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  • provisions of the English Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 15, rule 6 (2)
  • provisions of Order I, rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 8 MADHYA PRADESH PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT 1951
  • rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • sub-section (1) of section 7,
  • rule 10 (2) of Order
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • provisions of the English Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 15, rule 6 (2)
  • provisions of Order I, rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 8 MADHYA PRADESH PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT 1951
  • rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • sub-section (1) of section 7,
  • rule 10 (2) of Order
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Durga Prasad, instituted a civil suit in the Court of the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, under section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, seeking a declaration that entry No. 305 in the Register of Public Trusts was void and that the house in dispute did not belong to any public trust. The suit named the Registrar of Public Trusts, Jabalpur and the State of Madhya Pradesh as defendants.

An applicant, Baijnath, sought to be added as a party defendant by filing an application under rule 10 of Order I of the Code of Civil Procedure. He contended he was a necessary or, at least, a proper party on several grounds including that the Registrar had given a finding under section 6 of the Act following an inquiry initiated by him, that his presence was necessary for adducing evidence, that he had an interest in the trust and had moved for registration of the trust, and that his presence was necessary for decision of the matters in controversy.

The plaintiff opposed the application. The trial Court dismissed the application, recording (inter alia) that the applicant's presence was not necessary to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate the issues; that the need for evidence did not render a person a necessary or proper party; and that the applicant had not shown how he was interested in the trust beyond stating he was interested.

The applicant sought revision of the trial Court's order under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, contending that the Additional District Judge erred in dismissing the application and that he should be ordered to be joined. The revisional court (the Court giving this opinion) concluded there was no merit in the contention and dismissed the application with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the applicant, who sought joinder under rule 10 of Order I CPC, was a necessary or proper party and therefore ought to be added as a defendant to a suit under section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951.
  2. Whether the plaintiff can be compelled to litigate against a person (the applicant) whom the plaintiff did not choose to implead and against whom the plaintiff claims no relief.
  3. Whether the revisional court should exercise powers under section 115 CPC to direct joinder of the applicant.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The Registrar had given his finding under section 6 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act on an inquiry initiated at the instance of the applicant.
  • The applicant's presence would be necessary for adducing evidence against the plaintiff's contentions.
  • The applicant was a person interested in the trust and had moved an application to the Registrar for registration of the trust.
  • The applicant's presence would be necessary for decision of the matters in controversy in the suit.
  • The applicant's counsel contended that the learned Additional District Judge erred in dismissing the joinder application and that joinder should be ordered by exercise of revisional powers under section 115 CPC.

Plaintiff's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the plaintiff's legal arguments; it records only that the plaintiff opposed the application to join the applicant as a defendant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Norris v. Beazley (1877) 2 C P D Expressed the view that the defendant to be added must be a defendant against whom the plaintiff has some cause of complaint; the rule was interpreted narrowly to exclude persons against whom the plaintiff has no claim. The opinion notes this earlier, rigid view and records that it was subsequently modified. The case is cited to show the historical approach to joinder and to support the proposition that joinder should not be ordered where the person to be added is one against whom the plaintiff has no claim.
Moser v. Marsden (1892) 1 Ch. 487 Held that a person only indirectly or commercially affected by the decision (and not directly interested in the issues) cannot be added as a defendant; the question in the action (the only question) must be one which justifies adding that person. Cited as authority for the principle that indirect or commercial effect upon a third party is insufficient to make that person a proper party; the Court relied on this reasoning in refusing joinder, as the applicant was only incidentally affected.
Amon v. Raphael Tuck and Sons, Ltd. (1956) 1 All E. R. 273 Clarified that being a source of relevant evidence or having a commercial interest or fears about adequate defense does not make someone a necessary party; a person is to be joined only if the decision will affect his legal rights (i.e., curtail his legal rights). Applied to conclude the applicant had not shown a direct and legal interest that would be affected by the suit's adjudication; mere indirect or incidental effect or a concern about adequacy of defense by existing parties is inadequate to justify joinder.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the statutory framework. Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 permits a working trustee or a person having interest in a public trust (or in property found to be trust property) aggrieved by a Registrar's finding under section 6 to institute a suit within six months; the Civil Court must give notice to the State Government through the Registrar and the State Government may be made a party if it so desires. The Act does not mandate that a person who initiated an inquiry under section 5 or every person interested in trust property must be joined as a defendant in such a suit.

The Court then examined the relevant procedural rule, Order I Rule 10(2) CPC, distinguishing between two categories of joinder:

  • Necessary parties: those who "ought to have been joined" — their joinder is obligatory because in their absence no effective decree could be passed.
  • Proper parties: those "whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit."

Application of these distinctions to the facts led the Court to conclude:

  • The applicant was not a necessary party: the Act did not require his joinder and he did not contend that no effective decree could be passed without him.
  • The applicant's claim to be a proper party depended on showing that his legal rights would be affected by the adjudication such that, unless he were a party, the Court could not effectually and completely adjudicate the questions in the suit.
  • The Court reviewed English authorities interpreting equivalent provisions (including Norris v. Beazley, Moser v. Marsden and Amon v. Raphael Tuck) and adopted the established principle that mere possession of relevant evidence, indirect or commercial interest, or concern that existing parties may not defend adequately does not make a person a proper party. The decisive criterion is whether the decision in the suit will directly and legally affect that person's rights.
  • On the facts, the applicant had not demonstrated how he was directly and legally affected by the suit's adjudication; his interest, as presented, appeared indirect or incidental. The fact that his presence might be useful for adducing evidence did not convert him into a necessary or proper party. The concern that the State might not defend adequately in his absence was also insufficient.

Consequently, the Court found that the trial Court's refusal to order joinder was within its discretion and that there was no ground for interference under section 115 CPC. The application for joinder was therefore dismissed.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION DISMISSED. The application by Baijnath to be added as a defendant was dismissed, and the dismissal was made with costs.

Implications:

  • The immediate effect is that the applicant was not added as a party; the suit proceeds between the parties the plaintiff chose (the Registrar and the State Government).
  • The Court affirmed the established test for joinder under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC: joinder as a proper party requires a showing that the adjudication will directly and legally affect the proposed party's rights (not merely an indirect, commercial or evidentiary interest).
  • The opinion records no new legal principle beyond the application of existing authorities to the facts; therefore no new precedent or change in the law is announced beyond confirming the described application of the existing tests for necessary and proper parties.

    Baijnath v. State Of M.P. & Others

    The plaintiff Durga Prasad filed a civil suit in the Court of the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, under section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 for a declaration that the entry No. 305 in the Register of Public Trusts was void and that the house in suit did not belong to any public trust. The suit has been filed against the Registrar of Public Trusts, Jabalpur and the State of Madhya Pradesh as defendants. In this suit, the applicant Baijnath made an application under rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for being added as a party defendant to the suit on the ground that he was a necessary or, at least, a proper party because -

    (i) the Registrar had given his finding under section 6 of the Act on an inquiry initiated at his instance,

    (ii) his presence would be necessary for adducing evidence against the contentions of the plaintiff,

    (iii) he was a person interested in the trust and had moved an appli­cation to the Registrar for the registration of the trust, and

    (iv) his presence would be necessary for a decision of the matters in controversy in the suit.

    2. The application was opposed by the plaintiff, and the trial Court dis­missed the application holding, inter alia,-

    (a) that the presence of the applicant was not necessary to enable it to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit;

    (b) that the fact that the presence of the applicant was necessary for adducing evidence did not make him either a necessary or a proper party; and

    (c) that the applicant, beyond stating that he was interested in the trust, had not stated how he was interested in it.

    3. The learned counsel for the applicant contends that the learned Addi­tional District Judge has erred in the exercise of his jurisdiction in dismissing the application of the applicant for a joinder and that he should be ordered to be joined in exercise of my revisional powers under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    4. In my opinion, there is no merit in this contention, which must accordingly fail.

    5. The suit of the plaintiff is under section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, which reads as follows:

    "(1) Any working trustee or person having interest in a public trust or any property found to be trust property, aggrieved by any finding of the Registrar under section 6 may, within six months from the date of the notice under sub-section (1) of section 7, institute a suit in a Civil Court to have such finding set aside or modified.

    (2) In every such suit, the Civil Court shall give notice to the State Government through the Registrar and the State Government, if it so desires, shall be made a party to the suit."

    The plaintiff has joined both the Registrar and the State Government as party defendants to the suit; and though the State Government had an option to be made a party or not, it has, it appears, impliedly exercised its option in favour of its joinder. The Act does not in terms say that a person, who had initiated the inquiry under section 5 of the Act, should be made a party, nor does it say that every person interested in the trust property should be made a party defendant to the suit.

    6. It is settled law that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and that generally it is for him to choose against whom he shall fight, and that he cannot be com­pelled to fight against some person not of his choice unless such a process is required by any positive rule of law.

    7. The plaintiff in the instant case does not claim any relief against the applicant nor does he choose to implead him as a party defendant to the suit. The provisions of the Act also do not enjoin his joinder as a matter of positive law.

    8. The question, therefore, that arises for consideration in this appli­cation for revision is whether the plaintiff in this case should be compelled to litigate not only against the defendants of his choice against whom he has pray­ed for reliefs but also the applicant against whom he claims no relief and whose joinder he strongly opposes.

    9. The rule in the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals with the joinder of parties, is rule 10 (2) of Order I and reads as follows:

    "The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on Such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added."

    It enjoins the joinder of two classes of persons:

    (1) Persons who ought to have been joined. Such persons are known as necessary parties, because their presence is obligatory as, in their absence, no effective decree can at all be passed.

    (2) Persons whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. Such persons are known as proper parties,

    10. The applicant is admittedly not a necessary party. The Act does not in terms enjoin his joinder and it is not the applicant's case that, in his absence, no effective decree could be passed. Besides, if the applicant were a necessary party, he has nothing to worry because, in his absence, the suit was bound to be dismissed as not properly constituted.

    11. The applicant, therefore, presses his claim for joinder on the grounds that he is a proper party within the meaning of the aforesaid rule.

    12. The trial Court has held that it did not consider it necessary to join the applicant as a party defendant in order to enable it to effectually and com­pletely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit and that the fact that the presence of the applicant was necessary for adducing evid­ence was not enough. It has further held that it had not been shown how the applicant was interested in the trust.

    13. The provisions of the English Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 15, rule 6 (2) are similar to the provisions of Order I, rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and read as follows:

    "At any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter the Court may on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application-

    (a) order any person who has been improperly or unnecessarily made a party or who has for any reason ceased to be a proper or necessary party, to cease to be a party;

    (b) order any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon be added as a party; but no person shall be added as a plaintiff without his consent signified in writing or in such other manner as may be authorised."

    14. In regard to the aforesaid rule, as it then stood, Coleridge C.J., in Norris v. Beazley (1877) 2 C P D at p. 83, said:

    "It seems to me to be correctly argued that those words plainly imply that the defendant to be added must be a defendant against whom the plaintiff has some cause of complaint, which ought to be determined in the action, and that it was never intended to apply where the person to be added as defendant is a person against whom the plaintiff has no claim, and does not desire to prosecute any."

    Later, this rigid view was modified and now the rule is interpreted to mean that the Court has a discretion to add a person as a party defendant to a suit if by the decision in the suit, as it stands, his legal rights are to be affected.

    15. In Moser v. Marsden (1892) 1 Ch. 487, the plaintiff, a patentee of a machine, brought an action against the defendant for using a machine which he alleged was an infringement of his patent. One Montforts, the maker and the patentee of the defendant's machine, applied to be added as defendant, alleging that the judg­ment in the action would injure him and that the present defendant would not efficiently defend the action. The Court of Appeal consisting of Lord Justice Lindley and Lord Justice Kay, reversing the decisions of the Court Below, held that Montforts not being directly interested in the issues between the plaintiff and the defendant but only indirectly and commercially affected, the Court had no jurisdiction to add him as a defendant. Lord Justice Lindley at pages 489 and 490 observed as follows:

    "But reliance is placed en the following words of the rule, which provide for adding the names of parties 'whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the cause or matter'. Bat what is the question involved in the action? The question, and the only question, is whether what Marsden is doing is an infringement of the plaintiff's patent."

    And again later on, that eminent Judge said:

    "Can it be said that the rule prevents the plaintiff from proceeding against a defendant without having to litigate with everybody who may be in any way affected, however indirect­ly, by the action? It appears to me that it does not. The counsel for the applicant grounded his argument on the allegation that Montforts' interest would be affected by the decision in this action. It is true that his interest may be affected commercially by a judgment against the defendant, but can it be said that it would be legally affected? Can we stretch the rule so far as to say that whenever a person would be incidentally affected by a judgment he may be added as a defendant?"

    And Lord Justice Kay at pages 491 and 492 observed as follows:

    "No doubt the judgment in the present case may indirectly affect Montforts' patent; but the answer to that if, that whether it would affect it or not, this rule does not apply to such a cues. Montforts say that the defendant will not contest the case properly, and will not con­duct the defence so energetically as he would. But we cannot help that."

    16. The question was again considered in Amon v. Raphael Tuck and Sons, Ltd. (1956) 1 All E. R- 273, where Devlin J., on a review of authorities including the one quoted above, said:

    "The person to be joined must be someone whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party? It is not, of course, merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance and is afraid that the existing parties may not advance them adequately. That would mean that on the construction of a cause in a common form contract many parties would claim to be heard, and, if there were power to admit any, there is no principle of discretion by which some would be admitted and others refused. The Court might often think it convenient or desirable that some of such persons should le heard so that the Court could be sure that it had found the complete answer, but no one would suggest that it is necessary to hear them for that purpose. The only reason which makes it make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action, and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party.

    On the wider construction of the rule, I do not understand where the line is to be drawn between a commercial interest in the question involved in the case and a legal one. It is con­ceded that the line must be drawn somewhere. It is not enough that the intervener should be commercially or indirectly interested in the answer to the question; he must be directly or legally interested in the answer. A person is legally interested in the answer only if he can say that it may lead to a result that will affect him legally-that is by curtailing his legal rights."

    17. In the instant case it has not been shown how the applicant was directly and legally affected by the adjudication of the suit, and the fact that he was indirectly or incidentally affected was not enough, nor the fact that in his absence the case would not be adequately defended by the State. The prayer of the applicant was thus rightly refused.

    18. The application fails and is dismissed with costs.

    Application dismissed.

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    Comments

    Baijnath v. State Of M.P. & Others
    (Jan 17, 1969)