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citation codes
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  • section 87 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (19 of 1951)
  • provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • provisions of Sec.3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act
  • section 10 (d) of the Indian Telegraph Act (13 of 1885)
  • Section 3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • clauses (3), (4) and (5) of section 16
  • Madras Civil Courts Act
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 87 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (19 of 1951)
  • provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • provisions of Sec.3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act
  • section 10 (d) of the Indian Telegraph Act (13 of 1885)
  • Section 3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • clauses (3), (4) and (5) of section 16
  • Madras Civil Courts Act
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition under Article 227 of the Constitution challenged an order awarding compensation under the Indian Telegraph Act (specifically section 10(d)). The factual matrix as stated in the opinion is:

  • The Electricity Department laid electric transmission lines across the petitioner's fields (survey nos. 267/3 and 268/1), necessitating cutting of trees on those lands.
  • The trees cut (and taken away by the Electricity Department) included 32 coconut trees, three babul trees, one date tree, one palmyra tree and the branches of a large mango tree (the Additional District Judge found 32 coconut trees and seven large mango branches were cut).
  • The Telegraph Act permits such interference but provides for payment of "full compensation" for damage caused (section 10(d)). The Electricity Department initially offered Rs.250; the petitioner claimed Rs.8,203 and made an application to the District Judge as provided by the statute.
  • The District Judge transferred the proceedings to an Additional District Judge who, after considering evidence (including the karnam's evidence), assessed compensation at Rs.1,000 plus statutory interest at 6% per annum from the date the trees were felled.
  • The petitioner challenged that order by filing the present petition under Article 227, raising two principal questions (one concerning the legal basis of the compensation assessment and the other the jurisdictional competence of the Additional District Judge to determine compensation under section 16 of the Telegraph Act).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the compensation awarded by the Additional District Judge constituted "full compensation" within the meaning of section 10(d) of the Indian Telegraph Act and whether it was determined on a correct legal basis.
  2. Whether a determination of compensation by an Additional District Judge can, in law, be regarded as a determination by a District Judge within the meaning of section 16 of the Indian Telegraph Act (i.e., whether the District Judge's function under section 16 is persona designata and non-delegable or whether it can be exercised by an Additional District Judge as part of the District Court).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The legal basis adopted by the Additional District Judge for computing compensation (deduction from deterioration of property value via a market-value comparison based on land with a specified number of trees) was improper.
  • The correct method, the petitioner contended, was capitalisation of the annual net income from the trees at ten years' purchase (relying on Shunmuga Velayuda v. Collector of Tanjore, AIR 1926 Mad 945), a method used under the Land Acquisition Act.
  • On jurisdiction, the petitioner argued that the reference in section 16 to "District Judge" was as persona designata (i.e., the specific judicial officer) and therefore the District Judge could not delegate the authority to an Additional District Judge; alternatively, that the Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to try and dispose of such a case under section 16.

Respondent's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The respondent's counsel raised a preliminary point that the petitioner did not object to the jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge when the case was taken up before that Judge, and therefore the petitioner was estopped from raising the jurisdictional objection after an adverse result.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shunmuga Velayuda v. Collector of Tanjore, AIR 1926 Mad 945 Cited for the method of assessing compensation by capitalising annual net income (ten years' purchase) — decision under the Land Acquisition Act. The court noted this authority arises under the Land Acquisition Act, which contains express assessment provisions not present in the Telegraph Act; it concluded such decisions are not an obligatory guide for determination under the Telegraph Act.
Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hedge v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, (AIR 1960 SC 137) (1960 SCJ 1065) High Court's supervisory power (Art.227 / s.115 CPC) cannot be used to correct every mistake of law; errors not apparent on record cannot be corrected as an error apparent on the face of the record. The court relied on this principle to hold that the petitioner’s first challenge (alleging an incorrect legal basis for compensation) did not merit interference under Article 227 because the alleged error was not an error apparent on the face of the record.
National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Post Master General, 1913 AC 546 Where statute refers matters to determination by a "court of record" with no further provision, the necessary implication is that the Court will determine matters as a court and retain incidents of such jurisdiction (including right of appeal). Quoted to support the proposition that a statutory reference to the District Judge is a reference to the District Court acting as a civil court, not to a functionary acting in a personal capacity.
Abdul Aziz v. Punjab Government, AIR 1942 Lah 186 When a Court normally consists of a single judicial officer, a reference to that officer by title in a statute is often intended to refer to the court itself. Cited to support the conclusion that the reference to "District Judge" in the Telegraph Act should be treated as a reference to the District Court rather than an individual acting persona designata.
B. Krishna Brahman v. D. Chenchi Reddy, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 129 Where an officer is selected to act in his private/individual capacity he acts as persona designata; where duties are entrusted to him as the presiding officer he acts as the court and the incidents of court jurisdiction apply. Used to summarise the legal position distinguishing a persona designata from exercising functions as the presiding officer of a court; supported the court's view that section 16 contemplates action by the District Court.
Mahabaleswarappa v. Gopalaswami, AIR 1935 Mad 673 (Earlier Madras High Court rulings on persona designata issues; direction unclear in the opinion.) Referenced as a prior Madras decision which was not favourable to the petitioner’s position; the opinion did not elaborate a distinct principle from it for present purposes.
S.A. First Grade Pleader, Coimbatore, 1940-1 Mad LJ 259; AIR 1940 Mad 370 Interpreting Section 3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act: an Additional District Judge may lawfully deal with matters which come within the province of the District Judge under that Act or any other law. Cited to support the proposition that an Additional District Judge can lawfully exercise powers of the District Judge in matters falling to the District Court, including matters under special enactments.
Maturi Umamaheswararao v. Khota Kamraju, 1957 Andh LT 814 Expression "Subordinate Judge" is wide enough to include both principal and Additional Subordinate Judge. Cited by analogy to support that statutory references to a judicial office (here "District Judge") may include additional judges occupying the same court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in two discrete parts corresponding to the two issues raised by the petitioner.

Analysis of the Compensation-Basis Challenge

  1. The court noted that the Telegraph Act authorises the interference (civil trespass) but preserves the victim's right to "full compensation" under section 10(d) and prescribes that disputes as to sufficiency of compensation be determined by the District Judge whose determination is final.
  2. The petitioner argued that the correct and dependable legal basis for assessing compensation was capitalization of annual net income (ten years' purchase) as applied under the Land Acquisition Act (citing Shunmuga Velayuda). The court observed that the Land Acquisition Act is a self-contained code containing specific provisions as to mode of assessment which the Telegraph Act does not replicate.
  3. The court concluded that while decisions under other special statutes (like the Land Acquisition Act) could be of some assistance, they are not a mandatory guide for the Telegraph Act; assessment of full compensation under the Telegraph Act will depend on the particular circumstances of each case.
  4. Importantly, the court relied on the doctrine contained in Satyanarayan Hedge (cited) to hold that the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is not a substitute for appellate review of every error of law — particularly where the error is not apparent on the face of the record and requires extended reasoning or factual evaluation. On that basis, the court held the petitioner's first point did not merit interference.

Analysis of the Jurisdictional Challenge (Persona Designata vs. Court; Inclusion of Additional District Judge)

  1. The court examined the language of section 16 clauses (3), (4) and (5) of the Telegraph Act and noted textual indicators that the Act contemplates the District Judge acting as the civil court (references to the "court of the District Judge", deposits into the court, and other procedural features such as court-fee and process under section 34 of the Act).
  2. Applying the concept of "persona designata," the court explained the distinction between a person singled out in their personal capacity and a reference to an official acting in their judicial/court capacity. The court concluded that where a judicial officer is intended to act in the judicial capacity as presiding officer of the civil court, the statute's reference is to the court (and its incidents) rather than to that officer in a personal capacity.
  3. The court relied on authorities (National Telephone Co.; Abdul Aziz) to support the proposition that references to a judicial officer by title in statutory drafting often mean the court itself where the court normally consists of a single judicial officer.
  4. On whether "District Judge" includes "Additional District Judge," the court considered Section 3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act (which permits appointment of Additional District Judges and authorises them to discharge functions of the District Judge and exercise the same powers) and relevant case law (Full Bench decision in S.A. First Grade Pleader, Coimbatore). The court concluded that Section 3-A allows assignment of duties arising under other laws to Additional District Judges and that such Additional District Judges exercise the same powers as the District Judge in discharging those functions.
  5. The court addressed the argument based on the General Clauses Act and observed that an Additional District Judge is a judge of the principal civil court of original jurisdiction; the use of the indefinite article "a" in clause (5) of section 16 was noted as further indication that determination by "a District Judge" (i.e., any District Judge) is contemplated.
  6. By analogy to prior authority concerning expressions encompassing additional judges (Maturi Umamaheswararao), and noting Article 236 of the Constitution (as mentioned in the opinion) which includes Additional Sessions Judges in the expression "District Judge," the court held that the expression "District Judge" in section 16 of the Telegraph Act includes an Additional District Judge.
  7. On the respondent's estoppel point (failure to object to jurisdiction before the Additional District Judge), the court observed that if the Additional District Judge had lacked jurisdiction, acquiescence would not confer it; however, having found that the Additional District Judge had jurisdiction, the estoppel point was unnecessary to sustain the petition. Ultimately, the court held the Additional District Judge had jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Revision dismissed. The petition under Article 227 was dismissed with costs.

Implications (as discussed in the opinion):

  • The court affirmed that challenges to the legal basis of a compensation assessment under the Telegraph Act may not be amenable to correction in plenary supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 where the alleged error is not apparent on the face of the record and requires extended factual or legal reasoning (applying the principle from Satyanarayan Hedge).
  • The court concluded that the reference to "District Judge" in section 16 of the Telegraph Act is a reference to the District Court acting in its civil capacity and is not an appointment of the District Judge as a persona designata to perform a non-delegable personal function.
  • The court held that an Additional District Judge is included within the meaning of "District Judge" for the purposes of section 16 — in particular because Section 3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act permits assignment of the District Judge's functions to Additional District Judges who exercise the same powers as the District Judge; accordingly, the Additional District Judge lawfully exercised jurisdiction to determine the compensation in this case.
  • Direct practical consequence: the compensation award of Rs.1,000 (with statutory interest) made by the Additional District Judge stands; the petition seeking to set it aside was dismissed. The opinion limits interference under Article 227 in the circumstances outlined and recognises the legitimacy of delegation to Additional District Judges in this statutory context.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the matters, arguments, authorities and conclusions expressly set out in the provided judicial opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the text of the opinion have been introduced.

    Yeleswarapu Ramachandra Rao v. State Of Madras (Now Andhra Pradesh) And Another

    Judgement

    - This petition under Art.227 of the Constitution of India raises two questions: one is a mixed question of law and fact and the other which is of some importance is a question relating to jurisdiction. The first question is whether the compensation awarded is full compensation within the meaning of section 10 (d) of the Indian Telegraph Act (13 of 1885) (which will hereafter be called, the Act) and is determined on a correct legal basis. The second question is, whether the determination of such compensation by an Additional District Judge is in the eye of law, a determination by a District Judge within the meaning of section 16 of the Act.

    2. The brief facts of the case are these: The electric department laid electric transmission lines through the fields of the petitioner and also others. The trees under the said line as a result had to be cut. By this act, the petitioner happened to suffer damage to some of his trees in survey numbers 267/3 and 268/1 The trees alleged to be so cut were in all 32 coconut trees, three babul trees and a date and a palmyra tree and the branches of a big mango tree. After they were cut, they were taken away by the Electricity Department. The Telegraph Act, of course, legalises civil trespass of the kind but provides for payment of full compensation for the damage done. The petitioner was informed that the concerned authorities had fixed a sum of Rs.250/- for the trees cut. But having regard to the magnitude of the damage the sum offered, in the opinion of the petitioner, was but paltry. As the dispute relating to the sufficiency of compensation was justiciable even under the clear provisions of the Act in the forum prescribed by the Act, the petitioner, in compliance with the statute, made an application to the District Judge claiming compensation in the sum of Rs.8,203/-.

    3. The District Judge transferred the proceedings to the file of the Additional District Judge who on the evidence adduced, came to the conclusion that 32 coconut trees and 7 big branches of mango tree of the petitioner were cut and the trees so cut were taken away by the Electricity department. He further found that each coconut tree thus cut was expected to yield about 100 coconuts at the maximum per year and that these trees were about 40 years old and would, in the normal circumstances, yield fruits for about 20 years more. Having thus determined the number of trees cut and their expected period and extent of yield, he proceeded to assess their market-value. On the evidence of the karnam, he came to the conclusion that the market-value of Ac. 1-00 of land with 60 or 70 such trees thereon was Rs.2,000/-. On this basis, he proposed to determine the compensation. As the trees cut were only 32 and the land remained with the petitioner as ever, he held that a sum of Rs.1000/- could constitute full compensation for the damage sustained by the plaintiff as a result of felling the trees. In the result, he gave a decree for Rs.1000/- besides the statutory interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date when the trees were cut by the respondent. It is this order that is called in question by the petitioner.

    4. Sri Balaparameswari Rao, the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner contends that the basis adopted cannot be said to be a proper legal basis for assessment of compensation in such eases. According to him, the true dependable basis can be found only in the method of capitalisation of annual net income from the trees at ten years purchase. In support of this contention he relies on Shunmuga Velayuda v. collector of Tanjore, AIR 1926 Mad 945(2). That was a case under Land Acquisition Act which is a self-contained enactment embodying also provisions concerning the mode of assessment of compensation. The Telegraph Act, however, makes no such provision. All that it says is that the petitioner is entitled to full compensation and this compensation, on dispute being raised, shall be determined by the District Judge and his determination shall be final.

    Thus the Act recognises the civil rights and leaves the dispute as to sufficiency of compensation to the determination of a specified civil court and subject to the proviso therein attaches finality to its decision. If at all there is any restriction imposed by this enactment on the enforcement of this ordinary civil right, it is only to this extent. Otherwise, the right of the party to get redress is unimpaired. He has, as ever his right to get his full compensation, determined on the established principles of law and justice. So then, the provisions of any other special enactment in the matter of determination of Compensation may be only of some assistance but not a sure and full guide. Reliance therefore exclusively on decisions and cases under Land Acquisition Act for purposes of assessment of full compensation for damage within the meaning of the Telegraph Act may not be of great help. Much must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case.

    In the present case, the learned Judge sought to assess the damage incurred by the plaintiff by taking into account the deterioration of the property in value by reason of the act which resulted in damage. I do not think that could on no account be a legal basis for determination of compensation for the damage complained of. Assuming that there could be also other basis on which the computation could possibly be made, more appropriately, this being a petition under Art.227 of the Constitution, the power of superintendence of this Court would not extend to the correction of such errors. In Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hedge v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, 1960 SCJ 1065 at p.107: (AIR 1960 SC 137 at p.142), it was observed thus:

    "However wide it may be than the provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is well established that the High Court cannot in exercise of its power under that section assume appellate powers to correct every mistake of law. Here there is no question of assumption of excessive jurisdiction or refusal to exercise jurisdiction or any irregularity or illegality in the procedure or any breach of any rule of natural justice. If anything it may merely be an erroneous decision which, the error not being apparent ton the face of the record, cannot be corrected by the High Court in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Art.227."
    It was further observed:

    "An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record."

    In view of this pronouncement, the first point raised does not merit acceptance.

    5. Now as regards the second point, the argument is two-fold. Firstly, it is contended that the reference to District Judge in section 16 being made as persona designata, the District Judge could not delegate his authority to the Additional District Judge. The second contention is that even otherwise, when the law enjoins that the District Judge should determine the dispute, Additional District Judge could not have any jurisdiction to try and dispose of the case.

    6. Now the matter largely turns upon the question whether the District Judge while exercising the powers under Sec.16 of the Act was intended to act as a persona designata and not as a court of civil jurisdiction. A reference to clauses (3), (4) and (5) of section 16 may be appropriate in this behalf which read thus:

    "x x x x

    (3) If any dispute arises concerning the sufficiency a of the compensation to be paid under section 10, clause (d), it shall, on application for that purpose by either of the disputing parties to the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the property is situate, be determined by him.

    (4) If any dispute arises as to the persons entitled to receive compensation or as to the proportions in which the persons interested are entitled to share in it, the telegraph authority may pay into Court of the District Judge such amount as he deems sufficient, or, whether all the disputing parties having in writing admitted the amount tendered to be sufficient or the amount has been determined under sub-section (3), that amount; and the District Judge, after giving notice to the parties and hearing such of them as desire to be heard, shall determine the persons entitled to receive the compensation or as the case may be, the proportions in which the persons interested are entitled to share in it.

    (5) Every determination of a dispute by a District Judge under sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) shall be final:

    Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect the right of any person to recover by suit the whole or any part of any compensation paid by the Telegraph authorities from the person who has received the same."

    It may be noticed that the reference in the above provision in clause (3) is to District Judge", in clause (4) it is to the court of the District Judge whereas in clause (5) it is to "a District Judge".

    The expression persona designata connotes a person pointed out by name or other personal description in contra-distinction to one whose identity is to be ascertained by the office which he holds. So then, where a person is indicated in a Statute not by name but by an official designation, a question will arise whether the intention was to single him out as a persona designata, that is, as an individual, the designation being merely a further description of him or it was that he would cease to be the person so indicated on losing his official designation. Surely if he be a judicial officer as in this case and is intended by the statute to act not otherwise than in a judicial capacity or court of civil jurisdiction, he cannot come within the expression "persona designata" so that he may, irrespective of his continuance in office, perform the duty. Whether the intention is one or the other has to be gathered from the words used, nature of the functions to be performed and object and purpose of the statute.

    7. As already pointed out, the Telegraph Act legalises civil trespass of the kind but preserves intact the right of the person to be fully compensated for the damage resulting from infringement of his civil right. It however so far as the determination of compensation is concerned prescribes the forum and the manner in which it is to be moved and declares its decision as final. The ordinary right of a civil suit, if at all, may be deemed to be affected only to this extent. Thus, ,the determination of compensation under the Act must be by the District Judge, a Judge of the principal civil court of original civil jurisdiction. It is possible that even under the ordinary law certain cases though not all, having regard to their pecuniary value may have to be instituted normally in such a court. But what is more significant is that this law contemplates an application and not a suit for getting redress which indeed is a departure from the ordinary rule. This, obviously, is intended to get justice without much expense.

    Further, as already observed, the provision attaches finality to the determination by the District Judge evidently to obviate unnecessary delay without any risk of failure of justice. Certainly the decision by a higher court in matters so simple as these affords full protection against such risks. Thus it is manifest that the determination of civil rights of the kind being normally the duty of the civil courts, the Act has for its object and purpose getting disputes as to the sufficiency of compensation determined finally by the principal court of original jurisdiction without much expense to the parties. The language of the section on its proper construction also makes it clear that reference to the District Judge therein is in no other capacity than that of a civil Court. As a matter of fact, in sub-clause (4) of the same section, there is a reference to the court of the District Judge.

    It is provided in that section that in case of dispute as to persons entitled to receive compensation or as to the relative shares of various persons interested, the Telegraph authority may deposit in the court of the District Judge such amount as be deems sufficient or the amount admitted in writing to he sufficient by the disputing party. It further provides that the amounts determined by the District Judge as full compensation also may be paid into the court of the District Judge. It is reasonably clear that reference to the District Judge is in no manner apart from his capacity as a civil court of principal jurisdiction. It may further be noticed that the Act provides for payment of court fee and issue of process in its section 34. This is a further indication that the ordinary machinery of a court of civil jurisdiction was being made available for the settlement of dispute. As observed in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Post Master General, 1913 AC 546, by Lord Parker of Waddington:

    "Where by statute matters are referred to the determination of a court of record with no further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the Court will determine the matters as a court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged, but all the incidents of such jurisdiction, including the right of appeal from its decision, remain the same."
    But these observations, it is argued, are applicable only to cases where reference is made in explicit terms to the court and not to the particular judicial officer and that a distinction should be drawn between a reference to the District Judge and that to the District Court. Whatever may be said of such a distinction, I find none in the abovementioned provisions having regard to the clear intent of the Act which I have set out in the above paragraph at some length. An argument of the king. in a case under the Telegraph Act was advanced before a Bench of the Lahore High Court in Abdul Aziz v. Punjab Government Lahore, AIR 1942 Lah 186 at p.187. Justice Beckett who spoke for the court observed:

    "I think, it may be safely said, however, that when a Court normally consists of a single judicial officer, as the Court of a District Judge does, it is quite an ordinary practice in the drafting of Indian statutes for a reference to be made to that officer under his particular title when the intention is to refer to the court;..........."

    With respect, I find myself in complete agreement with the above observation. That apart, as already discussed when on a true construction of the provisions of the Act it is abundantly clear that the intention of the Act was to obtain determination of civil rights of the kind by a civil court, the use of expressions "the District Judge" or "a District Judge" who are the presiding officers of the District Court, does not militate against any inference as to their being used as synonym for the District Court and such officers on that account cannot be said to have been selected to exercise the powers of a persona designata.

    8. The learned counsel cited several cases dealing with the expression "persona designata" but none of them relate to assessment of compensation for breach of a civil right. Most of them relate to election or industrial matters and are not of much assistance for our purpose and therefore need not be discussed here. In the cases cited, there are also some rulings of the Madras High Court prior to the decision in Mahabaleswarappa v. Gopalaswami, AIR 1935 Mad 673 which certainly is not in his favour. AIR 1942 Lah 186 is the only authority on the question under the Indian Telegraph Act. That is a decision by the Lahore High Court and is against the petitioner. In B. Krishna Brahman v. D. Chenchi Reddy, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 129 at p.132 the question arose in relation to a Magistrate whether while acting under section 87 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (19 of 1951) he was acting as persona designata or by virtue of his office. After review of case law it was observed thus:

    "The effect of all these decisions is that if the Presiding Officer was selected to act in a particular matter in his private or individual capacity he acts as a persona designata and not in his capacity as a Judge; and if additional duties are entrusted to him as the Presiding Officer of that Court he discharges them as a Court attracting all the incidence of such jurisdiction such as appeal, revision, etc., attached to it. When new functions are assigned to him, his jurisdiction as Presiding Officer is enlarged quite dissimilar to the situation where the officer is constituted a special authority and does not act in the discharge of those functions as the Presiding Officer."

    That with respect, correctly sums up the position. Thus, on the clear language and intention of the provisions, the nature of the duties, and the purpose of the Act that it intended to get the civil rights letermined by the civil court of the rank of a District Judge finally, it admits of little doubt that the reference to District Judge in Sec.16 is not in his personal capacity or as an individual, but as a court. As a matter of fact, sub-clauses (3) (4) and (5) of section 16 of the Act unequivecally point to the fact that the determination by a District Judge is a determination by the civil court.

    9. That being the case, the next question that arises is, whether the expression "the District Judge" would include "an Additional District Judge". When it is once clear that the reference to District Judge is in fact a reference to District court as normally that court consists of a single Judicial Officer, whatever function the District Judge was intended to perform could also be lawfully delegated to the Additional District Judge who is a Judge of the same court. Section 3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act is clear on this point and reads thus :

    "When in the opinion of the High Court, the state of business pending before the Judge of any District Court (hereinafter called the District Judge) so requires, the State Government may appoint one or more Additional District Judges to that Court for such period as they may deem necessary, the Additional District Judge so appointed shall discharge all or any of the functions of the District Judge under this Act or any other law for the time being in force which the District Judge may assign to them, and, in the discharge of those functions, they shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge."

    This provision permits the assignment of the duties not only in cases ordinarily instituted in the civil court but also in cases where they are instituted under any particular law before the District Judge. In either case, the District Judge has power to assign them to the Additional District Judge, who thus seised of the case can lawfully dispose it of as a Judge of the District Court as contemplated by Section 3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act. The question whether an Additional District Judge can thus lawfully act in matters which are within the domain of the District Judge under special laws incidentally came up for consideration before the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the matter of S.A. First Grade Pleader, Coimbatore, 1940-1 Mad LJ 259 : (AIR 1940 Mad 370) which arose under the Legal Practictioners Act. The learned Chief Justice who spoke for the court, after referring to the provisions of Sec.3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act observed thus:

    "Therefore an Additional District Judge may lawfully deal with matters which come within the province of the District Judge under the Act or any other law for the time being in force."

    It is argued that the term district judge has not been defined in the Telegraph Act and that expression as defined in the General Clauses Act means the Judge of the principal civil court of original jurisdiction and therefore it does not include the Additional District Judge and that the Madras Civil Courts Act will have no application to these cases. This argument also is devoid of force. It admits of little argument that Additional District Judge also is "a" if not "the" only Judge of the principal court of original jurisdiction. When once it is held that being a civil right the intention of the Act was to get the matter determined by the District Court and Section 3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act permits assignment of cases filed under any other law to the Additional District Judge and gives the same status to the Additional District Judge, the definition under Sec.3(17) of the General Clauses Act must be taken to include the Additional District Judge. Nothing in the context of the Act is in any manner repugnant to this meaning.

    As a matter of fact, it may be seen that in sub-clause (5) of Sec.16 of the Telegraph Act indefinite article "a" and not definite article "the" in relation to District Judge is used. In other words, the determination of cases under the Telegraph Act can be by any District Judge. This is a clear indication that it is not necessary that the determination should be only by the principal District Judge and not by an Additional District Judge. In these circumstances it is manifest that the expression "the District Judge" used in the Telegraph Act includes the Additional District Judge. That apart, when the reference to the District Judge in that Act is virtually to the District Court, the Madras Civil Courts Act will have its operation unless there is a specific provision to the contrary. Above all, the Constitution of India which now holds the field includes in Article 236 an Additional Sessions Judge also in the expression "the District Judge" It follows that the expression "District Judge" is wide enough to cover the Additional District Judge.

    A similar question had arisen in relation to the expression "the Subordinate Judge" in one of the cases decided by this Court. It was contended there that the expression subordinate Judge does not include Additional Subordinate Judge. In a decision rendered by Satyanarayana Raju, J. in Maturi Umamaheswararao v. Khota Kamraju, 1957 Andh LT 814 it was held that the expression "subordinate Judge is wide enough to include the principal as well as an Additional Subordinate Judge. For the reasons shown above, the plea that the Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to determine the compensation cannot be accepted.

    10. A preliminary ground to render the above plea itself unentertainable was originally raised by the counsel for the respondent on the basis that since the petitioner took no such objection as to the jurisdiction before the Additional District Judge when the case was taken up he is estopped from taking that objection after the result has gone against him. I do not see any substance in this point. If the Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction, certainly consent of the parties could not confer any. If that was not a validly constituted tribunal or court, acquiescence in the proceedings will not turn it into a lawful tribunal. In other words, if it was illegal at its inception, it will remain so till the end. But as already observed, the Additional District Judge had jurisdiction in the matter. This petition would therefore fail and it is dismissed with costs.

    Revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    Yeleswarapu Ramachandra Rao v. State Of Madras (Now Andhra Pradesh) And Another
    (Feb 22, 1961)