Shantanu Kemkar, J.:-

This order shall govern disposal of Writ Petition No. 14078/2010, Writ Petition No. 14075/2010, Writ Petition No. 14096/2010, Writ Petition No. 14152/2010, Writ Petition No. 14077/2010 and Writ Petition No. 14094/2010.

2. The Writ Petition No. 14078/2010 is at the instance of Dr. Sajni Bajaj, who was allotted a plot in Sector-B, Scheme No. 71, Indore by the Indore Development Authority (for short, the IDA) and in whose favour a lease deed was executed by the IDA. Rest of the writ petitions are at the instance of owners/occupants of various shops, which were sold to them by the holder of power of attorney of the lessee of the said plot, after raising construction on it. This is the fourth round of writ petition for the lessee of the said plot and third round for the owners/occupants of the shops.

3. For the sake of convenience, the facts are taken from Writ Petition No. 14078/2010.

4. Briefly stated, the writ petitioner was allotted a piece of land ad­measuring approximately 3238.96 sq. meter on lease for 30 years by the IDA in aforesaid scheme framed by the IDA under section 50 of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (for short, the Adhiniyam). As per allotment order dated 23-6-1995 (Annexure P/3) and the lease deed dated 25-9-1996 (Annexure P/5) executed between the petitioner and the IDA, the allotment was for the use of it, for a Big Hospital with modern facilities. Apart from constructing a Hospital, a condition was imposed in the lease deed, requiring the lessee to provide in the building medical stores, PCO, Canteen and other necessary facilities for the patients and for the hospital in the building.

5. According to the IDA, the petitioner did not construct the hospital on the said piece of land and instead constructed large number of shops for commercial purposes and sold the same. Thus, as per the IDA, by changing the land use from 'Big Hospital' to 'Commercial', the petitioner had breached the condition of lease. In the circumstances, the IDA passed an order dated 5-4-2005 (Annexure P/14), cancelling the allotment order dated 23-6-1995 issued and the lease deed dated 25-9-1996 executed in favour of the petitioner with direction to the petitioner to handover the vacant possession of the land to the Executive Engineer of the IDA, with a further direction to the Executive Engineer to take necessary steps for taking possession of the land from the petitioner.

6. Aggrieved by the said order dated 5-4-2005 (Annexure P/14) passed by the IDA, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition No. 531/2005. The learned Single Judge held that since the IDA has passed the impugned order, without following the due procedure of law and in complete violation of the principles of natural justice, as neither the original lessee Dr. Sajni Bajaj nor other occupants were even heard in the matter before passing the impugned order of cancellation of lease, the action of the IDA is illegal. As a result, the learned Single Judge vide order dated 28-11-2007 allowed the writ petition and quashed the order dated 5-4-2005 passed by the IDA. However, the learned Single Judge granted liberty to the IDA to pass a fresh order, if so desired, by issuing a show cause notice, at the first instance, to lessee Dr. Sajni Bajaj and occupants, who are in actual possession of the constructed building, indicating the reasons, on which the lease in question is proposed to be terminated/cancelled. The IDA was also directed to provide an opportunity of hearing to the representatives of the lessee/occupants.

7. In compliance to the said order dated 28-11-2007 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 531/2005, the IDA issued a notice dated 29-5-2010 (Annexure P/16) to the petitioner and her power of attorney holder. Thereafter, the Chief Executive Officer of the IDA passed an order on 3-7-2010 (Annexure P/18), cancelling the allotment order dated 23-6-1995 and the lease deed dated 25-9-1996 executed in favour of the petitioner with direction to the petitioner and to the occupants of the shops to handover the vacant possession to the IDA. The said order dated 3-7-2010 (Annexure P/18) passed by the Chief Executive Officer of the IDA was challenged by the petitioner by filing Writ Petition No. 8792/2010. The learned Single Judge, noticed the fact that while disposing of the Writ Petition No. 531/2005 vide order dated 28-11-2007, the IDA was directed to pass fresh order, after granting an opportunity to the petitioner but ignoring the petitioner's prayer for giving breathing time, the order dated 3-7-2010 was passed. In the circumstances, the learned Single Judge vide order dated 23-7-2010 quashed the said order dated 3-7-2010. The learned Single Judge directed the petitioner to file reply positively within fifteen days before the IDA and the IDA was directed to pass a final order.

8. Thereafter, in terms of the order dated 23-7-2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 8792/2010, the petitioner submitted a reply to show cause notice issued by the IDA against the proposed cancellation of the allotment and the lease deed. The Chief Executive Officer of the IDA considered the said reply and vide order dated 3-9-2010 (Annexure P/21) cancelled the lease deed and directed the petitioner to handover vacant possession of the land to the IDA. Feeling aggrieved by the said order dated 3-9-2010 passed by the Chief Executive Officer of the IDA, the petitioner, once again, approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 11362/2010. According to the petitioner, the order dated 3-9-2010 was passed by the Chief Executive Officer of the IDA, who had no jurisdiction to pass the said order. It was the case of the petitioner that under the Adhiniyam and the Rules made thereunder, there is no provision for delegating powers of disposal of the land and building, and the said powers are vested only with the IDA. The learned Single Judge agreeing with the contention of the petitioner vide order dated 12-10-2010 allowed petitioner's Writ Petition No. 11362/2010. The learned Single Judge directed to the IDA to pass a fresh order considering the reply filed by the petitioner and reply filed by the persons, who have purchased the shops from the petitioner or those who are occupants. The learned Single Judge, while passing the order dated 12-10-2010, also ordered that till the IDA passes a fresh order, no commercial activities shall be carried out, in the premises, which consists of shops. However, this part of the order was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 17-8-2011 passed in WA No. 70/2011 and it was modified by substituting it with the condition that no structural alteration will be made by the appellants in the shops for carrying on normal commercial activity therein. Similar condition, which was incorporated by the learned Single Judge in the order dated 23-7-2010 passed in WP No. 8792/2010, was challenged in MCC No. 18/2011, which was disposed of by the Division Bench vide order dated 17-8-2011 by stating that the observations, regarding carrying out the other activities from the premises, in the order dated 23-7-2010 will not come in the way of interpreting or implementing any interim or final relief granted in any other proceedings to the applicants before us. The other writ petitions, which were filed by the occupants of the shops challenging the order dated 3-9-2010, were also decided in terms of the order dated 12-10-2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 11362/2010.

9. In compliance of the order dated 12-10-2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 11362/2010 and the order passed in other connected writ petitions, the IDA considered the matter and vide order dated 23-11-2010 (Annexure P/23) cancelled the allotment of the land made in favour of the petitioner. Consequently, the IDA directed the petitioner and the occupants of the shops to deliver it the vacant possession of the land and the shops. It has been held by the IDA that the land in question was allotted to the petitioner for construction of a Big Hospital and for medical stores, PCO, Canteen and for other necessary facilities for the patients and the hospital, but instead of making use of the land for the said purpose, the petitioner constructed 51 shops and sold it for commercial purposes. The IDA held that the use of the land has been changed to commercial purposes by constructing the shops and selling the same for running commercial activities. The IDA rejected the petitioner's plea that the construction of shops is only on the lower and the upper ground floor and the construction of the hospital, as was proposed in the map, was to be raised but in view of the various hurdles, the same could not be constructed. The IDA also rejected the petitioner's plea that the construction, raised is as per the map sanctioned by the Indore Municipal Corporation according to which, the hospital was to be constructed on the first and the second floor, and the petitioner shall be constructing the hospital on the said floors, and therefore, there was no violation of the terms of allotment and the lease deed.

10. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 23-11-2010 (Annexure P/23) passed by the IDA, by which the petitioner's lease has been cancelled and possession is ordered to be delivered, the petitioner/lessee has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

11. The case of all the writ petitioners is that the IDA has no authority or jurisdiction to interfere with the possession of the petitioners, without following the due process of law. According to the petitioners, the IDA cannot be the Judge of its own cause and possession from the lessee/owner and occupants of the shops cannot be taken without intervention of the Court as there is no provision under the Adhiniyam or the Rules made thereunder for taking over of the possession by the IDA directly, without there being any order from the competent Court of law. It is also the case of the petitioner that there is no violation of the terms of allotment and the lease deed, and the construction on the plot in question, has been raised as per the map sanctioned by the Indore Municipal Corporation. According to the petitioner, the sanctioned map and the raising of the construction according to it was well within the knowledge of the IDA, and therefore, it cannot be said that the construction is illegal and unauthorized. The petitioner has also stated that on the ground floor as also on the upper ground floor, apart from other shops, there are shops used for doctors clinic, STD/PCO and shops of daily need items like laundry, juice shop, barber shop and also for running of the canteen, which is a permissible use of the land. It is also the case of the petitioner that in case there was any violation of the terms of lease, the IDA was required to have issued notice for rectification of such violation and then if within the stipulated time the violation would not be rectified, then only the lease could have been terminated. It is also the case of the petitioner that at various places the IDA has allowed the change of use of land for other purposes, in the circumstances passing of the impugned order clearly shows mala fide action on the part of the authorities of the IDA. In support of the contention, that the IDA cannot take possession by adopting extra judicial method and the possession can be taken only by following due course of law, the petitioners have placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court passed in the case of State of U.P. and others vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997.

12. The respondent/IDA has filed reply, of which rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner.

13. In reply, the IDA has justified their action of cancellation of the allotment order and the lease deed. According to the IDA, instead of constructing a well equipped hospital building, the petitioner had constructed a shopping complex and thereby has violated the conditions of lease. The main purpose for which the plot was allotted to the petitioner on concessional rate was that because the plot was earmarked for its use for construction of a big and well equipped hospital. However, the petitioner constructed a large number of shops and sold the same for commercial use. According to the IDA, the business, which is being carried out by the shop keepers, cannot be said to be a facility for the patients/hospital. In reply to petitioner's contention that they would be raising construction for the hospital on the upper floors it is stated that this plea cannot be accepted firstly because the construction of large number of shops cannot be permitted and secondly because even after a lapse of such a long time, no hospital has been constructed as yet. It is the case of the IDA that the petitioner having grossly violated the terms and conditions of the lease deed by constructing a commercial complex, without there being any permission or sanction from the IDA, the action, which has been taken against the petitioners, is just and proper. It is also the case of the IDA that on being found that the petitioner has violated the conditions of the lease, the lease deed has rightly been cancelled and the possession has rightly been ordered to be taken from the petitioner and the owners/occupants of the shops. The IDA has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. and others vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh (supra). It is the case of the IDA that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, such disputed questions cannot be examined in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, according to the IDA, the petition challenging the impugned order, is liable to be dismissed as proper remedy for the petitioners is to challenge the action of the IDA by approaching the Civil Court.

14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and considered their contentions.

15. Learned counsel for both the parties have placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of UP and others vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh (supra). The petitioners are relying on the said judgment to contend that on cancellation of the lease deed, the possession cannot be taken by the IDA otherwise than by due process of law. The respondent/IDA is relying on the said judgment to contend that for challenging the impugned action of the IDA, writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not a remedy and the remedy lies with the Civil Court.

16. In order to appreciate the controversy, it would be appropriate to extract the relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and others vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh (supra) on which, as stated above, both the parties have placed strong reliance :

"10. The High Court was persuaded to the view that the proceedings initiated and the action taken by the Government and the Vice-Chairman of the LDA in the matter, respectively, of forfeiture of the lease and the cancellation of the permission to build were both infirm in law and required, to be quashed. Accordingly, writ petitions 6819 of 1985 and WP 367 of 1986 were allowed and the order dated 19-11-1985 of the Government purporting to cancel the lease was quashed. Likewise, WP 3463 of 1986 filed jointly by the Lessees was allowed and the show cause notice dated 9-1-1986 as well as the order dated 19-4-1986 of the Vice-Chairman cancelling the permission were quashed.

11. We may first take up the appeals of the State Government and of the LDA assailing the order of the High Court quashing the cancellation of the lease. Sri Yogeshwar Prasad for the appellants submitted that the High Court fell into an error in allowing a matter, which should properly have been the subject-matter of a civil-suit, to be agitated in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned counsel submitted that the relationship between the parties was one of the Lesser and Lessee; the dispute between them pertained to the question whether there were breaches and non-performance of the covenants and conditions of the lease justifying the forfeiture of the lease, and that these matters, pertained to a private law situation and were not appropriately matters for enforcement of public law remedies. Learned Counsel further submitted that the question whether there were breaches of covenants on the part of the lessee involved the construction of the terms of the lease-deed and required evidence on the matter. Disputes of this nature, learned counsel submitted, could not be resolved on mere affidavits. Thirdly, Sri Yogeshwar Prasad submitted that on the merits of the contentions, the High Court should have noticed that even on the facts admitted, there were clear violations of the covenants and conditions of the lease. Learned counsel also submitted that the view of the High Court that a reasonable opportunity of being heard had been denied to the respondents was erroneous and that, at all events, no hearing could be contemplated in the context for forfeiture of a lease of this nature. Sri Sorabjee for the respondents contended that the State, even as a lessor, could not act arbitrarily either in the grant or premature termination of the leases of public property and disputes arising in such contexts cannot always be reckoned as private law situations and that, at all events, the threatened exercise of extra-judicial re-entry by the State, being violative both of the limitations of the powers of the State as lessor under the law of landlord and tenant and of its actions as State, is a matter which requires to be mandated against.

12. The show-cause notice preceding the cancellation of the lease and the decision dated 19-11-1985 to cancel the lease, refer to and rely upon 10 grounds. Grounds 1 to 7 pertain to what the Government consider to be violations and breaches of the terms and conditions of the lease. They pertain to an alleged change of user, to subletting and sub­division of the leasehold property. The grounds also refer to the alleged non-disclosure of the terms and conditions of the Memorandum dated 7-7-1984 between the Lessees on the one hand and Messrs Amar Builders Private Limited on the other. The grounds for forfeiture also refer to the likelihood of fraud being practiced on the prospective purchasers of the fiats as to the nature and extent of the lessees' subsisting interest under the lease and the limitations thereon.

We do not propose to go into the merits of these grounds and their sufficiency in law to support the purported forfeiture as, in our view, this exercise, having regard to the disputed questions of fact that are required to be gone into in that behalf, are extraneous to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.

13. In regard to the merits of the grounds for forfeiture of the lease, the High Court after an elaborate discussion of the relevance and tenability of each of the grounds, the learned judge held :

"From the comments made by me on the above nine grounds it would be seen that some of the grounds are irrelevant or illusory or based on irrelevant material or on non-existent facts and some require serious consideration which has not been given. It has also been seen that while under the lease-deed the right of re-entry could be exercised only for a breach of the term of the lease in presenti, the lease has been cancelled for a breach in future. In this view of the matter the impugned order of the State Government cannot be sustained."

Shri Yogeshwar Prasad says that this exercise was extraneous to a proceeding under Article 226 as the question whether the construction with 39 flats would be one unit or multiplicity of units; whether if third party rights were created by the transfer, or use, of the flat, that would amount to sub-letting or assignment; or would, in any other way, violate the terms and conditions of the lease and the like, would not be matters that admit of being satisfactorily resolved on mere affidavits. Learned counsel submitted that even according to the learned judges there were serious questions to be examined.

14. On a consideration of the matter, we think, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the High Court should have abstained from the examination of the legality or correctness of the purported cancellation' of the lease which involved resolution of disputes on questions of fact as well. In Express News Papers vs. Union of India, [1985] Supp. 3 SCR 382 Venkataramiah, J. in a somewhat analogous situation observed :

"The rest of the questions relate truly to the civil rights of the parties flowing from the lease deed. Those questions cannot be effectively disposed of in this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The questions arising out of the lease, such as, whether there has been breach of the covenants under the lease, whether the lease can be forfeited, whether relief against forfeiture can be granted etc. are foreign to the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution. They cannot be decided just on affidavits. These are matters which should be tried in a regular civil proceeding. One should remember that the property belongs to the Union of India and the rights in it cannot be bartered away in accordance with the sweet will of an Officer or a Minister or a Lt. Governor but they should be dealt with in accordance with law. At the same time a person who has acquired rights in such property cannot also be deprived of them except in accordance with law. The stakes in this case are very high for both the parties and neither of them can take law into his own hands."

Accordingly, we hold that the question whether the purported forfeiture and cancellation of the lease were valid or not should not have been allowed to be agitated in proceedings under Article 226.

15. Sri Sorabjee submitted that great hardship and injustice would be occasioned to the respondents if the State Government, on the self-assumed and self-assessed validity of its own action of cancellation of the lease, attempts at and succeeds in, a resumption of possession extra-judicially by physical force. Sri Sorabjee referred to the notice dated 19-11-1985 in which the Government, according to Sri Sorabjee, had left no-one in doubt as to its intentions of resorting to an extra-judicial resumption of possession. Sri Sorabjee referred to paras 3.10 and 4 of the order dated 19-11-1985.

A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry' in the lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and Governmental authorities should have a 'legal pedigree'. In Bishandas vs. State of Punjab, [1962] 2 SCR 69 this Court said :

"We must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order."

"Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law."

Therefore, there is no question in the present case of the Government thinking of appropriating to itself an extra-judicial right of re-entry. Possession can be resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. It cannot resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Government is, accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than in due course of law.

16. In the result, the appeals of the State of Uttar Pradesh (SLPs 4761 and 4762 of 1987) and of the LDA (SLPs 13298 and 11498 of 1987) directed against the common Judgment dated 8-12-1985 in so far as it pertains to WP 6819 of 1985 and WP 357 of 1986 are allowed and the said two writ petitions are dismissed, leaving the question of the legality and validity of the purported cancellation of the lease and the defence of the lessees open to be urged in appropriate legal proceedings, whenever and wherever Government proceeds to initiate action in accordance with law for resumption of possession on the basis of the alleged cancellation or forfeiture of the lease. Any developmental work that may be made by the lessees or at their instance would, of course, be at their own risk and shall be subject to the result of such proceedings."

17. During the course of arguments, it has been stated by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners that though the writ petitions are against the order dated 23-11-2010 passed by the IDA whereby the lease has been cancelled but essentially their petitions are against the directions issued in the impugned order dated 23-11-2010 for taking possession of the plot from the lessee of the land and owners/occupants of the shops. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioners could not dispute that the controversy as to whether the order of cancellation of the allotment and the lease deed was proper or not and as to whether there were breaches of the conditions of the lease justifying the action on the part of the IDA are not the matters for enforcement of public law remedies. The question as to whether there were breaches of covenants on the part of the lessee and as to whether the raising of the construction was within the knowledge or was permitted by the IDA, are all disputed questions of fact, which require recording of evidence and cannot be gone into in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, on the basis of the observations made by the Supreme Court maintained that the respondent/IDA on the basis of their own impugned order regarding cancellation of the allotment of the plot and cancellation of the lease cannot be allowed to take possession by physical force. According to them, the IDA can take possession from the petitioners only in a manner known to and recognized by law. In the circumstances, they contended that to that extent these writ petitions are maintainable and the IDA deserves to be restrained from taking forcible possession.

18. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/IDA argued that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot examine the legality or correctness of the impugned order of cancellation of the allotment of plot and cancellation of lease, which involves resolution of the disputes on question of fact as well, in the circumstances, according to him, the petition is liable to be dismissed. He argued that on account of the clear violation of the terms of lease, the impugned order has rightly been passed and there is no illegality on the part of the IDA for directing the petitioners to handover the possession. According to him, as per Rule 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Vikasit, Bhoomiyo, Griho, Bhavano, Tatha Anya Sanrachanao Ka Vyayan Niyam, 1975 (for short, Rules of 1975), on cancellation of the lease, the IDA is empowered to take possession directly and it is not necessary for the IDA to seek orders of eviction from the competent Court of law.

19. Having considered the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, we find that both the parties are at one on the point that this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot examine the correctness and validity of the impugned order of cancellation of lease deed. We are also of the view that the questions, which are involved in the matter, relate truly of the civil right of the parties flowing from the lease deed. These questions cannot be effectively decided in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and others vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh (supra). The questions arising out of the lease; such as, whether there has been breach of covenant under the lease, whether there was a valid sanction for the construction, which has been raised by the petitioner, the stand of the petitioner that there was obstruction in raising the further construction and that the sanction of building map by the Indore Municipal Corporation was made known to the IDA and at no point of time, the IDA objected for raising of the said construction, are all questions, which cannot be decided in this writ petition. These are the questions, which require trial either in regular civil proceedings or in a proceeding for eviction, if initiated by the IDA under the Public Premises Eviction Act. In the circumstances, we refrain ourselves from deciding these disputed questions of fact in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

20. However, at the same time, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, on cancellation of lease, for taking possession, instead of taking recourse of law, the IDA cannot be permitted to take possession on the basis of their own order of cancellation of lease. The IDA has no right to take back the possession extra judicially by use of force from the lessee/occupants, even after cancellation of the lease deed. The possession of the lessee even after cancellation of the lease deed, is juridical possession and the dispossession forcibly cannot be permitted. Lessee/occupants cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. Even if, as in the present case, lessor is the IDA, an instrumentality of the State, it will not be placed at any higher or better position. In the circumstances, we repel the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the IDA that on cancellation of the lease, the petitioners can be dispossessed without adopting the procedure of law for taking the possession. This argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order (See Bishan Das and others vs. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1961 SC 1570).

21. In the circumstances, we are of the considered view, that there is no question for the IDA to resort to an extra judicial method of taking possession and in our considered view, the possession has to be taken by the IDA only, in accordance with law. We also find no force in the contention of the IDA that Rule 51 of Rules of 1975, empowers the IDA to take the possession directly without resorting the legal method. Rule 51 nowhere empowers the IDA to take forcible possession after cancellation of the lease.

22. Having regard to the aforesaid legal position, without recording any finding about the validity of the impugned order passed by the IDA, by which the petitioner's allotment and the lease deed have been cancelled, keeping the said question open to be adjudicated by the competent Court of law and giving liberty to the parties to take necessary steps/raise their respective pleas before the appropriate forum, we restrain the IDA from taking possession of the said land/shops from the lessee/occupants of it, otherwise than in due course of law.

23. With the aforesaid observations, liberty and direction, we dispose of all these writ petitions. Parties to bear their own costs.

Order accordingly.