(1) This is a petition to revise an order passed by the district judge of nellore under section 12 - b of the madras buildings (lease and rent control) act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act') , as amended by act viii of 1951 reversing the appellate order of the subordinate judge, nellore.
(2) The respondents are the tenants of a godown situate in kavali, of which the petitioner is the landlord. An application for eviction was filed by the petitioner before the rent controller on two grounds : (1) that the tenants had made wilful default in respect of the rents for the godown from 1st july, 1949 to 31st may, 1951; and (2) that the godown was required for carrying on the landlord's own business. The rent controller held against the petitioner on both the points, and thereupon the petitioner preferred an appeal to the subordinate judge, nellore, who is the appellate authority under the act. The appellate authority reversed the decision of the rent controller and directed an eviction of the godown by the respondents holding on both the points in favour of the landlord. The district judge, nellore, before whom the tenants preferred a revision, reversed the decision of the appellate authority. It is the order of the district judge that is the subject - matter of this revision petition. Mr. Ch. Ramakrishna rao, in a clear argument, contended that the district judge exceeded the jurisdiction vested in him under section 12 - b of the act by constituting himself a court of appeal ; that the findings arrived at by the district judge are erroneous and that therefore this court ought to interfere under section 115 of the code of civil procedure.
(3) Section 12 - b of the act which empowers the high court and the district court to revise the orders of the subordinate tribunals, was inserted into the enactment by means of amending act viii of 1951, and it came into force on the 1st of may, 1951 having been published in the official gazette on that date, though it received the assent of the governor on 21st april, 1951. Section i2 - b runs as follows :
" (1) the high court, in the case of an authority empowered by section 9 to execute an order, or of an appellate authority empowered under section 12, and functioning in the presidency - town and the district court concerned in the case of any such authority so empowered and functioning in a district may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceeding taken under this act by such authority ft r the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit."
(4) The words 'legality, regularity or propriety of the order' have been used in section 64 - a of the motor vehicles act. Similar words are found used in section 57 of the madras co - operative societies act. In section 435 of the criminal procedure code, analogous provisions are found though the words used in the section are 'correctness, legality or propriety'. Are the powers of revision vested in the high court and district courts under section 12 - b of the act wider than those conferred on the high court under section 115 of the code of civil procedure? under section 115, civil procedure code, the powers of the high court can only be invoked in cases in which no appeal lies to the high court provided the case has been decided by any court subordinate to such high court, and such subordinate court appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or to have failed to exerise a jurisdiction vested in it by law, or to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
(5) In the exercise of revisional powers, it is not the province of the high court to enter into the merits of the evidence; it has only to see whether the requirements of the law have been duly and properly obeyed by the court whose order is the subject of revision and whether the irregularity as to failure or exercise of jurisdiction is such as to justify interference with the order. If the high court finds that the conditions set out in the section are satisfied, it should not substitute its own appreciation of evidence, or its own judgment thereon, for the determination of the inferior court.
(6) But the words 'legality, regularity, or propriety of the order' used in section 12 - b of the act are of wider import. Construing similar words used in section 64 - a of the motor vehicles act, a bench of this court in kesava rao v. Subbaraju, (1956) an. W. R. 85 : 1956 a. L. T. 67, observed thus :
"'legality' and 'regularity' are well understood terms and well recognised grounds of judicial interference on an appeal or revision. An order is illegal if it is opposed to any enactment or any rule having the force of law. It is irregular if the procedure followed is in violation of principles of natural justice and fairplay. The term 'propriety' is however of wide import and there might be honest differences of opinion about the 'propriety' of an order even though it is in conformity with law and within the powers of the authority making the order."
(7) Construing the scope of the words, 'legality, regularity or propriety' used in section 64 - a of the motor vehicles act, in raman and raman, ltd. V. Government of madras, (1956) s. C. J. 368 : (1956) 1 m. L. J. (s. C.) 169 : 1956 an. W. R. (s. C.) 169 (s. C.) , their lordships of the supreme court pointed out that by enacting section 64 - a, the legislature clearly intended that the state government should have the powers to intervene, if it was satisfied that the order in question was either illegal, irregular or improper. In govindarajulu chetti v. Balasundara naicker, (1953) 1 m. L. J. (n. R. C.) 33, mr. Justice raghava rao held that with the difference in the language that undoubtedly exists between section 12 - b of madras act xxv of 1949 as amended by act viii of 1951 and the language of section 115, civil procedure code, it cannot be said that a revision petition under section 12 - b of the act is canvasable only within the strict limits of section 115, civil procedure code ; but that it is equally clear that because section 12 - b is wider than the language of section 115, civil procedure code, it cannot be said that it is in effect and in substance a reproduction of the appeal provision which existed prior to the amendment. The learned judge iurther observed thus : -
"the distinction between revisability and appealability is a thing well - defined in actual practice. The legislature did not intend to confer a right of appeal in the strict sense of that expression when it conferred a power of revision upon the high court in the language that it employed in section 12 - b of the act. If an order can be held to be improper on the evidence on record the high court will be doing the right thing in setting aside the order of the court below."
(8) The powers of revision given under section 12 - b of the act are certainly wider than those conferred on the high court under section 115 of the code of civil procedure. The words ' legality, regularity, or propriety of the order ' are wide enough to cover both questions of law and fact and go far beyond the revisional jurisdiction strictly so called. Bearing in mind the fact that the jurisdiction conferred under section 12 - b is of wider import, i will now examine the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The first of these contentions is that the district judge erred in interfering with the decision of the appellate authority holding that there was wilful default on the part of the tenants. Whether a default is wilful or not, is a mixed question of fact and law and a finding is to be arrived at on the facts coupled with the legal inference to be drawn from the facts. The ground on which the appellate authority held that default had been committed was that the tenants remitted not only the amount of rent that accrued due but also something more in advance and that the landlord was under no obligation to accept rents paid very much in advance inasmuch as such acceptance might be construed as willingness on her part to recognise them as her tenants for the entire period covered by the rent irrespective of all other considerations. While the appellate authority thought that by refusing the amounts sent to her by money order, she made it known to the tenants that she was not prepared to receive any rents in excess of the amount due to her at the time of the remittance, the district judge inferred from the proved facts that there was nothing in the landlord's conduct in refusing the money orders to indicate on what ground such refusal was based, and also that if the landlord took exception to such payments of lump sums in advance, she could have intimated the tenants accordingly. Having regard to the fact that the tenants always remitted not only the amount which represented the rent that accrued due but also something more, the learned district judge concluded that it did not mean thai the landlord was justified in refusing to receive the amount and in any view it could not be said that there was wilful default on the part of the tenants. This inference drawn by the district judge, it cannot be said, is an unreasonable or improper one.
(9) Then it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the district judge went wrong on the question as to whether the landlord was justified in pleading that she required the godown for carrying on her own business. Here again, the learned district judge, on a consideration of all the material circumstances, held that this ground was an after thought and did not conform to the averments made in the petition itself, observing however that if the landlord had started a new business for which she could justifiably demand recovery of possession of the godown, she might bring a petition properly framed and containing all the necessary averments so that the tenants might not be taken by surprise.
(10) On both the points, therefore, it cannot be said that the learned district judge exceeded the scope of his juridiction under section 12 - b of the act as under that provision it was open to him to examine the legality, regularity or propriety of the order passed by the appellate authority and come to his own conclusion on the facts admitted or found. In doing so he was not certainly differing from the appellate authority in the appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case. He held, as he was entitled to do, that the inference drawn by the appellate authority was not a proper or correct inference to be drawn on the facts, in this view, i hold that the order of the district judge does not suffer from any infirmity which attracts the jurisdiction of this court under section 115 of the code of civil procedure. The revision petition is therefore dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.