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  • s. 24 of the Indian Evidence Act.
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  • s. 24 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a criminal trial in which accused No. 1 challenged the learned trial Judge's charge to the jury concerning the applicability of Exception 1 to section 300 of the Indian Penal Code (the Exception which provides that culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, while deprived of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation). The defence pleaded that Exception 1 applied. The learned Judge, in his summing-up, informed the jury that Exception 1 had been read by defence counsel and stated in his charge that the exception did not apply. Counsel for accused No. 1 (Mr. Ghaswalla) contended on review that the Judge's direction effectively told the jury Exception 1 did not apply and that the factual question of grave and sudden provocation should have been left to the jury.

Procedurally, the matter came before the High Court under clause 26 of the Letters Patent, after the Advocate General granted a certificate under that clause. The Advocate General's certificate did not include the point about Exception 1. The High Court therefore had to determine (a) whether it had jurisdiction under clause 26 to consider points of law not mentioned in the Advocate General's certificate, and (b) whether, on the merits, there was any error in the trial Judge's charge regarding Exception 1 of section 300.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court, when exercising review jurisdiction under clause 26 of the Letters Patent based on a certificate from the Advocate General, may consider points of law not included in that certificate or reserved under clause 25.
  2. Whether the learned Judge's charge to the jury on the applicability of Exception 1 to section 300 amounted to misdirection (i.e., whether the question of "grave and sudden provocation" was wrongly taken away from the jury).

Arguments of the Parties

Accused's Arguments (Mr. Ghaswalla)

  • There was a misdirection in the learned Judge's summing-up concerning Exception 1 of section 300: although Exception 1 was pleaded, the Judge effectively directed the jury that it did not apply.
  • The factual question whether there was "grave and sudden provocation" should have been left to the jury to decide, not decided by the Judge in his charge.
  • The High Court has power under clause 26 of the Letters Patent to review the whole case and hence to consider points of law not covered by the Advocate General's certificate (relying in part on a broad reading of Emperor v. Narayen Raghunath Patki).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Narayen Raghunath Patki Considered whether the High Court under clause 26 may review the whole case beyond the specific point in the Advocate General's certificate. The decision was split: three Judges (Russell, Chandavarkar and Batty JJ.) held the Court could review the whole case; Davar and Beaman JJ. dissented. The case involved an erroneously admitted statement and subsequent consideration of the admissibility of a confession (s.24 Indian Evidence Act). The Court distinguished Patki on the facts and noted that the specific question presently before it did not arise in Patki. The present Court rejected the idea that Patki authorises wholesale review where no certificate point is shown to be in error; Patki was treated as not controlling the accused's contention.
The King-Emperor v. Upendra Nath Das Where a certificate under clause 26 is misconceived (i.e., there is no misdirection or error as certified), the High Court has no power to interfere or to reopen the case or to express an opinion on the merits. Cited as persuasive authority for the proposition that the High Court's power under clause 26 is limited to the points covered by the Advocate General's certificate; the present Court adopted this restrictive view.
The King-Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose Held that under the accepted interpretation of clause 26, the High Court may only consider alteration of sentence when the point of law in the certificate has been decided in favour of the accused; if the certified points cannot be answered in the accused's favour, the review must be dismissed. Relied upon by the Court as supporting the conclusion that clause 26 confines review to the points covered by the Advocate General's certificate.
Muthukumaraswami Pillai v. King-Emperor Unanimously held that counsel cannot argue any question of law not raised in the Advocate General's certificate under clause 26; the notion that a certificate opens the entire case for review was overruled. Cited by the Court as authoritative support for the restrictive interpretation of clause 26 adopted in this opinion.
Ramanujam v. King-Emperor Concerned admission of inadmissible evidence; Their Lordships did not interfere because there had been no decision on the point amounting to a point of law under clause 26 (but would have been entitled to interfere if broader review were allowed). Referenced in the analysis (Sen J.) to illustrate limitations on interference under clause 26 and to support the Court's narrower reading of the review power.
Adam Ali Taluqdar v. The King-Emperor The opinion lists this as one of the Calcutta decisions on the topic; the specific rule or principle from this case is not detailed in the provided opinion. The case was referenced as part of the series of Calcutta High Court authorities that the Court considered supportive of a restricted view of clause 26. The text does not elaborate its specific application beyond this contextual citation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded on two interrelated lines: (A) interpretation of clauses 25 and 26 of the Letters Patent to determine the scope of the High Court's review jurisdiction; and (B) application of that interpretation to the accused's contention about misdirection concerning Exception 1 to section 300.

(A) Interpretation of clauses 25 and 26

  1. Clause 25 provides that there shall be no appeal to the High Court from sentences or orders in criminal trials, but permits the trial Court to reserve points of law for the High Court's opinion.
  2. Clause 26 authorises the High Court, when points of law are reserved or the Advocate General certifies an error in points of law, to "review the case, or such part of it as may be necessary, and finally determine such point or points of law, and thereupon to alter the sentence... and to pass such judgment and sentence as... shall seem right."
  3. The majority view in this opinion (Wadia, Sen and Rajadhyaksha JJ.) reads the phrase "review the case, or such part of it as may be necessary" as permissive but limited: the High Court's power to review is confined to that which is necessary to decide the certified or reserved point(s) of law. If the Court concludes there was no error on the certified points, it cannot reopen other questions or alter the sentence.
  4. The Court relied on and endorsed Calcutta and Madras High Court authorities (Upendra Nath Das; Barendra Kumar Ghose; Muthukumaraswami Pillai) that adopt the restrictive interpretation that clause 26 does not permit a wholesale review of matters not in the Advocate General's certificate or reserved under clause 25.
  5. The Court considered Emperor v. Narayen Raghunath Patki in detail, noting that Patki had a divided bench and that the specific circumstances there (the High Court finding an error in admission of evidence and then considering the effect on confession evidence) made it distinguishable; thus Patki did not support the broad review power urged by the accused.

(B) Application to the Exception 1 contention

  1. The point about Exception 1 of section 300 (that the learned Judge's charge indicated the exception did not apply and thereby removed a factual question from the jury) was not included in the Advocate General's certificate.
  2. On the jurisdictional point, the Court held it was not open to consider that contention because clauses 25 and 26, read together and in light of the cited authorities, limit review to the points in the certificate or reserved by the trial Judge.
  3. The Court further stated that even if it had been at liberty to consider the Exception 1 contention, it would not conclude there was any legal error in the learned Judge's charge on that point.
  4. Each of the three concurring Judges (Wadia, Sen and Rajadhyaksha JJ.) expressed agreement with this twofold disposition: (i) a restrictive view of clause 26's scope, and (ii) absence of misdirection on Exception 1 in any event.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Petitions dismissed.

Consequences and implications:

  • The High Court held that, under clause 26 of the Letters Patent (read with clause 25), its power to review in criminal matters where a certificate from the Advocate General is furnished is confined to the point or points of law specified in that certificate or to points reserved under clause 25. It is not open to the High Court, in such a review, to entertain fresh points of law that are not covered by the Advocate General's certificate.
  • The specific contention that the learned trial Judge misdirected the jury about Exception 1 to section 300 was not included in the Advocate General's certificate; accordingly the High Court declined to consider it on review. The Court also stated that, even if it had jurisdiction to consider the point, it would find no error of law in the Judge's charge on that matter.
  • As a direct effect on the parties, no alteration of the sentences passed by the trial Judge was made and the petitions were dismissed.
  • The opinion expressly endorses the view taken by prior Calcutta and Madras High Court decisions (as cited) that limits the High Court's review under clause 26 to the certified or reserved points; the Court treated those authorities as correctly stating the scope of the review power. The opinion therefore affirms the restrictive interpretation of clause 26 reflected in those cases.
Petitions dismissed.

No additional factual findings, procedural steps or arguments beyond those explicitly set out in the provided opinion have been added to this summary.

    Emperor v. (1) Shaik Hassan Abdul Karim And (2) Akbar Khan Attamahomed

    N.J Wadia, J.:—The learned counsel for accused No. 1 has raised one other point. He contends that there is a misdirection in the learned Judge's charge to the jury as regards the applicability of exception 1 of s. 300 to the facts of this case. That exception provides that culpable homicide is not murder if the offender whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation causes the death of the person who gave the provocation. We are told that this exception was pleaded on behalf of the accused by the learned counsel who appeared for him at the trial. The learned Judge says in his charge that this exception was read to the jury by the counsel for the accused and he has dealt with, it in his charge.

    It is contended for the accused that the learned Judge's charge on this point practically amounted to a direction to the jury that exception I did not apply, and that the question whether there was grave and sudden provocation was a, question of fact which should have been left for the determination of the jury.

    Before I proceed to deal with this contention, it is necessary to deal with a very important point of law which is raised by it. The point with regard to exception I is not mentioned in the certificate of the learned Advocate General, and the question we have to consider is whether in dealing with a case coming before us under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent we are entitled to go into questions which are not covered by the certificate of the Advocate General Clause 25 of the Letters Patent provides that there shall be no appeal to the High Court from any sentence or order passed or made in any criminal trial before the Court of the original criminal jurisdiction which, may be constituted by one or more Judges of the High Court. But it shall be at the discretion of any such Court to reserve any point or points of law for the opinion of the High Court. Clause 26 of the Letters Patent runs as follows:

    “And we do further ordain that on such point or points of law being so reserved as aforesaid, or on its being certified by the said Advocate General that, in his judgment, there is an error in the decision of a point or points of law decided by the Court of original criminal jurisdiction, or that a point or points of law which has or have been decided by the said Court should be further considered, the said High Court shall have full power and authority to review the case, or such part of it as may be necessary, and finally determine such point or points of law, and thereupon to alter the sentence passed by the Court of original criminal jurisdiction, and to pass such judgment and sentence as to the said High Court shall seem right.”

    The words: “the said High Court shall have full power and authority to review the case, or such part of it as may be necessary, and finally determine such point or points of law, and thereupon to alter the sentence” seem to me to indicate clearly that the jurisdiction of the High Court under cl. 26 is restricted to the point or points of law certified by the Advocate General as involving an error, and that if the High Court comes to the conclusion that there has been no error with regard to the point or points of law mentioned in the certificate of the Advocate General, the High Court would have no power to go into any other question, or to review the case generally, even to the extent of altering the sentence. To take a different view would nullify the provision in cl. 25 that there shall be no appeal to the High Court from any sentence or order passed or made in any criminal trial before the High Court. It is no doubt true, and it has been held in many cases, that if the High Court comes to the conclusion that there has been an error on any of the points of law mentioned in the certificate of the Advocate General, the High Court is entitled to consider the whole case, and thereupon to alter the conviction or the sentence or both. There is no direct decision of our own High Court on this point. In Emperor v. Narayen Raghunath Patki a matter which came up before the High Court under a certificate granted by the Advocate General under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent was considered by a full bench of five Judges. The question referred to in the certificate of the Advocate General was as regards the admission of the record of a certain statement which had been made by a friend of the accused to a police officer. At the trial the person who was alleged to have made the statement denied it, and the presiding Judge admitted the statement in evidence both to discredit the person who had made it, and also as evidence against the accused as containing a statement made to the police corroborating confessions made by the accused. These confessions had also been admitted in evidence against the accused. It was held by all the Judges that the statement had been wrongly admitted by the trial Judge, and that its admission amounted to an error on a point of law. The Court then proceeded to consider whether there was sufficient evidence apart from this statement to support the conviction of the accused, and a question arose whether under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent the High Court had power to review the case only qua the wrongly admitted evidence, or whether it had power to review all the rest of the case. The counsel for the accused had asked the Court to consider whether the accused's confession which had been admitted at the trial had been induced by a threat or promise or inducement and was therefore inadmissible under s. 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. Three of the learned Judges took the view that the High Court acting under cl. 26 could review the whole case and could go into the question whether the confession, which had been admitted by the trial Court, was admissible or not. Two of the Judges, Davar and Beaman JJ., were of the opinion that under cl. 26 the Court was at liberty to review the case or part of the case for the purpose of determining the point or points of law which are either reserved for its opinion or certified by the Advocate General to be wrongly decided, but that it was not open to the Court in review to go behind the record of the case and enter into an elaborate investigation as to whether each particular piece of evidence recorded by the Judge was or was not rightly admitted. Beaman J. held that if the party did not object and did not ask for a certificate in respect of evidence which is challenged for the first time after the trial at the hearing before the Court of Reference, the objection comes too late. This decision, however, does not deal with the question in the form in which it arises before us. In Patki's case the High Court came to the conclusion that there was an error on the point of law with regard to which the certificate of the Advocate General had been given, viz. the improper admission of the statement. Having come to that conclusion it was the duty of the High Court to see whether, excluding that evidence, the conviction could be supported on the rest of the evidence. The point with which we have to deal, whether, when this Court has come to the conclusion that there has been no error on any point of law with regard to any of the matters referred to in the certificate of the Advocate General, the Court can nevertheless reopen the whole case and deal with points which were not raised before the Advocate General or are not covered by his certificate, did not arise at all in Patki's case. This question has, however, been dealt with in two judgments of the Calcutta High Court and in one judgment of the Madras High Court.

    In The King-Emperor v. Upendra Nath Das, a case coming up before the High Court under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent of that Court was dealt with by a full bench of five Judges. It was held that where there is no misdirection or other error as certified by the Advocate General under cl. 26, his certificate is misconceived, and the High Court has no power to interfere, and that it is not within its power to reopen the case and express any opinion on the merits. Jenkins C.J in dealing with the point said (p. 666):

    “The result then is that the certificate granted is misconceived: In part it is opposed to the learned Judge's conclusive statement of what occurred and in no respect can I find that it discloses an error in the decision of a point of law decided by the Judge at the trial.

    “In this view of the case it is not within my power to re-open the case and I regard myself as not entitled to express any opinion as to its merits. In fact, I am not in a position to deal with the merits; for they have not been discussed before us, nor have those conditions been established on which alone they could be considered by us.

    “Our powers are circumscribed, for we can only act in conformity with cl. 26 of the Letters Patent. If there was no misdirection or other error as certified the certificate was misconceived, and we have no power to interfere.

    “If the merits of the case or the sentence are to be further considered, then that must be not by this Court, but some other authority vested with the requisite power.”

    The same question again came up for consideration before a full bench of live judges of the Calcutta High Court in The King-Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose. The accused in that case was convicted under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The Advocate General granted a certificate under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent, and the point referred to in the certificate was that the trial Judge had misdirected the jury on a point of law, and had also misdirected them in so far as he omitted to draw the attention of the jury to the defence of the accused beyond making a mere reference to the statement made by him. It was held by the full bench that there was no misdirection or non-direction amounting to misdirection. It was further held that according to the accepted interpretation of cl. 26 of the Letters Patent the Court may consider the question of alteration of sentence by the trial Court only when the point of law reserved by the trial Court under cl. 25 of the Letters Patent, or certified by the Advocate General under cl. 26, has been decided in favour of the accused. Mookerji J., in dealing with this question, said (p. 209):

    “In my opinion, there is no escape from the conclusion that as neither of the two points of law specifically certified by the Advocate General can be answered in favour of the accused, his application for review must be dismissed so far as the exercise of the powers conferred on this Court by cl. 26 of the Letters Patent is concerned.”

    The same point was considered by a full bench of five Judges of the Madras High Court in Muthukumaraswami Pillai v. King-Emperor, and it was unanimously held that it was not open to the accused's pleader to argue any question of law which was not raised in the certificate given by the Advocate General under cl. 26, and the contention that as soon as a certificate is granted by the Advocate General in regard to any point of law the whole case is opened up for consideration by the High Court under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent, was definitely overruled.

    I am of opinion with respect that the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in The King-Emperor v. Upendra Nath Das and The King-Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose and by the Madras High Court in Muthukumaraswami Pillai v. King-Emperor is correct, and that, once we come to the conclusion that there has been no error on any point of law referred to in the certificate of the Advocate General it is not open to us to consider any other question not covered by the certificate of the Advocate General.

    On this view of the case it is not open to us to consider the point raised by Mr. Ghaswalla for accused No. 1, that there was an error on a point of law in the charge of the learned Judge with regard to the applicability of exception 1 of s. 300 to the facts of this case. Even, however, if we were at liberty to deal with this question, I am not prepared to say that there is any error of law in the learned Judge's charge on this point.

    In my opinion, therefore, it has not been shown that there has been any error on any point of law in the charge delivered by the learned Judge to the jury. On this view of the case it would not be open to us to alter the sentences passed by the learned Judge. We, therefore, make no order in the matter.

    Sen, J.:—I agree that none of the four points covered by the Advocate General's certificate satisfactorily establishes that the learned Judge's charge to the jury is vitiated by any such misdirection or non-direction as calls for our interference. At the outset, I may say that I am in agreement with the view taken by my learned brother regarding our powers under cl. 26. Mr. Ghaswala has strenuously urged that the High Court has power to review the case not only as to the points covered by the certificate, but to review the whole case, a point which was urged in Emperor v. Narayen Raghunath Patki. The headnote of that case on this point says:

    “Held, by Russell, Ag. C.J, Chandavarkar and Batty, JJ. (Davar and Beaman, JJ., dissenting) that the Court has power to review the whole case.”

    We would have been concluded if the headnote had been correct, but I find it is not. Chandavarkar J. thought that the contention that the High Court was precluded by the terms of cl. 26 from considering the admissibility of the confession of the accused, a matter which was not covered by the certificate, was “based on an obvious fallacy”. He held that the trying Judge had decided the question as a question of fact, holding in effect that the evidence did not appear to him to justify the exclusion of the confessions upon any of the grounds specified in s. 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, and he remarked (p. 126):

    “It is upon that narrower ground that the point now under discussion must and can be disposed of and it is not necessary to decide the broader question raised—whether we have jurisdiction under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent to decide any other point of law than that contained in the Advocate General's certificate. I say it is not necessary and I decline to consider it because there is no point of law as such about the admissibility of the confession before us.”

    Batty J. did not think it necessary to discuss the question of the powers and duties of the Court acting under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent. Davar J. and Beaman J. both held Court had not the power to go into any question not mentioned in the certificate. That case can be further distinguished from the present one on the ground that there the High Court upheld the objection raised in the certificate that a document containing a statement of a friend of the accused, which was used as evidence against the accused had been wrongly admitted. Having done that, the High Court had necessarily to see the effect of the confession. Such is not the case here, and, therefore, that case does not appear to be an authority in support of the contentions urged by Mr. Ghaswala. Both the Madras and the Calcutta High Courts in the cases cited by my learned brother, viz. Muthukumaraswami Pillai v. King-Emperor, The King-Emperor v. Upendra Nath Das, and The King-Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose, have definitely taken the view that the High Court's power of review is strictly limited to the points covered by the certificate. That appears to me to be also the natural interpretation of cl. 26.

    In Emperor v. Narayen Raghunath Patki Davar J. held (p. 132) that the words “review the case” in cl. 26 must be read with the words that follow, viz. “or such part of it as may be necessary and finally determine such point or points of law.”

    “Under cl. 26 it seems to me that we are at liberty to review the case or part of the case for the purpose of determining the point or points of law that are either reserved for our opinion or are certified by the Advocate General to be wrongly decided.”

    Similarly Beaman J. said (p. 145):

    “If the party did not object, did not ask for a certificate in respect to evidence which is thus challenged for the first time after the trial, at the hearing before the Court of reference, the objection comes too late.”

    A similar view will also appear in The King-Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose. It seems to me that cl. 26 must be read in conjunct on with cl. 25, the first part of which states that there shall be no appeal to the High Court from any sentence or order passed or made in any criminal trial before the Courts of original criminal jurisdiction. The second part of cl. 25 enables the trying Judge to reserve any point or points of law for the opinion of the High Court. Such points have to be dealt with under cl. 26 in the same manner as points covered by the Advocate General's certificate. It could hardly have been contemplated that when a point is reserved, the High Court would have the power to deal with, any other matter; otherwise there would be little significance in the expression “reserved”. Prima facie, it seems to me that the same consideration must apply to points mentioned in the Advocate General's certificate. The expression “review the case” must be read, in my judgment, in conjunction with the Words “and finally determine such point or points of law and thereupon to alter,” etc. The power and authority to review are obviously intended to be the necessary preliminary in order that the High Court may be able finally to determine the point or points of law mentioned, and on determination of such point or points (“thereupon”) the High Court would be in a position to alter the sentence and pass such judgment and sentence as to the High Court may seem right. Clause 26, therefore, is intended to give a limited power of interference to the High, Court, and being in derogation of the express prohibition that there shall be no appeal must be strictly construed. In Ramanujam v. King-Emperor some inadmissible evidence had been admitted, but Their Lordships did not interfere with the decision of the trial Judge on that ground, holding that there had been no decision on the point which could be regarded as a decision on a point of law within the meaning of cl. 26. But it seems obvious that they would have been entitled to interfere if they could “review the case” in the sense urged by Mr. Ghaswala. Our conclusion with regard to our powers under cl. 26 would, therefore, shut out from our consideration any contentions urged on points outside the Advocate General's certificate. The important point with respect to which such contentions had been urged is that part of the learned Judge's summing-up which relates to the applicability of exception I to s. 300. I also agree with my learned brother that even if we had the power to entertain the said contentions, we should find little substance therein.

    In the result, I agree that no order should be made in the matter.

    Rajadhyaksha, J.:—I am in entire agreement with the very full judgment delivered by my learned brother. Mr. Justice Wadia, and I shall state very briefly my reasons for so doing.

    It was argued by Mr. Ghaswalla for the accused that the learned Judge was wrong in telling the jury that although exception (1) was pleaded, it did not apply and that the jury could put out of their minds any idea that any exception applied. This point is not included in the certificate of the Advocate General, and the question, therefore, arises whether it is open to us to consider a point of law not included in the certificate. There have been several decisions of the Calcutta High Court, The King-Emperor v. Upendra Nath Das,, The King-Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose and Adam Ali Taluqdar v. The King-Emperor and of the Madras High Court in Muthukumaraswami Pallai v. King-Emperor, which have been referred to in the judgment of my learned brother where it has been held that it is not open to the Court hearing a petition under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent to go beyond the points mentioned in the certificate of the Advocate General. If I may say so with respect, I am in agreement with the view expressed therein. Clauses 25 and 26 of the Letters Patent have to be read together, and it seems to me that a point of law reserved by the learned Judge for the opinion of the High Court under cl. 25 and the certificate given by the Advocate General under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent have been placed on the same footing, and if it is not open to the High Court under cl. 25 to go into a point not reserved by the learned Judge, it would appear that it is not possible for the High Court to enter into the consideration of any other point of law not referred to in the certificate of the Advocate General. The point did somewhat indirectly arise for decision in a full bench case of this Court in Emperor v. Narayen Raghunath Patki. In that case, a certificate was given with respect to the point of law arising out of inadmissibility of certain evidence. The Court unanimously agreed that there had been an error of law. Thereafter while reviewing the case it had to consider the question as regards the admissibility of a confession. The question was whether that was a point which could be gone into on a review or whether the Court was confined in its review to consider only the effect on the ultimate result of the decision in respect of the points referred in the certificate of the Advocate General. Two Judges of this Court Beaman and Davar JJ. held that this Court could not go beyond the points raised in the certificate of the learned Advocate General. Mr. Justice Batty expressed no opinion, but Russell C.J and Chandavarkar J. held that it was open to the Court to consider other points in reviewing a case. That case can, however, be distinguished on the ground that there all the Judges agreed that there was misdirection with respect to the points referred to in the certificate of the learned Advocate-General, and having come to that conclusion, they had to consider whether the other evidence so recorded was sufficient to uphold the conviction; and while doing so, Russell and Chandavarkar JJ. held that other points could be considered. That case however is different from the one with which we are dealing. Here, we have come to the conclusion that there is in fact no misdirection in respect of any point referred to in the certificate of the Advocate General and therefore no question for review arises, and it is not open to us to consider any point apart from those raised in the Advocate General's certificate. But even if it were open to us to consider the contention raised by Mr. Ghaswalla, speaking for myself. I should have come to the conclusion that there was no misdirection even with respect to the view expressed by the learned Judge that exception (I) did not apply.

    I, therefore, agree with the order proposed by my learned brother.

    Petitions dismissed.
    A.J.P
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    Emperor v. (1) Shaik Hassan Abdul Karim And (2) Akbar Khan Attamahomed
    (Apr 13, 1944)