AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922
  • Nagpur Improvement Trust Act (Sections 58, 59 onwards)
  • Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Central Act 68 of 1984
  • Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Land Acquisition Act, Section 23(2), with a proviso and clause 3(a)
  • Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act (1984)
  • Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 127 of the MRTP Act
  • Schedule to the State Acts
  • Clause 10(3) of the Schedule to the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936
  • Section 6, Land Acquisition Act (amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967 (13 of 1967))
  • The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (2014)
  • Section 68 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936
  • Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Sections 58, 59 onwards of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Sections 9(1) and (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Land Acquisition Act (amended by insertion of proviso thereto by Act 68 of 1984)
  • Constitution of India, Article 14
  • Section 39 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936
  • Chapter VII of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act)
  • Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, Schedule to the Act, Clauses 10(2) and 10(3)
  • Section 3(c) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 45 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act
  • Section 39 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, Section 45 of the said Act, Clauses 10(2) and 10(3) of the Schedule to the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, Article 14 of the Constitution of India, Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Land Acquisition Act (amended by insertion of proviso thereto by Act 13 of 1967)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922
  • Nagpur Improvement Trust Act (Sections 58, 59 onwards)
  • Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Central Act 68 of 1984
  • Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Land Acquisition Act, Section 23(2), with a proviso and clause 3(a)
  • Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act (1984)
  • Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 127 of the MRTP Act
  • Schedule to the State Acts
  • Clause 10(3) of the Schedule to the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936
  • Section 6, Land Acquisition Act (amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967 (13 of 1967))
  • The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (2014)
  • Section 68 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936
  • Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Sections 58, 59 onwards of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Sections 9(1) and (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Land Acquisition Act (amended by insertion of proviso thereto by Act 68 of 1984)
  • Constitution of India, Article 14
  • Section 39 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936
  • Chapter VII of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act)
  • Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, Schedule to the Act, Clauses 10(2) and 10(3)
  • Section 3(c) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 45 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act
  • Section 39 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, Section 45 of the said Act, Clauses 10(2) and 10(3) of the Schedule to the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, Article 14 of the Constitution of India, Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Land Acquisition Act (amended by insertion of proviso thereto by Act 13 of 1967)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

A notification under Section 39 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 was issued on 13-6-1963 to acquire 10.80 acres of land belonging to the predecessor of the appellant. A declaration under Section 45 followed on 16-3-1967, and the Land Acquisition Officer passed an award on 27-4-1968 fixing compensation at Rs 8100 per acre.

The landowner challenged the award before the Bombay High Court (Special Civil Application No. 452 of 1968). On 8-7-1974 the High Court set aside the award only as regards the quantum of compensation and remanded the matter for a fresh determination.

The appellant (legatee under a 1980 will) subsequently filed:

  • Writ Petition No. 191 of 1984 (withdrawn on 19-9-1991);
  • Regular Civil Suit No. 2915 of 1991 (no interim relief sought); and
  • Writ Petition No. 593 of 1999 challenging a later order dated 2-1-1999 by which the Land Acquisition Officer reopened the compensation proceedings.

The Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissed WP No. 593 of 1999 on 28-8-2000 and rejected a review on 19-12-2000. The present Supreme Court appeal is against those two orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (inserted by Act 68 of 1984) applies to acquisitions carried out under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936.
  2. Whether, in the circumstances, the entire acquisition lapsed for failure to make a fresh award within two years of 19-9-1991.
  3. Incidentally, whether the Land Acquisition Officer (Collector) possessed any power to review or recall his earlier order dated 20-6-1998.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Section 11-A is mandatory and applies to pending proceedings; as no fresh award was made within two years, the acquisition automatically lapsed.
  • The Nagpur Improvement Trust Act is not a complete code; after Sections 39 and 45, the procedure is governed by the Land Acquisition Act, hence later amendments—including Section 11-A—apply.
  • The period of limitation should be reckoned from 19-9-1991 (withdrawal of the earlier writ petition) because no interim order thereafter restrained the Collector.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The original award was passed on 27-4-1968; it was set aside only on the compensation aspect and remitted for re-determination—hence Section 11-A, introduced in 1984, has no application.
  • The Nagpur Improvement Trust Act is a self-contained code; provisions of the Land Acquisition Act stand incorporated as they existed in 1936, and subsequent Central amendments do not automatically apply.
  • Possession was taken in 1971 and the land has been developed and allotted to more than 500 beneficiaries; setting aside the acquisition would disrupt settled rights.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasantrao (2002) 7 SCC 657 Distinction between legislation by incorporation and by reference; subsequent amendments to the Land Acquisition Act do not affect State Acts where the 1894 Act is incorporated. Relied upon to hold that Section 11-A does not extend to acquisitions under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act.
Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra (2011) 3 SCC 1 Self-contained nature of special town-planning statutes; inapplicability of Section 11-A to such statutes. Cited extensively to confirm that the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act is a complete code and immune from later Central amendments including Section 11-A.
T.M. Peter v. State of Kerala (1980) 3 SCC 554 Time-limit implications under Article 14 when different statutes prescribe different periods. Mentioned; court found it unnecessary to examine further after holding Section 11-A inapplicable.
Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437 Review/recall jurisdiction exists only when expressly conferred by statute; clarification cannot alter an order on merits. Cited in support of the proposition that, absent statutory authority, the Collector could not entertain a review—but the Court declined to decide this issue as the appeal failed on merits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court adopted a two-step analysis:

  1. Status of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act. Following Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasantrao and Girnar Traders (3), the Court held that the State Act is a self-contained code into which the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 stands incorporated only in the form it existed when the State Act was enacted. Subsequent Central amendments—including Section 11-A—do not apply unless the State legislature specifically adopts them.
  2. Effect on this acquisition. The 1974 High Court order had set aside the 1968 award solely for recomputation of compensation, not for any procedural illegality. Because Section 11-A was introduced much later (24-9-1984) and is inapplicable to Nagpur Improvement Trust acquisitions, the acquisition did not lapse. Consequently, the Land Acquisition Officer’s decision to reopen the matter for reassessment of compensation complied with the 1974 remand.

Having upheld the High Court’s reasoning on these substantive grounds, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to pronounce on the Collector’s power of review or on new claims based on later government resolutions.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The Court confirmed that Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 does not govern acquisitions under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936. The acquisition of the appellant’s land therefore stands, and the Land Acquisition Officer may proceed to redetermine compensation as directed in 1974. The decision re-affirms existing Supreme Court jurisprudence on incorporation versus reference and does not establish a new principle.

    Bankatlal v. Special Land Acquisition Officer And Another

    Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.— This appeal is directed against the impugned judgments and orders dated 28-8-2000 and 19-12-2000 passed by the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court in Bankatlal Ramprasad Sarda v. Land Acquisition Officer WP No. 593 of 1999 and Bankatlal Ramprasad Sarda v. Land Acquisition Officer respectively. By its first order, the High Court dismissed the writ petition preferred by the appellant and by the second order, the High Court rejected the review application filed by the appellant. The question that arises for determination is whether Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is applicable to the cases where land is acquired under the provisions of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936.

    2. The factual matrix of the case is as follows: a notification under Section 39 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 was issued for acquisition of land admeasuring 10.80 acres situated at Khasra No. 1/1, Mouza Pardi, Tehsil and District Nagpur. Section 39 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act is similar to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The said land was acquired for the eastern industrial area street scheme of the second respondent. According to the appellant, the aforesaid land was owned and was in possession of his predecessor-in-title, late Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda (grandfather of the appellant). A declaration under Section 45 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act was issued on 16-3-1967. The aforesaid Section 45 is similar to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Thereafter, a notice dated 31-7-1967 under Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was served on late Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda. Simultaneously, notice dated 8-8-1967 under Sections 9(1) and (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was also served on late Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda.

    3. Further, the case of the appellant is that his predecessor-in-title late Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda claimed compensation on 31-1-1968 (@ Rs 2,00,000 per acre) and thereafter, award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was passed on 27-4-1968 by the first respondent. The compensation fixed for 10.8 acres was @ Rs 8100 which according to the first respondent was the fair market value of the property under acquisition on the date of the first Notification i.e 13-6-1963. The aforesaid amount was payable with interest @ 6% per annum w.e.f 13-6-1963 till the date of payment of the said amount.

    4. At that stage late Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda filed a special civil application before the Bombay High Court challenging the award dated 27-4-1968 and seeking a direction on Respondent 1 to determine the compensation payable to him against the acquisition of his land on the basis of market value as provided in the Land Acquisition Act. He further prayed to quash the Notifications dated 13-6-1963 and 16-3-1967 published in the Government Gazette insofar as they relate to land belonging to him; Clause 10(3) of the Schedule to the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 was also challenged in the said writ petition. A further prayer was made to direct Respondent 3 to consider his application under Section 68 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 and also to direct Respondent 1 to act according to the decision on the application.

    5. On 18-5-1968 the possession of the land belonging to late Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda was taken over by the acquiring authority. After about a month i.e on 10-6-1968, the High Court admitted the case and granted interim stay in the said Special Civil Application No. 452 of 1968. Subsequently, by judgment and order dated 8-7-1974, the High Court held as follows:

    “Accordingly, the impugned awards in all the three cases are set aside and the cases are sent back to the Land Acquisition Officer without the aforesaid amendments introduced by Clauses 10(2) and 10(3) of the Schedule to the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, after giving full opportunities to the parties to make further pleadings and lead evidence. To this extent, the petitions are allowed. There will be no order as to costs.”

    From the aforesaid order, it is clear that the award dated 27-4-1968 was set aside only with respect to compensation to be paid in favour of late Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda.

    6. According to the appellant, late Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda executed a will dated 1-5-1980 whereunder the present appellant as a legatee acquired title to and interest in the property in question i.e the property which was sought to be acquired by the respondents. Subsequently, after the death of Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda on 13-5-1982, the present appellant filed Writ Petition No. 191 of 1984 before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court challenging the land acquisition proceedings. The same was admitted and an interim stay was granted by the High Court on 1-2-1984.

    7. During the pendency of the writ petition, Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was brought into effect from 24-9-1984. On 19-9-1991 Writ Petition No. 191 of 1984 was withdrawn by the appellant, in effect the interim stay in the aforesaid writ petition ceased to exist from that date.

    8. The appellant subsequently filed Regular Civil Suit No. 2915 of 1991 challenging the acquisition proceedings. As no application for interim orders was preferred by the appellant, the trial court did not pass any interim order or any order as contemplated by the Explanation to Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the aforesaid suit.

    9. Respondent 1 vide his letter dated 20-6-1998 informed the appellant that by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, there was no scope to pass a fresh award in the acquisition proceedings. Respondent 2 filed an application before Respondent 1 on 18-8-1998 for recalling the order dated 20-6-1998 passed in Revenue Case No. 105.A-65 of 1966-1967. The appellant filed his reply to the said application on 18-12-1998. Respondent 1, thereafter, by an order dated 2-1-1999, reconsidered the case and recalled the order dated 20-6-1998 and ordered that the case be reopened. It further fixed the case for passing an award referring to the direction of the High Court dated 8-7-1974.

    10. Aggrieved by the order dated 2-1-1999 passed by Respondent 1, the appellant preferred Writ Petition No. 593 of 1999 before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court. In the writ petition the appellant raised the following contentions:

    (a) The Collector as defined in Section 3(c) of the Land Acquisition Act is not a “court” and thus has no power to review its decisions/orders passed.
    (b) The power of review has to be expressly conferred on the Collector, which is absent under the Land Acquisition Act.
    (c) No opportunity was given to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed.
    (d) Respondent 1 did not consider the fact that the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act were also made applicable to the proceedings pending on the date of the commencement of Act 68 of 1984. As the award dated 27-4-1968 was already set aside by the Hon'ble High Court vide its order dated 8-7-1984, there was in effect no award in existence after 8-7-1984 and that the award had to be passed within 2 years from the date of the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court or in any case, within 2 years from 19-9-1991 i.e the date when the present petitioner had withdrawn Writ Petition No. 191 of 1984 and the interim order had ceased to exist.

    11. Initially, on 9-2-1999, the High Court granted an ad interim stay of the proceedings. In the said writ petition, Respondent 1 filed his reply, contending that the Land Acquisition Officer being a court can recall his order and, therefore, there was no illegality committed by him in recalling the order dated 20-6-1998.

    12. The appellant preferred Civil Application No. 3159 of 1999 in the aforesaid writ petition on 7-7-1999 for certain directions to the respondents. The Division Bench of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court by the impugned order dated 28-8-2000 WP No. 593 of 1999 dismissed the writ petition with following observation:

    “10. A perusal of the observations made by this Court in the abovereferred judgment dated 8-7-1974 undoubtedly makes it clear that the award was not set aside for want of any procedural illegality; however, the same was quashed only to the extent of the provisions, which are referred to hereinabove, came to be declared as ultra vires by the Apex Court, which undoubtedly deals with the aspect of compensation only.
    ***
    12. It is, therefore, clear to us that this is not the case where the respondents failed to pass award after Section 11-A was introduced in the Land Acquisition Act in the year 1984. The award was already way back in 1967. However, for the reasons stated hereinabove, the part of which was based on the provisions which were not good law, the award was quashed and set aside to that extent only and the direction was given to consider the aspect of compensation by giving appropriate opportunity to the petitioner in this regard.”

    13. The review petition vide MCA No. 286 of 2000 preferred against the same was also dismissed on 19-12-2000 with the following observation:

    “There is no quarrel with the proposition laid down by the Kerala High Court. However, in view of peculiar facts of this case, the law laid down by the Kerala High Court will not be applicable for the reason that in the instant case, this Court did not set aside the award for want of procedural illegality, but the same was quashed only in respect of compensation aspect of it in view of the declaration by the Apex Court that the provisions of Clauses 10(2) and 10(3) of the Schedule to the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act insofar as they add a new clause 3(a) to Section 23 and a proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are ultra vires and violative of the guarantee of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The operative part of the judgment dated 8-7-1974 in Special Civil Applications Nos. 495 and 497 of 1967 and 452 of 1968 makes it abundantly clear that the matter was remanded back for passing award only in respect of compensation in each case on the basis of the Land Acquisition Act….”

    14. The learned counsel for the appellant made the following submissions:

    (i) After insertion of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, there is a statutory obligation on the part of the respondents to make an award within the stipulated period of two years from the date of publication of declaration, failing which the land acquisition proceedings shall automatically lapse, in view of the provision of the said Act. It is contended that in the instant case, after award/awards was/were set aside in the year 1974, till now no fresh award was passed by the respondents, and, therefore, the entire land proceedings automatically lapsed in view of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act.
    (ii) That the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act is not a complete code in itself insofar as acquisition of land is concerned. Although Sections 39 and 45 of the said Act are akin to Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the further process of acquisition of land is undertaken as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This is evident from the perusal of Sections 58, 59 onwards of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act and the Schedule appended thereto.
    (iii) Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act is applicable to pending proceedings also. Section 11-A came into operation on 24-9-1984 and at that time the land acquisition proceedings with respect to land belonging to the appellant was pending. In the case of the appellant, Section 11-A of the Act would thus apply from 19-9-1991 i.e the date from which the appellant withdrew Writ Petition No. 191 of 1984, and, therefore, the award ought to be passed within a period of two years from 20-9-1991. The respondents having failed to do so within the stipulated time, the first respondent vide his order dated 20-6-1998 was right in law to hold that no award could now be passed in respect of land related to the appellant in view of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Further since 19-9-1991, no award had been passed by the first respondent in respect of the land in question till 9-2-1999.

    15. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent 2 contended that in the instant case, the Notification under Section 39 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act was published on 13-6-1963 and similarly on 16-3-1967, the Notification under Section 45 of the said Act was also published. It is contended that Respondent 1 also passed an award on 27-4-1968. It is further contended that the appellant in Writ Petition No. 452 of 1968 challenged the land acquisition proceedings undertaken by the respondent, and after hearing the parties the High Court on 8-7-1974 set aside the award only in respect of the compensation aspect of it in view of the declaration by the Apex Court that Clauses 10(2) and 10(3) of the Schedule to the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, insofar as they add a new clause 3(a) to Section 23 and a proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are ultra vires and violative of the guarantee of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that for the said reasons, in the writ petition the High Court directed Respondent 1 to pass a fresh award after taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect and give full opportunity to the parties, only to the extent of compensation part thereof. According to Respondent 2, the award was set aside on technical ground, therefore, the matter was remitted back to the Land Acquisition Officer with a direction to pass a fresh award.

    16. As far as the appellant is concerned, he claims to be the owner of the agricultural land i.e land admeasuring 10.80 acres situate at Khasra No. 1/1, Mouza Pardi, PC No. 17, Tehsil and District Nagpur and has no concern with the scheme of the respondents for which other lands are under consideration. The possession of the land in question was taken long back in 1971. The answering respondent has already developed and allotted more than 500 flats to the economically weaker sections from 1981 onwards. The land was acquired for the purpose of implementing the Nagpur Improvement Trust Scheme. After taking the possession of the land, the land was developed into small size plots and allotted the same to the economically weaker sections.

    17. It was lastly contended that the land acquisition proceedings in the instant case are not hit by Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as the said section was brought into effect on 24-9-1984 i.e after 10 years from the judgment dated 8-7-1974 wherein the award was declared illegal.

    18. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the submission made on behalf of the respondents and the decision of the High Court rendered in the judgment impugned.

    19. Similar question whether subsequent amendments made to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall automatically apply to the State Acts i.e the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936, the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 and the U.P Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (1 of 1966) was raised and considered by this Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasantrao (2002) 7 SCC 657. Relevant paras 31 and 59 read as under:( & 690)

    “31. We shall now proceed to consider whether the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as modified by the State Acts stand incorporated in the State Acts or whether there is a mere reference or citation of the Land Acquisition Act in the State Acts. The law on the subject is well settled. When an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a later Act, the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the later Act as if they had been bodily transposed into it. The incorporation of an earlier Act into a later Act is a legislative device adopted for the sake of convenience in order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of the earlier Act into the later. But this must be distinguished from a referential legislation which merely contains a reference or the citation of the provisions of an earlier statute. In a case where a statute is incorporated, by reference, into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the second. The later Act along with the incorporated provisions of the earlier Act constitutes an independent legislation which is not modified or repealed by a modification or repeal of the earlier Act. However, where in a later Act there is a mere reference to an earlier Act, the modification, repeal or amendment of the statute that is referred, will also have an effect on the statute in which it is referred. It is equally well settled that the question whether a former statute is merely referred to or cited in a later statute, or whether it is wholly or partially incorporated therein, is a question of construction.
    ***
    59. So far as the acquisitions under the Nagpur Act and the U.P Act are concerned, they have been challenged on the ground that the notification corresponding to the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was made more than 3 years after the expiry of the date of the publication of the notification corresponding to the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. This was on the assumption that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act were not incorporated in the State Acts but were merely referred to and the amendment of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act by insertion of proviso thereto by Act 13 of 1967, would apply to the acquisitions. We have already held that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as modified by the State Acts and the Schedule thereto stand incorporated in the State Acts and, therefore, the subsequent amendments of Section 6 by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967 (13 of 1967) or by Act 68 of 1984, will have no effect on the acquisition made under the State Acts. The High Court of Allahabad has taken this view while the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur has taken the contrary view. The appeals, therefore, which are directed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad must be dismissed and those against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur, must be allowed. Since we have held that the Land Acquisition Act stands incorporated in the State Acts, with the consequence that subsequent amendments to the Land Acquisition Act have no effect upon the acquisitions made under the State Acts, it is not necessary to consider the submission of Mr Rakesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate, that in view of the judgment of this Court in T.M Peter case (1980) 3 SCC 554 the absence of any time-limit in the State Acts for issuance of notification corresponding to the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act will not expose the State Acts to the charge of discrimination invoking the principles enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.”

    20. Recently in Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra (2011) 3 SCC 1, a question as to whether all provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Central Act 68 of 1984 can be read into provision under Chapter VII of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (“the MRTP Act”, for short) for an acquisition, came up for consideration of this Court. A question was raised as to whether Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is applicable in the case of acquisition of land under the MRTP Act. The matter (2007) 7 SCC 555 was referred to a larger Bench for consideration. In the said case the Constitution Bench of five Judges held and observed: [Girnar Traders (3) case (2011) 3 SCC 1, 54 & 69-70, paras 69, 86, 135 & 137-40]

    “69. For an Act to be a ‘self-contained code’, it is required to be shown that it is a complete legislation for the purpose for which it is enacted. The provisions of the MRTP Act relate to preparation, submission and sanction of approval of different plans by the authorities concerned which are aimed at achieving the object of planned development in contradistinction to haphazard development. An owner/person interested in the land and who wishes to object to the plans at the appropriate stage a self-contained adjudicatory machinery has been spelt out in the MRTP Act. Even the remedy of appeal is available under the MRTP Act with a complete chapter being devoted to acquisition of land for the planned development. Providing adjudicatory mechanism is one of the most important facets of deciding whether a particular statute is a ‘complete code’ in itself or not.
    ***
    86. At the very outset, we may notice that in the preceding paragraphs of the judgment, we have specifically held that the MRTP Act is a self-contained code. Once such finding is recorded, application of either of the doctrines i.e ‘legislation by reference’ or ‘legislation by incorporation’, would lose their significance particularly when the two Acts can co-exist and operate without conflict.
    ***
    135. While applying any of the doctrines, the Court will have to take care that there is no distortion or destruction of the provisions of the principal statute. For examining this aspect, it really would not matter whether we apply the doctrine of incorporation or reference to the facts of the present case. It will have to be examined on the touchstone of effective and complete workability while protecting legislative intent. Primarily, we have to examine whether incorporating provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act into the provisions of the MRTP Act by reference would disturb the scheme of the MRTP Act and cause legal and practical impediments in the execution of this Act.
    ***
    137. The Court cannot lose sight of one very important fact that the MRTP Act is an Act relating to planned development and acquisition is an incidental aspect thereof. Planned development is quite different from merely ‘achieving a public purpose’ for which the land is acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Development plan, regional plan and town planning scheme are major events in the development of a State. They are controlled and guided by different financial, architectural and public interest for the development including macro and micro planning of the entire State.
    138. The provisions relating to planned development of the State or any part thereof, read in conjunction with the object of the Act, show that different time-frames are required for initiation, finalisation and complete execution of such development plans. The period of 10 years stated in Section 127 of the MRTP Act, therefore, cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable ex facie. If the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, with its serious consequence of lapsing of entire acquisition proceedings, are bodily lifted and read into the provisions of the MRTP Act, it is bound to frustrate the entire scheme and render it ineffective and uncertain. Keeping in view the consequence of Section 11-A of the Central Act, every development plan could stand frustrated only for the reason that period of two years has lapsed and it will tantamount to putting an end to the entire development process.
    139. Another reason for rejecting the contention of the appellants is that for the full and complete implementation of the scheme dehors such reservation, allotment and designation, lands have to be acquired and once acquisition as argued, fails on the application of Section 11-A of the Central Act, those lands would have to be restored to the owners while lands of other plot owners under the same scheme would continue to be under reservation, allotment or designation. Even this would render the scheme unworkable. If the legislature has opted not to introduce any such limitation in the MRTP Act, then to read the same with reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act would be unjust and render the scheme under the State Act completely unworkable. That certainly is not the legislative intent.
    140. Thus, in our view, reading of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act into Chapter VII of the MRTP Act will render the substantive provisions of the State Act ineffective, unworkable and may frustrate the object of the Act materially.”

    21. In view of the aforesaid finding of this Court Girnar Traders (3) case (2011) 3 SCC 1, we hold that the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 is complete code in itself except for the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which stood legislatively incorporated in the State Act. The subsequent amendments to the Land Acquisition Act including amendment made vide Act 68 of 1984 inserting Section 11-A would have no effect on the acquisition made or to be made under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936.

    22. As regards the second limb of issue, we find ourselves entirely in agreement with the submission that in absence of a statutory provision, review application cannot be entertained. Even in the garb of clarification, earlier order cannot be modified or corrected. (See Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437.)

    23. In the present case, the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment dated 28-8-2000 WP No. 593 of 1999 made the following observation:

    “10. A perusal of the observation made by this Court in the abovereferred judgment, dated 8-7-1974, undoubtedly makes it clear that the award was not set aside for want of any procedural illegality; however, the same was quashed only to the extent of the provisions, which are referred to hereinabove, came to be declared as ultra vires by the Apex Court, which undoubtedly deals with the aspect of compensation only.”
    ***
    “13. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, in our opinion, the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act are not attracted since the award was already made prior to Section 11-A came into existence in the year 1984. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, in this regard, cannot be accepted and must fail.”

    24. In view of such finding, it is not necessary to decide the question as to whether the Collector has power of review as on merit itself, we find no ground to interfere with the order passed by the High Court.

    25. The learned counsel for the appellant made an alternative prayer by filing IA No. 9 of 2008 to consider the appellant's entitlement to the benefit of the Government Resolution dated 17-1-1992 but the learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that such relief has already been claimed by the appellant by filing a writ petition before the High Court which has been dismissed by the High Court on 12-10-2001. Therefore, no such relief can be granted in the present appeal.

    26. After judgment was reserved, the appellant has filed another IAs Nos. 13-14 of 2014 stating that “the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act” has come into force from 1-1-2014 but we are not inclined to decide such issue which was not raised before the High Court or this Court.

    27. For the reasons aforesaid, the interlocutory applications are rejected and the appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Bankatlal v. Special Land Acquisition Officer And Another
    (Jun 30, 2014)