(1) The defendant is the appellant. The respondents - plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale, ex. A1, dated 15 - 5 - 1978 entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendant in respect of a building bearing no. 11 - 4 - 624, red hills, hyderabad. The trial court decreed the suit directing the defendant to execute a registered sale deed. Hence the appeal. The parties will be referred to as described in the suit.
(2) The plaintiffs' case is that the defendant entered into an agreement of sale with the plaintiffs for sale of the suit schedule property for a consideration of rs. 2,90,000/ - and accepted an advance of rs. 30,000/ - towards part of the sale consideration ; that the agreement was reduced into writing on 15 - 5 - 1978 ; that the defendant undertook to produce permission from the urban purushottam and co. Vs. Manilal and sons, air 1961 s. C. 325 and ceiling authorities, a certificate from the income - tax authorities and a 'nil encumbrance certificate', within six months and also to handover copies of the title deeds; that having satisfied the title of the defendant, the plaintiffs entered into the said agreement and parted with an amount of rs. 30,000/ - ; that when the plaintiffs approached the defendent for compliance with the terms and execution of the sale deed, the defendant bagan to evade; that the plaintiffs, therefore, gave a telegraphic notice followed by a registered notice dated 9 - 11 - 1978 to the defendant demanding to comply with the terms of the agreement and that since the defendant failed to comply, the plaintiffs filed the suit.
(3) In the written statement filed, by the defendant, while admitting that he entered into the agreement of sale with the plaintiffs regarding the suit schedule property as per the terms and conditions mentioned therein, stated that time was the essence of the contract; that he signed the agreement in a hurry; that he received telegraphic and registered notices and replied to the same ; that he cancelled the agreement of sale since he was not in a position to convey perfect title in view of the dispute between himself and his co - sharers regarding the ownership of the suit property ; that the 2nd plaintiff was not represented properly and so the agreement of sale is defective ; that the present suit is also defective having been filed by the two plaintiffs - the 2nd plaintiff being represented by the general power of attorney and the gpa having not obtained permission of the court; that the defendant sent two cheques in a sum of rs. 15,000/ - each representing the amount paid to him as advance, to the plaintiffs while cancelling the agreement ; that the plaintiffs have no cause of action and that the suit is liable to be dismissed.
(4) The trial court framed the following issues : 1. Whether the defendant can unilaterally cancel the agreement of sale and refuse specific performance? 2. Exercising rights of ownership refuse to comply with the terms of sale and resile from the contract? 3. Whether the defendant is unable to give clear title of the property to plaintiffs? 4. Whether the defendant legally bound to convey absolute and valid title of the suit property to the plaintiffs?
(5) Whether the defendant had cancelled the agreement of sale on valid grounds?
(6) Whether the original agreement of sale is defective and cannot be implemented?
(7) Whether the present suit filed by the plaintiffs is defective in the absence of permission of the court?
(8) Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of specific performance?
(9) To what relief? 5. The above issues were recast on 16 - 3 - 1981 as under : 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for specific performance of contract of sale dated 15 - 5 - 1978 and for possession of the suit property as prayed for? 2. Whether the agreement dated 15 - 5 - 1981 is validly cancelled by the defendant? 6. Two witnesses - pws. 1 and 2, who are the 1st plaintiff and the gpa of the 2nd plaintiff respectively - were examined and exs. A1 to a12 were marked for the plaintiffs. Two witnesses including the defendant were examined and exs. B1 to b16 were marked for the defendant. The trial court answered both the issues in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. 7. The contentions raised on behalf of the defendant - appellant are: 1. There is no validly executed agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant; 2. The gpa did not authorise sri m. Manik reddy (pw2) to sign any pleadings in respect of the suit property and so, the plaint is defective ; 3. The plaint is not properly presented; 4. The permission of the court to initiate action through the gpa as provided in rule 32 of the civil rules of practice, has not been obtained ; 5. The agreement of sale, even if it is valid and binding, itself provides for getting determined on the happening of certain events and contingencies. They are : (a) non - transfer of unimpeachable title ; (b) non - obtaining of income - tax clearance certificate ; (c) non - securing permission under the urban land ceiling act and (d) any delay caused in compliance with the conditions will cause determination of the agreement, as time is the essence of contract. 6. The agreement is not capable of performance in view of the fact that the vendor was not in a position to hand over vacant possession of the entire land, as the tenant who was in occupation of a portion of the building refused to vacate the premises ; 7. The agreement of sale is of the year 1978 ; the relief of specific performance being discretionary one, it will be inequitable to enforce the contract at this distance of time. 8. Point no. 1 : - there is no valid agreement of sale : this was sought to be canvassed on two counts viz. , there was no consensus ad idem between the parties and the contract is vague and uncertain. The relevant material in this behalf be noticed. 9. The agreement of sale, ex. A 1, is admitted by the defendant. The 2nd plaintiff has been described in the said agreement as dr. M. Janardhan reddy,. At present residing in america, represented by sayeed bakran of red hills (hereinafter called 'the purchasers' which term shall mean and include heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives.). In para 2 of the written statement, it is stated :
"with regard to the allegations made in para 2 of the plaint, it is submitted that on 15th february, 1978 the defendant and the plaintiff no. 1 also representing the plaintiff no. 2 viz. , dr. M. Janardhan reddy had entered into an agreement of sale of the defendant's house known as baithul ashraff and the cheques were also cashed for rs. 30,000/ -"
.
(10) The defendant in his evidence stated :
". The terms and conditions agreed upon are mentioned in the agreement of sale. In terms of the agreement ex. A1 i had taken an advance of rs. 30,000/ -. Ex. Al bears my initials wherever corrections are made. The agreement of sale ex. Al is in the name of two persons to whom i agreed to sell the house for a sum of rs. 2,90,000/ - and i received as advance two cheques of rs. 15,000/ - each. Exs. A 4and a5 are the receipts issued by me. (ex. A5 receipt was issued in favour of janardhan reddy, the 2nd plaintiff.). Ex. A6 is the copy of the permission for sale obtained by me from the urban land ceiling authorities, handed over to the plaintiff no. 1. 1 applied for a nil encumbrance certificate, but i do not remember when, but i have not yet received the certificate. The certificate is not refused to me. Soon after the agreement of sale, i applied for income - tax clearance certificate, but i have not received any intimation refusing to give clearance"
.
(11) In view of the aforesaid evidence, it is indeed very hard to hold that there was no consensus an idem in respect of the property and with reference to the terms and conditions as mentioned in the agreement of sale : nor could it be said that there is any equivocality with regard to the terms in the agreement the defendant clearly in no uncertain terms states that he had signed the agreement agreeing to sell the property mentioned in it for certain consideration and also after taking an advance of rs. 15,000/ - each from plaintiffs 1 and 2 issued two separate receipts in their names agreeing to execute a sale deed after obtaining necessary certificates in terms thereof. The argument of the learned counsel for the defendant - appellant is that the defendant signed the agreement in a hurry at a time when he was leaving hyderabad the next day and on being insisted by the plaintiffs, he was prevailed upon to sign the same and so there was no time for him to brood over the pros and cons of the agreement. This is equally belied by the fact of his own evidence that he signed ex. Al agreement with initials at various places wherever corrections were made. Further it is not in dispute that the defendant is a retired director of mines and geology, government of andhra pradesh, and it is very difficult to believe that a person of that status could be said to have executed the agreement of sale involving the sale of a building costing nearly rs. 3 lakhs without taking a look at the contents and initialling at various places without realising the implications. It may even be mentioned that in his entire oral testimony, the defendant has not taken the trouble of mentioning this aspect any where. So, nothing could be made out of this for the proposition that there was no consensus ad idem in respect of terms of the agreement nor anything relatable to the vagueness or uncertainity about the terms of the agreement.
(12) The argument with reference to ex. Al that certain words used therein in singular at one place and plural at another place throws any omount of uncertainity or vagueness, is without fundation. It is true in para 2 of ex. A1 it is stated "in pursuance of this agreement, the vendor has this day received from the purchaser herein of rs. 30,000/ -. That the balance amount of consideration of rs. 2,60,000/ - will be paid by the purchaser to the vendor. ". Again in para 4 it is stated "the vendor has agreed to execute and register the sale deed. In favour of ihe said purchaser. " also in para 10 it is mentioned "in case the vendor fails to get the sale deed executed. Purchaser shall be entitled to claim specific performance. ". So, on the said basis a mountain is sought to be made out of a molehill stating that what was agreed upon was to sell in favour of only one purchaser. Forgetting that in like manner in more than one paragraph, plural has been employed viz. In para 1 it is stated "the vendor herein shall sell,. And convey to the purchasers. "; in para 5 it is stated "the vendor herein shall. Satisfy the purchasers. "; so also para 6 reads "it is mutually agreed between the parties hereto that for any reason the vendor becomes unable. For the alienation of. In favour of the purchasers. " and significantly in this very paragraph it is stated". Or there will be any delay in getting the requisite permission , in that event the earnest money of rs. 30,000/ - paid by the purchaser to the vendor (singular has been used). ". Again in para 7 it is stated " the vendor assures the purchasers. " para 8 reads: "the vendor herein is liable to pay and clear all the taxes. And handover to the purchasers. ". In para 9 it is mentioned "the vendor agrees to handover vacant possession. To the purchasers. ". Finally in para 10 it is stated "similarly if the purchasers or their nominees. ". What all at best that can be said in this connection is that by sheer inadvertance wherever singular has been indicated, it must be taken to convey the meaning of plural, as it would otherwise render the meaning redundant and consequently it cannot be said that the agreement, ex. A1, suffers from any ambiguity or vagueness ; nor for the reason that it has not been signed, as argued by the learned counsel for the defendant - appellant, by one of the purchasers inasmuch as it is stated at the outset in ex. Al itself that the second purchaser has been styled as "m. Janardhan reddy, at present residing in america, represented by sayeed bakran of red hills (the first purchaser) ' and underneath it is mentioned "herein - after called 'the purchasers', which term shall mean and include their heirs, executants, legal representatives etc. " therefore, for the purpose of document, it is the first purchaser janab sayeed bakran will also represent the second purchaser, which has been clearly understood by the defendant himself when he signed the document.
(13) The decision in special secretary, govt. Of rajasthan vs. Venkataramana seshaiyer, air 1984 a. P. 5 on which the learned counsel for the defendant - appellant has placed reliance is of no assistance, as the said decision deals with a situation where it pertained to a lottery ticket, on the back of which certain terms and conditions mentioned, whether could be held binding. The court held:
"where the material on the reverse of a lottery ticket was in small print and there was nothing in the evidence to show that the attention of the purchaser of the ticket was drawn t. The said matter at or before the time when the purchaser paid the price for purchasing the lottery ticket, and no copy of the notification published by the state government sponsoring the lottery and containing the conditions printed on the reverse of the ticket was supplied to the purchaser when he purchased the ticket, it would have to be inferred that there was nothing to suggest that the purchaser bound himself by what was printed on the backside of the lottery ticket. Consequently, when the condition printed on the reverse of the ticket that the dispute relating to the lottery ticket would be subject to jaipur jurisdiction and another condition that the winner of prize must produce the original lottery ticket were not brought to the notice of the purchaser at the time of the purchase, the purchaser would not be bound by those conditions and the purchaser would be entitled to the prize when other evidence established that the prize winning ticket was sold to him."
(14) In view of the above, it has to be held that there was consensus ad idem between the parties and that there was no uncertainity or vaguencees with regard to the terms of agreement and, therefore, the contention, whish is devoid of substance, is rejected.
(15) Point no. 2 : - whether the gpa authorises the gpa holder to represent and file the suit on behalf of the 2nd plaintiff? ex. A12 is the gpa which has been executed by the 2nd plaintiff as well as his wife smt. Mani in favour of sri m. Manik reddy (pw2) appointing him as an agent to look after the affairs on his behalf, which reads ; "whereas we are. To do and execute all or any of the following acts, deeds and things : 1. To work, manage, control and supervise the management of all properties now or hereafter belonging to us and to develop the same. 9. To appear for and represent us in all courts, civil, criminal or revenue including labour tribunals, original, revisional or appellate, in any registration offices, and to sign, execute and verify and file plaints, written statements and petitions, and also to present appeals in any court, and to accept service 0n all summons, notices and other process of law. 10. To appoint, engage on our behalf pleaders, advocates or solicitors whenever our said attorney shall think proper to do so and to discharge or terminate his or their appointment.
(16) The contention of the learned counsel for the defendant - appelant is that ex. A12 was executed on 26 - 8 - 1977 whereas ex. A1 was executed on 15 - 5 - 1978 i. E. Subsequent to ex. A12 and, therefore, the property referred to in ex. A1 cannot be said to be covered by ex. A12. Secondly the title or ownership with respect to the property covered by ex. Al is not crystallised into full ownership in favour of the 2nd plaintiff as well and so, the power of attorney cannot be said to clothe the attorney holder to prosecute the suit in respect of the said property on behalf of the 2nd plaintiff. The argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs respondents with which i am inclined to associate is that the words 'all properties now or hereafter belonging to us' mentioned in ex. A12 will cover not only the properties owned at present but also in future as well ; otherwise the word 'hereafter' employed in the gpa would be rendered nugatory, which construction should not be allowed to be placed. Secondly, the right to property need not necessarily bloom into full ownership so long as there exists a right in relation to a particular property, movable or immovable, and should there be any dispute with regard to that, surely a right is conferred to canvass the fame in a court of law. The gpa is comprehensive enough to cover such rights, otherwise it would frustrate the very object of nominating a person as an agent to take care of all the necessary things like 'manage, control, supervise' and so forth. Hence, i have no hesitation in holding that the gpa authorised the attorney holder to do all those things mentioned therein on behalf of the executant enabling him to look after the properties, not only the existing ones but even future acquisitions involving certain disputed claims as well.
(17) Points 3 and 4 : - whether the plaint has been properly presented with due permission from the court? the plaint is signed by the gpa holder and the same was presented to the court along with the gpa under item 11 of it. The argument of the learned counsel for the defendant - appellant is based upon the provisions made in rule 32 of the civil rules of practice. Rule 32 reads : 'party appearing by agent : - (1) when a party appears by any agent, other than an advocate, the agent shall, before making of or doing any appearance, application, or act in or to the court, file in court the power of attorney, or written authority, thereunto authorising him or a properly authenticated copy thereof together with an affidavit that the said authority still subsisting, or, in the case of an agent carrying on a trade or business on behalf of a party, without a written authority, an affidavit stating the resident of his principal, the trade or business carried on by the agent on his behalf and the connection of the same with the subject - matter of the suit, and no other agent is expressly authorised to make or do such appearance, application, or act. (2) the judge may thereupon record in writing that agent is permitted to appear and act on behalf of the party: and, unless and until the said permission is granted, no appearance, application, or act, of the agent shall be recognised by the court. '
(18) Order iii rule 2, civil procedure code reads : 'recognised agents : - the recognised agents of parties by whom such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done are - (a) persons holding power of attorney, authorising them to make and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such parties ; (b) persons carrying on trade or business for and in the names of parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of th; court within which limits the appearance, application or act is made or done, in matters connected with such trade or business only, where no other agent is expressly authorised to make and do such appearances, applications and acts.
(19) The civil rules of practice have been framed by the high court of andhra pradesh in virtue of the powers conferred by article 227 of the constitution of india and section 126 of the code of civil procedure, 1908, with the previous approval of the governor of andhra pradesh. From the provisions made in rule 32 it is manifest that the rule envisages permission to be obtained from the court in a case where any agent, other than an advocate, appears on behalf of a party. It is not in dispute that the gpa has been annexed under item 11 of the list of documents, to the plaint. Further an advocate - not the power of attorney holder - appeared for the 2nd plaintiff to act or argue on his behalf. Therefore, rule 32 has no place. Consequently permission from the court is not postulated under such circumstancrs. In fact in purushottam and co. Vs. Manilal and sons, air 1961 s. C. 325 it is held that when a power of attorney holder presents a suit, it is valid. No objection has been taken nor one could have been taken legally and if taken would not have sustained. The advocate to whom vakalat has been given by the power of attorney agent has appeared.
(20) A division bench of this court in m. Laxma reddy vs. Baqur ali baquri, 1977 (1) aplj 32 n. R. C. Held : "a pleader can be validly appointed by the power of attorney or agent, who is authorised to do so and such a pleader is a pleader appointed by the party himself. This is therefore, a case where the party is appearing by a pleader or advocate. It is only in such cases where the party appears by an agent other than a pleader or advocate that the provisions of section 16 (1) and (2) apply. The rule which applies to the case is rule 17. The two requirements of rule 17 have been complied within in this case as the power of attorney as well as the affidavit of the plaintiff have been filed. There is no provision either in the civil procedure code or in the rules authorising the court to dismiss a suit because these provisions are not complied with. In that case the court should not proceed further with the suit until and unless such requirements are complied with and give an opportunity to the parties to comply with that requirements. '
(21) The supreme court in purushottam and co. Vs. Manilal and sans2, supra) , where the plaint filed and verified by a person having power of attorney executed in his favour authorising him to sue for recovery of money and also to appear and represent the firm of which he was a partner, in any court in any jurisdiction and to make sign, verify, present and file any plaint, held :
"one of the partners manubhai maganbhai amin was the manager of the firm manilal and sons. He had executed a power of attorney in favour of four persons including one dunderdale. By this power he authorised any one of these persons to sue for recovery of moneys due to the firm from the firm purushottam umedbhai and co. , the appellant. It also empowered these persons to appear and to represent the firm in any court in any jurisdiction civil, criminal, insolvency, original, appellate or otherwise and before any official in any suit or proceeding or matter and to make sign, verify, present and file any plant. Dunderdale had signed and verified the plaint in the present case. We have no doubt on a perusal of the power of attorney, that it authorised dunderdale to file the plaint on behalf of the firm manilal and sons and also to verify it. It was suggested that this was a power of attorney by manubhai maganbhai amin for himself and not for the firm of manilal and sons. As we understand the power of attorney that is not so. No doubt the power of attorney is not signed by all the partners of manilal and sons but only by manubhai maganbhai amin. In our opinion, it was not necessary that the power should have been signed by all the partners of the firm because manubhai maganbhai amin was the manager of the firm. Under sec. 18 of the act a partner is an agent of the firm for the purposes of the business of the firm. Manubhai maganbhai amin was therefore the agent of the firm as well as its manager."
(22) True, the supreme court in the aforesaid case held valid plaint signed and verified by the agent in whose favour a power of attorney was executed, but a provision similar to rule 33 c. R. P. Did not fall for consideration before the supreme court. This rule is a special provision framed by the governor of this state and it would have a precedence over the provisions of the code of civil procedure. In deed there is no conflict between the c. P. C. And rule 33 crp. Rule 33 is an additional provision and not repugnant to any provision in the c. P. C. And, therefore, if a rule like 33 were to fail for consideration before the supreme court, what would have been the judgment? may be, it might have held on the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant that rule 33 must be given effect to in prelerence to c. P. C. Since already there is a decision by a division bench of this court in laxma reddy's case pointing to the effect that any non - compliance of rule 33 (old rule 17) would not result in dismissal of the suit, but the said requirement of filing the plaint though signed by the power of attorney holder and also verified by him must be accompanied by a due affidavit as provided for in rule 33.
(23) In my judgment, therefore, though in so far as the presentation of the plaint signed and verified by the power of attorney holder coupled with the very power of attorney executed in his favour filed in the court, does not require any permission from the court, for, an advocate, duly appointed by the said power of attorney holder, duly authorising him in this behalf, entered appearance in the court. But however in order to hold the said plaint to be valid, it must be accompanied by an affidavit of the executant of the gpa in terms of rule 33. The absence of the said affidavit, as in this case, however, does not in my view invalidate the suit resulting in dismissal thereof. It may however be seen that this objection has not been taken by the defendant in his written statement nor raised in the lower court. What all has been averred in the written statement is that the gpa holder must apply to the court seeking permission from it, which is not done so; nor any such objection raised in the evidence. On the basis of this, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs - respondents argued that the objection must be deemed to have been waived by the defendant, for which reliance was placed on a decision of the mysore high court in khatoon bee vs. Ameena bee, air 1953 mysore 89. Wherein it is held:
"no objection was taken either in the lower court or in the grounds of appeal to the institution of the suit. The parties joined issues, adduced evidence and the matters in controversy arc adjudicated upon after a full trial in view of all this, the appellant cannot at this stage insist on a critical scrutiny of the terms of the power of attorney. The objection on this account is untenable."
(24) Similarly in this case, no objection has been taken with regard to the non - compliance of rule 33. What all has been averred in the written statement is:
"moreover the present suit is also defective because there are two plaintiffs, the second plaintiff being represented by gpa. The gpa must give an appli:ation to the court seeking permission from the , court which is not done so."
(25) In the grounds of appeal, however, non - compliance of rule 32 has been raised, but not rule 33 and, therefore it will not be proper to allow the defendant - appellant at this stage to raise the issue of the affidavit not accompanying the plaint within the meaning of rule 33; more so when such a defect is a mere curable irregularity and does not invalidate the plaint resulting in dismissal. Hence, in the circumstances, it has to be held that the defendant - appellant should not be allowed to raise this objection at this point of time, as he should be deemed to have waived the same. 2. Points 5 and 6: - whether ex. A1 agreement stands cancelled in view of the provision made in clause 6 of ex. Al and was not capable of performance?
(26) Clause 6 may be set out:
"that the vendor will obtain income - tax clearing certificate under section 230 of the income - tax act and also obtain permission for alienation from the competent authority under section 27 of urban land (ceiling and regulation) act, 1976, one week before the date of registration of sale deed. The purchaser agreed to sign any requisite forms, statements and to extend all possible co - operation to the vendor in obtaining the permission. It is mutually agreed between the parties hereto that for any reason, the vendor becomes unable by prohibition or by any restriction of legislation for the alienation of the schedule property in favour of the purchasers or there will be any delay in getting the requisite permission in that event the earnest money of rs. 30,000/ - (rupees thirty thousands only) paid by the purchaser to the vendor this day in pursuance of this agreement shall be refunded to the purchaser and this agreement will stand cancelled"
.
(27) The argument of sri sivarama sastry, the learned counsel for the defendant - appellant, based on clause 6, is that the words "for any reason, the vendor becomes unable" are comprehensive enough as to put an end to the agreement by refunding the advance amount of rs. 30,000/ - in case of non - compliance, for any reason, of any one of the conditions mentioned in the agreement. Since income - tax clearance certificate has not been given by the department one week before the registration of the sale deed, as laid down in clauses 3 of the agreement, the argument further goes, and in as much as the sale itself has to be completed within six months from the date of the agreement as per the terms in clause 3 thereof the agreement ipso facto stands cancelled. The argument advanced is that in as much as co - sharers raised a dispute in fact by filing a suit in civil court in regard to the property covered by ex. A1 and also the tenant refused to vacate the premises, which again is one of the terms of the agreement of sale, the agreement must be held to stand cancelled. I apprehend i am not persuaded to be in association with this argument. It is quite apparent that clause 6 is in two parts. The first part relates specifically to two'aspects viz. , to obtain income - tax clearance certificate and obtain permission under the urban land ceiling act which should be one week before the date of registration of the sale deed. In this clause there is no consequential provision as to what would happen in case either income - tax clearance certificate or the permission under the ulc act is not obtained within the time mentioned therein. Under clause 3 of the agreement the stipulated time for completion of sale is six months from the date of the agreement. That throws obligation on the vendor to complete the sale within six months after duly obtaining permission mentioned in the first part of clause 6. Admittedly in this case permission under the ulc act has been obtained as in ex. A6 and also handed over to the plaintiffs - respondents, but in respect of it clearance certificate, the evidence of the defendant in his own words is "soon after the agreement of sale, i applied for it clearance certificate, but i have not received any intimation refusing to give clearance. It is not ture to suggest that i have set up these pleas in order to avoid my liabilities under the agreement of sale and to get more money for the property". Since the obligation is on the vendor and in the evidence nothing has been stated as to what efforts have been made to procure the it clearance certificate, it demonstrates apathy, carelessness and negligence in the matter of obtaining the said certificate. No wonder the suggetion in terms of the above extract of the evidence has been directed against the defendant in his cross - examination.
(28) Now to the second part of clause 6 of the agreement. The learned counsel for the defendant - appellant argued that the words "for any reason" mentioned therein confer wide discretion on the vendor and not restricted to the words "the vendor becomes unable by prohibition or by restriction of legislation for the alienation of the schedule property in favour of the purchasers" and so, in case the defendant is unable to complete the sale, the only consequence would be, as per this clause, to refund the advance amount of rs 30,000/ - to the vendees. It is not possible to accede to the said submission. After the words "for any reason", there is comma and then the words "the vendor becomes unable" follow, indicating thereby that those words are restricted to that situation only viz. , there should be some legislative prohibition or restriction for the alienation of the said property. No such contingency has been made out in this case showing that there was some prohibition or restriction owing to which the vendor became unable to finalise the transaction.
(29) The second limb of the argument in this behalf by the learned coun sel for the defendant - appellant is that failure to obtain it clearance certificate itself is an embargo on the completion of the sale and, therefore, it comes within the ambit of this part; consequently there is no further obligation to complete the sale. This is equally unfounded. This situation of non - obtaining the it clearance certificate cannot be said to fall within the meaning of the words "for any reason, the vendor becomes unable". They indicate complete embargo on the transaction to be completed unlike the one where completion of transaction depends upon happening of a contingency or condition being fulfilled. The non - fulfilment of the condition of obtaining the it clearance certificate' at any rate in this case, is the doing of the defendant - appellant himself and none could be blamed for it. Hence, the contention, which is devoid of substance, is rejected.
(30) Now to the words in the second part viz. , "or there will be any delay in getting the requisite permission". These words positively referrable to the permission referred to under the first part viz. , under the it act and ulc act, in which event, true the earnest money of rs. 30,000/ - will be refunded. But it must be shown, before taking any advantage of this part of the clause, that the delay must satisfactorily be established by the vendor, as it is his obligation to obtain the it clearance certificate. It has not been shown as stated in the first part of clause 6 that the certificate was not given because of non - co - operation of the vendees. It has not been shown by the vendor that he has made every conceivable effort to obtain the certificate. It has also not been shown that there was some difficulty in obtaining the certificate within the time stipulated and therefore, further extension of time was sought for from the vendees. In fact, nothing has been shown excepting to say that he has applied for the certificate, sat quiet and has done nothing thereafter. That i apprehend cannot give a room to the vendor to take refuge in the words "or there will be delay in getting the requisite permission" and thereby riggle out of the situation. The defence, therefore, sought to be set up is nothing but a futile attempt to frustrate the case of the vendees.
(31) The learned counsel for the defendant - appellant alternatively relied upon the terms of clause 10 of the agreement and argued that since the vendor failed to get the sale deed executed in view of the non - fulfilment of the obligations on his part, in particular, the objections raised by the co - sharers, as they have filed a suit claiming their rights vis - a - vis the suit property, the vendees at the most are entitled to liquidated damages and not for specific performance. Clause 10 reads: "in case the vendor fails to get the sale deed executed and duly registered after complying and fulfilling the obligations on his part except under clause no. 6 within the stipulated time in favour of the purchasers, purchaser shall be entitled to claim specific performance of this agreement of sale or the purchasers shall be entitled to get back from the vendor the amount of rs. 30,000/ - received by the vendor as earnest money and further sum of rs. 30,000/ - (rupees thirty thousands only) as liquidated damages for the breach of this agreement, which the parties considered reasonable and proper. Similarly, if the purchasers or their nominee or nominees, as the case may be, do not get the sale deed registered by paying the balance of consideration as agreed hereinabove within the stipulated time, the vendor shall be entitled either for specific performance of this agreement at the costs of the purchasers or to forfeit the sum of rs 30,000/ - (rupees thirty thousands only) which is paid this day by the purchaser as earnest money and this agreement will stand cancelled.
(32) This clause comes into operation in virtue of the non - fulfilment of the obligations on the part of the vendor other than those contemplated under clause 6 of the agreement, the effect of which has been already considered above. The two salient obligations for non - fulfilment of the contract of sale are said to be (1) the objection of the co - heirs by filing a suit claiming rights over the suit property and (2) refusal of the tenant to vacte the portion of the premises in question. It may, however, be stated that the main contention itself is not well - founded, as it is manifest from the provision of clause 10 that it confers discretionary power upon the vendees either to claim specific performance of the agreement of sale or to get back from the vendor not only the earnest amount of rs. 30,000/ - but also a further sum of rs. 30,000/ - as liquidated damages for breach of the agreement. Where, under the agreement the vendor agreed to sell certain premises and the purchaser agreed to purchase and a clause of the agreement made the vendor liable to execute the sale deed within a certain time, there was a concluded contract (vide jiwan lal vs. Brij mohan ,air 1973 s. C. 559. .
(33) Now to the objections raised on behalf of the vendor. Firstly, his co - sharers have raised objection that they have got a right in the suit property. The undisputed facts are that the father of the defendant purchased the suit property for the defendant under ex. B13. Thereafter the defendant himself, sold in the year 1974 a portion of the suit property to one bishen kumar and utilised the sale proceeds of the same. The municipal taxes are being paid by him. The co - sharers or heirs have not agitated in respect of their alleged rights for over 50 years. So, their claims are even otherwise barred by limitation. The argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs - respondents is that this kind of agitation which is alleged to have been raised is nothing but at the initiation of the defendant himself. It is in the evidence of the defendant :
"i told my brothers and sister that they have no right in the house and they are claiming shares in the house after so many years of my father's death. The money received by sale of a portion of the land was utilised by me"
. In view of there circumstances, in my undoubted view, the lower court very rightly held that the suit is nothing but an engineered one by the defendant. In fact in the suit which is said to have been filed by the co - sharers, the plea said to have been raised is one of benami and' that is sought to be raised after the death of the father after about 50 years. There appears to be a strong base for the argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs - respondents that the defendant was 21 years old at the time when the suit property was purchased in his name. As per the evidence of the defendant himself, he retired in the year 1964 as director of mines and geology at the age of 58 years. Therefore, the date of birth is fixed by the learned counsel being the year 1906, the registration of the sale deed was in the year 1927 and so, he was 21 years old at the time of purchase of the property. The defendant further ays in his evidence that his father died in 1933 and all along he has been living in that house; that in the municipal records the house stands in his name and that he has been paying the taxes. So, the claim is sought to be pressed into service after 50 years, which is with reference to the demise of the father in 1933. Therefore, filing of the suit o. S. No. 665/81 appears to be nothing but at the behest of the defendant to riggle out of the agreement of sale. More so, when a portion of the house was sold in the year 1974, none of the so - called co - sharers raised any objection. Very rightly, therefore, the question of co - sharers' claim can be gone into in the suit filed by them since the plaintiffs also were arrayed as parties to that suit. Consequently the trial court held that subject to the result of the above suit, the plaintiffs were entitled to obtain the sale deed from the defendant in pursuance of agreement of sale ex. A1 and it clearance certificate also can be obtained by the plaintiffs and there would be no difficulty on that score.
(34) The second limb of the contention is that the tenant is refusing to vacate the premises and, therefore, as agreed vacant possession cannot be delivered to the plaintiffs and consequently the contract is breached. The case of the defendant - appellant is that though notice has been served on the tenant, he did not vacate the premises. The tenant is examined as d. W. 2. His case was that his company happens to be the tenant in a portion of the suit property since 1971; that he received a notice on 13 - 6 - 1978 from the defendant to vacate the premises, which was replied on 6 - 11 - 1978 as in ex. B1 i. E. After a delay of 5 months, stating that they spent rs. 10,000/ - for renovation and modification; that they could not get a suitable accommodation and that therefore they are not in a position to vacate the premises. In the cross - examination d. W. 2 admitted that after they sent the reply, the defendant did not put any pressure on them to vacate the premises. It is also in his evidence that though they stated in the reply that they spent rs. 10,000/ - , there was no written agreement that the defendant should pay the said amount to them.
(35) From the above it is evident that the defendant was not taking effective steps to get the tenant evicted. This is a lapse on his part of which he cannot be allowed to take advantage. In the light of the above, i too concur with the lower court that when time was the essence of the contract, the defendant cannot take undue advantage of his own lapse and get the agreement cancelled. The lower court finally held
"as to the eviction of the tenants from the portion of the suit schedule property the defendant could get the tenant evicted and if the defendant failed to do so, the plaintiffs can get the same done after they obtain the sale deed; and no doubt they will be entitled for the expense that may be incurred for getting the tenants evicted from the defendant. On that score, we cannot refuse a decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs"
. I too concur with this view.
(36) Point no. 7: - the case as sought to be canvassed by the learned counsel for the defendant - appellant based on the provisions enacted in section 20 (2) (c) of the specific relief act, is that inasmuch as the agreement itself provides for liquidated damages and since it is already over 10 years since the execution of ex. A - 1, and the value of the property has also risen and, therefore, equities have to be worked out taking into consideration the present market value of the property or alternatively liquidated damages as stipulated in the agreement of sale may be awarded.
(37) section 20 (2) (c) reads.
"20 (2) the following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance - (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) where the dafendant entered into contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance."
(38) No doubt the remedy is discretionary to decree a suit for specific performance, but the circumstances of this case cannot, in my view, be said to fall within the ambit of clause (c) of sub - section (2) of sec. 20 warranting to hold that it would be inequitable to decree the suit for specific performance. With utmost promptness the plaintiffs issued notices to the defendants in the month of november, 1978 itself before the expiry of six months from the date of agreement of sale and thereafter the suit has been filed in that very month. If there has been any delay it should be ascribed to the length of ligitation, involving avoidable delay by the defendant. More so, the circumstances created for non - fulfilment of the completion of the sale are nothing but the creation of the defendant himself. Some of the objections raised by the defendant, who held at one stage the post of director of mines and geology, are incredible ones - whether it is with reference to the non - obtaining of the it clearance certificate or getting the tenant evicted from the premises; infinitely more so, the so - called claims of the co - sharers. All these are nothing but specious objections. Viewed, therefore, from any angle, it is not possible to hold that there are any equities in favour of the defendant - appellant. It will, on the contrary, be inequitable if the suit for specific performance laid is not decreed.
(39) The following case law relied on by the learned counsel for the defendant - appellant is of no assistance as the circumstances widely vary with the case on hand. (i) d. Anjaneyulu v. D. Venkata seshaiah 6; air 1987 sc 1641 in this case, which dealt with section 20 of the specific relief act, since certain structures like godowns and other costly structures were already built on the land in question, it was held that it would result in special hardship to the vendor to grant a decree for specific performance and, therefore, it was telt by the court that it was a fit case which can be resolved by directing that instead of executing a sale deed of the land in favour of the plaintiffs, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiffs of a sum of rs. 1,25,000/ - being the approximate present value of 10 kunt as of land. (ii) s. Hanumayamma v. Y. Sydalu, 1985 (1) an. W. R. 468 : - in this caae the facts were though the parties intended that the time was the essence of the contract, the plaintiff took no immediate steps either to call upon the defendant to receive the balance consideration or to file a suit for specific performance. The plaintiff remained silent for more than two years and then awoke and issued notice, followed by the suit. In those circumstances the court held "mere incantation of readiness and willingness statutorily enjoined under section 16 (c) of the specific relief act 1963 is not enough. They cannot be caged in a straight jacket formula. There must be same positive facts to substantiate the said assertion. The fact that she deposited the amount after the trial court decreed the suit if given credence to, would amount to placing premium on dilatoriness and would afford impetus unilaterally to circumvent bilateral essential terms of the contract. The appellant failed to perform her part of the contract within the time stipulated. The respondent has therefore rightly terminated the contract by issuing a notice". It was also held "the question whether time is the essence of the contract, has to be gathered, not strictly from the language couched in the contract but from the substance of the contract, ascertaining the intention of the parties at the time of contract or the terms thereof or the attendant circumstances. The court has to ascertain the same from the totality of the attending facts and surrounding circumstances at the time of the contract".
(40) Indeed sub - section (4) of section 20 of the specific relief act itself enacts:
"20 (4). The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party."
(41) The aforesaid provision is itself an answer to the contention raised in this behalf. Hence, the contention is rejected.
(42) From the foregoing, therefore, it is clear that the suit filed for specific performance by the plaintiffs - respondents is validly filed; cannot be held to be a defective one for the reason that no permission has been obtained from the court by or on behalf of the gpa holder, not that the plaint has not been properly filed; that under clause 6 of the agreement it cannot be said that the defendant - appellant became unable to perform the agreement of sale nor clauss 10 enables the defendant to plead that the agreement of sale has become unenforceable and so, the only remedy available is the claim for liquidated damages and not the specific performance.
(43) In the result, the suit is decreed, which however, will be subject to the result of the suit o. S. No. 655/81 on the file of the vi addl. Judge, city civil court, hyderabad, which however will not preclude the plaintiffs - respondents from executing the decree herein. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.