I.C.I India, Ltd. v. Labour Court (Iv) And Another

By the Court -- The petitioner has a factory at Kanpur in which it employees workmen. An application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was filed by the petitioner’s employees before the Labour Court claiming certain benefits, and this application is still pending. In this application the petitioner took an objection that Sri Nayar, who was representing the workmen, was an Advocate, and hence he was not entitled to represent the workmen in view of Section 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act (which corresponds to Section 6-1(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act). This objection of the employer has been rejected by the Labour Court by its order dated 14-11-91. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. 2. When this case was argued before me on 24-2-92, I had directed the petitioner to serve respondent No. 2 personally, and the said respondent was granted time to file counter affidavit. I had also observed that on 2-4-1992 (which I had fixed for the hearing) I will also decide the question of validity of Section 6-1(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, which corresponds to Section 36(4) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. and I had directed the Standing Counsel to inform the Advocate General about my order. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed by respondent no. 3. and I have heard the counsel for the petitioner and respondent No. 2. In my opinion, Section 6-1(2) of the U.P. Act as well as Section 36(4) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act are ultra vires Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and are consequently illegal. It is well known that Industrial Law is a complicated branch of law, and only persons who have knowledge of labour laws, and also some practical experience, can properly represent the parties before the Labour Court/Tribunal. The principles of Labour Laws are quite different from the principles of ordinary civil law, and what to say of a lay-man even an ordinary civil lawyer, unless he has studied labour law, cannot properly present the case before the Labour Court/Tribunal. For example, it is an established principle in labour law that the Labour Court has got powers which no civil court has got, e.g. to create contracts, and to enforce contracts of personal service. Labour Law is largely Judge made law, and hence only a person who has studied this branch of law can properly represent a party before the Labour Court. It has become a highly technical branch, and only trained persons can properly assist the Labour Court/Tribunal in the matter. Hence, to debar lawyers merely because the opposite party objects is wholly unreasonable and arbitrary. 4. The argument that lawyers will cause delay is, in my opinion, wholly frivolous. No doubt the aim of industrial adjudication is to expeditiously decide an industrial dispute because industrial friction affects not only the employer and the workmen, but also the public at large, but it is not understandable how the appearance of a lawyer will obstruct expeditious disposal. On the contrary a lawyer who is trained in labour law can quickly focus the attention of the Labour Court/Tribunal to the main points of the dispute, and place the relevant case law so that the Labour Court can quickly dispose of the dispute. Hence, debarring of lawyers, even with the proviso that a lawyer can appear if the other side gives consent is in my opinion, wholly arbitrary. As a matter of fact, it is well known that this arbitrary provision in the two Industrial Disputes Act, viz, Section 36(4) in the Industrial Disputes Act and Section 6-1(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, has led to all sorts of subterfuges. Lawyers have had to resort to creation of artificial employer’s or employees’ organisations of which they claim to be representatives, or appear as Officers of the concern. This invites all sorts of objections and much time of the labour court has to be wasted and devoted to first deciding this matter before proceeding to dispose of the dispute on merits. The provision, to my mind, is clearly arbitrary, and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 5. The procedure in the Labour Courts, though slightly different from those of the civil court, is still similar to it, and hence this requires study of the procedure also, which an untrained person does not know. For example, certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply to the Labour Courts also, vide Section 11(3) of the Central Act. Similarly many other provisions in the Industrial Disputes Act are similar to the provisions in the Civil Procedure Code, It is, therefore, wholly unreasonable to expect a layman to present his case properly before the Labour Court without assistance of a specialised lawyer. 6. In my opinion, the aforesaid provisions in both the Central and U.P. Acts are also violative of Articles I9(1)(g) of the Constitution of India since they amount to unreasonable restriction on a lawyer’s right to practice his profession. A whole class of labour lawyers has sprung up after enforcement of the Industrial Disputes Act, and the aforesaid provisions amount to unreasonable restriction on their right to practice. To say that lawyers raise all sorts of technical objections to delay the disposal of the case, is to my mind, a wholly frivolous objection. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court/Tribunal can always conduct the proceedings firmly and in such a manner that no delay is caused, and he can always reject any objection which he finds to be frivolous hyper-technical and which comes in the way of speedy disposal of the dispute. 7. My attention has been invited to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pradeep Port Trust v. Their Workmen, AIR 1977 SC 36 This authority has no application because the vires of Section 35(4) has not been decided in this case. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, I hold that Section 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as well as Section 6-1(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are unconstitutional, and hence void. 9. In view of the above, it is not necessary for me to decide whether the impugned order was justified or not, since I have held that the provision debarring lawyers is itself unconstitutional. The petition is accordingly dismissed. There is no order as to costs. (Petition dismissed.) _____________