P.Kodandaramayya, J.:-
(1) The state of andhra pradesh represented by the land acquisition officer (revenue divisional officer) , kamareddy, is the appellant in this batch of appeals. They arise out of jand acquisition proceedings the notification in question in respect of the lands acquired was made on 20 - 4 - 1972. They are sub - divisions of survey no 778, measuring 11 acres, 15 guntas. The said lands were acquired for constructing the bus - depot, bus - stand, and staff - quarters at kamareddy town. Under ex. A - 1 dated 20 - 1 - 1976, the land acquisition officer awarded compensation at rs. 6,000/ - per acre. The claimants contended that the lands are potential for house - sites; that, the assessment of compensation treating them as agricultural lands is incorrect and that, the correct value should be rs. 21/ - per sq yard. On a reference on these issues, the court below granted compensation at rs. 13/ - per sq yard.
(2) In these appeals, the learned counsel for the state urged that the court below committed a mistake in accepting the claim of the owners of the lands that the lands are fit for housesites. In fact, even though some evidence was produced in support of the claim that permission was granted by then panchayat samithi, kamareddy, for construction of house, no houses were constructed, and the assumption of the court below that these lands are fit for house - sites, is incorrect. We are not persuaded to accept this submission, in view of the over whelming evidence in support of the claim of he owners of the property, which has been accepted by the court below. Under ex. B - 1, sale - deed dated 16 - 8 - 1971, land of an extent of 400 sq yards was sold for rs. 5,000/ -. The value mentioned therein works out to rs. 12. 50 ps per sq yard. R w. 1 was examined to show the genuineness of this transaction. Under ex. B - 10 dated 29 - 10 - 1969 an extent of 533 sq yards was sold at rs 8,000/~ that works out to rs. 15/ - per sq yard. Under ex. B - 2, the saledeed dated 3 - 9 - 1971, an extent of 266 sq yards was sold at rs. 5,000/ - , which works out to rs. 18 - 80 ps per sq yard. R ws 2 and 4 were examined in support of this transaction. Further, the claimants had examined the village patwari, r w 6 and also examined r w 5 in support of their claim. Ex. B - 3 is the certificate issued by the gram panchayat, to the effect that the said land is included in the master plan. This is also an important piece of evidence. Further, exs. B - 11, b - 13 and b - 15 are permissions granted to some other residents to construct houses. These permissions were granted by the local gram panchayat. Ex. B - 12 is the plan which clearly shows that this land is situated on the national highway, hyderabad - nagpur. There is also evidence to show that nearby there is a college. The evidence further discloses that, in respect of the lands adjacent to the land acquired, betterment charges were paid, and hence the land in question is fit for construction of houses in view of this, it cannot be disputed that the potential value of house - sites must be taken into account. The court below was right in accepting the claim of the owners of the land that the assessment of compensation must be on the basis of potential value of house sites, but not treating them as mere agricultural lands. We have perused the oral evidence in this case and the various transactions are not challenged by the state as being faked up, or brought up for the purpose of these proceedings. Hence, the findings arrived at by the court below in fixing the market value of the lands in question are clearly sustainable and borne out by evidence on record. We see no infirmity in the decrees awarding compensation to these claimants.
(3) In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. We make no order as to costs.
(4) While we are affirming the judgment of the court below, the learned counsel for the respondent - claimants requested us to give a direction that the claimants in this case are entitled to a higher rate of solatium at 30% on the compensation and 9% of interest as per the provisions of the amendment act 68 of 1984. This was opposed by the learned counsel for the state.
(5) We must make it clear that the learned counsel for the state did not dispute that the amended act 68 of 1984 (central act) applies to this state acquisition, and the amended act is also retrospective in operation governing the acquisition in question. However he contends that in the appeal filed by the state the respondent - claimants cannot get the relief of higher rate of solatium and interest. We are of the opinion that this contention is illfounded and consequently we overrule the same. We proceed to record the reasons.
(6) The amended act 68 of 1984 came into force on 24 - 9 - 84. The award in this case was passed on 20 - 1 - 1976 and the decree of the civil court enhancing the compensation was made on 16 - 9 - 78 and hence there is no occasion for the claimants to invoke the applicability of the amending act. The amending act came into force when the appeal is pending in this court. Sec 30 (2) of the amending act is in the following terms:
"the provisions of sub - section (2) of section 23 and section 28 of the principal act, as amended by clause (b) of section 15 and section 18 of this act respectively shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the collector or court or to any order passed by the high court or supreme court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal act after the 30th day of april, 1982 (the date of introduction) bill, 1982, in the house of the people) and before the commencement of this act."
Now, the supreme court in b singh vs u t chandigarh (1) 1985 (2) scale 246 overruling its earlier view authoritatively laid down holding.
"the object of parliament clearly was that the amended
provisions of section 23 sub - section (2) and section 28 should be applicable in determination of compansation where proceedings before the collector or the court or the high court or the supreme court were pending on 30th april, 1982 or where commenced after that date, even if such proceedings had finally terminated before the enactment of the amending act and no proceedings were pending before the collector or the court or the high court or the supreme court at the date of enactment of the amending act. If the proceedings had notfinally concluded before the enactment of the amending act and ware pending on that date or were started subsequently, whether before the collector or the court or the high court or the supreme court, the amended
provisions of section 23 sub - section (2) and section 28 would apply on their own terms in determining compensation. But by virtue of
section 30 sub - section (2) , the arti3rided provisions of section 23 subsection (2) and section 28 were made applicable also where the proceedings ware pending on 30th april, 1982 or were commenced after that date even though they might have finally come to an end before the enactment of the airlanding act. Of course, if the proceedings had finally terminated on or before 30th april, 1982, the amended
provisions of section 23 sub - section (2) and section 28 could not possibly be intended to apply to the determination made in such proceedings. This was clearly the intendment of parliament in enacting
section 30 sub - section (2)"
.
Thus it is clear that by virtue of sec 30 (2) of the amended act if any proceedings are pending and not finally terminated by 30th april, 1982, the provisions of the amended act are attracted. It is necessary to remember if the proceedings are pending by 30th april, 1982, the provisions of the act apply even if the proceedings are finally terminated before the amended act came into force. Sec 30 (2) took care to mention all the authorities before whom the proceedings may have to go through, such as collector, court, high court and supreme court and those authorities are bound to give effect to these provisions as contemplated by the said provision.
(7) The objection of the learned counsel is based upon the procedural technicalities viz , in the absence of an appeal by the claimants such relief cannot be granted to them. Once as per the said provision the claimants are entitled to the higher rate of solatium and interest even if the proceedings are terminated provided they are pending by the. Crucial date viz. , 30th april; 1982, we : are of the opinion that even if we omit to give any direction the authorities are bound to give effect to the provisions of this act. However to avoid any doubt or dispute on the ground that once the award is merged in the appellate order the appellate authorities alone are entitled to give direction or modification, this declaration is sought by the respondent - claimants. In view of the clear provisions of the act strictly speaking we are not adjudicating the rights of the parties interse and hence the procedural objection of awarding relief to a person not appealed would not arise. In factthe solatium and interest is not part of compensation and that is why this court on two occasions held that no court fees is payable in respect of interest or solatium. In s rao vs rev divil officer, guntur (2) a i r 1969 a p 55 (fb,) it was held that "compensation can only be computed in the manner laid down in section 23 (1) which does not include interest either under section 34 or on the excess amount awarded by the court over that awarded by the collector under sec 28. " consequently it was held that no court fee is payable on interest. Similarly in k a swamy vs land acquisition officer (3) air 1970 a p 139 (fb) , it was laid down that no court fee is payable on difference of solatium as a result of increase in compensation awarded by thecourt. It was observed "the reason for excluding solatium from the award to be passed by the court is perhaps due to the solicitude of the legislature not to overburden the owner whose lands are acquired against his will with payment of court - fee thereon. This assumption of ours is fortified by the provisions of section 48 of the court - fees act itself, which require payment of court - fee on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed. We have already shown that the amount which an owner is required to claim includes neither solatium nor interest, but only compensation for all his interests in that land. It is therefore clear that solatium under section 23 (2) forms part of neither the claim nor of the award, and consequently, no court - fee is payable on such amount''. Accordingly, it was ruled that the solatium under sec 23 (2) of the land acquisition act forms part of neither the claim nor the award and consequently no court fee is payable on such amount. In fact sec 23 (2) which provides granting of solatium gives no discretion to the court which states -
"in addition to the market value of the land as above provided, the court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition". No doubt, sec 28 (2) which empowers the court to grant interest gives a discretion to grant or not to grant interest but as ruled by the supreme court''once the discretion to grant interest is exercised there is no further discretion when the interest has to be awarded at the rate mentioned in the act".
(vide raghubans narain vs govt. Of u p (4) a i r 1937 s c 465). In the above case, it was ruled that the claimants are entitled to interest even through they have not raised the said question of interest in the cross - objections filed by them before the high court and accordingly the supreme court allowed the claim of interest by the claimants.
(8) Thus, we are of the opinion that by virtue of the provisions of sec 30 (2) of the amended act, this court is entitled to give the declaration while affirming the awards passed by the courts below. We are not adjudicating any rights between the parties for the first time and this court is bound to take into account the subsequent change of law and declare its applicability to the proceedings in question. Once we are not adjudicating the rights interse, the procedural objection that we cannot give the relief to the respondent when he did not file the appeal must be over - ruled.
(9) That apart, we do not also see any infirmity in invoking the provisions of or 41 rule 33 c p c. Once solatium and interest are adjuncts it would follow necessarily without any further adjudication this court while affirming the decree is entitled to make the decree in conformity with the law. In fact, there is no occasion for the court below as already noticed to pass a decree in compliance with the provisions of the amended act. No doubt, the discretion under or 41 rule 33 c p c must be exercised carefully on known principles. We are satisfied that the respondents could not have filed this appeal in this case as the amended act came into force long subsequent to the decree of the trial court. The interference by this court by giving, the direction sought is necessary in the interests of justice which is one of basic requirements of or 41 rule 33 c p c. The expression "which sought to have been passed" occuring in order 41 rule 33 c p c was held to mean, ''what ought in law to have been passed /vide glani ram vs ramji lal (5) a i r 1969 s c 1144). Accordingly, if the appellate court is of the view that any decree which ought in law to have been passed was in fact not passed by the court below it may pass or make such further or other decree or order as the justice of the case may require and hence the supreme court in koksingh vs deokalal a i r 1976 s c 634 ruled that the high court is competent to pass a decree for enforcement of a charge in favour of respondent notwithstanding the fact that the respondent did not file any appeal from the decree.
(10) Hence we are of the opinion that in view of the subsequent eventcoming into force of the amended act, and in particular the courts below have no occasion to pass award in confirmity of the amended act, this court is fully competent to direct the decree to be in conformity with the law applicable thereto.
(11) We hold that the direction now sought by the respondent is clearly justified and accordingly we direct that the higher rate of solatium of 30% and also higher rate of interest 9% for a period of one year from the date of taking possession and at the rate of 15% thereafter shall be payable to the claimants as per the provisions of the amended act 58 of 1934 in respect of the awards passed in their favour and the decrees must stand modified accordingly.