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  • Section 2 of the code of 1859 and section 13 of the code of 1877
  • SECTION 11 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 11 of the code of civil procedure. Now, section 11, code
  • section 13 of the code of 1877 which replaced section 2
  • SECTION 145 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 15 of the code of 1859
  • section 11 of the code
  • section 15 of the code
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Section 2 of the code of 1859 and section 13 of the code of 1877
  • SECTION 11 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 11 of the code of civil procedure. Now, section 11, code
  • section 13 of the code of 1877 which replaced section 2
  • SECTION 145 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 15 of the code of 1859
  • section 11 of the code
  • section 15 of the code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, wife of the appellant, filed a suit seeking recovery of possession of certain suit properties on the basis that her deceased father was the pattadar of the lands and that she had become entitled to them following his death. She alleged that her husband (the appellant) wrongfully caused the patta of the lands to be transferred in his name by claiming to be the illatom son-in-law of the deceased. In a prior suit, the question of whether the appellant was the illatom son-in-law was litigated and decided against him, with the suit decreed in favor of the respondent. Subsequently, the appellant initiated proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, obtained possession of the lands pursuant to the criminal court's order, and the respondent then filed the present suit for declaration and possession of the lands. The appellant resisted on the same ground of being the illatom son-in-law. The trial court held the prior judgment operated as res judicata and decreed the respondent's suit. The appellant appealed against this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the judgment in the former suit operates as res judicata in the present suit despite the latter being beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court that tried the former suit.
  2. Whether Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, which requires the former suit to be tried by a court competent to try the subsequent suit, limits the application of the principle of res judicata.
  3. Whether Section 43 of the Specific Relief Act, which binds parties to declaratory decrees, must be read subject to Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The former judgment cannot operate as res judicata because the court that tried the former suit (the munsif's court) was not competent to try the present suit due to pecuniary jurisdiction limitations.
  • Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code requires that the court which tried the former suit must be competent to try the subsequent suit for res judicata to apply.
  • The bar of res judicata should not apply since the present suit is beyond the jurisdiction of the court that decided the former suit.

Respondent's Arguments

  • This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajah Run Bahadur Singh v. Mussumut Lachoo Koer, (1884) L.R. 12 I.A. 23 Grant of a certificate under the Indian Succession Act does not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit for title. Illustrates limits of res judicata where jurisdiction or subject matter differs.
Gokul Mandar and another v. Pudmanund Singh and others, (1901) L.R. 29 I.A. 196 Decision of a revenue officer without jurisdiction cannot be pleaded as res judicata. Supports the requirement that the court must be competent to try the subsequent suit for res judicata to apply.
Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal and others, (1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 187 Plea of res judicata exists apart from the limited provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Indicates that Section 11 is not exhaustive of the principle of res judicata.
Kalipada De and others v. Dwijapada Das and others, (1929) L.R. 57 I.A. 24 Section 11 of CPC is not exhaustive; courts should not be influenced by technical considerations. Used to argue that res judicata extends beyond strict jurisdictional limits.
Dwijapada Das and others v. Kalipada De and others, A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 421 Section 11 is not a rule of technicality; prior decisions on relationship operate as res judicata. Supports application of res judicata despite pecuniary jurisdiction differences.
Kalyanchand Lalchand and others v. Sitabi Kom Dhanasa Lakshmichand, (1914) I.L.R. 38 Bom. 309 Similar to Calcutta High Court on res judicata and relationship issues. Reinforces non-technical approach to res judicata.
Sahib Nasib Khan v. Qutb-un-nisa, I.L.R. 1940 All. 691 Supports the view that res judicata applies beyond strict pecuniary jurisdiction. Reinforces the approach of other High Courts on res judicata.
Mithoolal Girdharilal v. Jainarayan Bahadurlal, A.I.R. 1941 Nag. 346 Section 43 of Specific Relief Act makes declaratory decrees binding; not governed by pecuniary jurisdiction limitations. Supports binding nature of declaratory decrees despite jurisdictional issues.
Subbayya v. Nagayya, A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 951 Declaratory decrees under Specific Relief Act binding on parties and their representatives. Supports declaratory decree binding effect beyond pecuniary jurisdiction.
S. Sarangapani Ayyangar v. K. Venkatanarasimhacharyulu, A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 384 Section 43 must be read subject to Section 11 of CPC; jurisdiction prerequisite for binding effect. Supports limitation of declaratory decrees by competency of court under Section 11.
Durjati Subbayya v. Anantaraju Nagayya, (1936) 71 M.L.J. 619 Declaratory decrees bind parties under Section 43 even if subsequent suit beyond pecuniary jurisdiction of former court. Supports declaratory decrees having binding effect independent of jurisdictional limits.
Rajah Chattar Singh v. Diwan Roshan Singh, I.L.R. (1946) Nag. 159 Agreed with Durjati Subbayya on binding effect of declaratory decrees under Section 43. Reinforces non-restrictive interpretation of Section 43.
Maqsood Ali v. Hunter, (1943) I.L.R. 18 Luck. 683 (F.B.) Section 43 is restrictive and does not extend scope of Section 11 of CPC. Argues declaratory decrees do not extend res judicata beyond Section 11.
Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund Singh, (1902) I.L.R. 29 Cal. 707 Section 11 CPC is exhaustive regarding res judicata; court must be competent to try subsequent suit. Supports strict application of Section 11 for res judicata.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the principle of res judicata as codified in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, which requires that the court deciding the former suit must be competent to try the subsequent suit for the doctrine to apply. The appellant argued that since the present suit exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction of the munsif's court which tried the former suit, the bar of res judicata under Section 11 does not apply.

The court reviewed various precedents, including decisions by the Privy Council and Indian High Courts, which indicate divergent views on whether Section 11 is exhaustive or whether res judicata can apply beyond its strict terms. The court noted that Section 43 of the Specific Relief Act binds parties to declaratory decrees but does not include the competency limitation of Section 11.

After analyzing the legislative history and judicial pronouncements, the court concluded that Section 43 must be read subject to Section 11, meaning that declaratory decrees under Section 43 do not override the competency requirement of Section 11. Therefore, the prior decree from the munsif's court, which was not competent to try the present suit, cannot operate as res judicata to bar the current suit.

Accordingly, the court held that the decision of the lower court, which had applied res judicata to bar the suit, was not sustainable.

Holding and Implications

The court allowed the appeal and remanded the suit to the subordinate judge for disposal in accordance with law. The appellant was also entitled to costs both in the lower court and on appeal.

The direct effect of this decision is that a prior declaratory decree from a court lacking jurisdiction to try a subsequent suit does not operate as res judicata under Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. The court emphasized that Section 43 of the Specific Relief Act must be read subject to Section 11, thereby limiting the binding effect of declaratory decrees when jurisdictional competence is absent. The opinion did not establish a new precedent but clarified the interplay between Sections 11 and 43 and remitted the case for fresh adjudication.

    Veeranna v. Sayamma .

    Srinivasachari, J.:-

    (1) The respondent filed a suit for the recovery of possession of the suit property against her husband on the allegation that her father was the pattadar of the suit properties and after the death of her father, she became entitled to them. She alleged that her husband had wrongfully got the patta of the lands transferred in his name professing to be the illatom son - in - law. A suit was filed by the wife, the plaintiff herein for the cancellation of the patta and her being granted the patta and in that suit the question as to whether the defendant - respondent was the illatom son - in - law of the deceased was agitated and it was held that he was not the illatom son - in - law and the suit was decreed in favour of the wife (the daughter of the deceased). Proceedings under section 145, criminal procedure code, were started by the appellant which ended in favour of the appellant. He obtained possession of the lands in pursuance of the order of the criminal court. The wife thereupon filed the present suit for a declaration and possession of the suit lands. The suit was resisted on the same grounds that the defendant was the illatom son - in - law and the plaintiff had no right. Among the issues that were raised in that case there was one issue relating to res judicata. The issue was as to whether the finding in the prior suit between the same parties, that the defendant herein was not the illatom son - in - law of the deceased pattadar, did not operate as res judicata. The trial court held that the judgment in the previous suit did operate as res judicata and decreed the plaintiff's suit. Hence this appeal.

    (2) The contention of the learned advocate for the appellant is that the judgment in the former suit could not operate as res judicata because the present suit having regard to the value of the claim could not have been tried by the munsif who tried the former suit and gave a findinig on the question of illatom.

    (3) The gist of the argument is that in order to operate as res judicata, it is necessary that the court which tried the former suit must be a court which would be competent to entertain the latter suit. Section 11, as is well known, is based upon the principle that there should be a finality to litigation. Section 11 reads as under : -

    "no court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court"
    .

    (4) The learned advocate for the appellant relies upon the words appearing in the section, viz. , "no court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit. In a court competent to try the subsequent suit. " and it is argued that the above words are important and could not be ignored. Admittedly the present suit could not have been tried by the munsif who decided the former suit, the present suit being beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the munsif. This question as to whether the general principle of res judicata is circumscribed and limited in its"scope by ection 11 of the civil procedure code, in other words, is section 11 exhaustive of the cases where the principle of res judicata could be applied, has been the subject of decisions by the privy council and the indian high courts. The question in the case before us would be whether by reason of the fact that the present suit is beyond the competence of the munsif court which tried the former suit, the previous finding as regards the illatom adoption of the respondent would not operate as res judicata.

    (5) The first case that may be referred is the case of rajah run bahadur singh v. Mussumut lachoo koer. , (1884) l. R. 12 i. A. 23. In this case it was held that the grant of a certificate under the indian succession act would not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit for title. In the next case of gokul mandar and another v. Pudmanund singh and others, (1901) l. R. 29 i. A. 196. It was held that the decision of a revenue officer regarding a tenant's status which he has no jurisdiction to decide, cannot be pleaded as res judicata.

    (6) In hook v. Administrator - general of bengal and others, (1921) l. R. ~48 la. 187 there is an observation that the plea of res judicata still remains apart from the limited provisions of the civil procedure code. This point has been reiterated in kalipada de and others v. Dwijapada das and others, (1929) l. R. 57 i. A. 24. Where their lordships say that the terms of section 11, civil procedure code are not ex. Haustive and the courts should not be influenced by technical considerations. It would, therefore, appear that the trend of decisions of the privy council has been that section u is not exhaustive.

    (7) So far as the indian high courts and concerned, the calcutta high court has held in dwijapada das and others v. Kalipada de and others,a. I. R. 1927 cal. 421. That section 11 is not a rule of tenchnicality and where, therefore, a question of relationship is decided in a previous suit, if another suit is brought and the same matter is agitated, the judgment in the previous suit would operate as res judicata. This case has followed the decision of the bombay high court in kalyanchand lalchand and others v. Sitabi kom dhanasa lakshmichand. , (1914) i. L. R. 38 bom. 309. To the same effect are the observations of the judges of the allahabad high court in sahib nasib khan v. Qutb - un - nisa, i. L. R. 1940 all. 691. .

    (8) In mithoolal girdharilal v. Jainarayan bahadurlal, a. I. R. 1941 nag. 346. Also stone, c. J. , agreed with the view of the allahabad and bombay high courts. The matter came up before the madras high court in subbayya v. Nagayya, a. I. R. 1936 mad. 951 : 71 m. L. J. 619 this was a suit for a mere declaration. The learned judges held that section 43 of the specific relief act made it clear that a declaration made under the provisions of the act was binding on the parties to the suit and the persons claiming through them. They also held that section 43 was not governed by limitation as to pecuniary jurisdiction embodied in section 11 of the civil procedure code ; in substance section 43 enunciated the principle of res judicata. This case was distinguished in a subsequent decision of the madras high court in s. Sarangapani ayyangar v. K. Venkatanarasimhacharyulu,a. I. R. 1952 mad. 384 : (1951) 2 m. L. J. 464.

    (9) The trend of decisions no doubt has been in favour of holding that the provisions of section 11, civil procedure code, cannot be regarded as being exhaustive. The significance of the words that the subsequent suit should be in a court which was competent to try the former suit cannot be ignored. Having regard to the importance of the question and having regard to divergent views, expressed in a few of the decisions, we think that the matter should be considered by a larger bench. The file be placed before the honourable the chief justice for the matter being considered by a full bench. Subba rao, c. J.

    (10) I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my learned brother, satyanarayana raju, j. , and i agree with him. Satyanarayana raju, j. - the question for determination in this appeal, referred to the full bench by manohar pershad and srinivasachari, jj. , is whether section 43 of the specific relief act must be read subject to section 11 of the code of civil procedure.

    (11) The facts of the case are simple and are not in controversy. The respondent is the wife of the appellant. She filed a suit in the munsif's court, nizamabad, for a declaration that she was the pattadar of the lands in suit. The appellant resisted the suit on the ground that he was the illatom son - in - law of the respondent's father and that he was therefore himself entitled to the patta. The munsif's court held that the appellant was not the illatom son - in - law and decreed the suit in favour of the respondent. Subsequent to the respondent obtaining the decree, the appellant started proceedings under section 145 of the criminal procedure code and pursuant to the orders passed therein in his favour, he obtained possession of the suit lands. The respondent thereupon filed the present suit in the subordinate judge's court of nizamabad, for a declaration of her right to, and possession of, the suit lands. The suit was contested by the appellant on the identical ground raised by him in the former suit viz , that he was the illatom son - in - law and that he was entitled to the lands. , holding that the decision in the former suit operated as res judicata and constituted a bar to the defence raised by the appellant, the subordinate judge decreed the suit. Against the said decree, the appellant has preferred the above appeal.

    (12) It is contended for the appellant that the munsif's court which decided the former suit was not competent to try the subsequent suit and as a consequence, one of the essential requirements of section 11 of the code of civil procedure, is not satisfied and that the bar of res judicata does not apply. It is common ground that the munsif's court at nizamabad, which tried the former suit, is not a court competent to try the present suit. The decision of the munsif in the former suit cannot therefore operate as res judicata under section 11 of the code.

    (13) It is not contended that the former decision is a judgment in rem within the meaning of section 41 of the evidence act, for, that section applies only to a final judgment, order or decree of a competent court in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character. It has, however, been contended that though the prior declaratory decree may not operate as res judicata under section 11 of the code, the former decision is binding on the parties to the subsequent suit under section 43 of the specific relief act, raising as it does the same question between the same parties. There is difference of judicial opinion as to whether section 43 must be read subject to section 11 of the code of civil procedure. Now, section 11, code of civil procedure, which deals with the doctrine of res judicata, reads : -

    "no court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating, under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised and has been heard and finally decided by such court"
    .

    (14) Section 11 applies in terms to cases where the matter in issue in a subsequent suit was in issue in a former suit. It is not every matter decided in a former suit that can be pleaded as res judicata in a subsequent suit. The essential conditions for the application of the doctrine of res judicata are : - (1) the matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly and substantially in issue either actually or constructively in the former suit. (2) the former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim. (3) the parties must have litigated under the same title in the former suit. (4) the court which decided the former suit must have been a court competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue is subsequently raised. (5) the matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the court in the first suit. Section 43 of the specific relief act reads : -

    "a declaration made under this chapter is binding only on the parties to the suit, persons claiming through them respectively, and, where any of the parties are trustees, on the persons for whom, if in existence at the date of the declaration, such parties would be trustees"
    .

    (15) It is true that this provision does not incorporate the limitation laid down by section 11 of the code as to the competency of the court to try the subsequent suit. In durjati subbayya v. Anantaraju nagayya, (1936) 71 m. L. J. 619. A division bench of the madras high court, consisting of varadachariar and mockett, jj. , held that section 43 was not restrictive and decrees, merely declaratory, passed under section 42 would, by reason of section 43, bind the parties and their representatives in interest even though the subsequent suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court which tried the former suit. The question for determination in that case was whether a declaratory decree in a former suit operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit. The former suit was instituted in the court of the district munsif of nellore and the subsequent suit was filed in the subordinate judge's court, nellore.

    (16) It was contended that the decision in the former suit was not that of a competent court within the meaning of section 11 of the code because that court could not have entertained the subsequent suit by reason of its higher valuation. The learned judges held that the subsequent suit would have been within the jurisdiction of the district munsif's court if it had been instituted in the year 1883 when the former suit was filed and in that view the rule of res judicata would be applicable even according to the conditions prescribed in section 11 of the code. The alternative ground on which they rested their decision was that section 43 of the specific relief act barred the subsequent suit although the previous decree could not operate as res judicata under section 11. It was contended before the learned judges that it would not have been the intention of the legislature to give a declaratory decree a wider operation than was permissible under the rule of res judicata as recognised in the civil procedure code. The learned judges while not wishing to minimise the force of this suggestion, nevertheless held that they could not ignore the policy underlying the jurisdiction of the court to make declaratory decrees. They observed :

    "it was the very object of that procedure that questions of this kind should be adjudicated at the earliest opportunity before evidence bearing upon them should be lost, but that purpose will be undoubtedly defeated by holding that decades afterwards, simply because of some difference in the pecuniary jurisdiction of the courts concerned, a declaration once obtained should become futile."

    (17) A division bench of the nagpur high court, consisting of grille, c. J. , and hemeon, j. , in rajah chattar singh v. Diwan roshan singh, i. L. R. (1946) nag. 159. Concurred with the view taken by the learned judges in durjati subbayya v. Anantaraju nagayya. , (1936) 71 m. L. J. 619. In maqsood all v. Hunter, (1943) i. L. R, 18 luck. 683 (f. B.). A full bench of the oudh chief court has held that section 43 of the specific relief act is restrictive and does not extend the scope of section 11 of the code. Bennett, j. , who delivered the judgment of the full bench, observed that there was no reason why section 43 of the specific relief act should have been enacted for the purpose of enunciating the principle of res judicata when the principle was to be found in the code of civil procedure. He agreed with the contention that section 43 was enacted for the purpose of making it clear that the declaration would not operate as a judgment in rem.

    (18) In s. Sarangapani ayyangar v. K. Venkata narasimhacharyulu, air 1952 mad. 384 : (1951) 2 m. Lj. 464 viswanatha sastri, j. Was not prepared to subscribe to the view taken by the learned judges in durjat subbayya v. Anantaraju nagayya. , i. L. R. (1946) nag. 159 he observed that the language of section 43 of the specific relief act was designedly cast in a restrictive form and having regard to the fact that the existence of jurisdiction in a court to try a suit must be predicated before its decree could be held to be binding on the parties, section 43 of the specific relief act must be read subject to section 11 of the code and no exception with regard to declaratory suits and decrees could be read into that section. The learned judge did not decide the point finally though he indicated his view for he says that it was unnecessary to pursue the matter further in the view he had taken on the other questions raised before him.

    (19) Section 42 of the specific relief act which gives discretion to courts to grant decrees merely declaratory, provides : -

    "any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any persons denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief"
    .

    (20) This section does not sanction every form of declaration but only a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to any legal character or to any right as to any property. The object of this section is to enable disputes as to the legal character of a person or his title to property to be decided before evidence bearing on the question should be lost even though the cause of action for a suit for possession or other relief may not have arisen. Section 43 is a consequential provision providing that a declaration made under chapter vi of the specific relief act is binding on the parties to the suit and persons claiming through them respectively.

    (21) Decrees, merely declaratory, were introduced in this country by the enactment of section 15 of the code of civil procedure, 1859, by which it was provided : "no suit shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory decree or order is sought thereby, and it shall be lawful for civil courts to make binding declarations of right without granting consequential relief". section 15 of the code of 1859 was in the same terms as section 50 of the english chancery procedure act of 1852. When the code of 1859 was repealed by the code of 1877, the provision as to declaratory decrees was transferred to section 42 of the specific relief act, which was passed in the same year. Before 1877, the rule of res judicata was found stated in section a of the code of civil procedure, 1859, which ran as follows : - "the civil courts shall not take cognizance of any suit brought on a cause of action which shall have been heard and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a former suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they claim. " section 13 of the code of 1877 which replaced section 2 of the first code, effected no change in the language. Section 2 of the code of 1859 and section 13 of the code of 1877 were so worded that it was enough for the operation of the rule that the court trying the former suit or issue was a court of competent jurisdiction, to try that suit or issue. Under the code of 1882 and under the present code also it is now necessary that the court trying the former suit should have been competent to try the subsequent suit itself. Otherwise the rule of res judicata under this section does not apply.

    (22) The code of 1908 is an act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the procedure of the courts of civil judicature in india. It was pointed out by the privy council in gokul mandar v. Pudmanund singh , (1902) i. L. R. 29 cal. 707. :

    "the essence of a code is to be exhaustive on the matters in respect of which it declares the law and it is not the province of a judge to disregard to go outside the letter of the enactment according to its true construction"
    .

    Their lordships further observed:

    "they will only observe in reference to arguments addressed to them that under section 13, civil procedure code, a decree in a previous suit cannot be pleaded as res judicata in a subsequent suit unless the judge by whom it was made had jurisdiction to try and decide not only the particular matter in issue but also the subsequent suit itself in which the issue is subsequently raised. In this respect the enactment goes beyond section 13 of the previous act x of 1877, and also as appears to to their lordships beyond the law laid down by the judges in duchess of kingston's case. (1776) 2 sm. L. C. (edn, 10) , 713."

    To constitute a matter res judicata all the conditions enumerated in section 11, civil procedure code must be satisfied. One of such conditions is that the court which decided the former suit must be a court competent to try the subsequent suit. Section 11 being explicit with regard to this requirement as to the competency of the court, its provisions cannot be ignored. It is no doubt true that section 43 does not incorporate the limitations laid down in section 11 as to the competency of the court to deal with the later suit. The language of section 43 is in a restrictive form. It was enacted at a time when the rule of res judicata had not been embodied in the code in its present comprehensive form incorporating therein the substance of section 43 of the specific relief act. It cannot be that the legislature having specifically provided in section 11 the conditions subject to which the rule of res judicata should operate, intended to make an exception in the case of declaratory suits and decrees. As has been pointed out by viswanatha sastri, j. , in s. Sarangapani ayyangar v. K. Venkata narasimhacharyulu,a. I. R. 1952 mad. 384: (1951) 2 m. L. J. 464. Having regard to the fact that the existence of jurisdiction in a court to try a suit must be predicated before its decree could be held to be binding on the parties, section 43 of the specific relief act must be read subject to section 11 of the code. For the above reasons, we hold that the decision in the former suit does not bar the trial of the present suit and the view taken by the learned subordinate judge cannot be sustained.

    (23) In the result, the appeal is allowed. Inasmuch as the lower court has disposed of the suit on a preliminary ground, the suit is remanded to the subordinate judge for disposal in accordance with law. The appellant will be entitled to his costs both here and in the court below. Appeal allowed: suit remanded.

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    Comments

    Veeranna v. Sayamma .
    (Nov 29, 1957)