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Case Number

Civil Application No. 727 of 1928

Attorney(S)

H.C Coyajee and Gharekhan, with P.A Dhruva, for the petitioners.
D.A Tulzapurkar, for the opponents.

Judges

Mt. Patkar
Mr. Baker, JJ.

Acts

SECTION 110 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
SECTION 109 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
section 109 clause (c), of the Civil Procedure Code.
section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
section 596 of the Civil Procedure Code,
section 596 (i.e, the present section 110),
Order XLV, rule 5,

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Smart Summary

Opinion Summary — Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Privy Council

Factual and Procedural Background

These proceedings are two applications for leave to appeal to the Privy Council against this Court's decisions in Second Appeals Nos. 864 and 914 of 1926. The disputes arose from two cross suits concerning an easement — specifically, the right to open two windows and an arch in the western party-wall of the defendants' house. The primary procedural and factual questions addressed were whether the matter was of the value of Rs. 10,000 or upwards for the purposes of obtaining a certificate under the Civil Procedure Code, and whether the appeals involved a substantial question of law or were fit for certification under section 109(c).

Both applications were heard together; there is one judgment rendered by this Court. The Registrar excused delay that was raised as a possible bar to one application. Ultimately the Court refused the certificate and discharged the rule in both applications with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, for the purpose of obtaining leave to appeal to the Privy Council under section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code, the value to be considered is the value of the whole property or the value of the easement (or the detriment to the party prejudiced by the decree).
Whether the suit (or decree) involves a claim or question to or respecting property of the value of Rs. 10,000 or upwards within the meaning of section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Whether the appeal involves a substantial question of law such that a certificate should be granted under section 110, or alternatively whether the case is one of public or private importance warranting certification under section 109(c).
Whether any of the applications are barred by delay (a procedural point raised and excused by the Registrar).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The learned counsel for the appellant argued that in a suit for an easement of light and air the appealable value should be determined by the value of the property (the whole property) and not merely by the value of the easement. He relied on the decision in Appaya v. Lakhamgowda and on authority cited in Mulla's Civil Procedure Code (8th Ed.).
It was also urged (as an alternative) that the decree might fall under section 109(c) — that the case could be certified as a fit one for appeal to the Privy Council.
There was an affidavit produced (by the applicant) estimating the value of the building and portions of land (figures appear in the judgment), which was used to contest that the value was below Rs. 10,000.

Respondent's Arguments

The respondent's counsel relied on Hirjibhai v. Jamshedji to contend that the value of the subject-matter of the suit cannot be larger than what the trial court had jurisdiction to try, and that a plaintiff's own valuation (here, the suit valued at Rs. 5) is binding and cannot later be increased to seek a higher forum.
Respondent also contended that the detriment to the party seeking relief — i.e., the value of the easement or injury if the right were negatived — should determine appealability, and that the decree did not involve property of Rs. 10,000 or upwards.
On the question of section 109(c), the respondent argued the present dispute (two small windows in a loft/gallery) was not of great public or private importance nor an important precedent governing numerous other cases.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
De Silva v. De Silva	To determine the value for section 596/section 110 the decree must be looked at as it affects the interests of the party prejudiced; if detriment to the party seeking relief is estimated at less than Rs. 10,000 the matter is not of the prescribed value.	The Court treated De Silva as authoritative and "still good law," and followed it to conclude that the value of the easement/detriment (not the whole property) governs appealability; the Court applied this principle to find the appeal value was less than Rs. 10,000.
Manilal v. Banubai	Applied De Silva to hold that where the value of an easement is well below Rs. 10,000 there is no right of appeal even though the affected property is worth over Rs. 10,000.	The Court cited Manilal as following De Silva and noted that leave had been refused by this Court (though special leave was later granted by the Privy Council and that judgment was not before the Court).
Appaya v. Lakhamgowda	Relied on by appellant as authority for taking the value of the whole property (rather than the easement) for appealable value.	The Court distinguished Appaya on its facts and held it did not support the broad proposition urged by the appellant; the Court observed Appaya involved a dispute over property (a well and compound) whose value exceeded Rs. 10,000, and noted Appaya has not been followed in subsequent decisions cited.
Nariman Rustomji Mehta v. Hasham Ismayal	Held that in a partnership suit the value to be looked at is the appellant's share and not the whole partnership property; aligns with De Silva.	The Court cited this decision as following De Silva and using the same principle (value of the interest sought, not of the whole property).
Mirza Abid Husain Khan v. Ahmad Husain (Privy Council)	Held that section 110 applies to the value of the annuity sought to be recovered and not to the value of the property upon which the annuity is charged; thus focusing on the thing at stake.	The Court relied on the Privy Council's approach as corroborating De Silva/Nariman Rustomji Mehta's principle that the specific right or claim (annuity/easement) — not the whole property's value — is the relevant measure.
Radhakrishna Ayyar v. Sundaraswamier	Laid down that the sum of money actually at stake represents the true value.	The Court noted this case was distinguished by Mirza Abid Husain Khan and discussed in the context of differing approaches to valuation; cited as one of the authorities on valuation but not controlling for the present issues.
Hirjibhai v. Jamshedji	Holds that the value of the subject-matter cannot exceed what the trial court has jurisdiction to try; a plaintiff may elect a valuation within a particular court's jurisdiction and cannot later claim a higher valuation.	The Court relied on Hirjibhai to support the conclusion that because the suit was valued at Rs. 5 and brought in the Second Class Subordinate Judge, the applicant cannot now claim the suit relates to property of Rs. 10,000 or more.
Banarsi Parshad v. Kashi Krishna Naraina	Explains clause (c) of section 109 is intended for special cases where the point in dispute is not measurable by money though it may be of great public or private importance.	Patkar, J. cited the case to describe the narrow ambit of section 109(c) and rejected the suggestion that the present case fell within that special category.
Gosain Bhaunath Gir v. Bihari Lal (Patna High Court)	Affirms De Silva: where detriment to the party seeking relief is less than prescribed value, appealability under the prescribed value is not satisfied.	The decision was cited as another authority following De Silva and supporting the Court's approach.
Appala Raja v. Rangappa Naicker (Madras High Court)	Holds that the real value of a right (e.g., to take water) must be ascertained by the detriment the plaintiff would suffer if the right were negatived; the word "property" in the second paragraph refers to rights inferior to full ownership when those rights alone are in dispute.	The Court invoked this case to support the proposition that the true value is measured by detriment/injury and to distinguish claims affecting property from claims to property of the requisite monetary value.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the matter in two principal dimensions: (A) valuation for the purpose of section 110 (whether the dispute is of Rs. 10,000 or upwards), and (B) whether a substantial question of law or public/private importance existed to justify certification under section 109(c).

(A) Valuation under section 110 / which value is relevant

The Court reviewed the competing lines of authority. It recognized that Appaya v. Lakhamgowda was relied upon by the appellant to support using the value of the whole property. The Court examined Appaya and found its facts distinguishable — there the easement related to a well and compound of value over Rs. 10,000 — and concluded Appaya did not establish a general rule that the whole property's value should be taken in every easement case.
By contrast, the Court found the decisions in De Silva v. De Silva, Manilal v. Banubai, and Nariman Rustomji Mehta … Hasham Ismayal to consistently support the proposition that the correct measure is the value of the specific right or the detriment to the party prejudiced (i.e., the easement or the particular interest in dispute), not the whole property's value.
The Privy Council decision in Mirza Abid Husain Khan v. Ahmad Husain, which applied section 110 to the value of the annuity sought, was cited as consonant with the same principle.
The Court applied the principle that where the detriment to the party seeking relief is estimated at less than Rs. 10,000 the matter is not of the prescribed value for appeal to the Privy Council. The present suits were valued at Rs. 5 and were instituted in the Second Class Subordinate Judge's Court. Hirjibhai v. Jamshedji was used to support the procedural consequence that a plaintiff's own valuation (and choice of court) is binding and cannot subsequently be used to claim a higher valuation for appeal.
On the evidentiary question raised by Patkar, J., the applicant's engineer's affidavit put various figures for building and land; the learned judge observed that even accepting some figures it was doubtful the property, after depreciation, would be Rs. 10,000 or more. Therefore, on the valuation evidence and legal principle, the Court concluded the value for appeal purposes was under Rs. 10,000.

(B) Whether a substantial question of law or public importance exists (section 109(c))

The Court considered whether the case raised a substantial question of law or fell within clause (c) of section 109 as a matter of public or private importance. The central factual-legal point was about the acquisitive period for an easement (adverse user of 20 years): at the time the plaintiff (servient owner) brought his suit the defendant applicant had not enjoyed the easement for 20 years; by the time the applicant brought his cross suit, the period had elapsed. The courts found it was not open to the applicant to add post-institutional period to the pre-institutional period of the opponent's suit.
Although there was a point of law (and a decision of the Court of Chancery on a similar question was noted), the Court stated it was not a "substantial question of law" in the sense required for a certificate. The Court emphasized that section 109(c) is reserved for cases involving questions of wide public importance or important precedents; two small windows in a loft were not such a matter.
The Court therefore rejected the submission that the case could be certified under section 109(c).

Other procedural considerations

The Court observed there was one judgment for both applications and that delay was excused by the Registrar; the Court chose not to make a definitive ruling on whether one of the applications was barred.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court refused the certificate for leave to appeal to the Privy Council and discharged the rule with costs in both applications.

Implications

Direct effect on the parties: The applications for leave to appeal to the Privy Council were denied and the rule in each application was discharged with costs, so the decision of this Court (confirming the lower court) stands and no certification for appeal to the Privy Council was given.
On precedent and doctrinal effect: The Court reaffirmed that De Silva v. De Silva is "still good law" and that the correct measure for appealability under section 110 is the value of the specific right or detriment to the party prejudiced (e.g., the easement or annuity), not necessarily the value of the whole property affected. The Court distinguished Appaya v. Lakhamgowda on its facts and observed that Appaya has not been followed in subsequent authorities cited.
The Court clarified the limited scope of section 109(c): it is meant for exceptional cases of public or private importance or those likely to govern numerous other cases; ordinary easement disputes (such as two small windows in a loft) do not meet that standard.

Rule discharged. (J.G.R.)

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Lallubhai Pragji v. Bhimbhai Dajibhai

Baker, J.:—

These are applications for leave to appeal to the Privy Council against the decision of this Court in Second Appeals Nos. 864 and 914 of 1926. The appeals arose out of two cross suits in respect of an easement, i.e, the right to open two windows and an arch in the western party-wall of the defendants' house. The first question which will arise in this case is whether the property is Rs. 10,000 or upwards in value. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that in a suit for an easement of light and air claimed by the owner of property A against property B, it is the value of the property and not the value of the easement that determines the appealable value, and for that proposition he relies on the case of Appaya v. Lakhamgowda. Now the trend of decisions in this Court has always been the other way. In De Silva v. De Silva the point was directly in issue, and it was held, to determine the value prescribed by section 596 of the Civil Procedure Code, the decree is to be looked at as it affects the interests of the party prejudiced by it, and where the detriment to the party seeking relief is estimated at less than Rs. 10,000, the value of the matter in dispute in appeal is not of the prescribed value, the decree itself does not involve any claim or question to or respecting property of the prescribed value, and the case does not fulfil the requirements of section 596 of the code. Sir Lawrence Jenkins in deciding the case said (p. 406):—

“The argument has been that inasmuch as the whole property is valued at Rs. 12,000 there is a compliance with the terms of section 596 (i.e, the present section 110), though the loss to the defendant by reason of the decree is limited to ⅓ of that property and profits. If we were to give effect to the contentions urged before us it would follow that if the sole subject-matter in dispute were an easement of trifling value, but affecting property worth Rs. 10,000 or upwards then a right to appeal to His Majesty in Council under the Civil Procedure Code would exist.”

That ruling was followed in Manilal v. Banubai, in which in an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council the respondent contended that though the value of the easement of light and air claimed by him in the suit was less than Rs. 10,000, yet the suit involved a claim or question to or respecting property of the value of over Rs. 10,000, and he was, therefore, entitled to a certificate. It was held, rejecting the application, that in the case of an easement, the value of which fell much below Rs. 10,000, there was no right of appeal although it affected property worth over Rs. 10,000, and reference was made to the case of De Silva v. De Silva. Now it appears that after leave to appeal in Manilal v. Banubai had been refused by this Court special leave to appeal was granted by the Privy Council. But we are not in possession of the judgment, and we do not know what were the reasons which led their Lordships to grant special leave to appeal, but that is referred to in the case of Appaya v. Lakhamgowda. This is a case on which the learned counsel for the applicant relies, and it is also the case which Mr. Mulla has quoted in his Civil Procedure Code, 8th Edition, at p. 299 in support of the proposition that in a suit for an easement of light and air claimed by the owner of property A, against the owner of property B, it is the value of property A and not the value of the easement that determines the appealable value. With all, respect, the case of Appaya v. Lakhamgowda does not seem to me to support this proposition. In that case the dispute was between two persons as regards two properties in which the parties were held to be entitled to share equally, and it was found that the plaintiff's share was worth more than Rs. 5,000 and therefore the defendant's share was also worth more than Rs. 5,000 and so the total value of the property was over Rs. 10,000. The user referred to a well and to the open space in the compound adjoining the two houses. The property, therefore, in respect of which the easement was directly claimed and in respect of which the easement was exercised was worth more than Rs. 10,000. That is to say, the plaintiff claimed the right to use a well and compound the value of which was Rs. 10,000 and upwards, and this does not refer to the same thing as a dispute regarding two small windows in a particular room of a house. But as a matter of fact the judgment in Appaya v. Lakhamgowda has not dissented from the rulings already quoted in De Silva v. De Silva and Manilal v. Banubai, nor does it seem to have been followed in subsequent cases. In Nariman Rustomji Mehta…Defendant v. Hasham Ismayal…Plaintiff .,(4) which was decided two years later than Appaya v. Lakhamgowda, De Silva v. De Silva was again followed, and the principle laid down in Nariman Rustomji Mehta…Defendant v. Hasham Ismayal…Plaintiff . is not the principle laid down in Appaya v. Lakhamgowda. It was held in that case that where in a partnership suit leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council was applied for, the petitioner contending that the decree involved a claim respecting property of the value of Rs. 10,000 within the meaning of the second paragraph of section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, it was the value of the appellant's share in the partnership that must be looked to and not the value of the whole partnership property. It has just been pointed out that in Appaya v. Lakhamgowda what was held was that it was the value of the whole property and not the value of the plaintiff's share which for this purpose must be taken to apply. So the principle laid down in Nariman Rustomji Mehta…Defendant v. Hasham Ismayal…Plaintiff . is the same principle as that laid down in De Silva v. De Silva, and Manilal v. Banubai expressly follows De Silva v. De Silva and makes no reference to Appaya v. Lakhamgowda. In these circumstances it appears that this Court has with this one exception, for which no reasons are given, always followed De Silva v. De Silva, which is still good law. In addition to this the Privy Council in Mirza Abid Husain Khan v. Ahmad Husain(5) has proceeded on much the same principle as Nariman Rustomji Mehta…Defendant v. Hasham Ismayal…Plaintiff ., holding that section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to the value of the annuity which is sought to be recovered, and not to the value of the property upon which that annuity is charged. And that case distinguishes the case of Radhakrishna Ayyar v. Sundaraswamier,(6) the case upon which the learned counsel for the applicant has relied, and in which it was laid down that the sum of money actually at stake represents the true value. In these circumstances I am of opinion that the case of De Silva v. De Silva is still good law, which has been uniformly followed in this Court, and the principle which that decision lays down is that in the case of an easement it is not the value of the whole property which is to be taken into consideration. In addition to this the learned counsel for the respondent has quoted Hirjibhai v. Jamshedji,(7) which lays down that the amount of value of the subject-matter of the suit cannot be larger than what the Court in which the suit is brought has jurisdiction to try and decree, and where it is open to the plaintiff to place his own valuation on his suit, and he elects to value it at an amount which is within the jurisdiction of a Subordinate Judge of the Second Class, it is not open to him afterwards to say that it is of the value of Rs. 10,000 or upwards. In the present case the relief sought was valued at Rs. 5. The suit was valued at Rs. 5 for all purposes, and was brought in the Court of the Second Class Subordinate Judge. Hence it would not be open now for the applicant, who was plaintiff in one suit and defendant in the other, to contend that the suit related to property of the value of Rs. 10,000 or upwards, in which case the suit should have been brought in the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court. In these circumstances I am of opinion that the value of this appeal must be taken to be less than Rs. 10,000, and, therefore, it does not fulfil the requirements of section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that it does not involve any claim or question to or respecting property of the like amount or value. Secondly, in this case the decree which has been passed by this Court confirmed the decision of the Court immediately below, and, therefore, in order that a certificate might issue that this is a fit case for appeal to the Privy Council the appeal must involve some substantial question of law. Now the point in this case was only this, that at the time the plaintiff brought a suit, by plaintiff I mean the servient owner, the defendant applicant had not enjoyed the easement for 20 years, and that was found by all three Courts. After the institution of the opponent's suit the applicant brought a cross suit or another suit to establish his right to the easement, and at the time when he brought that suit, which was some months later than the institution of the opponent's suit, the period of 20 years had elapsed, and it was held that it was not open to him to add on to the period which had expired at the time of the institution of the opponent's suit the subsequent period after the institution of that suit. Now there is a decision of the Court of Chancery to that effect, and although there is a point of law, as there must necessarily be in every case, I am not prepared to hold that it is a substantial point of law. Then it is contended that the appeal might at any rate fall under section 109(c), which provides for an appeal from any decree or order, when the case as hereinafter provided, is certified to be a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council.

The same ruling which I quoted just now, Hirjibhai v. Jamshedji, deals directly with this point, and says what is contemplated in clause (c) of section 109 of the Civil Procedure Code is a class of cases in which there may be involved questions of public importance or which may be important precedents governing numerous other cases or in which while the right in dispute is not exactly measurable in money it is of great public or private importance. A case was quoted in the course of the arguments in this case which referred to the right of management of a Parsi fire temple, which naturally would be a matter of great importance to the Parsi community. But I do not think it can for a moment be urged that the present case, which relates to the right to open two small windows in a loft or gallery in a house, is a case of great public importance. It can hardly be said to be an important president governing numerous other cases. The circumstances of this case are, as I think I pointed out at the time of my judgment, very peculiar. It is very rare that such a question as two suits brought by two persons would involve questions such as arose in the present case. The point on which the Subordinate Judge felt some difficulty was that the applicant was entitled to a decree if the opponent had not brought a suit, and that is a point which I should think is hardly ever likely to arise again. Cases of easements of light and air are of daily occurrence in this Court, but they are not usually of great public or private importance. They may be important to the parties themselves, but not to the community as a whole. I do not think the case can be brought under section 109 clause (c), and I think that argument was raised as a last resource in case the case did not fall under section 110.

I do not wish to deal with the question of one of these two applications being barred. As a matter of fact there is only one judgment of this Court in the two cases, and the delay was excused by the Registrar. Apart from this, on the grounds which I have already given, I am of opinion that in this case the value of the property is not Rs. 10,000 or upwards, that no substantial question of law is involved, and that the certificate asked for should be refused, and the rule discharged with costs.

Patkar, J.:— I agree. These are two applications for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. It is urged on behalf of the opponents that one of the applications is beyond time. The Registrar has excused the delay, and for the determination of the question involved in these applications I consider that both the applications are within time. The applications for leave to appeal in this case do not ask for a certificate under section 109 clause (c), of the Civil Procedure Code. Leave can be granted under Section 109 clause (c), in very special cases. It was held in Banarsi Parshad v. Kashi Krishna Naraina that it is clearly intended to meet special cases such as for example those in which the point in dispute is not measurable by money though it may be of great public or private importance. I may also refer to the case of Hirjibhai v. Jamshedji. I do not think that this is a case which can be considered to be of great public or private importance. The case does not admittedly fall under the 1st clause of section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is urged that it falls under the 2nd clause of section 110 on the ground that the decree involves indirectly some claim to or respecting property of Rs. 10,000 or more. The earlier decisions of this Court in De Silva v. De Silva and Manilal v. Banubai are opposed to that contention. In De Silva v. De Silva Sir Lawrence Jenkins observes (p. 406):—

“If we were to give effect to the contentions urged before us it would follow that if the sole subject-matter in dispute were an easement of trifling value, but affecting property worth Rs. 10,000 or upwards then a right to appeal to His Majesty in Council under the Civil Procedure Code would exist. It appears to me that this would be giving to the words of the section an operation that could not have been intended, ….”

The same view was taken by Macleod, C.J, in Manilal v. Bariubai. Reliance, however, is placed on the later decision of Macleod, C.J, in Appaya v. Lakhamgowda, where reference is made to leave given by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Manilal v. Banubai. The judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council has not been reported, and the copy of the judgment has not been produced before us. The decision, however, in Appaya v. Lakhamgowda is inconsistent with the later decision of this Court in Nariman Rustomji Mehta…Defendant v. Hasham Ismayal…Plaintiff ., which follows the previous decision in De Silva v. De Silva and cannot be reconciled with the decision of the Privy Council in Mirza Abid Husain Khan v. Ahmad Husain explaining the case of Radhakrishna Ayyar v. Sundaraswamier. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code applied to the value of the annuity which was sought to be recovered and not to the value of the property upon which the annuity was charged. The view of this Court in De Silva v. De Silva is followed by the Patna High Court in Gosain Bhaunath Gir v. Bihari Lal. Where the detriment to the party seeking relief is less than the prescribed value of Rs. 10,000, the value of the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to His Majesty in Council is neither of the prescribed value, nor does the decree itself involve any claim or question to or respecting property of that value. The same view was taken by the Madras High Court in Appala Raja v. Rangappa Naicker, where it was held than in a suit framed as one for a declaration and injunction in respect of the right to take water from a pond and channel for the irrigation of lands, the real value of such a right could properly be ascertained only on the basis of the detriment or injury which the plaintiff would suffer if that right were negatived. It was held by Sadasiva Aiyar, J. that the word “property” in the second paragraph which is an alternative to the first paragraph means rights to property inferior to full ownership where such inferior rights alone are the subject-matter in dispute, and the second paragraph extended the privilege given by the first paragraph only to cases where a claim regarding rights of Rs. 10,000 or upwards in value is involved indirectly though not directly. Spencer, J. was of opinion that the claim must be one to or respecting property of Rs. 10,000 in value, and not a claim merely affecting property of such value. In case a right of way or other easement is claimed by the owner of two adjacent houses one of the value of Rs. 10,000 and another of the value of Rs. 5,000 in two different suits over the land of a third person and is negatived by the decrees in the two suits, leave to appeal to the Privy Council will have to be granted in the one case and refused in the other if the contention of the applicant is accepted. I think, therefore, that the case does not fall under the 2nd clause of section 110.

If the contention on behalf of the appellant had been accepted, it would have been necessary to send down an issue to the lower Court under Order XLV, rule 5, but in the present case the affidavit filed on behalf of the applicant shows that the value of the building is Rs. 10,892, to which is added the value of the front portion of the land and the rear portion of the land to the extent of Rs. 2,075 and Rs. 1,866. Assuming, however, that the value of the building was Rs. 10,892, it is difficult to accept the value of the depreciation at Rs. 345 only. If proper deduction on account of depreciation is made from the value of the building as given in the estimate of the engineer on behalf of the applicant, the value of the building might come to less than Rs. 10,000. On the other hand the value of the property according to the affidavit of the engineer on behalf of the opponent is Rs. 5,994 only. Even if the extended construction sought to be put upon the 2nd clause of section 110 be accepted, I doubt whether the value of the property would be Rs. 10,000 or more. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether there is any substantial question of law involved in this case. I would therefore discharge the rules in both the applications with costs.

Rule discharged.

J.G.R

Lallubhai Pragji v. Bhimbhai Dajibhai

Opinion Summary — Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Privy Council

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Respondent's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Implications

Lallubhai Pragji v. Bhimbhai Dajibhai

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