(1) The defendants are the appellants in this second appeal, which arises out of a suit filed for a declaration of the plaintiff's title to a house and site of the extent of 462 square yards and for recovery of possession of the same after ejecting defendants 1 to 3 therefrom and for recovery of past and future mesne profits. The courts below have decreed the suit.
(2) In order to appreciate the appellants legal contention it is necessary to state the relevant facts. One ramaswami somayajulu had four sons, suryanarayana, sangameswara dikshitulu, gopalakrishnamurthy and viswanadham and the family owned, among other properties, the suit house. On 23rd march, 1939, the four sons of ramaswami somayajulu relinquished their interest in favour of their father and became divided from one another. Thereafter ramaswami somayajulu died leaving his four sons above mentioned and a widow seetharamamma, their stepmother. Under exhibit a - 1 dated 1st august, 1942, seetharamamma sold to her stepsons sangameswara dikshitulu and viswanadham, defendants 4 and 5, her interest in all the properties which belonged to her deceased husband. Under exhibit a - 7, dated 21st august, 1942, suryanarayana the eldest brother gave up his interest in the suit properties and others in favour of the 4th defendant. Exhibit a - 7 styled as "deed of partition and relinquishment" was executed for a consideration rs. 100 paid by the 4th defendant to suryanarayana. On 18th september, 1942, defendants 4 and 5 sold the suit property to the plaintiff for rs. 500 under exhibit a - 2 with recital that the property belonged to the vendors ancestrally with absolute right and enjoyment. Relying upon exhibit a - 2 the plaintiff filed the present suit for possession of the house and site. Defendants 1 to 3, the 1st defendant being the father of defendants 2 and 3, set up title to the property in themselves under a sale - deed, exhibit b - 7, dated 8th january, 1943, executed by defendants 4 and 5 in their favour. Defendants 1 to 3 pleaded that exhibit a - 2, the sale - deed in favour of the plaintiff, purporting to have been executed on 18th september, 1942, but presented for registration on 16th january, 1943, was really executed by defendants 4 and 5 subsequent to the date of exhibit b - 7 and was collusively ante - dated in order to defeat their rights. Exhibit b - 7 was registered on 8th january, 1943, the date of its execution. The finding of both the courts below is that the sale - deed exhibit a - 2 in favour of the plaintiff was not ante - dated but a true and genuine sale - deed executed on 18th september, 1942, by defendants 4 and 5 in favour of the plaintiff for proper consideration. The lower appellate court also held that the 1st defendant was somehow bent upon acquiring the suit property which is adjacent to his. Own and with this object, brought into existence documents for defeating the prior sale - deed exhibit a - 2 in favour of the plaintiff. This finding is amply supported by the evidence, direct and circumstantial. On this finding it follows that exhibit a - 2 should prevail against exhibit b - 7.
(3) Even so it was argued for the appellants that the plaintiff was not entitled to the entire suit property but only to the half share of his vendors defendants 4 and 5, defendants 1 to 3 being entitled to the remaining half share in the events that happened. Before defendants 4 and 5 executed exhibit b - 7 they had acquired the interest of their brothers gopalakrishnamurthy and suryanarayana under exibit b - 6 from a lady, annapurnamma, who, in her turn, had purchased the interest of the two brothers under exhibit 6 - 4, dated 13th september, 1942 and exhibit b - 5, dated 20th september, 1942. The brothers as observed by the lower appellate court, had not scruples about selling their property in succession to different people. Though suryanarayana had executed exhibit a - 7 on 21st august, 1942, giving up his rights in the suit property in favour of the 4th defendant he again professed to sell his interest to annapurnamma, under exhibit b - 5, dated 20th september, 1942.
(4) It is urged by the appellants' learned advocate that exhibit a - 7 was inoperative to convey title to suryanarayana's share in favour of the 4th defendant, because the document was a mere release and that too by one coparcener in favour of another and not in favour of all the other coparceners. Reliance was placed on the decision in subbanna v. Balasubba reddi, (1945) 1 m. L. J. 140 : i. L. R. (1945) mad. 610 (f. B.). In support of the contention. It was there held that a member of a joint hindu family governed by the mitakshara law cannot give or relinquish his interest in the family estate in favour of one of several coparceners if they remain joint in estate. In the present case the brothers had become divided in 1939 and suryanarayana, the eldest brother, succeeded as heir to his deceased father along with the widow and the other sons. As sons had already became divided during their father's lifetime and there was no joint family in existence when exhibit a - 7 was executed, the document though styled as a deed of partition and relinquishment, was really a conveyance of the interese of suryanarayana in favour of his brother the 4th defendant for a price of rs. 100. A document, though styled as a release, could be treated as a conveyance if it appears clearly that the intention of the executant of the document was to transfer his rights. See doraiswami v. Chinniah goundan, (1917) 34 m. L. J. 258.
(5) In the present case such intention is manifest from the terms of exhibit a - 7 and in addition, a price was also paid by the transferee to the transferor. In substance the transaction under exhibit a - 7 was a sale of his one - fifth share in his father's estate by suryanarayana to the 4th defendant. Thereafter suryanarayana had no title to or interest in the suit property and the sale deed, exhibit b - 5, dated 20th september, 1942, executed by him in favour of annapurnamma conveyed nothing to the vendee and the further sale by annapur - namma in favour of defendants 4 and 5 under exhibit b - 6 was equally inoperative to convey to them the interest of suryanarayana in the property. When defendants 4 and 5 sold the property under exhibit a - 2 to the plaintiff on 18th september, 1942, they had acquired the one - fifth share of seetharamamma under exhibit a - 1 and also the one - fifth share of suryanarayana under exhibit a - 2 in addition to their own two - fifths share. They were thus in a position to validly convey and must be taken to have conveyed at least four - fifth share of the property to the plaintiff under exhibit a - 2 on 18th september, 1942. The one - fifth share of gopalakrishnamurthy in the suit properties was purchased by annapurnamma under exhibit b - 4, dated 13th september, 1942 and was conveyed by her to defendants 4 and 5 under exhibit b - 6 dated 8th january, 1943. Defendants 4 and 5 having sold the entire property as absolute owners under exhibit a - 2, dated 18th september, 1942, in favour of the plaintiff, the interest of gopalakrishnamurthy in the property, though it did not vest in them on the date of exhibit a - 2, but was subsequently acquired under exhibit b - 6 on 8th january, 1943, would enure for the benefit of the plaintiff, if section 43 of the transfer of property act applied to the case.
(6) It was argued that section 43 of the transfer of property act could not be invoked by the plaintiff because he knew or should have known when he investigated the title, that the vendors had no power to sell the property as if they were the absolute owners thereof. It is urged that the expression " fraudulently or erroneously represents " in section 43 implies not only that the transferee acts on the representation of the transferor but he is also unaware of the true facts and where the real facts are known to the transferee, there cannot be a "fraudulent or erroneous representation" within the meaning of the section. The argument was further elaborated by treating section 43 as a branch of the law of estoppel and by invoking the rules governing estoppel in pais, particularly the rule that there is no estoppel where the true facts are known to the person pleading estoppel. Reference was made to the decisions in pandiri bangaram v. Subbamju, (1910) i. L. R. 34 mad. 159. Mulraj v. Inder singh, (1925) i. L. R. 48 all. 150. And gangabhai v. Baswant balappa, (1909) i. L. R. 34 bom. 175. In support of these contentions. Many cases are found cited on page 624 of volume i of chitaley and appu rao's commentaries on the transfer of property act in support of the following proposition :
"the expression ' fraudulently or erroneously' (section 43) connotes that the transferee is not aware of the real facts and acts on the representation made. Where, therefore, the real facts were known to the transferee there cannot be a 'fraudulent or erroneous representation ' by the transferor within the meaning of this section."
(7) It cannot be denied that there are decisions supporting this statement of the law by the learned authors. Section 43 does not refer to the state of knowledge of the transferee regarding the true facts relating to the title to the property transferred. Nor does it require that the transferee should have acted in good faith after due inquiry in taking the transfer (compare section 41). Section 115 of the evidence act speaks of a person who has "caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief. " a person who knows the real facts could not be said to have been led to believe a thing to be true and cannot invoke the rule of estoppel under section 115 of the evidence act. There is no warrant for importing this limitation into section 43 of the transfer of property act. Leaving out cases of transfers which are illegal or void or are opposed to public policy, there is no prohibition in law against a person transferring property to which he has no title. Even in the absence of any representation as to title by the seller, section 55 (2) of the transfer of property act implies a convenant for title and the knowledge of the buyer as regards the real state of the title is immaterial. Even if the buyer knew of the transferor's want of title, he is entitled to rely on the covenant for title under section 55 (2) and hold the seller liable in damages for its breach. So also under section 65 (a) of the transfer of property act the knowledge of the mortgagee regarding the defect in the title of the mortgagor is immaterial. To entitle a transferee to the benefit of section 43 there must be a fraudulent or erroneous representation by the transferor that he is authorised to transfer the property which he professes to transfer and the transfer must be for consideration. There is no further requirement that the transferee must have acted in ignorance of the true facts and must have believed in the truth of the representation by the transferor. An erroneous representation does not cease to be such because the transferee knows the true facts any more than a thief who is cought in the act ceased to be a thief. Though it may not deceive the transferee, yet it is erroneous. The representation that the transferor is authorised to transfer may be embodied as a term of the deed or may be implied. A transferee who takes a transfer of property absoutely and pays full consideration, has acted on the representation of the transferor as to title incorporated in the deed of transfer and is entitled to the benefit of section 43 even though, to his knowledge, the title might be defective.
(8) The principle embodied in section 43 was stated by the privy council in two cases. In rajapakse v. Fernando, a. I. R. 1920 p. C. 216. It was observed :
"where a grantor had purported to grant an interest in land which he did not at the time possess but subsequently obtained, the benefit of his subsequent acquisition goes automatically to the earlier grantee, that is, it feeds the estoppel."
(9) In tilakdhari lal v. Khedan lal, (1920) 39 m. L. J. 243 : l. R. 47 i. A. 239 : i. L. R. 48 cal. 1 (p. C.). The law was thus stated :
"if a man who has no title whatever to property grants it by a conveyance which in form would carry the legal estate and he subsequently acquires an interest sufficient to satisfy the grant, the estate instantly passes. In such a case there is nothing on which the second grant could operate in prejudice to the first."
(10) In these statements of the law the transferee's knowledge of the facts relating to title is not treated as material. Section 43 makes a departure from the english law and protects the rights of subsequent transferees in good faith and for consideration without notice of the rights of the prior transferee. The appellants do not fall within this category. It is needless to consider the origin of the rule embodied in section 43, whether it is based on the english rule of estoppel by deed or on the rule of "title feeding the estoppel" or on the maxim that "equity treats that as done which ought to be done. " the language of section 43, is, in my opinion, plain and explicit. I am unable to follow mulraj v. Inder singh, (1925) i. L. R. 48 all. 150. Or to hold that it is only where the transferee had been led into the belief that the transferor had title and was not aware of the true facts relating to the title, that section 43 applies. The contrary was ruled by a full bench in parmanand v. Champalal, a. I. R. 1956 all. 225 (f. B.). And i am in respectful agreement with the decision of the full bench. The observations in pandiri bangaram v. Subbaraju, (1910) i. L. R. 34 mad. 159. With regard to the principle underlying section 43 are obiter in view of the finding that the transferee paid consideration only for the one - third share of the transferor and not for an one - half share. The learned judges, however, went on to observe :
"the well - known maxim of the law to which effect is given in section 43 is interest feeds estoppel that section only enunciates a rule which is an illustration of the general principles of estoppel not confined to the law of evidence, but extending to the region of substantive law."
(11) It is not legitimate to import the considerations governing personal estoppel under section 115 of the evidence act into section 43 of the transfer of property act. In poulton v. Moore, l. R. (1916) 1 k. B. 400, 414, 415. Phillimore, l. J. , observed :
"with regard to the question of estoppel by recital in a deed, it is truly said that the law of estoppel in the case of real property is different from the law of estoppel as between persons. It is the law which operates when a grantee of land has had a conveyance of the whole interest in the land from a grantor who himself at the time had only a partial interest in the land. The former then has a right, when the grantor gets the entire interest in the land, to say as against all the world that that interest passed to him. It does not then depend upon the mere representation by the grantor that he had the whole interest. The estate feeds the estoppel and therefore ceases to be an estate by estoppel only and becomes an interest."
(12) Under the doctrine of title or interest feeding the estoppel, knowledge of the truth appears to be material only when the transfer is void and invalid in law and not otherwise. As already stated, a transfer of property by a person without title is not prohibited by law though it may not be effective to vest the ownership of the property in the transferee. In holroyd v. Marshall, (1862) 10 h. L. C. 191. Lord westbury stated the rule thus :
"if a vendor or mortgagor agreed to sell or mortgage property, real or personal, of which he is not possessed at the time and receives consideration for the contract and afterwards becomes possessed of property answering the description in the contract, there is no doubt that a court of equity will compel him to perform the contract and that the contract would, in equity, transfer the beneficial interest to the mortgagee or purchaser immediately on the property being acquired."
(13) In the application of this doctrine of equity it is immaterial that the transferee knew the truth that the transferor had no authority to transfer the interest which he purported to transfer. Whether you approach the interpretation of section 43 in the light of the english rule of estoppel by deed or of the doctrine of interest feeding the estoppel or of the equitable rule that equity regards that as done which ought to be done, the result is the same. In my opinion, it is not a condition of the applicability of section 43 that the transferee should have had no knowledge or means of knowledge of the factual position regarding the title of the transferor. If a fraudulent or erroneous representation that the transferor is authorised to transfer the property is incorporated in the deed of transfer and the transferee accepts the transfer on those terms and pays the full consideration, the case falls within the protection given by section 43 even though the transferee has knowledge of the facts relating to the title. Lastly i must observe that, in view of the opinion i have formed somewhat at variance with that expressed in several reported cases, i would have referred the case to a division bench if it had been established that the plaintiff was in fact aware of the defect in the transferors' title, namely, that the one - fifth share of gopalakrishnamurli did not belong to his vendors on the date of exhibit a - 2. All that the learned advocate for the appellants urged was that if the purchaser had made a careful inquiry into the family pedigree and had carried out a critical investigation of the title of the property, he might have discovered that the vendors who asserted an absolute title in themselves and purported to convey it, had no right to an one - fifth share therein. Section 43 does not require that the transferee should have made an independent enquiry or taken reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer the property before claiming the benefit of the section and no decision has gone to that length. The contrast between the terms of section 41 and those of section 43 is significant. The transferee is entitled to the protection of section 43 if he had acted on the erroneous or fraudulent representation of the transferor and paid consideration for the transfer. For these reasons the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. Second appeal dismissed.