Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.
1. The substantial questions of law formulated on 29-11-1996 and to be answered are as under:
"1. Was the lower court incorrect in not appreciating that the plaintiffs' right which is sought to be enforced by the present suit, had not arisen during the first appeal No. 40/1963 as also in M.P. No. 119/1970 decided on 21-4-77, which cause of action arose for the first time on 6-3-87 when the Union of India did not deliver back vacant possession to the plaintiffs, in spite of anything contained in the First Part of Section 6?
2. Whether the judgment delivered in F.A. No. 40/63 and in M.P. No. 119/70 would operate as res judicata?
3. Whether the land which was requisitioned from the appellants by the Union of India would vest in the State of M.P. on coming into force of Act No. 1/1951, when the appellants because of the requisition proceedings and orders could not possess the land directly but would be deemed to be in constructive possession?"
[For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred in the instant judgment as were referred in the suit.] The necessary facts in nutshell required to be noticed for adjudication of the second appeal are as under:
"(2.1) The scheduled suit land situated at Village Koni, Tahsil and District Bilaspur earlier belonged to Ganesh Prasad Pandey, father of plaintiffs Nandkishore Pandey, Jugalkishore Pandey, Brijkishore Pandey and Ramkishore Pandey. Total 111.91 acres of land was requisitioned under Rule 75-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 for Defence Department of Government of India by virtue of orders passed by Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate, Bilaspur on 26-9-1946 and 28-9-1946. An Arbitrator was appointed under Section 19(1)(b) of the Defence of India Act. The 2nd Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, acting as the Arbitrator, by his award dated 10-1-1963, held that the plaintiffs are not entitled for any compensation in respect of grass land of 93.23 acres and they were found entitled in respect of 18.18 acres of Sir and Khudkasht land and 0.50 acre of tenancy land, i.e., total 18.68 acres of land. The plaintiffs preferred Miscellaneous (First) Appeal No. 40/1963 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, which was decided on 4-1-1967 (Ex. D-3), in which it has been held that the plaintiffs are not entitled for any compensation in respect of the grass land of 93.23 acres which had vested in the State Government by virtue of provisions contained in the Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1951. Thereafter, the plaintiffs preferred Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 for releasing the requisitioned land of total 111.91 acres situated at Village Koni, Tahsil and District Bilaspur. Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 was decided on 21-4-1977 (Ex. D-1), in which the miscellaneous petition was dismissed with regard to release of 93.23 acres of grass land, however, the petition was allowed with regard to release of 18.68 acres of land from requisition holding that the same was not acquired within the meaning of Section 7(i) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952. Thereafter, out of the aforesaid released land of 18.68 acres, land of 18.50 acres was sold by the plaintiffs in favour of the State Government vide sale-deed dated 19-12-1979 (Ex. D-2).
(2.2) With the aforesaid backgrounds, the plaintiffs filed a suit on 15-6-1981 for release of 109.53 acres of land situated at Village Koni, Tahsil and District Bilaspur stating inter alia that the suit land of 109.53 acres was requisitioned under Rule 75-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 for Defence Department of Government of India and thereafter the same was requisitioned under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952 and is now, after transfer of the same by the Government of India to the State Government, being used by the State Government for running an Industrial Training Centre thereon and, therefore, by virtue of Section 6 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952, the defendants/State are required to release the suit land of 109.53 acres in favour of the plaintiffs. It was further pleaded by the plaintiffs that Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 was filed before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh with respect to the suit land, but the High Court did not consider it appropriate to release the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs leading to arising of the cause of action in their favour for filing the suit for relief of recovery of possession of the suit land bearing Khasra No. 2961, 298, 301/2, 301/3, 305, 309, 291, 301/1, 3,20/3, 303, 329/2, 320/1,354, 361, 265/1, 366/1 , 366/1 , 366/1 , 366/1 , 366/1 , 366/1 , 366/1 , 357, 358, 290, 293, 294, 295, 296/3, 294, 301/1, 320, 321, 322, 366, 330, 331, 333, 355, 363, 365 and 340, total area 109.53 acres along with mesne profit.
(2.3) The defendants filed their joint written statement before the trial Court pleading inter alia that by virtue of the decisions of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous (First) Appeal No. 40/1963 decided on 4-1-1967 (Ex. D-3) and in Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 decided on 21-4-1977 (Ex. D-1), it has been conclusively decided that the land in dispute, i.e., 93.23 acres of grass land is vested in the State and no compensation in respect of that land was payable to the Ex-Proprietor/Ex-Malgujar and as such the said finding would operate as res judicata in the instant suit filed on 15-6-1981, i.e., after the decisions dated 4-1-1967 (Ex. D-3) and 21-4-1977 (Ex. D-1) of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and, therefore, the instant suit is liable to be dismissed."
2. On pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed following four issues and recorded findings on those issues as under:
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The trial Court, by the judgment dated 30-4-1986 passed in Civil Suit No. 194-A/1986, clearly held that the decision rendered by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous (First) Appeal No. 40/1963, as held by a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970, would operate as res judicata in the instant suit and, therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled for a decree for recovery of possession.
3. On an appeal being filed by the plaintiffs under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (henceforth 'the CPC), the first appellate Court, by judgment and decree dated 30-1-1995 in Civil Appeal No. 43-A/1993, accepted the finding of the trial Court with regard to operation of res judicata and declined to interfere with the appeal.
4. Questioning the legal acceptability and correctness of the impugned judgment and decree, the plaintiffs preferred the instant second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, in which substantial questions of law have been formulated by order dated 29-11-1996 and the same have been quoted in first paragraph of this judgment.
5. Dr. N.K. Shukla, learned Senior Advocate with Ms. Bulbul Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/appellant No. 2 and legal representatives of deceased appellants No. 1, 3 and 4, mainly criticising the judgment and decree of the two Courts below, would submit' that both the Courts below have committed a manifest error of jurisdiction in holding that the judgments delivered in Miscellaneous (First) Appeal No. 40/1963 and in Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 would operate as res judicata as the pleadings of the parties made in the earlier writ petition (Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970) was not available before the trial Court in the instant suit. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that the land in dispute has not vested in the State under the provisions of the Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1951.
6. Per contra, Shri H.S. Ahluwalia, learned counsel appearing for defendant No. 1/respondent No. 1/Union of India and Shri Vinay Harit, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for defendants No. 2 and 3/respondents No. 2 and 3/State would support the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below and would submit that both the Courts below have rightly held the suit to be barred by the principle of res judicata and as such the instant second appeal deserves to be dismissed.
7. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length and have also perused the record of the Courts below with utmost circumspection. Collective Answer to the Substantial Questions of Law:
8. Since all the three substantial questions of law are inter-related, therefore, they are being decided collectively.
9. The suit land held by Ganesh Prasad Pandey, the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiffs was requisitioned under Rule 75-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 for Defence Department of Government of India leading to appointment of the 2nd Additional District Judge, Bilaspur as the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator passed the award dated 10-1-1963 holding that the plaintiffs are not entitled for any compensation in respect of grass land of 93.23 acres as the said grass land had been vested in the State Government under the Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1951 and it has been so held by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in paragraph 8 of its judgment dated 4-1-1967 delivered in Miscellaneous (First) Appeal No. 40/1963 (Ex. D-3) as under:
"8. That takes us to the most important contention as to the liability to pay compensation with respect to the grass lands after 31-3-1951. The claim has been denied, and very rightly, because the claimant ceased to be the owner thereof as from 1-4-1951 as a consequence of the abolition of his proprietary rights in the village itself in which the said lands are situate. It cannot be disputed that as from 1-4-1951 proprietary rights ' of the claimant in every inch of the land in the village came to an end and stood vested in the State, and what was preserved to its out-going proprietor was only a right to remain in occupation of his home-stead, home farm lands, lands brought under cultivation by him after the agricultural year 1948-49 but before 1-4-1951, and that too as a tenant of the State. The "home farm" is defined in that act as under:
"Home farm" means--
(1) in relation to the Central Provinces--
(a) land recorded as "Sir" & "Khudkasht" in the name of a proprietor in the annual papers for the year 1948-49, and
(b) land acquired by a proprietor by surrender from tenants after the year 1948-49 till the date of vesting".
It is thus only the land recorded as such "Sir" or "Khudkasht" in the name of the proprietor in the annual papers for the year 1948-49 or the land brought by him under cultivation after the agricultural year 1948-49 but before the date of vesting, which was allowed to be retained by the proprietor in his possession but as a tenant of the State. It is not disputed that the lands were recorded as "Grass lands" and that is the end of it. It would make no difference that the lands having remained in occupation of the Defence Department were so recorded. The Supreme Court in the case of Haji Sheikh Subhan v. Madhavrao Ghatate (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1230) has laid down that it is the record which is decisive and it would make no difference whether the record made is lawful or unlawful. So long as the land is not recorded as such "Sir" or "Khudkasht" of the proprietor in the annual papers of 1948-49, the out-going proprietor shall not be entitled to claim the same for being allowed to be retained in his own possession. Thus, the claimant having ceased to be the owner of the lands recorded as "Grass lands" he could not be allowed any compensation for the same after 31-3-1951. Accordingly we reject his grievance about non-payment of compensation for the grass lands after 31-3-1951."
10. Thereafter, Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 was filed by the plaintiffs/petitioners before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, in which following reliefs were claimed:
"Prayer
It is therefore prayed that the Respondents be directed by a Writ or Mandamus--
1. to de-requisition all lands requisitioned from the Petitioners and restore their possession in the same state in which they were taken from the petitioners.
2. to pay to petitioners compensation as per Arbitrators Award for 18.18 acres of lands mentioned in paragraph 6(ix).
3. Deposit in Court compensation assessed by respondent No. 3 for other lands of Late Shri G.P. Pandey and refer it to Arbitrator under section 8 of Central Act No. 1 of 1952.
4. For lands belonging to Late Shrimati Chandanbai pay compensation as per Collector's Award (Para 6(2)) or to refer it to Arbitrator.
5. Issue derequisition order for lands abandoned mentioned in paragraph 2. And it may kindly be declared that petitioners have right to compensation for all lands recorded in the name of their predecessor in title Late Shri G.P. Pandey. And any other suitable Writ, direction order may be passed."
11. In Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 filed by the plaintiffs claiming derequisition of the suit land, the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, while deciding the miscellaneous petition on 21-4-1977 (Ex. D-1), in paragraph 5 of the judgment, posed a question and clearly held that the judgment delivered on 4-1-1967 in Miscellaneous (First) Appeal No. 40/1963 (Ex. D-3) with regard to non-release of 93.23 acres of grass land being vested in the State has attained finality and it is not open to the plaintiffs in any proceeding against any person to claim any relief in respect of the said grass land. Paragraph 5 of the judgment dated 21-4-1977 (Ex. D-1) reads thus:
"5. The question before us is whether the petitioner is entitled to release of these 93.23 acres as well. The decision in Misc. First Appeal No. 40 of 1963, was between the petitioner and the State of Madhya Pradesh. There, it having been held that the lands had vested in the State Government and the decision which was final between these two parties, the petitioner cannot in these proceedings claim that although that decision operates as res judicata between him and the State Government so that he cannot claim that the lands 93.23 acres have not vested in the State, still he can make a claim against the Union of India to release those lands. It is not the case of the Union of India that the lands 93.23 acres are still with the Union of India or have not vested in the State of Madhya Pradesh. So far as the petitioners are concerned, once it was finally decided that the grass lands 93.23 acres vested in the State Government, it is not open to them in any proceeding against any person to claim any relief in respect of those lands......."
12. Not only this, thereafter, the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh also repelled the submission of the plaintiffs that the land could not be vested under the Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1951 as the land was in operation of the Central Act of 1952, i.e., the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952 and held in paragraph 6 as under:
"6. Learned counsel for the petitioner tried to urge before us that the Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act cannot operate on these lands as they were under the operation of the Central Act. In other words, the contention before us is that since the lands had been requisitioned under the Central Act, they could not vest in the State Government. In our opinion, it is not open to the petitioner to raise this question in view of what we have said above. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that so far as 93.23 acres of grass lands are concerned, it is not open to the petitioners to seek a writ for their release."
13. Ultimately, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissed Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 with regard to release of 93.23 acres of grass land and directed for release of 18.68 acres of land in favour of the plaintiffs holding that the same was not acquired within the meaning of Section 7(i) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952. Thereafter, the plaintiffs sold 18.50 acres of land to the State Government on 19-12-1979 for a consideration of ` 3,33,000/- (Ex. D-2).
14. Thus, on the basis of foregoing analysis, the following facts would emerge on the face of the record:
"1. That the land of 93.23 acres, which belonged to the plaintiffs' father, the Ex-Proprictor/Ex-Malgujar, has been held to be vested in the State under the Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1951.
2. That for the land which was recorded as grass land, the plaintiffs are not entitled for any compensation as held in Miscellaneous (First) Appeal No. 40/1963.
3. That from the plaintiffs 111.91 acres of land was requisitioned by the Union of India, out of which, 93.23 acres of land has been held to be vested in the State by the judgment in Miscellaneous (First) Appeal No. 40/1963 and which has been held to be binding upon the plaintiffs by the judgment in Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 between the plaintiffs and the State.
4. That the plaintiffs were held to be entitled for release of 18.68 acres of land by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Ex. D-1) as having been not acquired within the meaning of Section 7(i) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952.
5. That the plaintiffs have sold 18.50 acres of land to the defendants/State by the sale-deed dated 19-12-1979 (Ex. D-2)."
15. The question for consideration would be whether the finding recorded in the miscellaneous (writ) petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the subject-matter in controversy between the same parties after full contest on merits would operate as res judicata in the subsequent regular suit between the same parties with respect to the same matter,
16. It is well settled that principle of res judicata applies to all proceedings under Section 11 of the CPC, though the provisions of the CPC do not apply to miscellaneous (writ) petition by virtue of Section 141 of the CPC (Kindly see G.K. Dudani and others v. S.D. Sharma and others 1986 (Supp) SCC 239 (Para 18)).
17. In Daryao and others v. State of U.P. and others AIR 1961 SC 1457(1), the Constitution Bench held that the decision rendered in the writ petition on merits would be binding upon the parties unless it is set aside. The Constitution Bench held as under:
"If a writ petition filed by a party under Art. 226 is considered on the merits as a contested matter and is dismissed the decision thus pronounced would continue to bind the parties unless it is otherwise modified or reversed by appeal or other appropriate proceedings permissible under the Constitution......."
18. Thereafter, again, the Constitution Bench in Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat AIR 1965 SC 1153, held that the decision in earlier writ petition on merits would operate as res judicata in subsequent suit involving the same question and the same reliefs. The Constitution Bench held as under:
"......Art. 226 or 32 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the principle of the finality of decisions after full contest. Consequently on the general principle of res judicata the decision of the High Court on a writ petition under Art. 226 on the merits on a matter after contest will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit between the same parties with respect to the same matter.........."
19. The aforesaid principle has been followed in Union Of India v. Nanak Singh . AIR 1968 SC 1370. It is held therein as under:
"5. This Court in Gulabchand Chhotalal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153 observed that the provisions of S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not exhaustive with respect to all earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit, and on the general principle of res judicata, any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject-matter. There is no good reason to preclude, such decisions on matters in controversy in writ proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the principle of the finality of decisions after full contest. The Court in Gulabchand's case, AIR 1965 SC 1153 left open the question whether the principle of constructive res judicata may be invoked by a party to the subsequent suit on the ground that a matter which might or ought to have been raised in the earlier proceeding but was not so raised therein, must still be deemed to have been decided."
20. The aforesaid principle has been followed in Smt. Pujari Bai etc. v. Madan Gopal (dead) L.Rs. viz. Smt. Jaiwanti and others AIR 1989 SC 1764. It is held therein as under:
"24. It thus becomes clear that when a writ petition after contest is disposed of on merits by a speaking order, the question decided in that petition would operate as res judicata, but not a dismissal in limine or dismissal on the ground of laches or availability of alternative remedy......."
21. In Ashok Kumar Srivastav v. National Insurance Company Ltd. and others (1998) 4 SCC 361, the Supreme Court clearly held that an issue heard finally and decided by a High Court in a petition under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India would operate as res judicata when the matter again comes before the High Court by way of an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC and carved out an exception that res judicata does not operate to detriment or impairment of functional rights.
"11. It is well-nigh settled that a decision on an issue raised in a writ petition under Article 226 or Article32 of the Constitution would also operate as res judicata between the same parties in subsequent judicial proceedings. The only exception is that the rule of res judicata would not operate to the detriment or impairment of a fundamental right. A Constitution Bench of this Court has considered the applicability of the rule of res judicata in writ proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution in Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457 and it was held that the basis on which the rule rests is founded on consideration of public policy and it is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decision pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over in the same kind of litigation.
12. This was reiterated by another Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. Janapada Sabha, AIR 1964 SC 1013. The following is the ratio:
"Therefore, there can be no doubt that the general principle of res judicata applies to writ petitions filed under Article 32 of Article 226. It is necessary to emphasise that the application of the doctrine of res judicata to the petitions filed under Article 32 does not in any way impair or affect the content of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of India."
13. Though the above has now become an accepted legal position (vide G.K. Dudani v. S.D. Sharma, 1986 Supp SCC 239) the contention raised here is that since the writ petition was in challenge of an order passed in execution of a decree, the decisions rendered in such writ petition would only remain in the realm of execution and they would not preclude the parties to the suit from raising such issues over again when the very decree itself is challenged in appeal. Explanation VII added to Section 11of the Code of Civil Procedure as per CPC Amendment Act 104 of 1976 reads thus:
"The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and references in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references respectively, to a proceeding for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree."
14. Though the said explanation may not stricto sensu apply to the trial stage, the principle couched in it must gain application thereto. It is immaterial that the writ petition was filed only subsequently because the findings made therein became final as no appeal was filed against the judgment. The basic idea in the rule of res judicata has sprouted from the maxim "nemo debet his vexari pro una et eadem causa" (no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause). In Y.B. Patil v. Y.L. Patil, (1976) 4 SCC 66 a three-Judge Bench of this Court considered the effect of a decision rendered in a writ petition at subsequent stages of the same lis. It held:
"The principles of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding at the subsequent stage of that proceeding."
22. Thus, it is authoritatively held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that once an issue has been heard finally and decided by a High Court in a writ proceeding under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India on merits after full contest, the said finding would operate as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding involving the same issue between the same parties.
23. Dr. N.K. Shukla, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiffs/appellant No. 2 and legal representatives of deceased appellants No. 1, 3 and 4, relying upon Ramchandra Dagdu Sonavane (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. Vithu Hira Mahar (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. AIR 2010 SC 818 would submit that the necessary pleadings of the parties made in the earlier writ proceeding were not available on record.
24. A perusal of the record would show that the plaintiffs themselves in their plaint had clearly mentioned in paragraph 8 that Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 was filed before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for release of the land in dispute. Not only this but also on the lower Court record of connected Second Appeal No. 1063/1999, copy of Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 and copies of the returns separately filed by defendant No. 1/Union of India and defendants No. 2 and 3/State are available and it is admitted case of the parties that Miscellaneous (First) Appeal No. 40/1963 was filed relating to the same land and thereafter Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 was filed. Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 was, by the judgment dated 21-4-1977 (Ex. D-1), partly allowed and thereby 18.68 acres of land was directed to be released in favour of the plaintiffs and ultimately, accepting the order of release of 18.68 acres of land, the plaintiffs, out of the released 18.68 acres of land, sold 18.50 acres of land to the State Government on 19-12-1979 (Ex. D-2). Thus, the judgment dated 21-4-1977 delivered in Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 (Ex. D-1), in which the plaintiffs and the State Government were parties, has become final and, therefore, the questions of unavailability of the pleadings and non-framing of the issues by the trial Court are immaterial.
25. In The State Of Punjab v. Bua Das Kaushal . AIR 1971 SC 1676, the Supreme Court has clearly held that if the necessary facts were present in the minds of the parties though no legal issues were framed, the plea of res judicata is not waived. Thus, considering the fact that in the earlier miscellaneous petition between the same parties and which related to the scheduled suit land, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh had clearly held that 93.23 acres of grass land had been vested in the State and which is binding upon the plaintiffs.
26. The plaintiffs in the instant suit claimed that the cause of action in the suit arose after the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970, when defendant No. 2 started disputing title and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissed Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that their cause of action arose on 6-3-1987 as it has been already held that the question of release of land has already been considered by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and the plaintiffs are entitled to be released only 18.68 acres of land and that decision has become final as accepted by the plaintiffs by selling 18.50 acres of land in favour of the State which has attained finality and, therefore, it was not open to the plaintiffs in the instant suit to again seek release of the land in dispute.
27. Hence, the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous (First) Appeal No. 40/1963 that 93.23 acres of grass land has been vested in the State Government, held to be binding upon the parties by the judgment of the same Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970, would, between the same parties, by virtue of the general principles contained in Section 11 of the CPC, operate as res judicata and cannot be reagitated in the subsequent instant regular suit and thereafter in the instant second appeal.
28. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court that the judgments of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous (First) Appeal No. 40/1963 and Miscellaneous Petition No. 119/1970 would operate as res judicata in the subsequent instant suit is hereby affirmed. The first appellate Court has also committed no illegality in affirming the said finding of the trial Court. All the substantial questions of law are answered accordingly.
29. Consequently, the second appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. A decree be drawn-up accordingly.
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