(1) The nature of the powers exercisable by the registrar of the co - operative society under sec. 32 (7) (a) and (b) of a. P. Co - operative societies act 7 of 1974 falls for determination in this appeal.
(2) The andhra pradesh co - operative central land mortgage bank limited which is now called andhra pradesh co - operative central agricultural development bank limited (hereinafter called the bank) is a federal type of co - operative society governed by the provisions of andhra pradesh co - operative societies act 1964 (herein after called the act). This bank has to its credit several service litigation episodes and the present appeal is one such episode for which the registrar himself is the author. In order to appreciate the present controversy the constitution of the bank and the previous history may be referred.
(3) The members of the central bank are the primary co - operative - agricultural development banks and the government in the first instance framed rule 70 in exercise of the powers conferred under sub - section (1) of sec. 30 read with sec. 115 of the act and the said rule empowered the board of directors of the bank to constitute a centralised service for the mortgage banks in the state and conferred power on the board with effect from such constitution to make appointments to those posts. The said rule was held to be ultra vires by this court and the same was confirmed by the supreme court - vide a. P. Co - operative bank vs. C. P. Cooperative land mortgage bank (1) a. I. R. 1974 supreme court 1692. Subsequently new section 114 - a was introduced in the act by amending act 51 of 1976 and under the powers conferred under the said provision new rule 70 was framed. Pending the framing of new staff patron several circulars were issued by the central bank directing the primary banks not to fill up any vacancies till the new staffing patron was evolved. When the primary banks made appointments and promotions in respect of centralised service, the central bank passed orders revoking those orders of appointments and promotions and reverting those officers to substantive posts and the said action of the central bank was challenged in writ petition no. 4208/80 and batch dated 27 - 10 - 1978 and ramachandra rao j. , upheld the orders passed by the central bank.
(4) In respect of the centralised service in this appeal we are concerned with the posts of manager as contemplated under new rule 70 as stated above. The present suit is filed by the candidates who were selected to the posts of managers but whose selection was cancelled by the bank subsequently and requiring them to appear for the fresh examination.
(5) The allegations in the plaint broadly are that the bank called for applications for the posts of managers by direct recruitment and the plaintiffs appeared for the written test on 24 - 4 - 77 and viva - voce on 21 - 1 - 78 and were declared as selected by the appointment committee on 21 - 1 - 78 and their selection was announced. However, the plaintiffs received notice on 7 - 7 - 78 proposing to hold an examination again on 16 - 7 - 78 and requiring them to appear for fresh examination. The plaintiffs challenged the said action impleading the managing director and also the chairman of the committee of the persons of the bank. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the defendants restraining them from conducting a fresh selection by conducting examination for the posts of managers of agricultural development banks to be held on 16 - 7 - 78, as the proposed action is ultra vires and constitutes an abuse of power.
(6) The bank filed a written statement and contended in main that the appointment orders were not served on the plaintiffs though the selection was admitted. It was stated that the appointment orders were not issued for want of immediate availability of seats in training college conducted by the bank for the chief executives of the primary banks. It is further averred that the registrar of co - operative societies directed the bank not to proceed further with the recruitment as per orders dated 10 - 3 - 78 by virtue of the powers under sec. 32 (7) (b) of the act and hence the bank is bound to obey the said direction as the bank was under the management of the persons incharge appointed under sec. 32 of the act and the registrar gave direction to conduct fresh examination for all the selected candidates on 24 - 5 - 78 and the new committee appointed by the registrar passed a resolution on 22 - 6 - 78 rescinding the earlier order of appointment committee and directed the plaintiffs and other persons to appear for the examination to be held on 16 - 7 - 78 and hence plaintiff have no right to question the same.
(7) It is unfortunate no proper issues were framed. Only two issues were framed by the trial court. (1) whether the plaintiffs are entitled to perpetual injunction as prayed for? (2) to what relief?
(8) Both the courts decreed the plaintiffs' suit as prayed for holding that the cancellation of the selection made by the previous committee by the new committee at the direction of the registrar is illegal and hence the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of injunction as prayed for. The lower appellate court did not permit the appellants to raise new questions including the question of jurisdiction of civil court.
(9) The learned counsel for the appellants in this appeal raised the following points before me.
(1) the orders of appointment were not served on the petitioners and hence they have no locus - standi to file the present suit. (2) the registrar has power to give directions under sec. 32 (7) (b) and the bank is bound to obey the same and the consequent action of the bank cancelling the selection cannot be questioned. (3) the registrar is a necessary party and the suit is not maintainable. (4) the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the same is barred under sec. 121 of the act. (5) the suit is not maintainable for want of notice under s. 126.
(10) It is seen that some of them are new questions. I have to consider whether i can permit the appellant's counsel to raise new questions for the first time in the second apppeal. Before examining these questions, it is necessary to record the events chronlogically.
(11) The plaintiffs applied for the posts of managers in pursuance of an advertisement dated 5 - 11 - 75 and 30 - 11 - 76. The plaintiffs and some others appeared for the written examination held on 24 - 4 - 77 who are not in the employment of the bank. On 22 - 5 - 77 another examination was held for the candidates who were already employed in the bank. A third examination was held on 15 - 1 - 78 for the candidates sponsored by the emplovment exchange. The then committee which is governing body of the society appointed an appointment committee as contemplated under rule 70 consisting of three members,. The said committee interviewed these candidates on 21 - 1 - 78 and conducted vivavoce and passed a resolution no. 24 appointing twenty of them and the said resolution was marked as ex. B - 1. Then it appears, the registrar issued a notice to the bank on 10 - 3 - 73 not to proceed with recditment until further orders. However no action was taken by the than committee. The term of the old committee has expired on 31 - 3 - 78. Than the registrar of co - operative societies constituted new board of management which is called the committee under the act consisting of three members himself, being the chairman, and joint registrar, his subordinate as one member and another person as managing director. The new body has come into force on 1 - 4 - 78. Thereafter the registrar issued a direction to the managing director on 24 - 5 - 78 as per ex. B - 4 stating that
"the bank had conducted written test on three different dates for different batches with different sets of examination papers. The ans wer scripts ware also valued by different examiners on different occasions. In this procedure a common yard stick to judge the merits of the candidate is conspicuously absent. It is pessary that there should be a common question paper to all the candidates in order to ensure fairness and uniformity. In the above circumstances, it is considered necessary to hold a fresh examination for all the candidates who are fully qualified as per the notification issued by the bank and who have appeared to the written test earlier"
. Thereafter the registrar as the chairman of the new body himself presided over the meeting of the new committee and passed a resolution on 22 - 6 - 78 rescinding the earlier resolution no. 24 of the appointment committee dated 21 - 1 - 78. The said resolution rescinding the appointments was marked as per ex. B - 5 and thereafter a notice dated 3 - 7 - 78 ex. A - 9 was issued to the plaintiffs and other candidates who were already selected stating that fresh examinations will be held on 16 - 7 - 78 at hyderabad and that they must appear for the said examination and the said notice was received by the plaintiffs on 7 - 7 - 78. The plaintiffs felt aggrieved as the bank having selected them and having announced their names set aside the said selection and hence they filed the present suit seeking the relief of injunction restraining the bank from conducting fresh selection for the posts of managers. It is pertinent to note that in the written statement the bank admitted that 20 candidates were selected by the appointment committee but no appointment orders were issued for want of immediate availability of seats in training college. The only defence raised is that the registrar issued directions under sec. 37 (2) (b) of the act not to proceed with the recruitment until further orders and the bank is bound by the said directions and consequently cancelled the earlier selection by a resolution dated 22 - 6 - 7s and decided to hold fresh examinations to the candidates who appeared earlier. Of course they have dented the allegations of mala fide act on and resisted the relief of perpetual injunction on the ground that the appointment orders were not issued to the plaintiffs.
(12) The witnesses were examined on behalf of the plaintiffs and both of them deposed that they were selected after oral interview and the same was put on the notice board of the 1st defendant's bank and they hava seen the notice board. No doubt p. W. 1 said in the cross - examination that 25 candidates were selected and that list was put on the notice board. Thare is no cross - examination on the seme so far p. W. 2 is concerned. D. W. 1 cepcsed that he was working as the managing director of the bank end no doubt he slated that no notice was displayed on notice beard both the court did not give a finding a whether the notice of selection was affixed on the notice beard. I am inclined to accept the evicence cf p w1 and p w 2 read with the admission in the written statement and hold that the selection list wes displayed on the notice board of the bank in exercise of the powers under sec. 103 c. P. C. As both courts did notdeter mine this question and the evidence on record is sufficient and the determination of this question is necessary for the disposal of the appeal,
(13) Point no. 1: locus standi: the learned counsel for the appellants argued that as the orders of appointment were rot communicated to the plaintiffs they have no focus stardi to question the action cf the benk conducting the fresh selection. It is admitted that the plaintiffs heve passed the examination both written and oral. It is also admitted that the appointment committee passed the resolution appointing them, but the new committee issued notice requiring the candidates to appear for the examination afresh. I hold that the notice ex,a - 9 dated 3 - 7 - 78 requiring them to. Appear afresh itself gives cause of action for the plaintiffs to question the action of the bank. They are entitled to challenge the validity of the action of the bank in holding a second selection for the same candidates hence it is difficult to say that they have no right to'question the action of the bank requiring them to appear for a fresh examination. Secondly it is admitted by the bank in the written statement that the selection made by the appointment committee was subsequently cancelled by the new committee. This cancellation was not informed to the plaintiffs. The cancellation of the selection without issuing notice to the plaintiffs is opposed to the principles of natural justice and also void. When the bank has to justify the action for the cancellation of the earlier selection, it is difficult to hold that the plaintiffs have no locus standi in the sense that they have no legal interest to question the action of the bank.
(14) The learned counsel for the appellants having realised that it is difficult to sustain the plea of locus standi in the sense of lack of legal interest, raised a larger question under this point viz, that no right has accrued to the plaintiffs to the posts and. Hence they cannot seek the relief of injunction. In view of the lack of proper issues in the courts below i have to examine this question though a mere plea of locus standi oh the part of the defendant - bank is not sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs claim.
(15) It is urged by the learned counsel for the appellatns that so, long as the order was not served upon the plaintiffs the previous order can be cancelled at any time. Let me examine the legal position.
(16) Bachhittar singh vs. State of punjab (1) a. I. R. 1963 supreme court 395, is a case where a civil servant was dismissed from service by the revenue secretary but the minister of revenue of the then state of pepsu on appeal passed an order directing that the officer should be reverted to the lower post instead of dismissal. But the state of pepsu was merged in the state of punjab and the chief minister of the punjab state passed fresh orders confirming the dismissal. The plea of the oral communication of the orders of the revenue minister was negatived. But it was urged before the supreme court that the order of revenue minister, pepsu having reduced the punishment from dismissal to reversion the chief minister of punjab could not sit in review over that order and set aside the same. In that context mudnolkar, j. , held that the order of revenue minister is not the order of the state government as the order was not expressed in the nama of the givarnor as required under art. 166 of the constitution and until such order is drawn up the state government cannot be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file. Having held that the order is not a final order not expressed as required under law, it was further held that until the order is communicated to the person affected by it it is opan to the council of ministers to consider the matter over and over, again and therefore till its communication, the order cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional in character.
(17) In pratap singh vs. State of punjab (2) a. I r. 1964 s. C. 72 a casa relating to suspension of a civil servant proposing an enquiry who was on leave preparatory for retirement. Raghuvir dayal, j. , observed that the orders of the govarnmant ordinarily take effect from the moment they are issued except they cannot be effective due to their nature, and that an order of suspsnsion whan a person was on leave could be effective from the moment it was issued and bachhittar singh vs. State of punjab (1) (supra) was distinguished on the ground that it was not a case of suspension and the order passed therein was not a final order.
(18) In state of punjab vs. Amar singh (3) , a. I. R. 1983 s. C. 1913 the question arose that the order of dismissal was passed on 3 - 6 - 1949 and the officer came to know of it on 28 - 5 - 1951. The supreme court accepting the view of the high court held that it is plain that mere passing of an order of dismissal would not be effective unless it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. ' in raj kumar vs. Union of india (4) a i r 1969 s c 180 the question arose when does the resignation of a civil servant taka effect. It was held that the resignation takes effect the moment it was accapted by the government and the civil servant cannot withdraw the resignation after it is accepted and the principle that an order terminating employment is not effective until it is intimated to the employee could not apply to the case.
(19) In state of punjab vs. Khemi ram (5) a. I. R. 1970 s. C. 214 on a similar question their lordships held that the order of suspension is effective from the date of communication and it is immaterial whether the order was actually received or not. Their lordships referring to partap singh vs. State of punjab (2) (supra) held that the observation of raghubar dayal. J. That the order becomes effective as soon as it is issued cannot be taken to be a majority view.
(20) In raj narain vs, indira gandhi (6) , a. I. R. 1972 s. C. 1302 the same principle as laid down in raj kumar vs. Union of india (4) (supra was reiterated regarding the date of coming into force of regsignation. In kedar nath vs. State of punjab (7) air 1979 s c 220 it was held that an order passed by the chief minister confirming a public servant does not create any right in favour of the servant when it is not expressed in the name of the governor and is not communicated to him.
(21) Thus the following principles emerge from these cases. A tentative order not communicated does not create any rights in parties. An adverse order passed by the authority must be communicated to the party. Communication does not mean receipt of the order by the party concerned but dispatching the order or publishing it otherwise. A tentative order if communicated may create rights in parties. A final order passed by the competent authority cannot be defeated by mere non - communication unless it is rescinded validly. Even assuming that communication of orders of appointment is necessary an order publishing the selection constitutes sufficient communication and creates rights in the candidates so selected.
(22) I have already held that the list of selection was published in the notice board and the selection of the competent authority unless shown to be validly cancelled the plaintiffs have got right to the posts. The non - communication of individual orders may have some bearing on the commencement of the tenure but once valid orders are passed by the competent authority, rights will be created in favour of the candidates and hence i hold the point no. 1 against the appellants.
(23) Point no. 2 nature of powers exercisable by the registrar under section 32 (7) (a) and (b) of the act: this point really touches the merits of the case and it must be examined in two parts. (1) the nature of powers exercisable by the registrar over persons appointed by him in the absence of an elected body. (2) his power to appoint persons to manage the affairs of the society.
(24) For the above purpose let us examine the provisions of sec. 32 (7) (a) and (b) of the act.
" (a) if there is no committee or in the opinion of the registrar it is not possible to call a general meeting for the purposes of conducting election of members of the committee, the registrar may appoint a person or persons to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding six months and he may, with the previous approval of the government, from time to time, extend such period beyond six months, so however that the aggregate period including the extension shall not exceed two years; (b) the person or persons so appointed shall, subject to the control of the registrar and to such instructions or directions as he may issue, from time to time, have power to exercise all or any of the functions of the committee or of any officer of the society and to take all such action as may be required in the interests of the society."
(25) Clause (b) of sec. 32 (7) of the act discloses: (1) the person or persons appointed by the registear shall have all powers and functions exerchable by the committee as defined in sec. 2 (b) (2). They are subject to the control of the registrar. (3) they are bound to follow the instructions and directions issued by the registrar from to time. The registrar cannot issue directions contrary to the act and rules made thereunder and the body so appointed by the registrar cannot disregard the provisions of the act or the rules made thereunder as it is the govering body for the society functioning within the frame wo'k of the act and hence it is clear that both the registrar and the body appointed by him cannot transgress the provisions of the act or the rules made thereunder and justify their action on the ground that they are simply implementing the directions given by the registrar.
(26) Under rule 70 of the new rules, once the appointment is made by the appointment committee after following the rules and the procedure prescribed under the said rule, the registrar cannot direct the cancellation of the said selection. No infirmity in the procedure or violation of any provision of the act or the rules was pointed out by the registrar but his mere personal opinion that different methods of selection would be more suitable would not justify issuing a direction to cancel the selection made in conformity with the said rule 70. Hence, i hold that the said direction is not in conformity with the provisions of the act and the committee is not bound by the said direction.
(27) Regarding the second aspect, the cancellation of the selection by the new committee is vitiated by another vital ground. The registrar has appointed a committee of persons under sec. 32 (7) (a) of the act consisting of himself as chairman and joint registrar and another person as the managing director. I have to examine whether the registrar can appoint himself as chairman of the committee of persons to manage the affairs of the society as contemplated under the said subsection.
(28) A perusal of sec. 32 (7) (a) discloses that the registrar may appoint " a parson or persons " does not include himself. Sub - clause (b) which empowers the registrar to issue instructions and directions to persons so appointed by him also excludes the possibility of the registrar appointing himself as person for the management of the society. The provisions of the act makes it clear that such appointment of himself as a person incharge of the society is destructive of the nature of powers to be exercised by the registrar. Section 34 empowers the registrar to supersede the committee. The provisions in chapter 7 gives control and supervision to the registrar over the entire affairs of the society including powers of enquiry and inspection (secs. 51 and 52). The registrar is the authority to make enquiry into the disputes in respect of any society and he has got revisional powers also under section 77. These provisions clearly disclose that the registrar cannot appoint himself as a person incharge of the affairs of the management of the society as contemplated under sec. 32 (7) (a). The registrar appointing himself as a chairman of the committee under sec. 32 (7) (a) had misconceived his powers and the order appointing himself as the chairman of the committee is wholly without jurisdiction and void. The further proceedings in the guise of implementing the directions given under sec. 32 (7) (b) constitutes an abuse of power as the direction given by him on one hand as a registrar was implemented by him as chairman of the committee appointed by himself as if he is bound by the instructions and directions issued by the registrar. The said proceedings of the registrar dated: 31 - 3 - 1978 appointing himself es the chairman of the committee consisting of joint registrar and another person as managing director are outside the powers conferred on him under sec 32 (7) (a) and consequently void. Once i hold that the proceadings under which the registrar h is appointed himself as the chairman of the committee are invalid, the subsequent proceedings of the said committee dated 22 - 6 - 1978 as per ex,b - 5 cancelling the earlier selection is clearly without jurisdiction and void. Hence i hold on point no. 2 that the registrar cannot appoint himself as the chairman of the committee of persons for managing the affairs of the society and the proceedings of the said committee are void and the cancellation of the selection of the plaintiffs cannot be justified as implementing the directions given by the rigistrar under sec. 32 (7) (b) of the act. ,
(29) Point no. 3: though the registrar was added as 2nd defendant in his capacity as chairman of the committee of the persons of the bank, a further contention was raised that the registrar must be added in his capacity as a statutory authority under the act. This contention was not raised in the courts - below and in view of the fact that he has already figured as 2nd defendant in the suit, no prejudice is caused and i do not permit the appellants to raise this question in the second appeal and accordingly i reject the said contention.
(30) Point no. 4: regarding the question of jurisdiction of civil court, the lower appellate court in paragraph 10 refused permission to raise the said question before it. But the learned counsel for the appellants urged as it touches the jurisdiction of the civil court, he should be permitted to urga the same and hence i am examining it. Section 121 of the act may be parusad which is in the following terms: -
"s. 121 (1) no order passed, decision or action taken or direction issued under this act by an arbitrator, liquidator, the registrar or an officer or person authorised or empowered by him, the tribunal or the government or any officer subordinate to them, shall be liable to be called in question in any court"
(31) A perusal of sub - section (1) of sec. 121 prohibits the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of the actions taken by enumerated authorities. The present action for injunction against the committee of management is not prohibited by the language of the section. This section enumerated specified categories of persons or authorities viz. , arbitrator, liquidator, the registrar or an officer or person authorised or empowered by him, the tribunal or the government or any officer subordinate to them. The injunction sought is against the bank and the chairman of the committee but not the registrar as a statutory authority. Similarly the committee members are not officers or persons authorised or em - powered by him in order to attract the said category mentioned therein. Once the registrar appoints the persons incharge they exercise powers in their own right and discharge the statutory functions of the committee as defined in sec. 2 (b) of the act. Hence the members of the committee cannot be described as persons authorised or empowered by the regis - trar to act as his agents and hence the prohibition under sec. 121 is not attracted. Further the society is a corporation with perpetual succession and a common seal and any ultra vires act of its can be challenged in a civil court and the said section does not take away the jurisdiction of the civil court to restrain the corporation to act beyond its powers. In the present case i have already held that the constitution of the committee itself is ultra vires the powers of the registrar and the cancellation of the selection of the plaintiffs was held to be without jurisdiction and conse - quently the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit.
(32) Point no. 5: this question was not raised in the courts - below and the plaintiffs specifically stated in the plaint that no notice is necessary under sec. 126 of the act since the subject matter of the suit does not relate to the constitution, management or business of the society. The said averment is not contradicted in the written statement and no issue was raised and the question of statutory notice can always be waived and hence i do not permit the appellants to raise this question, in the second appeal.
(33) Once i hold that the cancellation of the selection of the plaintiffs by the new committee is illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction, the present decree for injunction restraining the bank to hold a fresh selection in respect of these posts is well within the jurisdiction of the civil court and cannot be assailed.
(34) In the result, i dismiss the appeal with costs.