Chagla, C.J:—
The Councillors of the Kalyan Municipality were elected by a general election in the beginning of 1949 and their term of office was three years. The first meeting of the Municipality was held on April 29, 1949, and the first petitioner was elected President up to March 31, 1950. One Hande was elected President from April 1, 1950, to March 31, 1951, and the second petitioner was elected President for the period April 1, 1951 to March 31, 1952. Opponent No. 2 was elected President from April 1, 1952, to May 31, 1952. He was elected only for a period of two months because Government had extended the life of the Kalyan Municipality for a period of two months. Under the law the ordinary term of office, as already pointed out, of the Municipality is three years, but Government, have been given the power to extend it for one year. Government further extended the life of the Municipality for seven months up to December 31, 1952, and on June 1, 1952, the second opponent was again elected President for seven months up to December 31, 1952. Government further extended the life of the Municipality up to April 29, 1953. A meeting was called by the second opponent for January 6, 1953, to elect a President, but for some reason the meeting could not be held and no election of the President took place. On January 31, 1953, the second opponent called a routine meeting of the Municipality. On January 29, 1953, the petitioners addressed a letter to the Collector of Thana pointing out that the second opponent was only elected up to December 31, 1952, and no meeting had been called for election of another President and the Collector should interfere and take necessary action. On February 2, 1953, the Collector passed an order holding that it was not lawful for the second opponent to call the meeting on January 31, 1953 to conduct the ordinary business. On February 16, 1953, an application was made to the Collector to call a meeting for the election of a President and on March 13, 1953, the Collector passed an order calling a meeting for March 19, 1953. It may be pointed out that on February 27, 1953, the Director of Local Authorities confirmed the action taken by the Collector on February 2, 1953, and he took the view that the President's action in calling a meeting on January 31, 1953, for conducting the ordinary business after his term as President had expired was ultra vires of the provisions of the Act. On March 13, 1953, the Government passed an order purporting to be under powers vested in them under sub-s. (3) of s. 214 of the Municipal Boroughs Act, setting aside the orders issued by the Collector of Thana and confirmed by the Director of Local Authorities, and directing that the action of the President of the Kalyan Municipality in calling a meeting on January 31, 1953, for conducting the ordinary business was in order. In this order the Government expressed the opinion that the term of the Municipality having been extended up to April 29, 1953, and as Mr. Shukla, the second opponent, would be holding the office of the President for not less than one year, his continuing in office could not now be questioned. The present petition has been preferred challeng the order passed by Government and also for an order restraining the second opponent from functioning as the President of the Municipality.
Mr. Tarkunde has made it clear that he is not asking for any writ against the State of Bombay, nor does he want the order of the Government to be quashed. He says that he is not interested in challenging that order. What he really wants in this petition is a writ in the nature of quo warranto and his contention is that the second opponent is not entitled in law to hold the office of President of the Kalyan Municipality, and that we should give a declaration to that effect and pass an injunction restraining the second opponent from functioning as President of the Kalyan Municipality.
Section 19(1) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1923, provides:
“Save as otherwise provided in this Act a president or vice-president shall hold his office for such term, not less than one year and not exceeding three years, as the municipality shall, previous to the election of the president or vice-president determine, or until the expiry within the said term of his term of office as councillor, but shall be eligible for re-election.”
Therefore, under this section the term of office of the president has been fixed at not less than one year and not exceeding three years and the term of office has to be determined by the municipality previous to the election. In the case of the first petitioner, in the case of Mr. Hande and in the case of the second petitioner, the term of office was in each case not less than one year, but when we come to the election of the second opponent on April 1, 1952, the term of his office was only two months. This was unavoidable because the life of the municipality was only extended for two months, and the life being extended only for two months the municipality while electing him as President specifically fixed the period of his office up to May 31, 1952. Now, there is a very curious lacuna in the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925. Section 19(1) only deals with the ordinary case where the municipality continues for three years and the section provides that the President may be elected either for the whole period of three years or for a period of not less than one year. But this sub-section obviously does not contemplate the contigency that has arisen here where after the three years have expired Government does not choose to extend the life of the municipality by one year but by a shorter term, viz. two months. If the Government had extended the life of the municipality for one year, no difficulty could have arisen because the second opponent could have been elected President for one year. But as the Government chose to extend the life of the municipality only for two months the municipality thought that a President had to be elected and naturally he could only be elected for the remaining term of the municipality. Section 23(1) deals with vacancies in the office of president and vice-president and how it should be filled up. That section has no application to the present case because that deals with a case where the president either dies or resigns or is removed from his office during the term of his office and the section provides for filling up the vacancy which has arisen under those circumstances. Then s. 23(1A) provides:
“In the event of the expiry of the term of office of the president or vice-president determined by the municipality under sub-s. (1) of s. 19, unless s. 19A applies, a new president or vice-president as the case may be shall be elected within 25 days from the date of such expiry.”
Therefore there is a mandatory provision for the election of a new president after the term of office of the president fixed under sub-s. (1) of s. 19 expires and it is pointed out that it was incumbent upon the municipality under this sub-section to elect a new president within 25 days after the term of office of the second petitioner expired. But although it was incumbent upon the municipality to proceed to elect a new president, a new president in law could not be elected because the remaining term of the municipality was only two months and under s. 19(1) a president could not be elected for that short duration. Therefore the question that arises is whether the election of the second opponent on April 1, 1952, was a valid election.
Mr. Tarkunde says that we must construe s. 19(1) so as to read that the election of the president for a period not less than one year and not exceeding three years only applies to cases where the municipality is to continue to be in existence for one year at least, and that when a situation arises where the municipality is to continue in existence for a period less than one year then s. 19(1) should be applied with the necessary modification. In other words, Mr. Tarkunde's contention is that impliedly power is given to the municipality under s. 19(1) to elect a president for a shorter term where a situation arises in which it is impossible to elect a president for not less than one year, and Mr. Tarkunde says that it was open to the municipality to elect the second opponent for a period of two months as the circumstances then existing made it impossible for his being elected for a longer period. Mr. Tarkunde has requisitioned to his aid the well known canon of construction which permits a Court to construe words in order to bring them in accordance with the intention of the Legislature, and Mr. Tarkunde says that in this case also it is necessary to give the words used in s. 19(1) the meaning which best suits the scope and object of the statute. Now, this canon of construction can only be availed of when general words are used and those general words can be restricted to the fitness of the matter, but this canon of construction cannot be availed of when the words used by the Legislature are express and precise, and in this particular case the Legislature has used express and precise terms and provided that the president shall hold his office for such term not less than one year and not exceeding three years. Under those circumstances it is impossible for us to hold that in a particular case a president can hold office for a term which is less than one year. It will be construing s. 19(1) contrary to the precise and exact words used by the Legislature. When exact and precise words are used, they clearly show the intention of the Legislature and it is not open to the Court to speculate as to what the intention of the Legislature might be because a case not covered by the exact and precise words used by the Legislature has arisen. But in our opinion the way out of this impasse is to be found in the proviso to s. 19(1) and that proviso is in the following terms:
“Provided that the term of office of such president or vice-president shall be deemed to extend to and expire with the date on which his successor is elected.”
Therefore, once a president is legally and validly elected under s. 19(1), he does not cease to hold office until his successor is elected, and elected in this context must mean legally and validly elected. Therefore till there is a successor who is elected president in accordance with law, the incumbent who holds office as president must continue to hold office under the proviso to s. 19(1). Therefore, if our view is that on April 1, 1952, opponent No. 2 was not validly elected inasmuch as he was elected for a term shorter than provided under s. 19(1), the second petitioner continued to hold office and his term of office was extended by reason of the proviso to s. 19(1) and that term of office would only expire when his successor was elected. In the election of the second opponent was not in accordance with law on April 1, 1952, for precisely the same reasons, his election was invalid on June 1, 1952, because that election was also for a period less than one year. Therefore the result today is that no successor of the second petitioner has been validly elected and under the proviso to s. 19(1) his term of office is extended till today and that office must continue till his successor is validly elected. In our opinion, therefore, the second opponent is not entitled to hold the office of President of the Kalyan Municipality as he has not been validly elected to that office.
We would therefore issue an injunction restraining the second opponent from functioning as the President of the Kalyan Municipality and from discharging any duties as President of the Kalyan Municipality. It is with some reluctance that we have come to this conclusion because we are impressed by what the Advocate General told us that the second opponent has been functioning as the President from April 1, 1952. No reflection is intended against the second opponent because the municipality as a whole took the view that it could elect him President for a shorter period than one year. At both the meetings on April 1, 1952, and June 1, 1952, he was elected by the municipality. The difficulty only started when after December 31, 1952, no further meeting was called for electing a President to hold the office after December 31, 1952. The Advocate General says that inasmuch as the second opponent has been acting as de facto President, we should not interfere at this stage by issuing a writ of quo warranto. In our opinion it is the duty of the Court, as soon as its attention is drawn to the fact that a person who is not qualified is holding a public office, to declare that he is not entitled to that office and to prevent him from acting as such. Fortunately, the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 seems to have provided for a contingency like the present by enacting s. 57 and we hope that no difficulty would arise with regard to the acts performed by the second opponent as President of the Kalyan Municipality by reason of the validating provisions contained in that section.
The result is that the rule, to the extent that we have indicated in the judgment, will be made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.
Rule made absolute.
K.B.S