1 Petitioner Shri Mirza Rashid Beg executed four sale-deeds of certain land and a house on part of that land in favour of respondent inaytulla Khan. These sale-deeds are dated 25-4-1957, 15-8-1957 and the two are dated 3-9-1958. By one of these sale-deeds dated 3-9-1958 is sold a house along with the land. The petitioner has filed a suit on 17-1 1-1975 against the respondent inaytulla Khan claiming title over the lands covered by the sale-deeds alleging that the documents executed as sales in fact did not transfer property to respondent Inaytulla Khan. He claimed to be in possession of a part of the land and, therefore, claimed possession of the remaining land in suit. He also claims injunction in that suit restraining the respondent to interfere with his possession. During the pendency of that suit, an application was also made for grant of temporary injunction in respect of the part of the land said to be in possession of the petitioner. Civil Revision No.1546 of 1982 pending decision in this Court, arises out of those proceedings taken for grant of temporary injunction.

2 Meanwhile the State Legislature passed the Madhya Pradesh Samaj Ke kamjor Vergaon Ki Krishi Bhumi Dharkon Ki Udhar Dene Walone Ke Bhumi hadapane Sambandhi Kuchakorn Se Paritran Tatha Mukti Adhiniyam,1976 (Act No.3 of 1977) which came into force on 31-1-1977. The petitioner, therefore, availed of the remedy provided under that Act and filed an application before the Sub-Divisional Officer (respondent No.3) under Sec.5 of the Act. It was claimed that the petitioner belongs to the weaker section of the Society, the transactions evidence by the aforesaid four sale-deeds were governed by the Act, the transactions in fact evidence advance of certain loans to the petitioner by the respondent No.1, that the transactions were subsisting on the date the Act came into force, and, therefore, claimed to be discharged. The application was opposed and the Sub-Divisional Officer, vide order dated 1-6-1979 (Annexure P/1), declared sale-deeds void and confirmed the title and possession over the land. Pursuant to this order, on 1-7-1979 the petitioner was put in possession. The respondent No.1 appealed and the Additional Collector who heard the appeal, vide order dated 10-3-1980 (Annexure P/ 2), allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and remanded the case for fresh decision according to law. After remand, the Sub-Divisional Officer reconsidered the petitioner's application in the light of the remand order (Annexure P/2) and by order dated 18-6-1982 (Annexure P/3) rejected the petitioner's application. The petitioner then took up the appeal before the Collector who by order dated 14-3-1983 (Annexure P/5) dismissed the appeal. The petitioner is aggrieved by the orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Collector (Annexures P/3 and P/5)and prays for quashing of those orders. The consequent prayer is that the application filed before the Sub-Divisional Officer under section 5 of the Act be allowed.

3 Shri Ravish Agarwal, appearing for the respondent Inaytulla, raised a preliminary objection that the application filed by the petitioner under the Act is not tenable. The argument is that since on the date when the Act came into force, i. e. , 31-1-1977, a civil suit in respect of the same land and for the similar reliefs was pending before a civil Court, the authority under Act gets no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon that matter. Shri Pande, learned counsel for the petitioner, objected to raising of such an objection by the respondent on the ground that such a plea was never raised before the Sub-Divisional Officer and, therefore, could not be considered by the Collector in appeal and also should not be permitted to be raised in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It appears from the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer (Annexure p/1) that although the claim of the petitioner was denied, yet such precise objection was not taken then. However, the Additional Collector while passing the order (Annexure P/2) and remanding the case back to the Sub-Divisional officer, had taken note of Sec.11 of the Act and in his opinion, the Sub-Divisional Officer did not lose jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings in spite of the pending suit. When the matter again went to the Sub-Divisional Officer, he was of opinion that it was competent for him to entertain and decide the application. The present case is, therefore, not the one where the party claiming writ of certiorari under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution has not raised the question of jurisdiction before the Lower Tribunal whose order is sought to be quashed. The matter appears to have not only been urged before the lower tribunals but has been specifically decided in favour of the petitioner. For this reason the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in manrakhanlal V/s. S. N. Chaturvedi, 1961 M. P. L. J.761 is distinguishable for in that case the question of jurisdiction of the lower Tribunal to entertain the action was not raised by the party who was seeking a writ of certiorari in those proceedings to quash the order of the lower Tribunal Shri Pande also relied on a decision of the supreme Court in Avery India Ltd. V/s. Second Industrial Tribunal West bengal, AIR 1972 S. C.1626. There it has been ruled that the High Court cannot allow even a respondent to support the action of the lower Tribunal on a ground neither raised before that Tribunal nor in the counter affidavit to the petition. The following observations in that decision are pertinent :

"the 2nd respondent did not support the award in respect of his reinstatement in the counter-affidavit filed by him in the High Court in answer to the writ petition of the appellant on the ground that he was entitled to the benefit of the retirement age as fixed by the award, and for that reason, the direction for his reinstatement was in any event justified."

It was for this reason that the award was not permitted to be supported in respect of the reinstatement on the ground not raised in the counter-affidavit filed in answer to the petition. We noticed, in the instant case, that the respondent No.1 has specifically supported the orders of the two lower Tribunals also on the ground that in view of Sec.11, read with Sec.14, of the Act, the Sub-Divisional Officer has no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the petitioner. We are, therefore, of opinion that there is no substance in the petitioner's contention that the respondent No.1 is precluded by his conduct or otherwise to raise a plea of want of jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Officer to entertain the application.

4 Coming to the merits of the objection relating to want of jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Officer to entertain the petitioner's application, the relevant facts to be noted are that the Act was published on 31-1-1977 and the application before the Sub-Divisional Officer was filed on 5-6-1978. The petitioner had filed suit on 17-11-1975 and that suit was pending on 31-1-1977 and 5-8-1978. Sec.11 of the Act is as follows :

"11 Pending proceedings to be decided in accordance with this act.- Any proceedings pending in a court of law in relation to land which can be a subject matter of enquiry by the Sub-Divisional officer under this Act shall, on the publication of this Act in Gazette, be decided by the Court in accordance with the provisions of this Act, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force."

It is manifest that what section 11 says is that the pending proceedings in any court of law in relation to the land which can be the subject matter of enquiry before the Sub-Divisional Officer under the Act, shall not come to an end on the coming into force of the Act. Instead foreseeing that the proceedings including civil suit may be pending on the date when the Act is enforced in relation to rights in any land which can be the subject matter of enquiry by the Sub-Divisional officer, the legislature in its wisdom preserved the continuance of those proceedings. All that is said therein is that after coming into force of the Act, the matter in those proceedings including suit shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this would (be so notwithstanding any other law for the time being in force. This is the only limitation put upon the Courts, Tribunals and authorities entertaining proceedings in relation to the land which can be a subject matter of enquiry under the Act. Thus the continuance of the pending proceedings is assured. The legislature cannot be said to have permitted continuance of two parallel proceedings which could well result in conflicting decisions. The preservation of the pending proceedings necessarily envisages that no parallel proceedings could be taken under the Act by the competent authority, viz. , Sub-Divisional Officer. We find that the questions raised before the Sub-Divisional Officer are similar to those raised in the suit. The petitioner's claim is for title despite the sale-deeds ass according to him, they evidenced only loan transactions. That precisely and in substance is the claim before the Sub-Divisional Officer. The reliefs claimed are also similar. Confirmation of title and possession as also injunction is claimed in both the proceedings. We are of opinion that the Sub-Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the petitioner's application when a civil suit filed by the petitioner himself was pending in Civil Court when the Act came into force. Three learned Single judges of this Court, in Parag and 3 others V/s. Pachkod and others, Civil Revision No.1962 of 1980, decided on 12th January 1981. , ramdhar V/s. Balakram, Civil Revision No.44 of 1982, decided on 8th July 1983. , and Korra V/s. Shriram and another, Second Appeal No.814 of 1978, decided on 10th April 1985. , have taken such view and we hereby affirm the view so taken. For this reason alone two orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Collector (Annexures P/3 and P/5)must be quashed and the petitioner's application must be dismissed.

5 Even if we were to consider the merits of the petitioner's claim, we find no substance in it. The Sub-Divisional Officer as also the Collector in appeal have found that the petitioner on the date of application was not the holder of agricultural land in the weaker section of the people within the meaning of section 2 (c) of the Act and was, therefore, not entitled to avail of the remedy provided under the Act. The finding is that he still has 6.08 acres of land and that at the time of the transactions he had more than eight acres of unirrigated land. This finding is reached on evidence before that authority. In appeal, the learned collector has affirmed this finding. Learned counsel for the petitioner tried to assail the finding before us on the ground that the records of rights were not property prepared and the copies thereof filed before the S. D. O, were not authenticated. In these proceedings, it will not be open for us to examine the conclusions reached on facts after re-appreciation of evidence. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court does not act as an appellate authority and re-examine the findings of facts arrived at after due consideration of the evidence. Shri Pande, however, urged that after the first transaction transferring the considerable land, the petitioner, for the remaining transfers, must be deemed to be the 'holder of agricultural land'. Even if it were so, the petitioner's claim still has to be thrown out because the finding is that the transitions were not prohibited transactions of sale within the meaning of Sec.2 (f) of the Act, The finding is that respondent No.1 is not a moneylender and that there had been no condition to re-transfer the land on repayment of consideration. Learned counsel for the. petitioner referred to the statement made by respondent No.1 in some execution proceedings (P1. J. C.31 of 1959 ). The document is Annexure P/6. There, in the examination-in-chief the respondent No.1 stated that the house was mortgaged but not purchased. It thus appears that the statement was made in respect of a house and not any land. In cross-examination, respondent No.1 deposed that it was agreed orally that the petitioner has right to repurchase within a period of three years, This alleged admission does not seem to have been put to respondent No.1 when he appeared in the witness box before the Sub-Divisional Officer. At least, there is no such mention of any such statement either in the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer or the Collector. It thus appears that this statement was not relied upon before the lower Tribunals as an admission by the respondent who had a right to show it to be erroneous. In any case, it does not appear from this admission that it relates to the lands in question. The lower tribunals, therefore, have rightly concluded that the transactions were not prohibited transactions of loan. They have reached a right conclusion that they were outright sales without any condition of re-transfer or re-sale to the petitioner and, therefore, the claim made by the petitioner was not within the purview of the Act.

6 It was also argued that the Additional Collector who passed the order annexure P/5 had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal as under section 6 of the act, the appeal lies to the 'collector'. The argument is that the Collector does not include 'additional Collector'. This contention also is baseless and must be rejected. Code is defined under section 2 (b) of the Act to be the Madhya Pradesh land Revenue Code, 1959 (No.20 of 1959 ). Sec.2 (g) provides that the words and expressions used but not defined in the Act and defined in the Code or the transfer of Property Act, 1882 (No. IV of 1882) shall have the meaning respectively assigned to them in the Code or that Act, as the case may be. Since the word 'collector' has not been defined under the Act but has been used in section 8 of the Act as an appellate authority, its meaning has to be ascertained with reference to the provisions of the Code. 'collector' in a district is appointed under section 16 while Additional Collector is appointed under Sec.17 of the code which provides that the State Government shall appoint in each district a collector who shall exercise therein the powers and discharge the duties conferred and imposed on a Collector by or under the Code or any other enactment for the time being in force. Sub-section (1) of Sec.17 provides that the State Government may appoint one or more Additional Collectors in a district. Sub-section (2) then provides that an Additional Collector shall exercise such powers and discharge such duties conferred and imposed on a Collector by or under the Code or by or under any other enactment for the time being in force, in such cases or class of cases as the State Government may, by a general order notify or as the Collector of the district may subject to any general or special restrictions imposed by the State Government, by an order in writing direct. Thus powers under the Code vested in Collector have also been vested in the additional Collector who has jurisdiction to exercise powers and discharge duties conferred and imposed on a Collector. It may be remembered that twice the matter came up in appeal before the Additional Collector and at no stage did the petitioner allege that the Additional Collector was not competent to hear and decide the appeal nor did he raise a question that the Collector had not directed the Additional Collector to hear and decide the appeal under section 8 of the Act. That being so, the petitioner cannot now be heard to say that the Additional collector had no authority to hear and decide the appeal. Shri Pande, however, relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Budhoolal V/s. Registrar, Public Trusts, Jabalpyt, 1964 M. P. L. J.887, which in turn relied upon another decision of the bombay High Court in Shah Fariduddin V/s. Mohammed Akbar, 1957 N. L. J.551. The matter related to the exercise of powers by the Additional Collector as Registrar of public Trusts under the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951 (80 of 1951 ). The following observations in Shah Fariduddin's case (supra) may usefully be quoted :

"it is to be noted, however, that the Public Trusts Act confers powers and enjoins performance of the duties only upon the Registrar of public Trusts. It does not confer any power on the Deputy commissioner nor does it enjoin upon the Deputy Commissioner to perform any duty. Clearly, therefore, the provisions of section 9-a cannot be availed of in this connection. The Deputy Commissioner is a persona designata under Sec.3 (1) of the Public Trusts Act and consequently he alone can act as Registrar of Public Trusts."

The Division Bench then observed that under the Public Trusts Act the Collector is a persona designate and he alone could exercise powers of Registrar under that Act and the Additional Collector has no such power to act as such Registrar of Public Trusts. Since the Public Trusts Act did not enjoin on the Deputy Commissioner (now Collector) to perform any duty, it was held that the Collector alone was the person to act as a Registrar of Public Trusts. Since section of the Act No.3 of 1977 provides for an appeal to the Collector, as mentioned in Sec.16 of the Code, this case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application and is clearly distinguishable.

7 It was then urged that the Additional Collector did not decide the appeal in accordance with law. Reference was made to section 44 of the Code which, according to the learned counsel is the only provision according to which the Additional Collector ought to have decided the appeal. We, however, do not find any infirmity in the appellate order of the Additional Collector. The additional Collector has discussed the respective cases put forward by the parties and after referring to same evidence, has reached the conclusion that the petitioner was not the holder of agricultural land and that the transections are not prohibited transections of loan within the meaning of section 2 (c) and 2 (f)respectively of the Act. Since the order was one of affirmance, it was not necessary for the Additional Collector to have discussed the evidence in any greater detail. We find that the order of the Additional Collector cannot be assailed on the ground that it is not in conformity with the provisions of Sec.44 of the Code.

8 No other point was urged.

9 The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs.200/- if certified. Balance of security amount, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.