This is an application by the plaintiff Deepchand Modi to revise the order of the trial Court holding that the plaint is insufficiently stamped.
2. One of the reliefs sought by the plaintiff is a declaration that the order of the Deputy Registrar Shri J. K. Verma, dated 12-8-1950, directing the plaintiff to pay Rs.1,271-8-0 to the said Association with Rs.50 as costs is null and void and is not binding on the plaintiff'.
3. The question is whether the suit containing the above prayer is one to set aside an award within the meaning of Article 17 (iv) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act and a fixed court-fee of Rs.20 only is payable. Learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that ad valorem court-fee on the amount found due by the Registrar is not payable. He cites the decision of Clarke, J. in Seth Kisanlal v. The Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., Scorn (1941 N L J 254 = 1 L R 1942 Nag. 636.).
4. The expression 'award' used in Article 17 of Schedule IF of the Court-fees Act is not denned in the Act. It is also not defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. There is also no definition in the Co-operative Societies Act. In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the meaning given to the expression 'award' is 'a sentence or decision after examination especially that of an arbitrator or umpire-the document embodying it'. The expression, however, has acquired a special meaning. It means the decision of an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire. In some statutes, orders of certain authorities are described as awards. For instance, the decision of the Collector under section 11 and the decision of a Judge on a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, are described as awards. Under the Co-operative Societies Act, the Registrar on receiving notice of any dispute referred to in rule 26 of the Rules made by the State Government under section 43 of the Act shall either decide the dispute himself or shall appoint an arbitrator or shall refer it to three arbitrators, of whom one shall) be nominated by the Registrar and act as chairman. The decision of the arbitrator or arbitrators is described as an award in rules 31 and 32. Where the
Registrar decides the disputes himself, his decision is not characterized as an award. It is said to be his 'order'. It will thus be clear that the Act has not used the same expression in respect of the decision of the arbitrator and the Registrar. It is only the decision of the arbitrators which is termed as an 'award'. The instant suit cannot, therefore, be described as a suit to set aside any award of the Registrar as there is no award by him.
5. In Seth Kisan lal v. The Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., Seoni (1) Clarke, J. has stated: -
"Therefore it would appear to me that any judicial decision which is not a decree might be considered to be an award for the purposes of
Article 17 (iv) of the Court-fees Act."
We respectfully agree with the observation of the Division Bench in Ratansingh v. Raghurajsingh (1945 N L J 431=1 L R 1945 Nag. 975) at page 993 that the aforesaid statement is rather widely stated as it would include an 'order' of a Court as denned in section 2 (14) of the Civil Procedure Code. Where an award is enforceable as a decree, we do not think that Article 17 (iv) applies. Article 17 is primarily intended to apply to suits where it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute, and for which no provision exists in the Act. Here the liability was imposed on the plaintiff by the order of the Registrar. A suit of this kind is governed by clause (4) (c) of section 7 of the Court-fees Act. In essence, it is. similar to the suit in Baldecprasad v. R. S. Seth Ghasiram (16 N L R 84=A I R 1920 Nag. 243) where it was held: -
"A prayer to' set aside a decree is a prayer for a consequential relief. In a suit where such a prayer is made, court-fee must be computed under
clause (4) (c), section 7, of the Court-fees Act."
Here the plaintiff is asking for a declaration that the order of the Registrar is; not binding on him. It is tantamount to a declaration to; consequential relict.
6. The suit cannot be regarded as a suit to set aside an award. Rule 32 prohibits a suit to set aside an award of, the arbitrators. The remedy of a person aggrieved by the award is to file an appeal within one month. If no appeal is filed, the award is in all respects to be final and conclusive.
7. A suit questioning the validity of an award is prohibited by sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. Section 32 is as follows:
"Notwithstanding any law for the time being in force, no suit shall lie and any ground whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award, nor shall any arbitration agreement or inward be set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in this Act."
Section 46 lays down that with certain exceptions the provisions of the arbitration act shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment. Section 47 says -
"Subject to the provisions of section 46, and save in so far as is otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings there under,
Provided that an arbitration award otherwise obtained may with the consent of all the parties interested be taken into consideration as a compromise or adjustment of a suit by any Court before which the suit is pending."
In Nathulal v. Behankd (I L R 1951 Nag. 883, 888) it was observed:
"Sections 32 and 33 provide that an arbitration agreement or award can only be contested by an application and not by a suit."
8. The result is that the revision fail's and is dismissed with costs.
Application dismissed.