(1) The petitioners herein, who are a. L and a. 4, filed the criminal petition under section 482 cr. P. C. To quash the proceedings in c. C. No. 240 of 2002 on the file of the xxii metropolitan magistrate, hyderabad.

(2) It is alleged in the charge - sheet that marriage of daughter of the de facto complainant with a. 1 was performed on 22 - 4 - 1998 at hyderabad as per hindu rites and customs. Before marriage, a. 1 to a. 4 demanded dowry of rs. 5. 00 lakhs cash, 50 tulas of gold and rs. 75,000/ - towards adapaduchu katnam. They also demanded transfer of ground floor of h. No. 10 - 4 - 503/ a3, sreeram nagar colony, masabtank, hyderabad in favour of a. 1 or a. 2. L. Ws. L and 3 agreed to pay rs. 4. 00 lakhs cash, 60 tulas of gold, rs. 75,000/ - towards adapaduchu katnam and to bequeath ground portion of their house in the name of their daughter, which was accepted by the accused. After betrothal, a. 2 and a. 3 demanded maruti zen car and threatened to cancel the marriage if their demand went unconceded. L. W. 3 purchased the said car after raising loan of rs. 4. 00 lakhs from city bank and kept it at the disposal of a. 2 and a. 3. Before marriage, l. Ws. L and 3 had withdrawn rs. 5,97,500/ - from their respective accounts in the various banks, borrowed rs. 80,000/ - from l. Ws. L3 and 14 and gave the dowry as agreed. On 30 - 4 - 1998, a. 1 flew to u. S. A. Promising to arrange visa and other documents for his wife for coming to u. S. A. A. 2 and a. 3 initially looked after her for sometime and started expressing their displeasure for not bringing sufficient dowry. Therefore, the accused not only meted out cruelty to the daughter of the de facto complainant but also demanded and accepted dowry from lws. 1 and 3 and criminally misappropriated stridhanam. Hence, they are liable for punishment for the offences under sections 498a, 406 ipc read with sections 3, 4 and 6 of the dowry prohibition act, 1961.

(3) The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that on 2 - 12 - 1998, daughter of the de facto complainant left the company of a. 1 voluntarily and did not turn up, and from that date onwards, the wife is not living with the husband; that she was married to some other person and begot 2 children through the second husband; that on the ground of cruelty, a petition is filed for divorce which was granted by competent court and as per the application of the daughter of the de facto complainant, all the items were returned through the competent court; that all the offences alleged are punishable with punishment upto 3 years and therefore, the complaint is barred by limitation; that after final report, police have no power to reinvestigate into the matter; that there is no allegation of whatsoever that the present petitioner demanded dowry; that section 188 cr. P. C. Is bar for trial of the case in view of the fact no sanction has been obtained; hence, he prayed to quash the impugned proceedings.

(4) On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent contended that the offence of cruelty is a continuing offence; since the complaint is lodged within 3 years, it is well within time and further the limitation aspect is mixed question of fact and law, which has to be decided by the competent court and the same cannot be decided by this court exercising the powers under section 482 cr. Pc; that under section 188 cr. Pc, permission of the central government can be obtained at any stage during trial of the case; hence, there are no grounds to quash the impugned proceedings.

(5) Inherent powers under section 482 cr. P. C. Can be exercised to carry out the order passed under the code or to prevent abuse of process of court or to secure ends of justice. It is equally well settled that when the allegations in the charge - sheet and the statements of witnesses recorded by police during the course of investigation do not make out a prima facie case of the offences alleged, then only question of quashing the same arises.

(6) 'cruelty' for the purpose of 498a ipc means any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical, of the woman; (ii) harassment of woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. To constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust as defined section 405 i. P. C. It is essential that the prosecution must prove first of all that the accused was entrusted with some property or with any other dominion or power over it. It has to be further established that in respect of the said property so entrusted there was dishonest misappropriation or dishonest conversion or dishonest use or disposal of the same in violation of description of law or legal contract by the accused himself or by someone else which he wilfully suffers to do. Demand of dowry before, at or after the marriage is an offence punishable under sections 3 and 4 of the dowry prohibition act, 1961. The definition of 'dowry' as defined under section 2 of the act shows that any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage at or before or after the marriage as a consideration for the marriage of the said parties.

(7) It is not in dispute before this court that all the offences alleged against the petitioners are punishable upto 3 years. Therefore, under section 468 cr. Pc, no court shall take cognizance of the offences after expiry of period of limitation of three years. Under section 470 (4) cr. Pc in computing the period of limitation, the time during which the offender has avoided arrest by absconding or concealing himself, shall be excluded.

(8) The first contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners is that all the offences are barred by limitation. In support of his contention, he relied on a decision in m/s. Zandu pharmaceutical works ltd. And others v. Md. Sharaful hague and others, 2005 (1) ald (crl.) 278 (sc) = 2004 (8) supreme 31. Wherein it is held as follows : (para 14)

"the learned magistrate has issued process in respect of offence under section 418 ipc. The punishment provided for the said offence is imprisonment for three years. The period of limitation in terms of section 468 (2) (c) cr. Pc is 3 years. That being so, the court could not have taken cognizance of the offence. section 473 of the code provides for extension of period in certain cases. This power can be exercised only when the court is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice."

(9) The learned counsel also relied on a decision in ramesh chandra sinha and others v. State of bihar and others, 2003 (2) ald (crl.) 441 (sc) = 2003 (5) supreme 548. It is a case where there was no dispute that cognizance of the offence was taken by the learned magistrate long after the period of 3 years. But, in the case on hand, the allegations would go to show that cognizance was taken within 3 years. Hence, the decision has no application to the facts of the present case.

(10) On the other hand, the learned counsel for the second respondent relied on a decision in arun vyas and another v. Anita vyas, 1999 4 scc 690, wherein it is held that essence of offence under section 498a 1pc is cruelty and it is a continuing offence and on each occasion the wife is subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation. In the case on hand, there is evidence on record to show that on 4 - 12 - 1998, t. Ramesh, t. Swapna went to new jersey and all the accused abused wife of a. 1 in filthy language and demanded transfer of ground floor portion of the house situated in hyderabad, and that they also demanded usd 3,000. So also, there is evidence on record to show that the accused demanded certain amounts towards charges of flight on 22 - 10 - 1998. F. I. R. Was lodged in the year 1999. Originally, police registered a case on 3 - 9 - 1999 and filed charge - sheet in the year 2001.

(11) The next ground is that after filing final report, the police have no power to investigate into the offence. When the complaint was forwarded to police for investigation as required under section 156 (c) cr. P. C. , police registered the case in crime no. 54 of 1999 for the offences under sections 498a, 406 ipc and 4 and 6 of the dowry prohibition act, 1961, and after investigation filed final report on 18 - 9 - 2000 stating that the alleged cruelty meted out by the accused to smt. Dr. B. Sireesha, daughter of the complainant, took place in u. S. A. And as such, c. I. D. , a. P. , hyderabad has no jurisdiction to investigate into it and so requested the court to close the case as lack of evidence. When the said case was not closed, w. P. Nos. 6237 of 2001 was filed to quash crime no. 54 of 1999, whereas w. P. No. 23842 of 2001 was filed to direct the magistrate to accept the final report filed by the police in the above crime. Both the writ petitions were disposed of by this court by common order dated 4 - 12 - 2001 directing the xxii metropolitan magistrate, hyderabad to pass appropriate order on the final report submitted by police. Thereafter, it is stated by the learned counsel appearing for the parties that no decision has been taken on the final report, but subsequently a charge - sheet is filed.

(12) In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel relied on a decision in vijendra sharma alias vijendra kumar sharma and others v. State of u. P. And others, 2005 crl. Lj 2743, wherein it is held as follows : (para 11)

". The learned magistrate is under obligation to pass the order on the police report but in the present case the learned magistrate has not considered the police report and no order was passed at the time when the protest petition was treated as complaint, even at the stage of taking cognizance against the petitioners also no order on police report (final report) was passed, therefore, the order dated 28 - 6 - 2002 is also illegal."

It is a case where the investigating officer filed a final report stating that the petitioners therein were falsely implicated and therefore it was held that without considering the final report, order of taking cognizance is illegal. In the case on hand, no material is brought before this court to show that the learned magistrate while taking cognizance for the offences under sections 498a, 406 ipc and 4 and 5 of the dowry prohibition act, 1961, has not taken into consideration the final report submitted by police. Simply because police filed final report stating that the case may be closed due to lack of evidence or false, it cannot be a ground for quashing the complaint. It is for the magistrate to apply his mind even after filing of the final report to know whether the prima facie material discloses a cognizable offence alleged against the petitioners. In the absence of any such evidence, it cannot be said that taking cognizance is illegal. It is entirely at the discretion of the magistrate either to accept or reject the same considering the facts and circumstances of the case. It is not known whether the police have taken permission to reinvestigate the case after filing of the final report. In view of the fact that final report has not been accepted, still the police have power to investigate the case and file a report. Whether the investigating officer has power to conduct further investigation after filing of the report, or in what manner further investigation conducted by police would cause prejudice to the case of the petitioners, or whether the police can file a charge - sheet even after submission of the final report, are the questions of fact to be decided and determined by the trial court. Hence, on that ground alone, the proceedings need not be quashed.

(13) It is the further contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that in pursuance of a divorce petition, divorce has been granted by the competent court in u. S. A. And it has become final; that thereafter the daughter of the de facto complainant married one venkat pushkar in the year 2002 itself and begot 2 children through him; that all articles given were returned to the de facto complainant and hence, he prayed to quash the impugned proceedings. To what extent the judgment of the foreign court is binding on courts in india is considered in ramesh venkat perumal v. State of a. P. , 1998 (1) ald (crl.) 122, gurdas mann and others v. Mohinder singh brar, air 1993 pun. And har. 92 and y. Narasimha rao v. Y. Venkata lakshmi and another, 1991 (2) crimes 855. Under section 13 cr. Pc a foreign judgment is not conclusive as to any matter there by directly adjudicated upon between the parties if (a) it has not been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction; (b) it has not been given on the merits of the case; (c) it is found on an incorrect view or international law or a refusal to recognize the law of india in cases in which such law is applicable; (d) the proceedings are opposed to natural justice; (e) it is obtained by fraud; (f) it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in india. Where a decree was an ex parte and it refers no evidence which might have adduced in court before passing thereof, then it can be said to be a decree passed ex parte. Therefore, judgment of a foreign court is not conclusive proof. Even otherwise, what is the evidence adduced in the petition for divorce and what are the material filed or referred to in the judgment, or whether any application was filed by daughter of the complainant for return of articles that were entrusted, whether the husband of de facto complainant is signatory for return of the articles, are all required to be proved and established before competent criminal court. So, basing on the decree passed by the foreign competent court, the issue cannot be decided.

(14) The other contention of the learned senior counsel is that section 188 cr. P. C. Is a bar for trial of the case in view of the fact that no previous sanction of central government is obtained. The learned senior counsel relied on a decision in syed asgar v. Government of a. P. And others, 2005 (3) ald 877, wherein it is held as follows : (paras 25 and 26).

"there is no misuse of the powers conferred under the statute by the police. Necessary safeguards have to be provided and such safeguards have been provided in the shape of section 188 of the cr. P. C. , to avoid misuse. There is a definite and crystalised procedure prescribed under section 188 of the cr. P. C. , which has to be necessarily read and followed."

(15) On the other hand, the learned counsel for the second respondent relied on a decision in ajay agarwal v. Union of india and others, air 1993 sc 1637, wherein it is held as follows : (para 27)

"thus we hold that sanction under section 188 is not a condition precedent to take cognizance of the offence. If need be, it could be obtained before trial begins."

(16) Section 188 cr. P. C. Reads as follows :

"when an offence is committed outside india (a) by a citizen of india, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or (b) by a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in india. He may be dealt with in respect of such offences as if it had been committed at any place within india at which he may be found : provided that, notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding sections of this chapter, no such offence shall be inquired into or tried in india except with the previous sanction of the central government."

(17) From the above decisions and as seen from section 188 cr. Pc, it is clear that when an offence is committed outside india by a citizen of india, no such offence shall be enquired except with the previous sanction of the central government. The sanction can also be obtained before the trial commences. Therefore, cognizance of the case can be taken although its further progress depends upon the provision of sanction from the central government. The object of giving sanction is to prevent the accused being tried over again in two different places. In the case on hand, admittedly, trial of the case has not been commenced and only cognizance was taken. In such a view of the matter, on this ground alone the proceedings need not be barred. In view of the foregoing discussion, there are no grounds to quash the impugned proceedings.

(18) The criminal petition is devoid of merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.