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  • section 411 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act
  • section 471 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act.
  • section 12 of the City of Bombay Police Act
  • section 45 of the Specific Relief Act,
  • Bombay Municipal Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • section 411 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act
  • section 471 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act.
  • section 12 of the City of Bombay Police Act
  • section 45 of the Specific Relief Act,
  • Bombay Municipal Act
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Kania, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition, brought under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, seeks an order directing the Municipal Commissioner to issue a license permitting the petitioner to carry on the business of a butcher at Charni Road and, additionally, an injunction restraining the respondent from prosecuting the petitioner in the Police Court for carrying on the business without a license.

The petitioner had carried on the business of a butcher at a shop in Girgaum for many years. Around 1928 the Municipality adopted a policy to confine the sale of meat to specified areas; in pursuance of that policy it erected a municipal market at Chandanwadi. A private market at Chira Bazar also existed where meat was sold.

The petitioner applied for a license for a shop at Charni Road; the application was refused by the Municipal Commissioner. The petitioner's shop is more than half a mile from the Chandanwadi market but within half a mile of the private Chira Bazar market. The municipal policy was that shops of this nature should not be permitted within half a mile of a recognised market where meat is sold. After refusal and repeated attempts to obtain reconsideration, and in view of a criminal prosecution launched against him under the penal section of the municipal Act, the petitioner filed the present application in court.

The petition was supported by affidavits and annexures describing municipal policy and correspondence. The Municipal Commissioner filed an affidavit explaining the grounds for refusal, stating the policy aimed to facilitate supervision and meet local requirements. The petition was ultimately dismissed with costs.

Attorneys for applicant: Messrs Cama & Co. — Attorneys for respondent: Messrs Crawford, Bayley & Co.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 411 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act deprives a person of the right to carry on the business of a butcher except under a license and, if so, whether that provision permits the Commissioner to refuse to grant a license.
  2. Whether the Municipal Commissioner is under a legal obligation to grant a license when applied for, or whether the power to grant a license is discretionary (and includes the power to refuse).
  3. Whether the Municipal Commissioner's exercise of discretion in refusing the petitioner's license was arbitrary or unlawful, so as to justify judicial interference.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Section 411 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act does not empower the Commissioner to refuse a license; the petitioner contended the Commissioner must grant a license when applied for.
  • Where the legislature intends to confer a discretion or to impose an obligation to issue a license it does so in express terms (petitioner relied on section 394(4) as an example of such express wording).
  • The petitioner relied on Rossi v. Edinburgh Corporation and Gell v. Taja Noora to support the principle that deprivation of the citizen's liberty to carry on a business is a power of the legislature alone and cannot be exercised by an administrative officer unless expressly given.
  • In case of doubt about the extent of the Commissioner's power, the construction should favour the subject and disfavor the Commissioner (reliance on Somu Pillai v. The Municipal Council, Mayavaram).
  • The petitioner also cited various authorities (Rustom J. Irani v. H. Kennedy; Gell v. Taja Noora; Alimahomed v. Municipal Commissioner of Bombay; Pachan Ladha v. The Municipal Commissioner, Bombay) to argue that the Commissioner's discretion was arbitrary and should be set aside.
  • It was further contended that the Chandanwadi market scheme had failed (few stalls occupied), so the Commissioner was not properly exercising his discretion and the court should intervene.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Commissioner, by his affidavit, explained that the municipal policy restricting meat sales to certain markets and preventing shops within half a mile of a recognised market was adopted to facilitate supervision and to meet the general requirements of the locality.
  • The Commissioner maintained that his refusal followed that considered municipal policy and was exercised for municipal welfare rather than any ulterior or arbitrary motive.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rossi v. Edinburgh Corporation Principle that deprivation of the liberty to carry on a trade is a matter for the legislature and cannot be effected by an administrative officer unless the legislature has expressly done so. The Court distinguished this authority: in Rossi there was no express legislative provision depriving citizens of the right to carry on the trade; here section 411 expressly conditions the trade on holding a license, so Rossi was held not to apply.
Gell v. Taja Noora Similar principle to Rossi regarding absence of express legislative deprivation of the right to carry on a trade. The Court treated this decision as analogous to Rossi and distinguished it for the same reason: section 411 here expressly imposes the licensing restriction.
Somu Pillai v. The Municipal Council, Mayavaram Rule that where there is doubt as to the extent of an administrative power, construction should favour the subject and against the administrative authority. The Court acknowledged the principle but determined that, on the language of section 411 and the municipal policy, there was no ambiguity that required such a construction in favour of the petitioner.
Rustom J. Irani v. H. Kennedy Illustration that where legislature intends to impose an obligation on a public servant to issue a license it uses mandatory language (e.g., "shall"); cited regarding interpretation of statutory language. The Court relied on the reasoning in that case to explain that section 411 does not use mandatory language imposing an obligation to grant a license; it instead implies a power to grant (and consequently a power to refuse).
Alimahomed v. Municipal Commissioner of Bombay Cited by the petitioner among authorities alleging arbitrariness of administrative discretion. The Court noted the citation but treated the present statutory scheme (section 411) and the Commissioner's affidavit-based justification as distinguishing the present facts from the situations relied upon; it did not find the Commissioner's exercise arbitrary.
Pachan Ladha (Petitioner) v. The Municipal Commissioner, Bombay Cited by petitioner in support of the submission that the Commissioner's discretion could be challenged as arbitrary. The Court acknowledged the citation but, on the statutory language and the stated municipal policy, concluded there was no justification to interfere with the Commissioner's discretion in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a series of connected propositions grounded on the statutory language and the facts shown by affidavit.

  1. Interpretation of section 411: The Court held that section 411 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act, by its terms, deprives every citizen within the Act's operation of the right to carry on the trade of a butcher except under a license granted by the Commissioner and in conformity with its terms. Thus, unlike the cases cited by the petitioner where the law did not expressly deprive citizens of the right to carry on a trade, section 411 does impose such a legislative restriction.
  2. Existence of power to grant and refuse licences: The Court reasoned that while section 411 does not contain express words conferring the power to grant a license, the power is necessarily implied by the statutory prohibition — otherwise there would be no licensing authority at all. From the existence of an implied power to grant a license, the Court held there necessarily follows an implied power to refuse; to hold otherwise would make the concept of a discretionary licensing power meaningless.
  3. Mandatory versus discretionary language: The Court observed that when the legislature intends to impose a binding obligation on an official to issue a license it uses clear mandatory language (citing Rustom J. Irani v. H. Kennedy and reference to section 12 of the City of Bombay Police Act). Since section 411 lacks such mandatory phrasing, it could not be read as creating an imperative duty on the Commissioner to grant a license.
  4. Limits on discretion and non-arbitrariness: Although the Act did not expressly define or limit the Commissioner's discretion, the Court held the power must be exercised properly — i.e., not arbitrarily or for an ulterior motive. The affidavit of the Commissioner set out in detail the municipal policy and the reasons for refusing the petitioner's application (facilitation of supervision and furthering the general requirements of the locality). On the face of the material before the Court, the exercise of discretion was found to be for municipal welfare in accordance with considered policy and not arbitrary.
  5. Petitioner's contention regarding failure of Chandanwadi market: The petitioner argued the municipal scheme had failed and that the Commissioner should, therefore, reconsider. The Court responded that even if future reconsideration might be proper should the market scheme fail, at present the market still existed for its avowed object and the Commissioner had undertaken to reconsider if the scheme were found to be a failure. On the present facts the Court saw no justification to interfere with the discretion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the petition. The core ruling is stated as DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Implications:

  • The petitioner's application for a writ directing the Municipal Commissioner to issue a license and for an injunction against prosecution was refused; the petition was dismissed with costs.
  • The Court upheld the view that section 411 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act operates to require a license to carry on the trade of a butcher and that the Municipal Commissioner possesses an implied power to grant or refuse such licenses, subject to the obligation not to act arbitrarily or for ulterior motives.
  • No broader or novel precedent was announced beyond the Court's application of section 411 to the facts before it; the decision confined itself to the statutory interpretation and the propriety of the Commissioner's exercise of discretion in the circumstances shown by affidavit.

Order: Petition dismissed with costs. (Final words in the opinion: "Petition dismissed." )

    Fakir Mahomed Malang v. The Municipal Commissioner Of The City Of Bombay

    Kania, J.:—

    This is a petition filed under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, praying that the respondent, the Municipal Commissioner, be ordered to issue a license to the petitioner permitting him to carry on the business of a butcher at Charm Road. There is a further prayer asking for an injunction against the respondent prosecuting the petitioner in the Police Court for carrying on the business of a butcher without a license.

    The petition and the affidavits show that the petitioner has been carrying on the business of a butcher at a shop in Girgaum for many years past. In about 1928, the Municipality, after mature deliberation, came to the conclusion that it was in the municipal interest of the city of Bombay that the sale of meat should be confined to specific areas. From the annexures to the affidavit of Mr. Laud it appears that this policy was reiterated many times in the communications between the Municipal Committee and the Commissioner and the applicants for licenses and the Commissioner. It further appears that in pursuance of that policy the Municipality has erected a market at Chandanwadi. Besides this market there also exists another market at Chira Bazar, which is a private market, where meat is sold.

    The petitioner applied for a license in respect of a shop at Charni Road but that was refused. After repeated attempts made by him to persuade the respondent to reconsider his decision and in view of the fact that the Municipality launched a criminal prosecution against him under the penal section of the Act, the petitioner has made this application to the Court. It is clear from the facts that the petitioner's shop is more than half a mile away from the Chandanwadi market but within half a mile from the private market at Chira Bazar. It also appears that the policy of the Municipality is that shops of this nature should not be permitted within half a mile of a recognised market where meat is sold. In his affidavit the respondent says that this policy has been adopted with a view to facilitate the work of supervision and to meet the general requirements of the locality as a whole. In my opinion, the policy so adopted is not open to question as violating any principle of Municipal administration.

    On behalf of the petitioner it is first contended that section 411 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act does not empower the respondent to refuse a license when applied for. It is urged that whenever legislature intended to invest the Commissioner with a discretion it had done so in specific terms. For this purpose reliance is placed on section 394(4). The petitioner further relies on the decision in Rossi v. Edinburgh Corporation to support his contention that it is only within the power of the legislature to deprive a citizen of his right to carry on a business as and where he pleases and it does not lie within the power of the Commissioner or any other person, unless expressly invested by legislature with such power, to curtail that liberty of a citizen. Further, reliance is placed on the decision in Somu Pillai v. The Municipal Council, Mayavaram, to show that in the event of a doubt as to the extent of the power of the Commissioner, the construction should be in favour of the subject and against the Commissioner. The petitioner further relied on Rustom J. Irani v. H. Kennedy,(3) Gell v. Taja Noora,(4) Alimahomed v. Municipal Commissioner of Bombay,(5) and Pachan Ladha…(Petitioner) v. The Municipal Commissioner, Bombay…()*, Bombay,(6) in support of the contention that the discretion exercised by the Commissioner in this particular case was arbitrary, and, therefore, should be set aside.

    section 411 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act runs as follows:—

    “No person shall without, or otherwise than in conformity with the terms of, a license granted by the Commissioner in this behalf—

    (a) carry on within the city, or at any municipal slaughter-house, the trade of a butcher;

    (b) use any place in the city for the sale of the flesh of any animal intended for human food, or any place without the city for the sale of such flesh for consumption in the city.”

    In my opinion the first contention of the petitioner is incorrect. section 411 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act, in terms, deprives every citizen, living within the city or to whom the Act applies, of the power to carry on the business of a butcher. The only exception to that is the grant of a license by the Commissioner and carrying on the trade of a butcher in conformity with the terms of that license. The present case, therefore, differs materially from the decisions in Rossi v. Edinburgh Corporation and Gell v. Taja Noora inasmuch as in those cases there was no express provision made by the legislature depriving every citizen of his right to carry on the particular trade. The relevant sections quoted in those decisions are the penal sections corresponding to section 471 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act. It is, therefore, not open to the petitioner to contend that the Commissioner has attempted to deprive the citizens of Bombay of their right to carry on the trade of a butcher. In fact by section 411 of the Act the legislature has imposed that restriction.

    The next contention of the petitioner that the respondent is under an obligation to issue a license when asked for, is also unsound. In the Act there is no express provision giving power to the Commissioner to grant a license to carry on the trade of a butcher. By reason of the words used in section 411 it seems that the power is impliedly vested in the Commissioner. If this view is not accepted the other alternative would be to consider that there is no power in the respondent to grant the license. That would be against the clear intention of section 411 and clearly detrimental to the rights of the public, because in that event there would be no licensing authority at all. If this power is deemed to exist in the Municipal Commissioner, impliedly by reason of the terms of section 411, it follows that the power to refuse the license must also be vested in the same authority because a power to grant necessarily implies a right to refuse. To consider otherwise would mean that there was an obligation on the Commissioner imperatively to grant a license and that he had no jurisdiction to refuse the same. There appears in the Act no words to justify such a conclusion. Whenever the legislature desired to impose any such obligation on a public servant the legislature used appropriate words to show clearly its meaning. A reference to section 12 of the City of Bombay Police Act quoted in the decision in Rustom J. Irani v. H. Kennedy makes this position clear. As pointed out by Jenkins, C.J in that case the legislature had deliberately made use of the word “shall” when it intended to impose on a public servant the obligation to issue a license. At the utmost, therefore, section 411 can be construed to mean that the Municipal Commissioner was not under an obligation to issue a license but had the power to issue the same. In that view, as I have pointed out, the power to grant a license must necessarily be accompanied with the right to refuse, because otherwise the term “power” would have no meaning.

    If the Municipal Commissioner has, therefore, the power to grant a license it must be a power which he is to exercise in a proper manner, i.e, not arbitrarily or for an ulterior motive. Although no express words are found in the Act giving him the discretion or limiting his discretion in the exercise of his power, in my opinion that would be the proper view to take of the limits of his power. In the present case the grounds stated by the Commissioner are set out in extenso in his affidavit. So long as the discretion is exercised for the proper municipal administration of the area under the control of the Commissioner, and from no other motive, I am unable to consider that the exercise of the power would be arbitrary or unlawful. The affidavit shows clearly that the Commissioner had exercised his discretion only for the purpose of the Municipal welfare of the inhabitants of the particular locality, in accordance with the considered policy of the Municipality. If that position is not found to be incorrect, there would be no justification to interfere with the discretion of the Municipal Commissioner.

    On behalf of the petitioner it is contended that the Chandanwadi market has proved a failure and very few stalls are in fact in the occupation of vendors of vegetable, fish or meat. It is, therefore, contended that the Municipal Commissioner is not at present exercising the discretion in a proper way and the Court should interfere in the matter. While realising that if the market proved to be a failure the Municipal Commissioner may properly reconsider his decision in granting the license to the petitioner, I see no reason at this stage to interfere with the exercise of his discretion. The Commissioner has already intimated to the petitioner that as and when the Chandanwadi market scheme is found to be a failure and the building is directed to be used for another purpose, he would reconsider the question of granting the petitioner a license. So long, however, as in fact the Chandanwadi market is used for the avowed object of furthering the Municipal policy laid down in the resolutions, it cannot be stated that the scheme had failed, and, therefore, action should be taken on the footing that the scheme did not exist. The Chandanwadi market yet exists for the use and benefit of the vendors who choose to go there. The ground mentioned by the Municipal Commissioner, viz., to facilitate the supervision of such shops, is still applicable inasmuch as there is another market (although a private market) at Chira Bazar where meat is being sold. Under the circumstances I am unable to consider that the exercise of the discretion by the Commissioner on the face of it is arbitrary or unlawful. The Court would, not, therefore, be justified in interfering with the same.

    The petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs.

    Attorneys for applicant: Messrs Cama & Co.

    Attorneys for respondent: Messrs Crawford, Bayley & Co.

    Petition dismissed.
    B.K.D
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    Fakir Mahomed Malang v. The Municipal Commissioner Of The City Of Bombay
    (Jul 3, 1936)