Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from an appeal by the original opponent against an order of the learned Judge, Labour Court and Ex‑officio Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Rajkot (W.C. (F) Application No. 9 of 1972). The labour court had allowed the workmen's compensation application of the applicants who are the heirs of the deceased, an Assistant Traffic Inspector attached to the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, and awarded a sum of "rs. 10 0" as compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The deceased suffered a heart attack while on duty on 26th May (the opinion text contains references to both 1970 and 1972 in different paragraphs) and subsequently died (the opinion records his death as occurring on 6th June 1972 according to a death certificate referenced in the text). The original opponent appealed, contending there was no material to establish a causal connection between the death and the deceased's employment.

The opinion records interlocutory events and differing notations about the appeal's status at stages of the judgment: paragraph (6) of the opinion contains the line "Appeal allowed. (heard again on January 25 1980)", whereas the concluding paragraph records "Appeal dismissed." Both statements appear in the text supplied; the text that follows contains the court's analysis and reasons for the final disposition recorded at the end of the document.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the death of the deceased arose out of and in the course of his employment, i.e., whether there was a causal connection between the heart attack/death and the duties performed by the deceased as an Assistant Traffic Inspector.
  2. Whether the evidence on record (medical evidence, history of prior heart disease, nature of duties performed and surrounding circumstances) was sufficient to justify an award of compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. V. V. Patel)

  • Contended there was no material on record to justify a conclusion that there was a causal connection between the death of the deceased and his duties or that the accident happened out of the specific employment with the opponent corporation.
  • Referred to several authorities in support of the proposition that injury must both "arise out of" and "in the course of" employment to attract liability under Section 3 of the Act (cases cited by him are listed in the precedents table below).

Respondent's Arguments (Mr. H. B. Shah for Respondent No. 1)

  • Relied on prior decisions (specifically Jivaben v. Saraspur Co-operative Supply Society Ltd. and Bai Diva Kaluji v. Silver Cotton Mills Ltd.) and argued that the facts of those cases were similar and the ratios should apply to the present case.
  • Argued by analogy with the Bombay decision (Bai Diva Kaluji) that sudden collapse and subsequent death shortly after working on a hot day supported an inference that work caused or accelerated the fatal event.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kamlabai v. Divisional Superintendent, Central Railway, Nagpur (1971) 1 L.L.J. 603 Cited in support of the general legal principles regarding causation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The opinion lists this case among authorities referred to by the appellant; the court treated it as part of the body of authority on causation but does not record a distinct fact‑specific application beyond that context.
Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. v. Ibrahim Mahomed Issak (1970) 1 L.L.J. 16 Explication of the meaning of "arising out of and in the course of employment": injury must arise both out of and in the course of employment; requires a causal relationship between accident and employment and that the work brings the worker within a "zone of special danger". The court quoted this passage and applied the test it sets out (necessity of causal connection and the "zone of special danger") in analysing whether the heart attack arose from duties performed by the deceased; concluded the test was not satisfied on the facts of the case.
Bai Shakri v. New Manekchowk Mills Co. Ltd. (1 L.L.J. 585) Summarised principles: (1) causal connection required; (2) onus on applicant to show work/strain contributed to injury; (3) not necessary that death occurred while actually working; (4) balanced evidence can be decided on probabilities. The court set out these principles from the case and applied them as a framework to assess the evidence; determined that the claimant did not discharge the onus in this case.
Messrs. Ramlal Jawahirlal v. Smt. Leela Bai & Others (1972) 2 L.L.J. 598 Cited among authorities addressing the scope of Section 3 and the causal nexus requirement. Used as part of the corpus of case law cited by the appellant. The opinion does not record a distinct, separate factual application beyond referencing it as an authority on the causation test.
Jivaben v. Saraspur Co-op. Supply Society Ltd. & Another, 15 G.L.R. 451 Relied upon by the respondent in support of the claim that the facts were similar and the ratio should apply. The court records that the respondent relied on this case but does not elaborate any detailed application; it formed part of respondent's attempt to show analogy with authorities finding liability.
Bai Diva Kaluji v. Silver Cotton Mills Ltd. 1986 (1) L.L.J. 740 Applied in that case to hold that a sudden collapse and death shortly after working (manual, strenuous work on a hot day) permitted the inference that work accelerated death; expert evidence in that case supported the finding. The present court distinguished Bai Diva Kaluji on its facts: that case had expert opinion (Dr. Vaidya) and signs (e.g., unconsciousness) and involved manual, strenuous work for eight hours on a hot day. The court held that those features were not present here and thus the ratio did not govern the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the matter by applying the statutory test under Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act — that an injury must both "arise out of" and "in the course of" employment — and the principles set out in the authorities quoted in the opinion.

Key steps in the court's reasoning as recorded in the opinion:

  1. The court stated the elements required under Section 3: the deceased must be a workman within the Act, the personal injury must have been caused by an accident, and the accident must have arisen out of and in the course of employment.
  2. The court quoted the authoritative formulation from the Mackinnon decision explaining that "in the course of employment" means during the work the employee is employed to do and "arising out of employment" requires a causal link — the work must have exposed the worker to a special risk which led to injury.
  3. The court applied principles crystallised in Bai Shakri (causal connection, onus on applicant, possibility of death not occurring while actually working, and deciding on probabilities) as the analytical framework.
  4. On the facts, the court observed there was no history of previous heart disease or prior attacks; the evidence suggested the deceased suffered an acute coronary thrombosis and a heart attack for the first time and later died despite treatment.
  5. Medical evidence: Dr. Mankad (who treated the deceased) recorded the cause as acute coronary thrombosis and stated that possible causes include age, overweight, over‑exertion, or tension; but the treating doctors did not attribute the attack specifically to the deceased's duties and expressly said they could not say whether there was a causal connection between the heart attack and his duties as a bus checker.
  6. The court recited the deceased's duties (inspection of buses, checking tickets, noting routes/times and supervising bus traffic) and observed these were ordinary inspection/supervisory duties, not work of a manual, strenuous character that would ordinarily cause extreme strain; the court found no evidence that the duties involved over‑exertion, tension, or anxiety sufficient to constitute a causal factor.
  7. Because there was no prior heart disease shown and no expert medical opinion linking the attack to employment duties (contrast with the Bombay case Bai Diva Kaluji where an expert gave a hypothetical opinion and the deceased had collapsed suddenly and died soon after), the court found it difficult to conclude the attack "arose out of and in the course of" employment.
  8. The court therefore held the learned judge/commissioner had erred in finding that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment, and the court set out its view distinguishing the factual and evidentiary basis of the cited Bombay decision.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

The opinion concludes with the recorded disposition "Appeal dismissed." The court's reasoning rests on the absence of evidence establishing a causal connection between the duties performed by the deceased and the heart attack, the absence of prior heart disease on the record, and the absence of expert medical opinion attributing the attack to the employment duties.

The opinion explains no broader legal innovations; it distinguishes prior authority (notably the Bai Diva Kaluji decision) on the factual basis that that case involved expert opinion, signs such as immediate unconsciousness, and comparatively strenuous manual work. The opinion does not assert that it establishes any new precedent beyond the factual distinction it draws.

This summary is based exclusively on the text provided in the opinion and contains no information not present in that text.

    The Divisional Controller, Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Bai Jiviben Arjan And Another

    M.K.Shah:-

    (1) This is an appeal by the original opponent in a workmen compensation application before the learned judge labour court and exofficio commissioner for workmens compensation rajkot district rajkot being w. C. (f) application no. 9 of 1972 allowing the said application of the applicants who are the heirs of the deceased assistant traffic inspector attached to the gujarat state road transport corporation who got a heart attack while on duty on 26th may 1970 and who later succumbed to the same by awarding a sum of rs. 10 0 as compensation payable under the workmens compensation act (the act). .

    (2) Mr. V. V. Patel the learned advocate appearing for the appellant contends that in the instant case there is no material on record to justify a conclusion that there was a causal connection between the death on the deceased and his duties and that the accident happened out of the specifics employment with the opponent corporation. He has referred me to several authorities on the subject. They are kamlabai v. Divisional superintendent central railway nagpur (1971) 1 l. L. J. 603; mackinnon mackenzie and co. V. Ibrahim mahomed issak (1970) 1 l. L. J. 16; bai shakri v. New manekchowk mills company ltd. 1 l. L. J. 585 (ii g. L. R. 23) and messrs. Ramlal jawahirlal v. Smt. Leela bai and others (1972) 2 l. L. J. 598. These decisions are based on consideration of the provisions contained in sec. 3 of the act the material part whereof so far it concerns the question under consideration in the instant case reads thus: -

    "3 (i) if personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this chapter"
    ; thus in order that an employer is held liable to pay compensation the claimant will have to establish that the deceased (in case of fatal accident) was a workman within the meaning of the act. It will also have to be established that the personal injury was caused to him by the accident. It will further have to be established that the accident arose out of and during the course of the employment of the workman and on all these facts being established the employer will be held liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions contained in chapter ii read with sec. 3 of the act. As observed by the supreme court in mackinnons ease (supra)

    "to come within the act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The words in the course of the employment mean in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it. The words arising out of employment are understood to mean that. During the course of the employment injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service which unless engaged in the duty owing to the master it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered. In other words there must be a casual relationship between the accident and the employment. The expression arising out of employment is again not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to employment as such to its nature its conditions its obligations and its incidents. But by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger the injury would be one which arises out of employment. To put it differently if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment the claim for compensation must succeed unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act"
    .

    This court also in bai shakris case (supra) set out the principles which emerge from decided cases in this connection and they are (1) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the work done in the course of employment. (2) the onus is upon the applicant to show that it was the work and the resulting strain which contributed to or aggravated the jury. (3) it is not necessary that the workman must be actually working at the time of his death or that death must occur while he is working or had just ceased work (4) where the evidence is balanced if the evidence shows a greater probability which satisfies a reasonable man that the work contributed to the causing of the personal injury it would be enough for the workman to succeed.

    (3) Now applying this test to the facts of the present case in my opinion it would be difficult to come to the conclusion that the injury was caused to the deceased resulting in his death out of the employment meaning thereby that there was causal connection between the death of the deceased and the work he was engaged in at the time when the accident happened. It is to be borne in mind in this connection that there is no history of any previous heart disease or any previous heart attacks and the question therefore of any acceleration of such disease pre existing by virtue of the strain and stress of the duties which the deceased had to perform during the course of his employment does not arise in the instant case. This is a case in which it appears that the deceased got a heart attack for the first time and succumbed to the same within a few days inspite of treatment and as the evidence of dr. Mankad who had worked as civil surgeon and assistant civil surgeon and in whose private hospital at the relevant time the deceased was admitted shows he died of heart attack and as his certificate ex. 26 shows he suffered from acute coronary thrombosis. In his opinion the attack may be due to age overweight body or over exertion or tension.

    (4) There are also facts on record showing that the duties of the deceased as assistant traffic inspector were to travel in the bus to be inspected and note its number the conductor and driver the route the time taken by the bus from reaching from one stage to another the number of passengers etc. He also had to check the tickets whether properly issued by the conductor or not and to see that buses operated according to schedule and rules. On the day of the accident it was a summer day being 26 may 1972 he started his duties by boarding the bus at midday at 12 noon. The bus carried about 48 passengers and though there is no positive evidence it may be presumed that he must have performed his duty of checking the tickets from the passengers etc. By moving from seat to seat in a running bus.

    (5) On these facts and in this background the question which arises is as to whether these duties were such as would cause strain and stress and which were responsible for the heart attack. In other words whether that was a contributory cause of the attack which be got while in the bus. Now in the instant case there is no previous history of any heart attack or heart disease and this was a sudden attack of coronary thrombosis. Can it be said that there was causal connection between this attack of coronary thrombosis and the duties which the deceased was performing as assistant traffic inspector ? the medical science has not advanced to that stage when it can precisely lay down the exact causes for a heart attack or heart disease. But it is presumed as dr. Mankad says that old age overweight body over exertion tension and anxiety are some of the causes which may lead to heart disease or heart attack. So far as the deceased is concerned it cannot be said that he was old in age he being 54 years old nor is there any material to warrant an inference that it was the old age which was one of the contributory causes. It is true he was fat but then also it cannot be said that this amounted to on overweight body which might be one of the causes contributing to a person getting heart disease. In any event old age and overweight body will have no connection with his employment. Over exertion tension and anxiety are three other possible causes. There is no evidence worth the name on record to show that his duties involved over exertion tension and anxiety. In this view of the matter it is difficult to agree with the learned commissioner in him finding that it was legitimate and reasonable to infer that strain and stress of the duties which the deceased was performing was one of the causes or was a contributory cause if not the sole cause of the injury viz. Attack of coronary thrombosis which the deceased got. The duties of the assistant traffic inspector as are stated hereinabove in my opinion are normal duties of an employee with the corporation entrusted with the work of inspection and checking of buses as also of tickets from passengers and supervising and controlling bus traffic. These cannot be termed as duties which are fraught with any danger or hazard having likelihood of a person being struck by a heart attack or a heart disease. Again on the day of the accident there is nothing on record to show that the duties which he performed in travelling in the bus at noon time and doing the usual work as an assistance traffic inspector involved any strenuous duties causing stress or leading to the deceased getting any such attack as a result of the strain and stress involved in performance of his duties. The learned judge was therefore obviously in error in the conclusion arrived at by him and in holding that the accident arose out of and in the course of the deceaseds employment with the opponent corporation. The appeal therefore succeed and the result will be the following order : -

    (6) Appeal allowed. (heard again on january 25 1980

    (7) I have now heard mr. H. B. Shah the learned advocate representing respondent no. 1 at length and he has not been able to persuade me to charge the view i have taken in the judgment which was dictated on 26/27th july 1979.

    (8) Mr. Shah relied on jivaben v. Saraspur co. Op. Supply society ltd and another 15 g. L. R. 451. The learned single judge who decided this matter placed strong reliance on bai diva kaluji v. Silver cotton mills ltd. 1986 (1) l. L. J. 740 and mr. Shah strongly relies on the said bombay decision. In the submission of mr. Shah the facts are similar in the bombay case as well as the case and hand at that therefore the ratio should apply to the facts of the present case. In the bombay case applicant husband kaluji was a weaver in the employ of respondent silver cotton mills limited and the evidence showed that he was working on the first shift on 6th june 1953 which started from 7 - 30 a. M. And he collapsed in the weaving department of the mills where he was working. He was removed to the hospital. Some stimulants were given to him. He became conception went home and on that very night at about 12 oclock he died and the court observed that it is the most natural inference to draw that when a man suddenly collapses and dies very soon after and the doctor is not in a position to suggest any reason for this sudden collapse and the death ensuing that he was suffering from heart trouble which cannot be discovered on a mere clinical examination and that the fact that in the instant case the deceased workman had worked for eight hours on a hot day must have caused the strain and accelerated his death with the result that it must be held to be due to accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

    (9) In my opinion bai divas case was decided on its own facts an expert dr. Vaidya was examined and on hypothetical questions he gave opinion that if a weaver works about eight hours in a textile mills in ahmedabad in the weaving department in the month of june and collapses unconscious and dies within about six hours it is likely that he must have died of heart failure. He also opined that unconsciousness is a sign of a heart disease and work is likely to accelerate death of a person suffering from heart disease. It would be thus seen that there was expert opinion in that case which guided the court in coming to the conclusion that the death must have been caused by a heart attack and that the deceased must have been suffering from heart disease before that. Again this was also a case in which the workman was employed in rather a manual strenuous work. He was employed in the mill and had worked for eight hours on a hot day and if such a person was suffering from court disease then a reasonable inference can be drawn that such work must have caused strain and accelerated his death.

    (10) Now let us look at the facts of the case at hand. In the instant case there is no doubt that the deceased died of heart failure because the doctors certificate ex. 31 in terms says that he expired of heart failure on 6th june 1972 but there is neither an opinion of the doctor who treated him nor any expert opinion on hypothetical questions to the effect that he was or must be suffering from heart disease before he got the heart attack on 26th may 1972 the expert in the bombay case came to the conclusion that he must be suffering from heart disease by placing reliance on the sign which indicated such disease viz. Unconsciousness. In the instant case there is no material on record to show that the deceased became unconscious. He got sudden heart attack on 26th may 1972 and he did not succumb to the injuries very soon as in the bombay case but succumbed to the injury much later viz on 5th june 1972 that is after lapse of about 11 days from the attack. Dr. Mankad examined at ex. 25 who had treated the deceased in terms stated that he cannot say whether there was causal connection for the heart attack and his duties as a checker of s. T. Bus. Neither dr. Mankad nor dr. Nathvani who was another doctor who had treated him says that the patient had in fact suffered from heart disease or there were any indications that in the past he was a heart patient. Dr. Mankad merely referred to as earlier stated the possible causes of heart attack and stated that the attack cannot be due to certain reasons specifically stated but may be due to age over weight body over exertion tension and anxiety which are some of the factors. But in the case of the deceased he could not show which was the reason for his attack. He also admitted that the heart attack can be possible even when a person rests in bed. Again mr. Trivedi drew my attention to ex. 51 which is a leave application which the deceased made to his employer just a day prior to his death in this application he gave the history about the circumstances under which he got the heart attack and the almost following the sale and he therefore asked for expost fact sanction for leave for the period from 27 - 6 - 1972 to 5 - 6 - 1972. In this letter also we do not find a word about any previous heart attack or disease from which the deceased was suffering previous to the attack which he got on 26th may 1972 in these circumstances it would not be possible to come to the conclusion that there was any causal connection between the attack which he got and the work in which he was engaged. Appeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    The Divisional Contr... v. Bai Jiviben Arjan An...
    (Jan 25, 1980)