 2002 under section 143(3)/148. The petitioner appealed; the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) initially dismissed the appeal and enhanced the assessment by an ex parte order dated July 29, 2003, but later recalled that order and, by a fresh order dated January 30, 2004, held the income to be assessable only as business income.

For the assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03 the petitioner filed returns (21 July 2001 and 7 October 2002 respectively) which were accepted under section 143(1) (intimations dated 29 April 2002 and 31 January 2003). Notices dated December 15, 2003 (issued under section 148) were served (record also records issuance on/around 10 January 2004) and reasons for reopening were supplied at the end of February 2004. The Assessing Officer's stated reasons included that certain receipts (rent) had been shown as business receipts and that business expenditure had been claimed in a manner which, in the AO's view, improperly reduced property income; the AO relied on the earlier CIT(A) order (July 29, 2003) and the East India Housing decision. Objections were filed by the petitioner on 5 July 2004; those objections were rejected by letter dated 10 December 2004. The petitioner then filed these writ petitions challenging the validity of the reassessment notices.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notices under section 148 read with section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03 were validly issued.
  2. Whether initiation of reassessment proceedings in this case amounted to an impermissible "change of opinion" by the Assessing Officer.
  3. Whether the earlier treatment of income in assessment year 2000-01 (and subsequent appellate proceedings) precluded reopening for subsequent years by way of res judicata or otherwise.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The reassessment proceedings initiated under section 147/148 represent a prohibited "change of opinion" and are therefore liable to be quashed.
  • The issue of classification of income as business or property income had been finally determined for assessment year 2000-01 (the petitioner relied on the earlier favorable order ultimately passed by the CIT(A) on January 30, 2004), and thus reopening for subsequent years was impermissible or unjustified.
  • The petitioner cited several judicial decisions in support of its contentions (specific cases relied upon by petitioner are referred to in the judgment and discussed by the court).

Revenue's Arguments

  • The notices under section 148 of the Act were issued in accordance with law and the Assessing Officer validly exercised jurisdiction to reopen the assessments.
  • The reasons supplied for reopening provided relevant material to form a "reason to believe" that income had escaped assessment for the years in question.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. v. CIT, [1961] 42 ITR 49 Used by the Assessing Officer (as cited in the AO's reasons) to support treating certain receipts as property income rather than business income. The court noted that the Assessing Officer placed reliance upon this decision as part of the material giving rise to a reason to believe; the court treated it as part of the prima facie material justifying issuance of notice.
Radhasoami Satsang v. CIT, [1992] 193 ITR 321 (SC) Authority referenced by the petitioner in support of challenge to reassessment notices. The court concluded the petitioner could not derive assistance from this decision because the apex court had expressly confined the decision to its special facts; the court observed that the Radhasoami decision was not of general application on the point relied upon.
J.P. Bajpai, HUF v. CIT, [2004] 269 ITR 40 Authority on quashing of notice where reassessment was founded on a mere change of opinion. The court held this precedent distinguishable: in J.P. Bajpai the notice under section 148 was issued only on the basis of change of opinion; in the present case returns had been accepted under section 143(1) and the Assessing Officer had prima facie material to form a reason to believe.
CIT v. Pateshzvari Electrical & Associated Industries P. Ltd., [2006] 282 ITR 61 (All.) Case relied upon by the petitioner (as cited in the judgment). The court held this case had no application to the facts before it because that case was not directed against issuance of notice under section 148; it did not assist the petitioner here.
Universal Plast Ltd. v. CIT, [1999] 237 ITR 454 (SC) Authority cited by the petitioner. The court observed that in Universal Plast the validity of a notice under section 148 was not under consideration, and thus it was not applicable to the present challenge.
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi-II v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., [2002] 256 ITR 1 (Del. FB) Authority concerning reassessment when a regular assessment under section 143(3) had been framed. The court distinguished Kelvinator on the ground that in that case a regular assessment under section 143(3) had been passed, whereas in the present matters the returns for the years in question had only been accepted under section 143(1) (no application of mind).
Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. CIT, [1959] 35 ITR 1 (SC) Interpretation of when income can be said to have "escaped assessment"—not confined to mere inadvertence or oversight; an erroneous failure to tax part of assessable income qualifies. The court relied on this principle to support the proposition that escaped assessment is not limited to cases of oversight and that reopening may be valid where income was erroneously not taxed.
CST v. Bhagwan Industries P. Ltd., [1973] 3 SCC 265 (AIR 1973 SC 370) Explains the meaning of "reason to believe"—there must be some rational, germane basis; at notice stage the existence of relevant material giving prima facie inference is what matters; sufficiency of reasons is not to be gone into. The court applied this principle directly: it held that the Assessing Officer had relevant material giving a prima facie inference that income might have escaped assessment and that the High Court cannot examine sufficiency of those reasons at the notice stage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequential legal analysis grounded on statutory provisions, administrative guidance and judicial precedents as follows:

  1. Application of mind under section 143(1): The court observed that the returns for the assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03 were accepted under section 143(1), which indicates the assessing authority did not apply its mind after routine acceptance. As a result, there was no prior forming of an opinion that could thereafter be said to have been changed — and therefore the petitioners' reliance on "change of opinion" as a ground to quash was misplaced when acceptance was only under section 143(1).
  2. Circular No. 549 (31 October 1989) and the Amending Act, 1987: The court reproduced and relied on the explanatory extract of Circular No. 549 which explains that under the post‑1987 scheme many returns are accepted without framing regular assessments under section 143(3). The circular rationalises section 147 to deal with escaped income particularly in non-scrutiny cases. The court used this to reinforce that acceptance under section 143(1) commonly entails no application of mind and cannot be equated to a prior considered assessment.
  3. Statutory scope of Explanation 2 to section 147: The court referred to clauses (b) and (c) of Explanation 2 to section 147 which treat cases where a return has been furnished but no assessment made and the Assessing Officer notices understatement or excessive claim of deduction/relief as cases of escaped assessment. The court found the present case fit within Explanation 2(b)/(c) territory because returns were accepted without assessment and AO alleged excessive business expenditure that reduced property income.
  4. Prima facie material and reason to believe: The court examined the reasons supplied by the Assessing Officer: (i) rental receipts shown as business receipts of Rs. 8,83,080 relative to sales and profit figures; (ii) large business expenditures debited that produced net profit less than rent received; (iii) the AO's view that a portion of interest paid to partners related to capital invested in property (non‑borrowed capital) and hence not allowable; and (iv) reliance on the then-existing CIT(A) order (July 29, 2003) and East India Housing decision. The court concluded these facts constituted relevant material giving rise to a prima facie inference that income chargeable to tax may have escaped assessment.
  5. On reviewability of reasons at notice stage: Relying on CST v. Bhagwan Industries, the court reiterated that what can be challenged is the existence of a belief (i.e., whether some material exists to form a belief) but not the sufficiency of the reasons. The court found there was relevant material and thus the Assessing Officer had jurisdiction to issue notices; the sufficiency of the material would be gone into during reassessment.
  6. Res judicata and assessment year separability: The court stressed that res judicata principles do not apply to income‑tax proceedings across different assessment years; each assessment year is a separate unit with its own facts. The notices for 2001-02 and 2002-03 were issued on December 15, 2003, which preceded the CIT(A)'s January 30, 2004 order in the 2000-01 year; consequently, the petitioner could not derive advantage from the later appellate order in the earlier assessment year when the notices had already been issued.
  7. Distinguishing authority relied upon by the petitioner: The court examined the cases cited by the petitioner (Radhasoami Satsang, J.P. Bajpai, Kelvinator, Universal Plast, Pateshzvari) and explained why they did not support quashing the notices in the present factual matrix — primarily because those cases were either confined to their facts, involved clear change of opinion, involved regular assessments under section 143(3), or did not concern validity of notices under section 148.
  8. Conclusion on legality of issuance: Taking the above points together, the court concluded that there was no illegality or infirmity in initiating proceedings under section 147 read with section 148 for the assessment years in question, and that the petitioners' challenge failed.

The court emphasized that at the stage of issuing a notice the question is whether relevant material exists to give rise to a prima facie inference; the ultimate determination of taxability is for the assessing authority in light of material in its possession and any fresh material obtained during enquiry.

Holding and Implications

Holding: These writ petitions are dismissed.

Immediate consequences and practical implications:

  • The Assessing Officer may proceed with reassessment proceedings under section 147 read with section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act for the assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03 based on the notices already issued and the reasons supplied.
  • The court found that there was relevant prima facie material to form a "reason to believe" that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment; therefore, issuance of notices was lawful and not a mere change of opinion invalidating the notices.
  • The judgment distinguishes earlier authorities relied upon by the petitioner and clarifies that those precedents were either fact‑specific or inapplicable in the factual context where returns had only been accepted under section 143(1).
  • No broader binding precedent beyond the reasoning expressed is announced; the court explicitly stated that the respondent (assessing authority) will not be influenced by observations in the judgment and must independently exercise its authority to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law in the proceedings under section 147/143(3).

    Desh Raj Udyog v. Chaman Udyog

    S.K Gupta, J.:— Writ Petition No. 32 of 2005 has been filed, inter alia, for the following reliefs:

    “(i) That a suitable writ, order or direction be issued quashing the notices dated December 15, 2003, for reassessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03, both under section 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961;

    (ii) That a suitable writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus or prohibition be issued restraining or prohibiting the Income-tax Officer, Ghaziabad, respondent from passing any reassessment order in pursuance of the notices dated December 15, 2003, both under the Income-tax Act, 1961.”

    2. Writ Petition No. 31 of 2005 has been filed, inter alia, for the following reliefs:

    “(i) That a suitable writ, order or direction be issued quashing the notices dated January 8, 2004, for reassessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03, both under section 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961;

    (ii) That a suitable writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus or prohibition be issued restraining or prohibiting the Income-tax Officer, Ghaziabad, respondent from passing any reassessment order in pursuance of the notices dated January 8, 2004, both under the Income-tax Act, 1961.”

    3. In these writ petitions similar questions of fact and law are involved and with the consent of the parties they are taken up together and are being disposed of by a common judgment and order.

    4. These writ petitions relate to the assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03. All the facts of the aforesaid writ petitions are more or less the same, therefore, the facts of the leading Writ Petition No. 32 of 2005 are briefly stated as under:

    The petitioner is a partnership firm engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of RCC pipes. The return of income declaring total receipt as business receipts for the assessment year 2000-01 was accepted under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). Later on a notice under section 148 of the Act was issued and assessment order dated February 26, 2002, was passed for the assessment year 2000-01 under section 143(3)/148 of the Act. The petitioner filed an appeal against the addition of Rs. 27,876 before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Ghaziabad (hereinafter referred to as “the CIT(A)”). The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) not only dismissed the appeal but enhanced the assessment by taking recourse of the report of the Income-tax Officer, vide ex parte order dated July 29, 2003.

    5. The returns of income for the assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03 were duly filed on July 21, 2001, and October 7, 2002, respectively, declar: ing the total income under the head “Income from business”. The aforesaid returns for the years 2001-02 and 2002-03 were accepted by the Income-tax Officer, vide intimation under section 143(1) of the Act dated April 29, 2002, and January 31, 2003, respectively. On January 10, 2004, notices dated December 15, 2003, were issued under section 148 of the Act for the assessment years 2001 to 2003.

    6. In the mean time the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) recalled the order dated July 29, 2003 (2000-01) for rectification and passed a fresh order on January 30, 2004, and held that the income of assessee is assessable only under the head “Income from business” as has been declared by the assessee.

    7. On the request of the petitioner, reasons for issuance of notices under section 148 for the assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03 were supplied in the end of February, 2004. For ready reference, reasons for issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act as supplied by the respondent for the assessment year 2001-02 is quoted below:

    “M/s. Desh Raj Udyog, Site-3 C-19, Meerut Road, Industrial Area, Ghaziabad, for the assessment year 2002-03. Reasons for issue of notice under section 148;

    On a perusal of the profit and loss account in the above mentioned case for the assessment year 2001-02, it reveals that the assessee-firm has credited miscellaneous receipt as rent from property amounting to Rs. 8,83,080 and sales of Rs. 30,82,001 and gross profit of Rs. 6,28,459 only and debited business expenditure to the tune of Rs. 11,20,413 giving a net profit of Rs. 3,91,158 which is less than the rent received. Which shows that the assessee has claimed excessive business expenditure with the motive to reduce the taxable property income. Thus, the assessee is entitled to get the benefit of deduction as allowable under the head “Income from house property” and not as business expenditure as claimed by the assessee in the profit and loss account. The same view has been held by the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeal), Ghaziabad, vide her order at July 29, 2003, in the case of the assessee in the assessment year 2000-01. This view also finds support from the decision of the hon'ble apex court in the case of East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. v. CIT reported in [1961] 42 ITR 49 as cited by the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Ghaziabad, in her above mentioned order. It appears that the interest paid to partners is not entirely on account of business activity but a major part of the capital has been invested towards the purchase of the property. Thus, it is the investment made by these persons the so called partners and no interest can be allowed on their investments as there is no borrowing of capital. Therefore, I have reasons to believe that excessive relief from the income from house property has been allowed under section 147, Explanation C(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. I have reasons to believe that the assessee has escaped income within the meaning of section 147 read with section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Hence, notice under section 148 is being issued separately.”

    8. Similar reasons were also assigned by the respondent for the assessment year 2002-03.

    9. The objections were raised by the petitioner by letter dated July 5, 2004. The respondents by letter dated December 10, 2004, rejected the objections of the petitioner against the issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act for the assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03. Hence, the present writ petition.

    10. It was submitted by the petitioner that the initiation of the proceedings under section 147/148 of the Act is a “change of opinion” and as such proceedings are liable to be quashed. It was further contended that the issue pertaining to “income from property” has already become final by the order of the respondent for the assessment year 2000-01 under section 147/148 of the Act, as much as the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has recalled the earlier order dated July 29, 2003, and passed a fresh order on January 30, 2004, whereby the petitioner has been assessed for the assessment year 2000-01 only under the head “Income from business” and not under the head “Property income”. It has been further contended that the reassessment, proceedings initiated under section 148 is absolutely illegal and without jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also cited a number of decisions in support of his contention which will be discussed in the latter part of the judgment.

    11. In contra, learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that the notices issued under section 148 of the Act is in accordance with law and the assessing authority had validly exercised its jurisdiction to reopen the assessment.

    12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

    13. It is not disputed that the returns filed for the assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03 were accepted under section 143(1) which indicate that mind was not applied by the assessing authority and after accepting the return in the routine manner the intimation was sent to the petitioners as provided under section 143(1) of the Act. Since the returns were accepted and the intimation was issued under section 143(1) of the Act to the petitioner as such when no opinion was formed by the assessing authority, therefore, there is no question of change of opinion.

    14. In this regard, it will be useful to refer to aforesaid Circular No. 549, dated 31st October, 1989. The relevant extract of the said circular is reproduced below ([1990] 182 ITR (St.) 1, 28):

    “Income escaping assessment.

    7.1 Simplification of the provisions relating to assessment or reassessment of income escaping assessment (section 147):

    Under the old provisions of section 147 of the Income-tax Act, separate clauses (a) and (b) laid down the circumstances under which income escaping assessment for the past assessment years could be assessed, as follows:

    (i) Clause (a) empowered the Income-tax Officer to assess or reassess the income escaping assessment, if he had reason to believe that income had escaped assessment on account of omission or failure on the part of the assessee to file a return of income for an assessment year or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment for that year.

    (ii) Clause (b) empowered the Income-tax Officer to reopen an assessment, notwithstanding the fact that there had been no omission or failure, as mentioned in clause (a), on the part of the assessee if the Income-tax Officer, on the basis of information in his possession, had reason to believe that income had escaped assessment for the relevant assessment year.

    Since under the new scheme of assessment (refer to para 5.1 of these Explanatory Notes), introduced by the Amending Act, 1987, returns filed will now be accepted as such and passing of assessment orders will not be necessary, it follows that in the majority of cases there would not be any application of mind by the Assessing Officer after the returns are filed, unless the case is picked up for scrutiny and a regular assessment order is passed under section 143(3). The Amending Act, 1987, has, therefore, rationalised the provisions of section 147 and other connected sections to simplify the procedure for bringing to tax the income which escapes assessment, especially in non-scrutiny cases.”

    15. Thus, while accepting the return for the assessment years 2001 to 2003 there was no application of mind by the respondent, simply the intimation was sent and the assessments of the said years were not framed under section 143(3), therefore, it cannot be said that the regular assessments for the years 2001 to 2003 were framed.

    16. A bare perusal of the reasons supplied for issuance of notice under section 148 by the respondent for the assessment year 2001-02, clearly indicate that the assessee-firm had credited miscellaneous receipts as rent from property amounting to Rs. 8,83,080 and sales of Rs. 30,82,001 and gross profit of Rs. 6,28,459 only and debited business expenditure to the tune of Rs. 11,20,413 giving a net profit of Rs. 3,91,158 which was less than the rent, received. According to the Assessing Officer, the assessee had claimed excessive business expenditure with the motive to reduce the taxable property income. The Assessing Officer was further of the view that the assessee was entitled to get the benefit of deduction as allowable under the head “Income from house property” and not as business expenditure as claimed by the assessee in the profit and loss account. The Assessing Officer had placed reliance on the order dated July 29, 2003, passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Ghaziabad, in the case of the petitioner in the assessment year 2000-01 and also placed reliance upon the decision of the apex court in the case of East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. v. CIT, [1961] 42 ITR 49.

    17. Further reasons assigned by the Assessing Officers were that the interest paid to the persons is not entirely on account of business activity but the major part of the capital was invested towards the purchase of the property thus the investment made by those persons, the so called partners and no interest can be allowed on their investment as there was no borrowing of capital.

    18. During the assessment years 2001 to 2003, the assessee was in possession of the land and building which was partly being used for the purpose of its business as godown, factory shed, etc., whereas the remaining part was given on rent to third party. The rental income received from third party was shown by the petitioner firm under the head “Income from business”. The return filed by the petitioner disclosing the entire income from business and not under the head “Property” was accepted under section 143(1) without any application of mind thereafter the notice under section 148 was issued and the Assessing Officer was of the opinion that the said income was chargeable under the head “Property income” and was also of the opinion that the interest paid to the partners was not entirely on account of business activity but a major part of the capital was invested towards the purchase of the property thus it was the investment made by the partners and no interest can be allowed on the investment as there was no borrowing of the capital, therefore, the respondent on the basis of the aforesaid reasons called upon the assessee to explain as to why the same should not be taxed under the head “Income from house property” instead of the “Income from business”.

    19. The main plank of the argument of the counsel for the petitioners is that, already in the earlier assessment year 2000-01 it has been held by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and further confirmed by the Tribunal that the income should be treated as “business income” and not under the head “Property income”, therefore, the assessing authority was not justified to issue notice under section 148 of the Act. We are not at all impressed by such submissions.

    20. At this juncture it will be useful to refer to clauses (b) and (c) of the Explanation 2 to section 147 which read as follows:

    “Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this section, the following shall also be deemed to be cases where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, namely:—

    (a) Where no return of income has been furnished by the assessee although his total income or the total income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax.

    (b) Where a return of income has been furnished by the assessee but no assessment has been made and it is noticed by the Assessing Officer, that the assessee has understated the income or has claimed excessive loss, deduction, allowance or relief in the return;

    (c) Where an assessment has been made, but…

    (i) income chargeable to tax has been underassessed; or

    (ii) such income has been assessed at too low a rate; or

    (iii) such income has been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act; or

    (iv) excessive loss or depreciation allowance or any other allowance under this Act has been computed.”

    21. Here, in the present case, in fact no assessment order under section 143(3) was passed and simply the returns for the assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03 were accepted without application of mind and the intimation was sent to the petitioners. It is also relevant to note that for the assessment year 2000-01, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Ghazia bad, initially by order dated July 22, 2003, before the issuance of impugned notices under section 148 had dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and held that the petitioner was not entitled for set off the business expenditure claimed to the extent of Rs. 4,72,256 against the income from property and taxed the income under the head “Income from property” instead of “Income from business”.

    22. The notices under section 148 for the assessment years 2001 to 2003 were issued on December 15, 2003, much prior to the subsequent order dated January 30, 2004, passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Ghaziabad, recalling its order dated July 22, 2003, for the assessment year 2000-01 and allowing the appeal of the petitioner. It is a settled law that res judicata does not apply to income-tax proceedings and each assessment year being a separate unit and is new and is based on different facts and circumstances. It is also relevant to note that when the objections raised by the petitioner against the issuance of notice under section 148 for the assessment years 2001 to 2003, even at that time the case of Chaman Udyog for the assessment year 2000-01 was sub judice. Moreover, the assessment order for the assessment year 2000-01 was passed under section 143(3) read with section 147 of the Act/however, for the assessment years in question (assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-03) the returns were accepted under section 143(1) of the Act.

    23. In view of the aforesaid reasons the petitioner cannot get any advantage of the fact that in the assessment year 2000-01 the income of the petitioner was treated as “Income from business” and not under the head “Income from property”.

    24. The petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of Radhasoami Satsang v. CIT, [1992] 193 ITR 321 (SC), but I am afraid, that the petitioner cannot get any help from the decision of the said case due to following observations made by the apex court before concluding the, judgment (page 329):

    “The counsel for the Revenue had told us that the facts of this case being very special, nothing should be said in a manner which would have general application. We are inclined to accept this submission and would like to state in clear terms that the decision is confined to the facts of the case and may not be treated as an authority on aspects which have been decided for general application.”

    25. The petitioner has further placed reliance on the decision of this court in the case of J.P Bajpai, HUF v. CIT, [2004] 269 ITR 40, this case is clearly distinguishable and has no bearing in the facts of the present case. In the case of J.P Bajpai, HUF one Atul Traders which was a partnership firm concern in Etawah, and managed by Sri Om Prasad Purwar, fraudulently and without the consent of the petitioner started an account in the books of his firm styled as J.P Bajpai, Hindu undivided family, Etawah. The aforesaid amount allegedly shown deposited in the books of M/s. Atul Traders fraudulently and with nefarious design had illegally shown the bogus deposit in the name of the petitioner on the liabilities side of its balance-sheet. The assessing authority while passing the assessment order in the case of Atul Traders treated the deposit as bogus and the entire amount along with interest was added in the hands of the firm, M/s. Atul Traders, Etawah. Despite the aforesaid fact the assessing authority issued notice under section 147 of the Act to J.P Bajpai, HUF as well as to M/s. Atul Traders.

    26. Thus, it is obvious that in the case of J.P Bajpai, HUF, [2004] 269 ITR 40 the impugned notice under section 148 was issued only on the basis of a change of opinion on the part of the Assessing Officer, consequently the impugned notices were quashed.

    27. The aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case of J.P Bajpai, HUF, [2004] 269 ITR 40 clearly suggest that the present case is clearly distinguishable and has no bearing on the case in hand.

    28. The petitioner has further placed reliance on the case of CIT v. Pateshzvari Electrical and Associated Industries P. Ltd., [2006] 282 ITR 61 (All). This case has absolutely no application to the facts of the present case. The said case was not directed against the issuance of notice issued under section 148 of the Act. In the present matter, the matter is still to be decided finally by the assessing authority, whether the income should be treated under the head “Business income” or “Property income”. The petitioner will get ample of opportunity to show sufficient cause to the assessing authority during the course of assessment.

    29. The petitioner has placed further reliance on the decision of the Universal Plast Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Calcutta, [1999] 237 ITR 454 (SC). In this case also, the validity of notice issued under section 148 of the Act was not under consideration, therefore, it has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case.

    30. The petitioner has also placed reliance on the decision of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Delhi-Ii. v. Kelvinator Of India Ltd. reported in [2002] 256 ITR 1, This case is also not at all applicable and it is distinguishable. In that case, the regular assessment order was passed in terms of sub-section (3) of section 143 but, in the present case, no such assessment under section 143(3) was passed, simply the returns filed by the petitioner was accepted under section 143(1) of the Act and consequently intimation was sent to the petitioner.

    31. In the case of Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. CIT reported in [1959] 35 ITR 1 (SC) 1958 (IT-2) GJX-133-SC. The apex court examined the provisions of section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (as is stood at the relevant time) (pages 7 and 8):

    “The next question that remains to be considered is in regard to the other conditions prescribed by section 34(1)(b). When can income be said to have escaped assessment?… We see no justification for holding that cases of income escaping assessment must always be cases where income has not been assessed owing to inadvertence or oversight or owing to the fact that no return has been submitted. In our opinion, even in a case when a return has been submitted, if the Income-tax Officer erroneously fails to tax a part of assessable income, it is a case where the said part of the income has escaped assessment. The appellant's attempt to put a very narrow and artificial limitation on the meaning of the word ‘escape’ in section 34(1)(b) cannot, therefore, succeed.”

    (emphasis1 supplied)

    32. The apex court in the case of CST v. Bhagwan Industries P. Ltd., [1973] 31 STC 293; (1973) 3 SCC 265 : AIR 1973 SC 370 in a case arising out of section 21 of the U.P Trade Tax Act which related to the escaped assessment, has held as follows (page 374):

    “9. The controversy between the parties has centred on the point as to whether the assessing authority in the present case had reason to believe that any part of the turnover of the respondent had escaped assessment to tax for the assessment year 1957-58. Question in the circumstances arises as to what is the import of the words ‘reason to believe’, as used in the section. In our opinion, these words convey that there must be some rational basis for the assessing authority to form the belief that the whole or any part of the turnover of a dealer has, for any reason escaped assessment to tax for some year. If such a basis exists, the assessing authority can proceed in the manner laid down in the section. To put it differently, if there are, in fact, some reasonable grounds for the assessing authority to believe that the whole or any part of the turnover of a dealer hasescaped assessment, it can take action under the section. Reasonable grounds necessarily postulate that they must be germane to the formation of the belief regarding escaped assessment. If the grounds are of.an extraneous character, the same would not warrant initiation of proceedings under the above section. If, however, the grounds are relevant and have a nexus with the formation of belief regarding escaped assessment, the assessing authority would be clothed with jurisdiction to take action under the section. Whether the grounds are adequate or not is not a matter which would be gone into by the High Court or this court for the sufficiency of the grounds which induced the assessing authority to act is not a justiciable issue. What can be challenged the existence of the belief but not the sufficiency of reasons for.the belief. At the same time, it is necessary to observe that the belief must be held in good faith and should not be-mere pretence.

    10. It may also be mentioned that at the stage of the issue of notice the consideration, which has to weigh is whether there is some relevant material giving rise to prima facie inference that some turnover has escaped assessment. The question as to whether, that material is sufficient for making assessment or reassessment under section 21 of the Act would be gone into after notice is issued to the dealer and he has been heard in the matter or given an opportunity for that purpose. The assessing authority would then decide the matter in the light of material already in its possession as well as fresh material procured as a result of the enquiry which may be considered necessary.”

    33. Thus, the apex court in the aforesaid case has clearly held that what can be challenged, is the existence of the believe not sufficiency of reasons for the belief.

    34. A bare perusal of the record shows that it cannot, be said that there was no relevant material to initiate proceedings under section 147 of the Act. At the stage of issuance of the notice under section 148 of the Act, the consideration which has to weigh is whether there is some relevant material giving prima facie inference that some turn over has escaped assessment. The question as to whether material is sufficient for making reassessment under section 147 of the Act could not be gone into at the time of issuance of notice. The assessing authority while reassessing has to decide the matter in the light of material already in its possession as well as fresh material procured as a result of the enquiry which may be considered necessary. In view of the above discussions, we do not find any illegality or infirmity in initiating the proceedings under section 147 of the Act against the petitioner. For the aforementioned reasons, these writ petitions are accordingly dismissed.

    35. Before parting with the judgment it is made clear that the respondent will not be influenced by any of the observations made in this judgment. It will be independent exercise of the concerned authority to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law in the proceedings under section 147/143(3) of the Act.

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