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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Raghuvir, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two writ petitions challenged amendments to various university acts introduced first by Andhra Pradesh Ordinance No. 11 of 1985 (promulgated 10 June 1985) and later enacted as Andhra Pradesh University Acts (Second Amendment) Act, 1985 (Act No. 17 of 1985), effective from 11 July 1985. The amendments substituted section 18 and incorporated a new section 31‑A in the Sri Venkateswara University Act No. 14 of 1954. The petitioners sought declarations that the substituted section 18 and the new section 31‑A were illegal, void and ultra vires the Constitution of India.

The petitioners included elected members of the university bodies (members of the Academic Council, Syndicate and Senate) who alleged that the new section 18 reconstituted the syndicate with a predominance of nominated government officials and nominees (reducing academic representation), thereby defeating university autonomy and academic freedom; section 31‑A curtailed the tenure of already‑elected syndicate members by providing that they would cease to hold office on reconstitution. The State filed a common counter‑affidavit defending the ordinance/Act as validly promulgated under Article 213 and within legislative competence, denying any destruction of university autonomy and asserting administrative and financial reasons for dispensing with elections.

The petitions principally raised questions about academic freedom, the meaning and constitutional status of "academic freedom", whether it is part of freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), and whether section 31‑A offended Article 14.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the substituted section 18 (composition and powers of the university syndicate) is detrimental to or violative of academic freedom and therefore unconstitutional under Article 19(1)(a).
  2. What is the meaning and scope of "academic freedom" and whether academic freedom is part of the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
  3. Whether section 31‑A (curtailing the term of existing elected syndicate members until reconstitution) is ultra vires the Constitution or discriminatory/opposed to Article 14.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The new section 18 creates two classes of syndicate members but loads the syndicate with nominated members (government officials, nominees and three "eminent persons" to be nominated by the State), thereby creating a syndicate that is a "facade" of a state department and destructive of university autonomy and academic freedom.
  • The phrase "eminent persons representing educational interests" (and similar expressions) is vague and liable to arbitrary exercise; courts have struck down vague statutes in some prior cases and should do so here.
  • Section 31‑A curtailed the tenure of elected syndicate members (elected 31 October 1984 for three years) and was aimed at unseating elected members — alleged to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 (discriminatory treatment against Sri Venkateswara University).
  • Dispensing with elections (or replacing elected members with nominated members) erodes democratic processes within university governance and is not justified merely on grounds of administrative convenience or financial burden.

State / Respondent's Arguments

  • The ordinance was validly promulgated under Article 213 and later enacted by the legislature; the amendments do not destroy university autonomy.
  • The chairman and executive officer of the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam (TTD) are ex‑officio members because of financial help provided by TTD to the university; several members are ex‑officio or nominees for valid reasons.
  • The State accepted advice (from a Vice‑Chancellors' conference, 16 November 1983) to avoid elections and keep syndicate/academic council as compact bodies; the change is motivated by administrative and financial considerations and complaints about irregularities in elections, not by ulterior motives.
  • Section 31‑A is a transitory provision to enable reconstitution under the new scheme and is not discriminatory; the autonomy of universities is not abrogated by the new composition and is preserved in substance.
  • Where statutory language is ambiguous or susceptible of a constitutionally offensive meaning, the court should, in interpretation, read down or constrain meanings rather than strike down provisions altogether (as a general interpretive principle).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad (AIR 1961 SC 293) Example of a statute struck down for vagueness (word 'goonda' lacked settled definition). Referred as an instance where courts struck down vague statutory language; contrasted with later authority to show shifting approach to vagueness.
Amritsar Municipality v. State of Punjab (AIR 1969 SC 1100) Illustrates a judicial reluctance to strike down statutes solely on vagueness grounds (a change in approach). Used to explain the evolution in the court's approach to vagueness and statutory invalidation.
K.A. Abbas v. Union of India (AIR 1971 SC 481) Principle that where diverse constructions are possible, construction that accords with legislative intent and advances the statute's purpose should be preferred; courts' power to strike down is restricted. Adopted as the controlling approach in cases of alleged vagueness; the court said this law "now holds the field" though it did not need to apply reading‑down in the present case.
A M A Khudds v. State of A.P. (1967 (2) A.N.W.R. 482) Used by petitioners to argue that nomination power can produce circular validation of nominees' status (i.e., post‑nomination status equated to prior eminence). Court noted the danger but observed that courts strike down unreasonable exercises of power, not necessarily enabling provisions; State produced records of nominees to show non‑abuse in practice.
Towne v. Eisner (Holmes J.) Observation on the flexible, context‑dependent meaning of words in law ("a word is not a crystal"); statutory words obtain meaning from context and purpose. Quoted to support interpretive principle that words must be read in context; court noted this method but said it was unnecessary to apply it here.
All Saints High School v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1980 SC 1042) Accepted principle that words should be read in light of history, purpose and mischief; supports contextual interpretation. Cited to justify the approach to statutory construction; the court referred to it when discussing interpretive tools but stated it did not need to invoke reading‑down here.
Kedarnath Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1962 SC 1955) Principle that courts must consider antecedent history, purpose and mischief when interpreting an enactment. Reinforced the court's discussion of interpretive methods applicable to contested statutory language.
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1955 SC 661) Shows reading down of statutes to keep them within constitutional bounds is an accepted method. Referenced to support the proposition that courts may read down statutes to avoid invalidity, though the court said it was not required to do so in the present matter.
Chamarbaughwalla case (AIR 1957 SC 628) Example of judicial reading down as an interpretive tool. Cited among authorities demonstrating the accepted method of reading down; court listed it while explaining interpretive methodology.
D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (AIR 1983 SC 130) Considered in context of Article 14 and reading down doctrines; cited for the court's approach to constitutional limits of legislation. Referred to in discussion on Article 14 and arbitrariness; court relied on the principles from this case in analysing equality/arbitrariness contentions.
State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (AIR 1978 SC 215) Authority endorsing reading down as a method of interpretation. Mentioned in the discussion of interpretive techniques; formed part of the background exposition though not central to the final disposition.
Ex parte Jackson (U.S. case) American authority on the importance of circulation to the value of publication. Quoted to support the proposition (from Romesh Thappar) that freedom of circulation is essential to freedom of publication/freedom of speech.
Lovell v. City of Griffin (U.S. case) American authority used to support the circulation/propagation aspect of free speech. Used as comparative authority to demonstrate scope of free press as part of free speech.
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 124) Held that freedom of press and circulation is included within Article 19(1)(a). Adopted as precedent for the proposition that propagation and circulation of ideas are part of Article 19 freedoms; used in setting foundation for academic freedom analysis.
De Jonge v. Oregon (U.S.) Stresses the necessity to preserve constitutional rights of free speech, press and assembly to maintain free political discussion. Quoted in support of the general value of free speech and as part of the international/comparative jurisprudence referenced in analysing academic freedom.
Shelton v. Tucker (U.S.) Characterizes the classroom as a "market place of ideas"; court protection for free intellectual discussion. Relied upon in adopting the proposition that academic freedom flows from free speech and the classroom is a special zone of free expression.
Pennekamp v. Florida (U.S.) Cited in the opinion as part of American cases indicating that academic freedom flows from freedom of speech. Referenced in the passage concluding that academic freedom flows from freedom of speech and the court adopted the same view for Indian constitutional law.
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of New York (17 L.Ed.2d 629) U.S. Supreme Court decision declaring safeguarding of academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment and courts should not tolerate laws casting a "pall of orthodoxy" over classrooms. Quoted at length and adopted as persuasive authority for the proposition that academic freedom has constitutional importance; used to support conclusion that academic freedom is protected under Article 19(1)(a).
Epperson v. Arkansas (U.S.) (citation as in text) U.S. Supreme Court case enabling teachers to teach evolution (illustrates the historical struggle to preserve academic freedom). Referred to in historical illustration of dangers to academic freedom and the ultimate vindication of teachers' rights to teach controversial subjects.
Bates v. Little Rock (U.S.) Affirms protection of freedom of speech, press and association against subtle governmental interference. Quoted in support of the principle that constitutional freedoms are protected not only from direct attack but also from subtler forms of governmental interference.
Catherine J. Healy v. F. Don James (U.S.) Recognition that denial of official recognition to student groups burdens associational rights and implicates First Amendment protections. Used to show the practical implications of denying recognition/voice in academic settings and as comparative support for associational aspects of academic freedom.
Thomas v. Collins (U.S.) Warns that even small restraints can lead to greater tyranny; supports protection of basic rights. Quoted to emphasize the dangers of petty restraints on fundamental freedoms and to buttress the argument for robust protection of academic freedom.
I. E. Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1958 SC 578) Discusses the relationship between Article 19(1)(a) and the American First Amendment; permits reference to American decisions to understand free speech. Referred to for the proposition that American authorities may be considered to appreciate the nature and scope of the freedom of speech.
I. E. Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1986 SC 515) Observes that decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court may be taken into consideration to understand free speech principles. Quoted for the view that comparative jurisprudence is a legitimate aid in interpreting Article 19 rights.
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (AIR 1977 SC 1361) Illustrates that when membership of a legislative body ceases by presidential action, incidental rights such as salary cease and such office holding is not a fundamental right. Applied analogously to hold that a legislature may curtail tenure of elected syndicate members by law and that such office holding is not a fundamental right preventing legislative alteration.
In re G.A. Natesan (AIR 1918 Madras 763) Describes syndicate as a statutory body carrying duties for public benefit and thus as holders of public office amenable to certain remedies. Referred to in support of the position that the syndicate is a statutory body with public duties and the composition of such a body is an important matter of governance.
Satish Chander v. Rajasthan University (AIR 1970 Rajasthan 184) Adopted the passage in In re G.A. Natesan regarding the syndicate as a statutory public body. Cited to show judicial recognition of the syndicate's public character and the importance of its proper constitution.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1978 SC 597) Principles on Article 14: equality is antithetic to arbitrariness; Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in state action. Relied upon in the court's Article 14 analysis; the opinion used Maneka Gandhi to frame the test for arbitrariness/discrimination.
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 2 SCR 348; (AIR 1974 SC 555) Equality is antithetic to arbitrariness; a constitutional benchmark for Article 14 analysis. Referenced as part of the body of jurisprudence establishing that arbitrary state action violates Article 14; used in the equality/arbitrariness discussion.
A.L. Kalra v. P. & E. Corporation of India Ltd. (AIR 1984 SC 1361) Affirms that executive action resulting in denial of equal protection can be judicially reviewed; legislative policy cannot shield a law violating fundamental rights. Quoted to support the proposition that where law infringes fundamental rights (including Article 14), it can be struck down; used in assessing alleged arbitrariness.
"ajay nasia's case" (as cited in the opinion) Referenced in connection with the Constitution Bench observations on arbitrariness in state action (as quoted in the opinion). Included among authorities cited by the court to illustrate the settled position that Article 14 acts against arbitrariness; the court relied on the general proposition without detailed exposition of this citation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured fashion:

  1. Interpretation and vagueness: The court reviewed authorities on vagueness in statutes and interpretive tools (including the shift in approach from striking down vague provisions to preferring constructions that align with legislative purpose and reading down where necessary). The court noted these principles (citing State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad, Amritsar Municipality, K.A. Abbas and others) and observed that although reading‑down is an accepted method, the present case did not require resort to that technique.
  2. Academic freedom and Article 19(1)(a): The court undertook a sustained doctrinal and comparative exposition of free speech, drawing on philosophical authorities (Socrates, Locke, Mill), comparative constitutional materials, and foreign jurisprudence (notably U.S. decisions such as Keyishian, Shelton, De Jonge and others). The court defined academic freedom in relation to teachers and students (teacher's three facets: pursue inquiry to honest conclusion, present findings, publish results; students' rights to honest instruction and to form conclusions and choose studies). The court concluded that academic freedom is encompassed within the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and expressly adopted the view that "free speech in Indian constitution includes academic freedom."
  3. Examination of the statutory scheme (section 18): The court compared the unamended section 18 (the erstwhile composition — larger and more elected/academic representation) with the substituted section 18 (composition reduced to 11 members; predominance of ex‑officio government officials, co‑opted members and three nominees designated as "eminent persons"). The court analysed in detail the mode of appointment (ex‑officio, nominees, delegates and co‑option) and emphasised how the new composition substantially reduces academic representation and increases government control, with particular concern about open‑ended terms such as "nominee or delegate" and the State's power to nominate "eminent persons."
  4. Application of principles to facts: Applying the conception of university autonomy (select students, appoint teaching staff, determine courses and methods — citing University Education Commission and other reports), the court found that the syndicate is the pivotal executive body and that its composition under the substituted section 18 would saddle it with so many nominated/government officials that the autonomy essential for academic freedom would be stifled. The court rejected the State's financial‑and‑administrative justification for dispensing with elections as an inadequate rationale to exclude democratic process from university governance.
  5. On vagueness and possibility of abuse: The court considered petitioners' contention that expressions like "eminent educationists" are vague and enable arbitrary appointments. The court acknowledged the theoretical possibility of misuse but held that the expression "eminent educationists" is capable of objective identification and that vagueness alone — without proof of systematic abuse — was not a sufficient ground to strike down a provision. Nonetheless, the court's broader conclusion on composition and domination by government officials led it to invalidate section 18 on grounds of curtailing academic freedom and autonomy.
  6. Section 31‑A and tenure reduction: The court analysed section 31‑A (a transitory provision that existing syndicate members would continue only until a new syndicate was reconstituted and that elected members would cease on reconstitution). Drawing analogy to State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (on cessation of legislative membership), and treating office holding as not a fundamental right, the court held that the legislature had power to curtail terms; section 31‑A was a necessary corollary to section 18 and thus constitutionally valid. The court also rejected the argument that section 31‑A constituted invidious discrimination under Article 14.
  7. Relief and consequential directions: The court concluded that section 18 (as substituted) violated academic freedom under Article 19(1)(a) and therefore struck it down; section 31‑A was upheld as constitutionally valid. The writ petitions were partly allowed. The court recorded no costs and fixed advocate fees (Rs. 500 in each petition). The State was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and the judgment was suspended for two months to allow the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court held that Section 18 (as substituted by Act 17 of 1985) is unconstitutional and illegal because its composition gives the State (through officials, nominees and co‑opted members) such dominance over the syndicate that university autonomy and academic freedom (within Article 19(1)(a)) are substantially impaired. The court upheld Section 31‑A as a valid transitory provision and therefore the writ petitions were partly allowed.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The substituted section 18 cannot be enforced as it stands; the court struck down that provision.
  • Section 31‑A is valid, so the transitory mechanism of cessation on reconstitution was not struck down by the court.
  • The petitions were partly allowed; no costs were awarded; advocate fees were fixed at Rs. 500 in each petition.
  • The State Government was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and the judgment was stayed (suspended) for two months to permit the appeal.

Broader legal implications noted by the court (as stated in the opinion):

  • The court recognised and declared that "academic freedom" forms part of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a), adopting comparative authorities (notably U.S. Supreme Court decisions) as persuasive support.
  • The decision emphasises that legislative competence to reorganise university governance is subject to constitutional limits: statutory designs that effectively displace academic autonomy and silence the academic voice may be struck down as infringing fundamental freedoms.

The opinion also records that leave to appeal was granted to the State and that the judgment is suspended for two months; accordingly, the final enforceability of these conclusions would be subject to the Supreme Court's consideration of the appeal.


Note: This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No facts, arguments or conclusions have been added beyond those expressly contained in the opinion.

    R. Rama Murthy And Ors. v. Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors.

    Raghuvir, J.:-

    (1) The above two writ petitions were filtd after ordinance 11 of 1985 was promulgated on june 10, 1985 by the state government. The ordinance later was replaced by act 17 of 1985. The act is enforced from july 11, 1985. Some provisions of the act are enforced from the date of the ordinance. The act by its provisions amends various university acts in the state including sri venkateswara university act no 14 of 1954 ('the act'). In the act section 18 is tubstituted. A new section 31 - a is incorporated. The two sections in act 14 of 1954 are assailed in the above two writ petitions. The petitioners pray to declare sections 18 and 31 - a are illegal, void and ultravires of the indian constitution.

    (2) Rama murthy, rama subba reddy the two are petitioners in one of the writ petitions. The two are members of academic council and syndicate of sri venkateswara university. They aver as per the new section 18, syndicate members of the university are divided in two categories; class i members and class - ll members. The former consists of six members the vice chancellor, two secretaries of the state government (secretary for education and secretary for finance and planning departments) , the director of higher education, the chairman of t t d. Board and the executive officer, t t d. The category of class ii members consists of five members; a professor of the university, a principal of a college, three "eminent" persons representing educational interests. All the five in class ii are to be nominated by the state government

    (3) The petitioners allege with so many, if not all, nominated members such a syndicate has a facade of a department of the state. The syndicate does not give out the impression of a governing body of any university. The two petitioners allege to - day the syndicate is a tool in the hands of state government. Such a syndicate is detrimental to academic freedom in the university. It is principally for the protection of academic freedom and for other cognate reasons (to which we will return later) the petitioners seek to declare section 18 is ultra vires of the coustitution. Gopal reddy and nagi reddy in another writ petition are members of academic council of sri venkateswara university. The former among the two is also a member of the senate. The two were elected on october 31, 1984 to the syndicate for three years. Their term in section 31 - a is now curtailed till the syndicate is reconstituted. (the syndicate since is reconstituted). Therefore, the two seek to declare section 31 - a is ultra vires of the constitution. These two writ petitions are resisted by the state government.

    (4) The additional secretary to government in education department in the two writ petitions filed a common counter. In that the state averred: ordinance was promulgated under article 213 of the constitution. The autonomy of the university is not destroyed by no provision in act 17 of 1985. The chairman, the executive officer of t t d are ex - officio members of the syndicate. The two, no doubt, are nominated for the financial help rendered by ttd. Authority during formation of the university. As to elections in october, 1984 to the various bodies of the university, it is averred, the government accepted the advice tendered on november 16, 1983 by the vice - chancellors, to do away with elections in the universities of the state. Their advice was to keep syndicate and academic council as "compact'' bodies. Therefore, section 31 - a was introduced in the act 14 of 1954. There was no ulterior motive in incorporating this provision in the act. The state government, inter alia averred, to have received complaints of irregularities in holding elections.

    (5) The question, therefore, in the two writ petitions principally turn on the academic freedom in universities. The issues are whether section 18 is detrimental to academic freedom. What is meant by academic freedom. Is it part of free speech. Whether section 31 - a is ultra vires of the constitution or opposed to article 14 of the constitution. Before the issues are dealt, one or two cognate questions may be considered at the outset.

    (6) It is argued on behalf of the petitioners section 18 contains vague words such as "eminent educationists" to enable the government to nominate them to the syndicate of sri venkateswara university a question is posed who are eminent educationists? in answer it is preferred one can only guess for the meaning of these words. Two honest persons, it is suggested, can only differ on the meaning of words. In elaboration it is argued in the case of two jurists on the same premise, are bound to differ on the choice of persons, in such a state of affairs, it is argued, wilderness alone can prevail. Such a state is attributed to the words contained in section 18 for they are vague words. For this reason section 18 is to be struck down. Cases are cited as instances when courts struck down statutes. In state of madhya pradesh v. Baldeo prasad (1) air 1961 sc. 293, the central provincies and berar goondas act, 1946 was considered. !n that act the word 'goonda' was decided to have gained no settled definition. The act principally for that reason was struck down. In amritsar municipality v. State of punjab (2) air 1969 sc 1100 the word 'fair was considered. In this case there was a volte face in the approach of the court, ft was held indian courts do not strike down a statue even when a statute is vague. The two cases in (1) and (2) were reviewed in k a. Abbas vs. Union of india (3) air 1971 sc 481. In the third case the approach was made from the perspective of the constitution. It was held "where diverse construction is possible, a construction which accords best with the intention of the legislature and advances the purpose of legislation, is to be preferred". Not that the provisions are vague, therefore, to be struck down. The power of the courts in this regard was held to be "restricted" even when a statute leads to a "boundless sea of uncertainty". The legislature it was suggested, to provide guidance. Finally, it was hald when a statute deprives a citizen of guaranteed rights in the constitution. , in such a contingency it is to be seen whether in effect the statute offends the guarantee. Thus in the third case the two methods adumbrated in the two cases referred ware departed. The law expounded in the last of the three cases now holds the field.

    (7) The petitioners for the same resuit argued section 18 enables the state government to wield power arbitrarily, therefore, should be struck down. Reliance is placed on the case in a m a khudds v. State of a p (4) 1967 (2) an. W r 482 it is argued when a person is nominated under the power to nominate an eminent educationist, as a sequel to nomination sure such a parson is an eminent educationist. The question is, before nomination is he an eminent educationist. In this search for quality it is asserted the process gets jiggered and no ona can break the circle. All this is attributed to vague words in the statute. However, when power is shown exercised unreasonably courts do strike down the resulting order, but not the enabling provisions. Therefore, section 18 cannot be held ultra vires on the ground because it is likely to be abused by the authorities. In the instant case the government produced the record to show the persons who are appointed. Professor herbert, a retd. Professor of s v university prof. D l narayana, a retd. Professor of s v university and r subba reddy, a retd. Principal of v r college, nellore are nominated to the syndicate of university. Their record is offered to show the power is not abused.

    (8) The learned advocate general for the state in the context of vague words contended if meaning of a word in the statute is offensive to the constitution, he argued, instead of striking down a provision, the court should read down the meaning in interpretation.

    (9) English language contains words with many meanings. It is said to be rich because of this quality. When english words are used in statutes words carry all the meaning relevant to the text and subject. Therefore, words in a statute cannot be interpreted in vacua. Holmes j in towne vs. Eisner (5) 62 l. Ed. , 372 @ 376 said a word is not a crystal. The meaning of words is naver transparent. Nor can the meaning be unchanged. It is like a skin of living person that varies in colours. According to subject, words do gain meaning. Sometimes words are kept in limits to arrest the mischief. 'it is construed as operative between certain persons, or in certain circumstances, or for certain purposes only, even though the language expresses no such circumspection of the field of operation". This was accepted by the supreme court of india in all saints high school vs. Government of andhra pradesh (6) air 1980 sc 1042 kedarnath singh vs. State of bihar (7) air 1962 sc 1955. In the latter case it was observed : it is well settled that in interpreting an enactment the court should have regard not merely to the literal meaning of the words used, but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the legislation, its purposes and the mischief it seeks to suppress. " in the bengal immunity co. Ltd. Vs the state of bihar (8) air 1955 sc. 661 meaning of words was read down. The reading down of a statute is accepted method in constitutional law. The courts a dopt the method to adjust the subject, where an act is expressed in generality courts interpret to make it effective, "if read literally, of applying to matters beyond the relevant legislative power, the court will construe it in a more limited sense so as to keep it within the power. " in chamarbaughwalla case (9) air 1957 sc 628, d. S. Nakara vs. Union of india (10) air 1983 sc 130 and state of karnataka vs. Ranganatha reddy (11) air 1978 sc 215 this method was adopted by the courts. This method of interpretation is a wellknown and well recognised method adopted by the courts. These principles were debated for considerable time, therefore, i thought fit to advert to these methods of interpretation. I may, however, state in the instant case i have not found the necessity to have recourse to such a method of interpretation.

    (10) The principal issue in the two cases turns on academic freedom to that aspect i now turn to. It is argued section 18 is ultra vires of the constitution for it is opposed to freedom of speech as guaranteed in article 19 of the constitution.

    (11) The words academic freedom are not found in article 19. The words used in clause (1) (a) of that article are: "freedom of speech and expression. " the question, is whether academic freedom is part of free speech is the broad issue to be considered. To begin, at the begining free speech is essentially a concept in philosophy when government consisted of elected persons, free speech came to be nurtured by the people and governments. When frea speech came to be entrenched in constitutions, the subject bursted out with manifold problems in the administration of the government. When such problems came for adjudication, courts borrowed heavily from philosophy in moulding reliefs to the aggrieved. In doing so courts considered perspectives of free speech whether it is a right or a natural right. What limitations should be imposed on the rights. In considering limitations again ideas were borrowed from philosophy from social beliefs and ideals of a free society. In the process of assimilation philosophical theories were juxtaposed with legal concepts. This entwinement brought forth manifold problems like problems of majority rule and minority rights. These vicissitudes of free speech therefore warrants exposition of the subjsct in philosophy and methods of assimilation practised in the past. We intend to cruise the subject in brief.

    (12) What is free speech in law. The answer in law always was understood in the context of philosophical understanding of the subject. Jurists of ancient period and in modern periods (more in the more modern period) expounded always its content from philosophical perspective. John milton, the poet in areopagitica said : "give me the liberty to know, to utter and to argue freely according to conssience above all liberties.

    "john locke, concerning toleration adumbrated frea speech. John stuarf mill, a political thinker in his essay on liberty propounded free speech."

    (13) In english bill of rights of 1689 individual right (as understood in philosophy) is incorporated. The french declaration of rights in article 11 (1789) provided : "every citizen may speak, write and publish freely. " the declaration in france was broad based in the content than english bill of rights. On april 17, 1882 u. S. Constitution act declared free speech is a natural right. The universal declaration of human rights on december 10, 1948, by the united states enunciated : "everyone has the right of freedom of opinion and expression. " article 125 of the soviet constitution of 1936 recites ; "the citizens of the ussr are guaranteed by law - freedom of speech. '' in canada in recent years 1981 - 82 in article 2 (1) (b) of charter of rights included

    "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression including the freedom of press and other media of communication. As freedoms which the state shall not violate."

    (14) The vitality of free speech is not in the mare declarations. The strength of the right lies principally in the roots of the society. How much does the society exhibit the spirit of tolerance ? what respect is accorded to dissidents ? what procedure is adopted in protecting the right. What power is vested in courts to remedy its infringements ? we do not intend to cover the subject on all its courses in history. Each country traversed these mile stones in a way far different from others. How issues in free speech were dealt by each nation is outside the scops of the discussion. The fact we are at it in the two cases on hand is proof positive of free speech exists in our constitution. Now, therefore, we turn to the meaning of free speech in article 19 of the indian constitution.

    (15) The expression ''freedom of speach

    " in article 19 (1) (a) is expresssed in broad terms. The width of the right was considered by the supreme court of india in fifties from the stand point of pressearly in cases. The issus considered was. Whether free press was part of free speech in romesh thappar vs. State of madras (12) air 1950 sc 124 and it was held :"
    there can be no doubt that freedom of speech and expressi. On includes freedom of propagation of ideas and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation. ' in that decision, the ratio in american cases was borrowed. It was held liberty of circulation is as essential to the freedom as the liberty of publication. In america without circulation, publication is said to be of little value in exparte jackson (13) 24 l. Ed 877 and lovell vs. City of griffin (14) 82 l. Ed. 949.

    (16) The order of the government of madras was declared opposed to free speech, a fundamental right under art. 19 (1) (c) in (12) (supra). The discussion in the case touched the problematic subject of "public order'. Still the right of free speech was allowed to prevail. It was finally held ; "liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing ; indeed without the circulation, the publication would be of little value" thus free press was declared to be part of free speech.

    (17) The next question is whether academic freedom is part of free speech. To our understanding no court as yet considered this aspect. The task falls on our shoulders in the instant cases. I consider at first the meaning of academic freedom. Academic freedom deals with the rights of teachers and the rights of students. The right of a teacher is to teach without restraint. That right has three facets (the facets are again borrowed from philosophy.) (1) a teacher must be at liberty to pursue scholarly inquiry to any honest conclusion. (2) he must be free to present his findings. (3) he must be free to publish results of research to his pupils and (in the wider context) to the general public. For a student, academic freedom is to have honest instruction. The student should have the freedom to draw his own conclusions. He also should have a right to decide what he has to study. No authority need be cited in proof of these norms. These facts touching teachers or students are accepted as axioms. The ideas in all these facets are expounded in philosophy.

    (18) In europe, britain, canada, australia and in united states of america academic freedom is said to be "unlimited". Now what are limitations? the one limitation is a teacher does not get a right to present his views to delude students. This limitation operates differently in elementary and secondary schools. Academic freedom is allowed to operate liberally in colleges and universities for society considers younger students need more protection than college students.

    (19) Whether students should stay out of political activities or should participate in political compaigns is not easy subject to decide. Whether teachers can assert a citizen's right is again a difficult question. Open societies usually accord more freedom. Even in open societies in national crises teachers and students are subjected to pressures both in and out of school. When i said limitations, it covers all these aspects. I have surely touched these aspects in brief. I cannot justify a further discussion in this opinion, therefore, i carry out the subject for obvious reasons.

    (20) I may now turn to the meaning of academic freedom. In that search one cannot but start with socrates who was a greek philosopher. He taught in athens. We learn of him and his teachings through his pupils - plato, antisthenes and aristlppus for he (socrates) wrote no book he was the son of sophroniscus, a stone mason. Phaenarete, his mother was a mid - wife. He was a soldier for some time and participated in three wars. He was ones elected to senate. The delphic oracle declared him once the wisest among men. Plato in his books made him the mouth - piece of ideals. Xenophen, the historian, however wrote of socrates as a commonplace citizen in his book memorabitia. His biographers portray him as a person who often engaged, in discourses at public places. His pursuit was to reveal truth and expose error. In doing so, he incurred the enmity of aristophres, melus the leading lights, the pandits of his times.

    (21) Socrates was arraigned for "searching into things under the earth and heaven, making the worse appear better", and corrupting youth. His defence is set out in plato's book of apology. He was at the trial held guilty by 256 against 244 votes. He was asked to suggest punishment alternative to death. He refused in silence. The judges thereupon imposed on him the death penalty. Dimitrius and crete his friends planned his escape from athens. He refused to run away from athens. He said, to do so was "to break the law'. Thirty days later after his sentence, he drank hamlock and died. The last days of socrates are recorded in the book phao do by plato.

    (22) His principle plank was knowledge is virtue, not power as distinguished in the modern adage. He considered duty of philosophy was to investigate in ethical questions. He considered no one is wicked. Happiness was in virtues. His technique of teaching is referred as dialectical technique, the origin of which is attributed to zeno. In his technique answers are deduced to contradictory consequences. His teachings were the origin of megaric, cyonic and cyrenaic schools of thought. These schools were improved by romans. Byzantine romans referred his method as "socratic irony" and his philosophy as "rationalistic". This life history of socrates is traced to show academic freedom is not mere philosophy and sinecure pastime.

    (23) Today when we believe world is round, in south africa there is a society at durban where the constituent members of that society believe the world is flat. The name of the society is "flat world society". Historians divide the history in ancient, medieval, modern and more modern. An italian historian divided the history of europe in two parts. The history when the sun want round the world. He said the other is a chronicle when earth moved round the sun. Galieleo an astronomer was subjected to inquisition in 1613 for his teaching about sun and stars he was forbidden to "teach or defend" the sun is the centre of the universe. In that thepry it was not the sun but the god in bible failed' when he published books in defiance of the ban, he was pushed to retire in the country. His pupils otherwise had written him off as hanged. See the modern controvercy burning for 100 years long eversince t h huxley propounded darwin's theory of evolution. To - day in four states of united states "evolution" is a dirty word. Darwin is considered fit to be exhumed and hanged as was done in the case of cromwell for heresy. In july 1925 john t scopes, a teacher in biology, taught evolution in a school in america. Divine creation in that theory shows man descended from lower animals. He did not come out of creation in the book of genetics. Scopes was prosecuted for teaching evolution. His trial gained worldwide attention. He was convicted and fined one hundred dollars. On appeal, the only relief he secured was fine was reduced to fifty dollars. It took 43 years for the supreme court of america in epperson v. Arkanson (15) 81 l ed 278 to enable teachers to teach evolution.

    (24) I have referred to socrates, galielo and scopes no doubt at the cost of relevance to show how dangerous it is at times to practise academic freedom. The few instance in history no doubt caste a "pall of orthodoxy. " in class rooms as explained in keyisha vs regents (16) 17 l. Ed 2d. 629. As we are writting this opinion in some countries a teacher cannot teach communism. In some other countries, it is dangerous to teach against communism.

    (25) Adverting to schools and universities american supreme court held there is necessity "to preserve inviolate the constiutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will qf the people and that change, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means " in de jonge vs oregon (17) 81 l. Ed 278. A school is now referred as a market place of ideas in shelton vs tucker (18) 5 l. Ed 2d 231 and a nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure. The teacher and the taught, it is said, "take with them into the school house gate constitutional rights of free speech". The american supreme court, therefore, concluded that academic freedom flows from the freedom of speech penne kamp vs florida (19) 90 led 1295. I adopt the same. I conclude on this part of the case that free speech in indian constitution includes academic freedom

    (26) The next issue for consideration is whether section 31 - a in act 14 of 1954 is ultra vires of the constitution. In that section, the term of elected syndicate members of sri venkateswara university is restricted til! the syndicate is reconstituted. In assailing this provision, the larger question is raised by the petitioners - whether syndicaie snould consist of only elected persons and not of nominated persons.

    (27) The importance of syndicate in a university was considered by the madras high court in in re g a. Natesan (20) air 1918 madras 763

    "the syndicate is a creature of statute with certain duties imposed upon it by statute and these duties are to be carried out for the benefit of the public at large (see the very wide words in the preamble to the act of incorporation) and especially for that portion of the public which desires to utilise the educational advantages of the university. It seems to me too plain for argumant that where a statute appoints a body of persons to carry out purposes of public benefit, the persons constituting such a body ipso facto become holders of a public officer within the meaning of the section. It is not disputed that to hold otherwise would be to go contrary to a vast number ofe nglish decisions with regard to the writ of mandamus and that it would also give the go - by to the principle which, if not expressly enunciated, is underlying numerous decisions of the high courts both of bombay and calcutta. I am, therefore, of opinion that the syndicate is a body amenable to the jurisdiction of section 45 of specific relief act, if the other conditions for that relief are present"
    . This passage was bodily incoporated in satish chander v. Rajasthan university (21) air 1970 raja sthan 184 by the rajasthan high court.

    (28) The petitioners referred to the view of a chancellor expressed in johannesberg in 1962:

    "the political government could honestly commit a greater mistake than by attempting to convert the university a mere office of department of state"
    . Nearer home the recommendations of univarsity education commission in 1948 submitted by s. Radhakrishan: the kothari commission in 1964 the gajendragadkar commission in 1969 are cited to hold universities should be governed by elected members. At the debate the counsel referred to numerous opinions of eminent educationists. The entire argument showed as though this court can decide the issue by treating opinions of these authorities as evidence in the cases. How enigmatic the task is to be imagined once we see the education commission 1964 - 66 interviewed 9,000 persons and obtained memoranda from 2400 persons.

    (29) I consider and hold it is not for the courts to adjudicate issues like desirability or otherwise of syndicate consisting of elected persons or nominated pe'rsons. In this country and in other civilized western countries, the question is a moot point. The question even otherwise is not free from doubt and difficulties. It is for the legislature to take stock of the situation and decide one way or the other. The parliament or legislature in their affairs have the power to go into such questions. In their wisdom parliament might think it is better to have elected persons. In another period the same parliament may consider better to have nominated persons. Whatever the decision is, their power is supreme. It is thus for legislatures to choose between the two modes and not for the courts to adjudicate such issues. The andhra pradesh legisature has decided to have nominated persons is obvious from the provisions in act 17 of 1985. Therefore, it cannot be held section 31 - a is ultra vires of the constitution. I will return to section 18 to consider its validity.

    (30) The next aspect relates to reduction of term of existing members of syndicate when the ordinance was promulgated. I hold the issue is no more resintegra. Wnen the president under article 356 (1) of the constitution dissolved the legislative assemblies of nine states in 1977 all sleeted members of the assemblies ceased to be members of legislative assemblies. When the act of the president was challenged in state of rajasthan v. Union of india (22) air 1977 sc. 1361, the supreme court held:

    "as a result of their csasing to be such members their right to draw salary which they could only draw if they were members of the assembly, came to an end"
    . This aspect even it is an infraction of rights 'indirect and remote' (para 116). The right was to hold an elected office and such a right was not a fundamental right. It was an ordinary right subject to laws (p. 1432) , and such a right could be deprived by law of the legislative body. Once the legislature dissolved elected syndicate, as has been done in section 31 - a, no right survived. I, therefore, hold section 31 - a is not ultra vires of the constitution. It was alternatively argued the introduction of sec. 31 - a is in violation of article 14 af the constitution. Once the legislature had power to cut short the term of elected persons to a syndicate, the question under article 14 of the constitution does not survive. Finally, it is to be considered whether the substituted section 18 of act 14 of 1954 violates free speech.

    (31) It is now accepted on all hands university is an autonomous body. Syndicate is the cabinet of such an autonomous body and runs its affairs. The sowers of syndicate are set out in section 19 of the act, to prescribe standards of education, control students, and teachers, grant recognition to institutions, publish books, etc. The entire gamut of power is exercised by the syndicate and in the instant case such a body consists of eleven members. The eleven are divided in class i and class ii members. One among them is a vice - chancellor in class i, who is an academician. The balance of four are nominated. Two secretaries in education and finance departments, the director of higher education, the chairman of t. T. D. , the executive officer of t t d. - ail the four out of five are nominated persons. The three eminent educationists are nominated in class ii members. I cannot avoid the discomfort to see the syndicate loaded with so many nominated persons. When i say this, i am not trying to legislate how a syndicate should be composed: all that i hold is a syndicate runs the university. In running a university free speech is involved. Is it not that university is made effect by nominated persons. The syndicate may consist a few nominated persons by the government. I hold so important a body with so many as nominated is sure to thwart the academic freedom. This is not to say academic freedom stands stifled in the presence of few nominated persons. In the realm of human experience no freedom including academic freedom can survive with as many as 10 out of 11 nominated, l am sure this is a opinion. There is the necessity to express this opinion. In this regard i am in agreement with all reasoning and conclusion reached by my brother rama rao j. Therefore, i cannot sustain section 18 i strike down the section. The two writ petitions thus are partly allowed. No costs. Advocate's fee rs. 500/ -. In each.

    (32) Per rama rao j. This is a petition for issue of an appropriate writ and for a declaration that a p ordinance 11/85 dated 10 - 6 - 1985 is unconstitutional, illegal and beyond the powers of the state government.

    (33) The averments in the affidavit in support of the writ petition may be briefly stated: - sri venkateswara university was established in 1954 at tirupati and the important authorities of the university are the senate, the syndicate and the academic council. The syndfcate is the executive authority of the university. This is the pattern in all unieversity acts. The syndicate has the power to appoint teachers, dismiss them and award fellowships, appoint members of board of studies, appoint examiners, direct inspection of all affiliated colleges, conduct examinations and administer all funds of the university and thus the entire control is vested in the syndicate further this is an appellate authority in disciplinary cases against the students and the employees against any decision of the officers of the university. The syndicate before the ordinance consists of seven ex - officie members, the vice - chancellor, the rector, the secretaries to departments of education and finance, the director of higher education, the directors of autonomous post graduate centres in the university area, the chairman of the tirumala tirupathi devasthanam. Class ii members are four persons elected from the senate from among its members, four persons elected from the academic council from among its members and three persons elected from among members of legislative assembly. Thus the total strength of the syndicate consists of seventeen members as per the act. Three out of these members are government officials. The chairman of the tirumala tirupathi devasthanam is a nominee of the government. To carry out any resolution, it requires a simple majority as no quorum was fixed. While so, the state government passed an ordinance 11/85 changing the composition of the syndicate. The ordinance provides that in respect of the universities of andhra, osmania, sri venkateswara, kakatiya and sri krishna devaraya, the ex - officio members are the vice chancellor, the secretaries to government of andhra pradesh in education department and finance department, their nominecs or delegates, the director of higher education, the chairman of the tirumala tirupathi devasthanam and the executive officer. Class if members consists of one professor to be co - opted by the syndicate one principal of the affiliated colleges co - opted by the syndicate and three eminent persons representing the educational interests in the university to be nominated by the state government. Under the ordinance the strength of the syndicate is reduced to 11. There are four officers of the state government, the chairman of the tirumala tirupathi devasthanam and the other three are nominated by the state government. The quorum for a meeting is one - third of the total number of persons or four persons whichever is higher. The members to be co - opted by the syndicate will be again persons desirable to the government. The vice chancellor is the only person from the academics and the government is incomplete control of the university and its affairs and the university has become another limb of the government. Autonomy of a university is assured under the constitution and the ordinance interfers with the autonomy of the universities. Further section 31 - a introduced in the main act provides that the members of the syndicate functioning prior to the date of ordinance shall continue till the syndicate is reconstituted under the said ordinance and on reconstitutlon the members of the syndicate shall cease to hold office. There is absolutely no rationale behind this provision and the clause is arbitrary and unreasonable. The ordinance 11/85 offends the guaranteed freedom of speech and is not saved under the reasonable restrictive clause. This ordinance is aimed at to unseat the elected members of the sri venkateswara university. With a view to make the university as a limb of the government ordinance is istroduced constituting a new composition of the members.

    (34) W. P. No 6361 of 1985: - this petition is for a issue of an appropriate writ declaring that ordinance 11/85 and particularly section 3 of the ordinance is unconstitutional, illegal and violative of article 14 of the constitution of india.

    (35) The petitioners are members of the academic council of sri venkateswara university. The petitioners are elected as members of the syndicate of the university in the elections held on 31 - 10 - 1984. Under section 31 (1) of the sri venkateswara act, the petitioners are entitled to continue as members of the syndicate for a period of three years. It is stated that ordinance 11/85 emending the act and substituting sections 18 and 31 - a destroys the autonomy of the university and the tenure of office as members of the syndicate is put to an end. It is further stated that it is only in venkateswara university elections were held to the members of the syndicate from the senate as well as academic council and legislative council. The provisions though intended to amend the act of the universities, it is directed against sri venkateswara university to disable the elected members to function as the members of the syndicate for their full term of office to which they are entitled under section 31 of the act. Thus it is arbitrary and violative of article 14 of the constitution of india.

    (36) In the common counter - affidavit filed by the additional secretary to government of andhra pradesh, education department, it is stated that section 31 - a is introduced as a transitory provision providing that the members of the existing syndicate shall continue to function as members of the syndicate till new syndicate is reconstituted in accordance with the provisions of ordinance 11/85. It provides that on the reconstitution of the new syndicate, the members of the syndicate holding office immediately before the reconstitution of the syndicate under the ordinance shall cease to be such members. The allegation that this ordinance is aimed at unseating the elected members of sri venkateswara university syndicate is denied. The main reason for not conducting elections to the other universities is to avoid heavy financial commitment and it is felt expedient and essential in the interests of the university administration that it is better that the universities fellow the existing composition of the executive council of the central universities (university of hyderabad) where there is no election element and the members of the executive council. , equivalent to syndicate, are being nominated by the vice - chancellor. Keeping in view the automomy and educational interests of the university and to avoid unnecessary expenditure, ordinance 11/85 was promulgated in public interest. The autonomy of the university is in no way affected by reconstitution of syndicate in accordance with new procedure. The reconstitution of the syndicate under section 18 is legal and valid and does not infringe art. 19 (1) (a) or article 14 of the constitution. ' in the year 1981 in osmania university, andhra university and sri vankateswara university, the election element was introduced and till 1984 the universities have not taken any action to conduct the elections. This matter was discussed in the vice - chancellors's conference held on 16 - 11 - 1983 and the conference observed that the financial and organisational problems involved in conducting elections are many and formidable and huge expenditure was also involved. The autonomy of the universities is not eroded and the syndicate cannot be considered as a limb of the state government. The contention that the provisions of section 31 - a of the ordinance is brought with the intention to do away with the elected members of the syndicate of sri venkateswara university is without substance and there is no infringement of article 14 of the constitution.

    (37) The learned counsel for the petitioners in both the writ petitions contended that the provisions restructuring the composition of the syndicate are destructive of university autonomy and offend freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under article 19 (1) (a) of the constitution and the expression eminent persons representing the educational interests'' is vague and not amenable to any explicit qualification. In w. P. No 6361/85 sri s venkat reddy in addition to the aforesaid general contentions contended that section 31 - a is aimed at to unseat the elected members of the syndicate for sri venkateswara university is discriminatory and it is further contended that the composition of the syndicate with mostly government officials and their nominees and giving a go - bye to elections and involvement of academicians is arbitrary and violative of article 14 of the constitution. The learned advocate - general contended that the elections to the universities have been given up in view of the great drain on the financial resources of the universities and the autonomy of the uuniversity is intact as the composition of the syndicate indicates that more academicians are taken into the syndicate and further the question of curtailing the freedom of speech or expression of any person or body of persons does not arise in the enactment of provisions relating to the universities under the power vested in the state legislature under the constitution. It is further contended by the learned advocate - general that section 31 - a is intended to bring into effect the coostitutioi of new syndicate uniformly for all the diversities and therefore the question of singling out sri venkateswara university does not arise.

    (38) It may be stated that ordinance 11/85 is repealed and replaced by andhra pradesh uuniversity acts (second amendment) act. 1935 (act no 17 of 1985) which is desi'gned to amend the andhra university, sri venkateswara university, osmania university, nagarjuna university, kakatiya university, sri krishna deva. Aya university, the a. P. Open university, and sri padmavathi mahila viswa vidyalayam acts, to appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to have close - up of impugned section 18 and section 31 - a of act 17 of 1985 and the erstwhile composition of syndicate.

    "section 18 (1) the syndicate shall consist of the following persons namely: - class i ex - officio members : (i) the vice - chancellor ; (ii) the secretary to the state government in the education department or his nominee or delegate ; (iii) the secretary to the state government in the finance and planning (finance wing) department or his nominee or delegate ; (iv) the director of higher education or his nominee or delegate ; (v) the chairman of the tirumala tirupathi devasthanam's board ;and (vi) the executive officer of the tirumala tirupathi devasthanams. Class il - other members. (i) one professor of the university to be co - opted by the syndicate by rotation in order of seniority for a period of one year ; (ii) one principal of the affiliated colleges to be co - opted by the syndicate by rotation in order of seniority for a period of one year and (iii) three eminent persons representing the educational interests in the university area to be nominated by the state government. (2) the syndicate shall meet at least once in every six weeks and may meet more often if necessary. (3) upon a requisition in writing signed by not less than one - third of the total number of members of the syndicate the vice - chancellor shall convene a meeting of the syndicate on a date appointed by him which shall not be later than seven days from the date of receipt of requisition aforesaid. (4) in the absence of the vice chancellor from any meeting of the syndicate, the members present at the meeting shall choose one among themselves to preside over the meeting. (5) the quorun for a meeting of the syndicate shall be one - third of the total number of members or four persons, whichever is higher"
    .

    Section 31 - a: - notwithstanding anything in this act,

    (a) the members of the syndicate constituted and functioning before the commencement of section 3 of the andhra pradesh university acts (second amendment) act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the said act,) shall continue to be such members and function only until a new syndicate is reconstituted in accordance with the provisions of this act as amended by the said act '.

    (b) on the reconstitution of such new syndicate in accordance with the provisions of this act, as amended by the said act, the members of the syndicate holding office immediately before such reconstitution shall cease to be such members ; and

    (c) the persons if any, elected as members to the syndicate in accordance with the provisions of this act, prior to the commencement of the said act shall not have the right to be, or to enter into office as such members after the commencement of the said act. " the same pattern is evolved for all the other universities except the addition of two members namely chairman and executive officer of the tirumala tirupathi oevasthanam board for sri venkatesvvara university. In accordance with the unamended section 18 of the act the syndicate shall comprise two classes as members : class l - ex - officio members : (i) vice - chancellor ; (ii) ractor ; (iii) secretary to the state government in the education department (iv) secretary to state government in finance department (v) director of higher education. (vi) , directors of autonomous post graduate centres in the university area if any. (vii) chairman of tirumala tirupati devasthanam board. Class - ll : (i) four persons elected by the senate from among its members. (ii) four persons elected by the academic council from among its members. (iii) three persons elected from members of a. P. Legislative assembly; (iv) two persons elected from members of a p legislative council.

    (39) The essence of the distinction between the reconstituted syndicate and the erstwhile syndicate highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, is that the academic element is eliminated in class - 1 members and the majority constitutes government officials and though class - ll members profess to be comprising academicians the nomination is left to the syndicate comprising officials in class i and category (iii) persons in class ii, are nominated by the government. It is amplified that the involvement of academicians and democratic process in the erstwhile set up have been given a go - bye and the autonomy is substantially eroded. It is further stated that in so far as venkateswara university the chairman is a m l a and the executive officer is government official. The learned advocate - general contends that there is no direct interference of the government in the affairs of universities and sufficient representation is given to academicians and the elections hav. E been given up in view of heavy expenditure involved and the autonomy is not interfered with.

    (40) The university is an institution of higher learning with power to grant degrees. The diverse types of modern universities throughout the world are traced mainly to three types namely, the english, french and german. Of these, the english type represented by the universities of oxford and cambridge are oldest. The universities by and large are autonomous corporations and the state has absolutely no concern with the internal management of the universities. The pattern prevailing in england was transplanted in north america. In france subsequent to revolution the universities are replaced by technical schools established by the state and the central governing body controls the entire national educational system from elementary schools to the highest professional schools. The german type is via media between english and french and the autonomy is cherished and the senate an elected body wields considerable influence in the appointment of professors and other matters.

    (41) The focal point is university autonomy and therefore at the outset it is necessary to dilate upon anatomy of autonomy. The university autonomy broadly comprises three ingredients : -

    (1) the power to select its own students. It is stated in bobbin's report at page 231 that' it would obviously be an infringement of freedom' if academic institutions are forced to accept or reject any particular student. (2) the appointment of teaching staff. The university must be free to employ and promote its own teaching staff from among the best that are available. (3) the extent to which the university and teachers are free to determine their courses of study, the methods of instruction, the place of research vis - a - vis teaching or fields or forms of specialist learning at various stages.

    A university should therefore be free to teach what it is best equipped to do. In this context, it is pertinent to refer to the observations of one of the out - standing vice - chancellors - late lakshmanaswami mudaliar : 'it is unfortunate that sometimes those in officials circles acting under different ministries, should consider that the universities should prune the syllabi and courses of studies just to fit the finished produce to enter on the duties, which a government department may require him to do. When appeals are made therefore, directly or indirectly, to fashion the syllabi and courses of studies, to include particular subjects or if a general 'condemnation is made of what the universities are attempting to do by persons in officials position, dressed for the time being with authority, acting on their own or perhaps on behalf of the ministry, with which they are connected, an embrassing situation arises in the university. '

    (42) In all such cases, it is perhaps the zealous reformer or politician who pushes through reform to improve the quality and character of university education. Nearly always his zeal encroaches on the freedom of the academician to explore and extend the realms of knowledge as best he can. '

    (43) The freedom from outside interference is basic to the functioning of an autonomous institution. An autonomous institution like a free individual, must be free from want and have adequate resources to meet its commitments. A university with insufficient or uncertain material resources can hardly preserve its independence and if its expenditure becomes subject to open discussion or public controversy. Regarding this aspect a compromise, from avoiding this embarassment of auditor's elaborate inquiries or direct intervention by the government is evolved by university grants committee of britain which is independent of ministeriaf direction and at the same time maintains close contact with the government, advises the chancellor of the exchequer on the amounts needed by the universities and distributes 'the grants made available among them. On the same pattern the university grants commission is modelled to act as a liason between the universities and the government. For more than 20 years the commission contributed to the initiation and development of new and old universities. The university education commission comprising (1) dr s radhakrishnan, (2) dr tara chand, (3) dr (now sir) james f duff, (4) dr zakir hussain, (g) dr arthur e morgan, (6) dr a lakshmanaswami mudaliar, (7) dr meghnad saha, (8) dr karm narayan bahl, (9) dr john j tigert and (10) shri nirmal kumar sidhanta in their report dated 4 - 11 - 1948 stated that the syndicate is the pivotal body in the administration of indian universities. It is bound to wield considerable power and the right choice of members is therefore highly important and it must contain elements derived from several sources. The syndicate should be evenly divided between internal and external members but with the balance inclining to the internal side. The report of the university education commission published by the government of india press, simla, 1951 stated that the freedom which british universities possess is a priceless gift of the royal charter and it might be well worth fighting for in india. British universities are managed in a completely free atmosphere of almost monastic seclusion and the proof of the value of this system is to be found in the profound and universal respect which they command and enjoy. The report of the education commission 1964 - 66 - kothari commission stated as follows : -

    Autonomy within university : before considering the relations between individual universities of the university system as a whole with external authori ties, it would be desirable to discuss briefly the meaning of autonomy within the university itself. (1) it is recognized that the representation of lay elements on the various governing bodies of the university is necessary and justified in view of the nature of relationship between the university and the society. It would, however, be contrary to the principle of university autonomy if the lay of nonacademic members in these bodies assume a dominating and controlling position. Conventions should be developed which would largely shift the centre of gravity of authority to the academic wing of the university's government. In particular, care should be taken to see that the academic council is vested with the final authority in all academic matters. The function of the non - academic element should be mainly to present academics the wider interests of the society as a whole, but not to impose then ; it should also serve to represent the views and interests of the academics to the widsr society and thus make the smooth functioning of the university more easily possible.

    (2) it is necessary to ensure that universities do not become administration or administrator dominated and to keep vigilant in this regard. The dominance, if one is to use that word at all, must be of the academic element, and the principal function of the administration is te serve the academic interests of the university. As in the case of liberty, the price of autonomy is eternal vigilance by all parties concerned. The universities are established by law and they can have only as much autonomy as the law permits. In the last analysis, therefore, the real custodian of university autonomy is public opinion based on a conviction that autonomous universities, which maintain intellectual integrity in their fearless pursuit or truth, are an indispensable bulwark of democracy and freedom. In creating a strong public opinion in this behalf, the ugc, the iub and the intelligentia, who are themselves mostly the alumini of the universities, have an important role to play".

    The report of the university education commission (1948 - 49) is as follows; -

    "university autonomy : freedom of individual development is the basis of democracy. Exclusive control of education by the state has been an importont factor in facilitating the maintenance of totalitarian tyrannies. In such states institutions of higher learning controlled and managed by governmental agencies act like mercenaries, promote the political purposes of the state, make them acceptable to an increasing number of their populations and supply them with the weapons they need. We must resiat, in the interests of our own democracy the trend towards the governmental domination of the educational process. The respect in which the universities of great britain are held is due to the freedom from governmental - interference which they enjoy constitutionally and actually. Our universities should be released from the control of politics"
    .

    (44) The inter - university board considered the question of university autonomy consisting of dr c p ramaswami' aiyer, dr. A. L. Mudaliar, dr. C. D. Deshmukh dr. K. L. Shrimali and dr. B. Mullick examined the whole problem and issued the following statement ; -

    "the inter - university board its firmly of opinion that the mere fact that certain contributions are made by state government or even by the centre cannot be a justification to bring abotut changes which will radically alter the composition, the working and efficiency of the universities - and humilitate the universities concerned in the eyes of the academic world. The board is of the opinion that a statutorily established university is practically in the same position as a statutorily established political government and the mere afact that the legislature - , of such governments have certain powers of legislation should not be utilised to lower the reputation of indian universities and to make their efficient working impossible."

    The report of the committee on governance of universities and colleges is as follows : - the concept of university autonomy is often misunderstood. It is not a "legal concept "not even a "constitutional concept". It is an ethical concept and an academic concept. This concept does not question that, in a democratic society like ours, legislatures are ultimately sovereign, and have a right to diccuss and determine the questions of policy relating to education including higher education, which means that legislatures can determine the structure of universities, their rights and their obligations. It is well known that education including university education is within the legislative competence of state legislatures. Entry 11 in list ii of the 7th schedule in the indian constitution makes it clear that the state legislatures are sovereign and are competent to deal with all problems of university education subject to limitations which flow from entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 in union list i of the same schedule. Entry 66 in list i provides for coordina tion and determination of standards in institutions of higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions. Thus subject to the limitation imposed by these latter entries, the sovereignly of state legislatures to deal with university education cannot be and is not in question ; in other words. University autonomy does not suggest that the universities are a state within a state, and a law unto themselves. The concept of university autonomy, however, means that it would toe appropriate on the part of democratic legislatures not to interfere with the administration of university life, both academic and non - academic. The claim for autonomy is made by the universities not as a matter of privilege but on the ground that such an autonomy is a condition precedent if the universities are to discharge their duties and obligations effectively and efficiently as regards imparting and advancement of onowledge, and also making their unique kontribution to the life and deveippment cf the nation. " the calcutta university commission stated that our universities are not independent corporations of learning, but bodies mainly nominated by government wielding defined powers delegated to them and subject to constant supervision by government. Freedom of speech and expression - article 19 (1) (a) of the constitution

    (45) The material portion of article 19 (1) (a) of the constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and expression is as follows: -

    19 (1) all citizens shall have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression, (2) nothing in sub - clause (a) of clause (1) shall effect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the state from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub - clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of india, the" security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

    (46) Article 19 is analogous to first amendment to the u. S. Constitution and first amendment to the extent relevant is as follows :

    "congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. "

    Regarding the width of the freedom of speech and expression in express news papers (private) ltd. Vs union of india (1) air1958 sc 578 bnagwati, j held that the fundamental right to the freedom of speech and expression enshrined in our constitution is based on amendment i of the constitution of the united states and it would be therefore legitimate and proper to refer to the decisions of the supreme court of america in order to appreciate the true nature, scope and extents of this right inspite of the warning administered by this court against use of american and other cases.

    (47) In i. E. News papers (bombay) pvt ltd vs union of india (2) air 1986 sc 515 venkataramaiah, j held as follows :

    "while examining the constitutionality of a law which is alleged to contravene article 19 (1) (a) of the constitution, we cannot no doubt, be solely guided by the decisions of the supreme court of the united states of america. But in order to understand the basic principles of freedom of speech and expression and the need for that freedom in a democratic country we may take them into consideration."

    Though article 19 (1) (a) does not advert to the freedom of press as provided in first amendment of the constitution of america, it is firmly settled by the decisions of the courts that the freedom of speech and expression is comprehensive enough to include freedom of press and thus a wide coverage and connotation has been given. Act 19 of the international covenant on civil and political rights is as follows : -

    1. Every one shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Every one shall have the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to seek, receive and import information and ideas of all kinds". .

    (48) In keyishian vs board of regents of new york (3) 17 lawyers' edition 629 the faculty members of the state university of new york became state employees when the university was merged in the state university of new york. Their continuance of employment was conditional upon their compliance with a new york plan, prevented employment or retention of subversives in state employment. The appellants i e the members of the faculty refused to sign a certificate, as provided by the regulation that thay were not communist and they were notified that their failure to sign required certificate will result in their dismissal. Thereupon the action was brought up for declaratory relief in various respact. In the context of considering the concept of academic freadom and also whather the provisions are invalid as they prescribe mere noting membership without demonstration to fulfil the aim of the university. Mr. Justice brennan delivering the opinion of the court held as follows :

    "our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the first amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "the vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community, of american schools".

    Shelton v tucker supra 361 us at 487, 5 led 2d at 236. The classroom is peculiarly the "market place of ideas. " the nation's future depends upon leaders, trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection". United states v associated press, 52 f supp 362, 372. In sweezy v new hampshire, 354 us 234 250, 1 led 2d 1311, t324, 77 s ct 1203, we said.

    "the essentiality of freedom in the community of american universities is almost self - evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colic - gas and universities would imperil the future of our nation. No field of education is so throughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturiiy and understanding ; otherwise our civilisation will stagnate and die"
    .

    In bates vs little rock, (4) 4 lawyers edition 480 mr. Justice stewart held as follows :

    "freedom of speech and press and freedom of association for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances are constitutionally protected not only against heavy - handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle govern mental interference"
    .

    In catherine j healy vs f don james (5) 33 lawyers' edition 226 in the context of considering the denial by state college of official recognition to a group of students who desired to form local chapter of students for a democratic society and also the applicability of the first amendment principles, mr justice powell held as follows :

    "among the rights protected by the first amendment is the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the amendment it has long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and petition -. There can be no doubt that denial of official recognition, without justification, to college organisations burdens or abridges that associational right. The primary impediment to free association flowing from non - recognition is the denial of use of campus facilities for meeting and other appropriate purposes. The practical effect of non recognition was demonstrated in this case when several days after the president's decision was announced, petitioners were not allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop because they were not an approvedjgroup."

    In dejonge vs. State of origon (6) 279 us 353 it is held as follows:

    "the greater the importance of safeguarding from incitements to the ovartnrow of our institutions by force and vioience the more imperative is the need co preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assemoly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end tnat tne govt. May be responsive to tne will of the people and that changes, if desired may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the republic, the very foundation of constitutional government"
    .

    In thomas vs. Collins (7) 323 us 516 it is held as follows:

    "if the restraint were small than it is, it is from petty tyrannies that large ones take root and grow. This fact can be more plain than when they are imposed on the most basic rights of all seedlings planted in their soil grow great and growing break down the foundation of liberty"
    .

    A new dimension is projected by the supreme court to the freedom of speec and expression in i e news papers (bombay) p ltd vs. Union of india (supra) wherein the question whether tax on news print is open to review as infringing the freedom of speech and expression under article 19 (1) (a) is considered and venkataramaiah j voicing the opinion of the court held as follows;

    "the government should strike a just and reasonable balance between the need for ensuring the right of people to freedom of speech and expression on the one hand and the need to impose social control on the business of publication of a news paper on the other. In other words the government must at all material times be conscious of the fact that it is dealing with an activity protected by art. 19 (1) (a) of the constitution which is vital to our democratic existence. In deciding the reasonableness of restriction imposed on any fundamental right the court should take into consideration the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the disproportion of the imposition and the prevailing conditions at the relevant time including the social values whose needs are sought to be satisfied by means of the restrictions. Equalising principle - article 14 of the constitution article 14 of the constitution' frowns upon unequal treatment between a citizen and citizen and between a sigment of the society and another without rational or logical distinction. Without recourse to the investigation of the concept of reasonable classification linked to legitimate object of the provision the arbitrariness in the state action or legislative measure provokes article 14 as arbitrariness is antithesis to equality."

    (49) In menaka gandhi vs. Union of india (8) air 1978 sc 597 while considering the parameters of equality enshrined in article 14, bhagwati, j. Held as follows:

    "now, the question immediately arises as to what is the requirement of article 14: what is the content and reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this article? there can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its all - embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits. We must reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority in e p royappa vs. State of tamil nadu (1974) 2 scr 348; (air 1974 sc 555) namely, that "from a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies ; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of article 14".

    In a. L. Kalra vs. P and e corporation of india ltd, (9) air 1984 sc 1361. Desai j. Held as follows : -

    "it is difficult to accept the submission that executive action which results in denial of equal protection of law or equality before law cannot be judicially reviewed nor can it be struck down on the ground of arbitrariness as being violative of art 14. Conceding for the present purpose that legislative action follows a legislative palicy and the legislative policy is not judicially reviewable, but while giving concrete shape to the legislative policy in the form of statute, if the law violates any of the fundamental rights including art 14, the same is void to the extent as provided in art 13. If the law is void being in violation of any of the fundamental rights set out in part - ill of the constitution, it cannot be shielded on the ground that it enacts a legislative policy. Wisdom of the legislative policy may not be open to judicial review but when the wisdom takes the concrete form of law, the same must stand the test of being in tune with the fundamental rights and if it trenches upon any of the fundamental rights, it is void as ordained by art 13"
    .

    It is further held as follows: -

    "if thus appears well settled that article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in executive/administrative action because any action that is arbitrary must necessarily involve the negation of equality. One need not confine the denial of equality to a comparative evaluation between two persons to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory treatment. An action per se arbitrary itself denies equality of protection by law. The constitution bench pertinently observed in ajay nasia's case and put the matter beyond controversy when it said wherever therefore, there is arbitrariness in state action whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of an 'authority' under art. 12, art. 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such state action'. This view was further elaborated and affirmed in d. S. Nakara vs. Union of india (1983) 1 scc 305 (air 1983 s c 130). In maneka gandhi vs. Union of india ( 1978) 2 scr 621 (air 1978 sc597) , it was observed that art. 14 strikes at arbitrariness in state action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment."

    (50) The" university autonomy has received universal recognition and accord. The autonomy comprises freedom for the parson or body of persons at the helm of the affairs of the university to prescribe syllabi, admits students, appoint teachers and allied matters for inculcation and promotion of education and research without any external control or strings. In the wake of autonomy free exchange of ideas, intellectual intercourse is nourished and academic freedom blossoms and the freedom of speech and expression flourishes. The initial exetcise is to investigate whether autonomy has become a casuality or bruised by section 18 of the act. The scan of the texture of class i ex - officio members discloses that except the vice - chancellor the other three parsons are government officials. Therefore, the government officials have a decisive voice and the government through their officials is given clearance to have a final say in the affairs of the university and academicians or the persons closely associated or linked with the university are eliminated. Further there is an undercurrent - uneasiness and anomoly in the process of representation of these three members. The provision postulates either the government official or their nominee or delegate. The apprehension of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that this way of deputing nominee or delegate is susceptible of choosing any person without reference to any semblance of requisite qualification or academic attainment. It is amplified by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no embargo upon the concerned official to depute or nominate any person and the official can as well depute his personal assistant er lower division clerk. The expression delegate or nominee is capable of cennotation of licence to depute any person and no guidelines or restrictions are indicated in this regard. It may be that the concerned official may not misuse the power to the extent indicated by the learned counsel and the exercise of power or acting under this provision by an individual officer or otherwise is not the criterion but the expression is of wide amplitude and coverage as to authorise the official to nominate any person he chooses without adherence to any norms. The provision is likely to be relaxed and stretched to the region of irrationality by efflux of time. The learned advocate general obviously realising this un easiness contended initially that the concerned officials cannot be expected to exercise the power in the manner indicated and in any event the provision should be read;down as joint secretary or deputy saeretary. The width of the expression does not accommodate such restricted or truncated connotation and in view of wide latitude it cannot be compressed or funnelled into one or other category as suggested. In any event as contended by me learned counsel for the petitioners the chances of deputing or nominating an academician are remote and virtually eschewed. The first and second category of class ii members is by co - optiongby the syndicate i. E. , the class i members or the majority of the syndicate members. The class i members is packed by government officials or their nominees and they have a dominent voice and decisive control over choosing the members 1 and 2 in the'class ii. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the government officials or the members of the syndicate with the halo of government are likely to appoint the persons who toe the lien or the trend of the government without regard to academic excellence and independence. ,. The other three members laced by the expression "eminent educationists" should be appointed by the government. The learned counsel contended that this expression is vague and not intelligible and under the facade of eminence the government is likely to appoint any persons of their choice. We are unable to share this proposition. The eminent educationists can be identified by an impartial and dispassionate approach on a cumulative apprisal of diverse facets and the vagueness attributed to the expression is not correct. The apprehension of misuse of power in an individual case or other cannot signal the infirmity in the provision as such. The presence and involvement of eminent educationists in the affairs of the university is a welcome feature and this should not be discounted merely on the basis of likely misuse of power. As indicated above the three members in class i are government officials, two members in class ii are co - option by the members of the syndicate virtually under the thumb and control of the government and the nomination of three members of the government fuels the domination of the government. It is obvious that the voice of the government is re - sounding through and in the corridors, of the edifice, composite and texture of the restructured syndicate in consonance with section 18 of the act. Apart from the infirmity of lack of sufficient representation of academicians and virtual control of the government the rump of democratic element prevelant in the erstwhile set - up is elbowed out. There was election of few members of the syndicate from out of the senate members and other categories and the traces and loose ends of democratic element in the erstwhile set - up of the syndicate are completely snapped in the reconstituted syndicate. The learned advocate general seeks to sustain this aspect on the ground that the conduct of election is a great drain on the purse of the university. We must say that this is an extravagant plea. The country is irrevocably wedded to democracy and election is a normal and indispensable feature for all organisations and the expenditure of a high magnitude is incurred periodically for elections. The democratic traditions are ingrained in the society and the divorce from democratic process cannot be tolerated. The syndicate can be considered as fulcrum in the administration of the university. It is obvious that the government is permitted to virtually conduct the affairs of the university by loading the syndicate with officials and nominees and the members of the syndicate can be considered as spokesmen of the government and in any event conduit pipe facilitating and transmitting the views and policies of the government. Thus the packing of syndicate with government officials, co - opted members and nominees and weeding out elections result in coup of university autonomy. The syndicate reconstituted with government official and laced by control and voice of the government can hardly be dignified as syndicate studded with academic element and it is scracely an exaggeration that it is designed to ferret out intellectual atmosphere and tease out the principle of autonomy. In the present context, one cannot expect the former standards and high traditions of oxford and cambridge universities innoculated with intellectual atmosphere and high altitude of moral excellence but the extensive forays in the field of education and the syndicate densely populated with officials or nominees sponsored by the government directly or indirectly phasing out the academic element, resulted in dismantling the edifice of autonomy. It is true that the state legislature is competent to legislate regarding universities but the provision providing the over dose of domination by the government and congestion of persons sponsored by the government in the syndicate resulted in fracturing the academic freedom. The learned advocate general fairly stated that the university autonomy should be preserved and there cannot be two opinions about it but his endeavour is that the autonomy is not interfered with or destroyed. We are unable to subscribe to this view. The very lay out of section 18 bears out the complexion of government domination and - control and the representation and by election or otherwise by academicians or persons intimately associated with. The academic element is given a go - bye and their voice is silenced down. The learned advocate general stressed that the question of infringing freedom of speech or expression by any person or body does not arise and there is not even remote connection between the curtailment of autonomy and art. 19 (1) (c) of the constitution. It is true that this is an uncharted legal domain. The composition of syndicate eschewing academic freedom and atmosphere curtailed the free intellectual course, discussion, exchange of ideas and modalities of teaching and the spin - off of such composition of syndicate restricted the freedom of speech and expression. The concept of freedom of speech and expression should not be imprisoned within rigid contours of applicability in a situation of affecting expression of ideas by individuals or associations but it is wide and comprehensive enough* to take in its fold the curtailment of university autonomy, academic freedom and thereby mute the academic voice. The supreme court in the latest news print case considering the wide connotation of freedom of speech visualised under art. 19 (1) (a) held that the exhorbitant levy of duty on news print resulted in the infringement of freedom of press and breach of article 19 (1) (a).

    (51) In so far as sec. 31 - a it is forcefully contended by the learned counsel that the reconstitution of syndicate is singularly aimed at dislodging the elected members of the senate of sri venksteswara university and therefore discriminatory and arbitrary. It is difficult to contain this farfetched contention. Sec. 31 - a is a transitory provision which seeks to affectuate the constitution of syndicate visualised under section 18. The effect of section 31 - a is that after the reconstitution of the new syndicate in consonance with section 18 the erstwhile syndicate membersare stripped of their entity as members [of the syndicate. Section 31 - a is a necessary follow - up and corollary of section 18 and there is absolutely no discrimination,

    (52) In the result, section 18 is unconstitutional and illegal and sec. 31 - a is legal and valid. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by my learned brother raghuvir j.

    (53) Writ petitions partly allowed. Advocate's fee rs 500/ -.

    (54) The learned advocate general orally sought leave to appeal to the supreme court. The subject in this writ petition, indeed raises a substantial question of law. Therefore we grant leave to the state government to appeal to the supreme court of india and we suspend our judgment for two months from today.

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    Comments

    R. Rama Murthy And Ors. v. Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors.
    (Apr 28, 1986)