Barlee, J.:—
In a partition suit between three brothers Revanshiddappa, Shidramappa and Gurushantappa certain property was awarded to Gurushantappa, and the two others, Revanshidappa and Shidramappa, obtained a decree for about Rs. 30,000 against him. The decree was made in December 1925. Revanshidappa and Shidramappa did not relinquish. Gurushantappa's share, and he sued them for rent and mesne profits and obtained a decree for Rs. 15,000 and odd. His suit went on from 1926 to 1934. In 1929, whilst it was pending Revanshiddappa and Shidramappa assigned their rights to recover Rs. 30,000 from him to one Nagappa; and in September 1933, Nagappa filed a darkhast. In reply Gurushantappa asked for a set-off of the amount which he was claiming against Revanshiddapa and Shidramappa though he had not then obtained a decree. The execution matter was not decided till August 1934, by which time he had obtained a decree. The Surbordinate Judge then rejected his claim to a set-off and he failed in appeal to this Court. He has now filed a Letters Patent appeal and the only question for decision is whether he is entitled to a set-off. Section 49 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that every transferee of a decree “shall hold the same subject to the equities if any which the judgment-debtor might have enforced against the original decree-holder.” It was contended in the lower Court that, since Gurushantappa has obtained a decree which he could now set-off against the assignors had the partition decree not been assigned, he has a legal right to claim a set-off against the assignee. Mr. Coyajee has pressed this view on us relying on the difference between the wording of s. 49 of the Code and the corresponding section in the Transfer of Property Act, s. 132. But s. 49 quite clearly means that an assignee holds—subject to equities which the judgment-debtor might have enforced against his assignor—had the assignor chosen to execute his decree instead of assigning it, and that amounts to saying that he holds subject to equities existing at the date of the assignment. We agree with Wassoodew J. that Gurushantappa must fail if he has nothing but a legal set-off to plead.
We have to see, then, whether Gurushantappa had any equity against the assignors at the date of the assignment which he can now set up; and if so whether the assignee has an overriding equity. Mr. Coyajee is claiming something in the nature of an equitable set off, which, according to the cases cited in Mulla in the note in Order VIII, r. 6, has been recognised in India. He has referred us to two cases by way of illustration. In Kristo Ramani Dassee v. Kedar Nath Ghakravarti the facts were somewhat similar to those in our case. A and B had obtained a decree against K and T. After the decree had been partially satisfied, A and B assigned it to D. Prior to the date of the assignment, K and T had instituted a suit against A, B and D, and ultimately obtained a decree against them. It was held that K and T were entitled to set-off their decree against the unexecuted portion of the decree which had been assigned to D. In the judgment their Lordships relied on s. 243 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, which is now Order XXI, r. 29. It provides that “where a suit is pending in any Court against the holder of a decree of such Court, on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided.” And they went on to say that as D had taken an assignment of the decree she must have known perfectly well of the existence of the suit against herself and her assignor, and in consequence that the judgment-debtor had an “equitable right which could be made to operate as against the holder of the decree and against the assignee with notice of the existence of the pending suit.” This judgment then recognises an equitable right created or recognised by r. 29 and the possibility of an equity in favour of an assignee.
The second case is the recent Privy Council decision in Hazari Ram Marwari v. Rai Bahadur Bansidhar Dhandhania, wherein the judgment-debtors were allowed to set-off against a claim made to execute an assigned decree, a decree which had not been obtained by them till after the assignment, on the ground that the two decrees related to the same transaction, to avoid circuity of proceedings. Apparently the principle adopted in the High Court of Patna, from which the appeal had been made, was not challenged for there is nothing on the point in the judgment. The judgment-debtors had purchased a share of a village and had discharged two security bonds charged on it. The sale was set aside; the estate holder sought restitution of the land with mesne profits and the purchasers sued for the amount spent by them to discharge the bond. The estate holder or his representatives obtained a decree first and assigned it before the auction-purchasers had obtained their's and the case arose on an application being made for execution by the assignees, since the purchasers sought a set-off.
These cases show that an equitable set-off can be and has been recognised in India; in fact that the right of a judgment-debtor to ask for a stay under r. 29 is an equity which binds an assignee. In our case it cannot be doubted that the Court would, have granted Gurushantappa a stay in 1929 had his brothers sought to execute their decree without allowing him time to obtain a decree in his suit. His claim was no more than that they should be compelled to give full effect to the partition decree by paying him mesne profits in respect of his share which they had wrongfully withheld. Thus both decrees arose out of the one transaction and no Court of equity could have rejected his request.
We agree then with the learned counsel that the assignee took the decree subject to Gurushantappa's equitable right to have execution stayed until his suit had been decided and therefore to set-off his decree. It only remains to decide whether the assignee's ignorance of the facts of the case gives him an overriding equity. It is contended that his ignorance is immaterial; but a bona fide purchaser for value without notice always obtains consideration in a Court of equity. However, we do not think that his equity is the stronger for if he bought in ignorance it must have been because he neglected to make enquiries. The decree was one which gave rights to Gurushantappa and it was incumbent on the assignee to enquire whether Gurushantappa's claims under it had been satisfied.
For these reasons we allow the appeal with costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
J.G.K