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  • section 12-B of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, hereinafter referred
  • clause (c) of sub-section (3) of section 7
  • sub-section (3) (a) of section 7,
  • sub-clause (c) of section 7(3),
  • section 6-A (2),
  • section 7(3) (c),
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citation codes
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  • section 12-B of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, hereinafter referred
  • clause (c) of sub-section (3) of section 7
  • sub-section (3) (a) of section 7,
  • sub-clause (c) of section 7(3),
  • section 6-A (2),
  • section 7(3) (c),
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Civil Revision (Chittoor)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Revision challenges the Judgment and Order of the District Judge, Chittoor, made under section 12-B of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 (the Act).

The petitioner (tenant) occupied a portion (one room and a verandah) of a house belonging to the respondent (landlord) at Door No. 181/11, “Invalid Lines,” Chittoor. The tenant used the premises for beedi manufacture; the respondent occupied the remaining portion (two fairly large rooms, verandah and kitchen) with two wives and eight children. The tenancy had been in place about four or five years prior to the petition.

On 7 March 1958 the respondent filed H.R.C. No. 16 of 1958 before the Rent Controller, seeking eviction under section 7 of the Act on two grounds: (1) wilful default in payment of rent (arrears for December 1957 and January 1958) and (2) bona fide need of the premises because of an increased family. The tenant contested both grounds and raised that his occupation was non-residential (business) and that eviction would cause hardship.

The Rent Controller found wilful default and bona fide need, and ordered eviction. On appeal the Subordinate Judge (to whom appeal lay) reversed: he found no proof of wilful default and held that, because the tenant’s portion was non-residential and the landlord required the premises for residential purposes, eviction could not be ordered; he relied on authority (including Dakshinamurthy v. Thulja Bai). The District Judge in Revision (under s.12-B) re-examined evidence, concluded there was wilful default and bona fide need, held that s.7(3)(c) was not subject to the restrictions in s.7(3)(a)(i) and (iii), restored the Rent Controller’s order and directed eviction. The tenant brought the present Civil Revision against the District Judge’s order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the tenant’s alleged default in paying rent amounted to a "wilful default" within the meaning of the Act so as to justify eviction under section 7.
  2. Whether the rights and restrictions set out in section 7(3)(a)(i) and (iii) (regarding residential/non-residential purpose and ownership of other premises) apply to an application under section 7(3)(c) when a landlord occupying part of a building seeks possession of the remaining portion.
  3. Whether, having regard to the statutory Proviso to section 7(3)(c), the landlord’s claimed need for additional accommodation outweighed the hardship to the tenant in the particular facts of this case.
  4. Whether the District Judge in Revision was justified in reappraising and substituting his own findings of fact in place of the Subordinate Judge’s findings.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Venugopala Reddy)

  • The District Judge erred in interfering with the Subordinate Judge’s findings of fact in Revision proceedings; he should not have re-examined and substituted his own findings.
  • There was no proof of default in payment of rent, and if any default existed, it was not wilful within the meaning of the Act.
  • Because the portion occupied by the petitioner was non-residential, before eviction under section 7(3)(c) the respondent should establish: (i) need for additional accommodation; (ii) absence of any other non-residential building owned by the respondent in the locality; (iii) that the required accommodation was for a non-residential purpose; and (iv) that the hardship to the tenant caused by eviction would be outweighed by the advantage to the respondent.

Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Vaidyanathan)

  • There was default and it was wilful; the District Judge was correct to find wilful default and to order eviction.
  • The restrictions contained in section 7(3)(a)(i) and (iii) do not apply to section 7(3)(c); accordingly, whether the respondent required the premises for residential or non-residential purposes, he could evict under section 7(3)(c) if the statutory requirements of that clause were satisfied.
  • Conceded (fairly) that under section 7(3)(c) the Proviso (weighing hardship to tenant against advantage to landlord) must be applied, and that this aspect had been overlooked by the courts below — if necessary the matter should be remitted to the Rent Controller to apply the Proviso.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amura Rathniah v. Mysore Kasamma (1958 1 An. W.R. 518) Definition of "wilful default": default must result from deliberation and supine indifference; mere arrears is insufficient — the court must look for conscious violation or supine indifference. The Court adopted and applied this formulation to hold that there was no evidence in the instant case of deliberate or supine indifference by the tenant; therefore the tenant was not in wilful default.
Dakshinamurthy v. Thulja Bai (Full Bench, Madras High Court) The test for classifying premises as residential or non-residential is the purpose for which the premises were let to the tenant at the time of the application for eviction (the letting purpose governs classification for the Act). The Court applied this test to conclude that the tenant’s portion was non-residential. The Court also relied on the decision to construe section 7(3)(c) as subject to the same residential/non-residential purpose restriction as in section 7(3)(a)(i) and (iii).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two main analytical steps: (A) assessment of wilful default and (B) construction and application of section 7(3)(c) relative to sections 7(3)(a)(i) and (iii) and the Proviso.

A. Wilful Default

  • Evidence showed the tenant regularly remitted rent by money-order throughout the tenancy; the parties had acquiesced in that mode of payment (Exhibits R-6, R-7, R-5 and the registered notice Exhibit R-1 directing future remittances by money-order).
  • Two money-orders (Exhibits R-6 and R-7) had been returned to the tenant with endorsement of refusal; the landlord explained this was due to his absence on business. The tenant later remitted the outstanding rent (Exhibit R-5) which included the amounts of R-6 and R-7, and deposited the arrears into the Subordinate Judge's Court; the landlord drew that amount.
  • The District Judge emphasized non-compliance with section 6-A(2) procedure; the High Court held that where the parties have agreed on a mode of payment (money-orders) and the landlord had himself directed payment by money-order, strict compliance with section 6-A(2) was unnecessary and section 6-A(4) had been satisfied.
  • Relying on Amura Rathniah (which requires deliberation or supine indifference to establish wilful default), the Court held that the evidence did not support an inference of deliberate, wilful, or supine indifference by the tenant. On the facts — attempted remittances, returned money-orders owing to landlord’s absence, subsequent payment of outstanding amount — there was no material to conclude wilful default.

B. Construction and Application of Section 7(3)(c)

  • The Court examined s.7(3)(a)(i) and (iii) and the definition of "building" (which includes a part of a building) to determine whether the conditions that apply to whole residential or non-residential buildings should also affect part-occupancy cases under s.7(3)(c).
  • Clause (c) was designed for situations where the landlord occupies part of a building and the tenant occupies the remaining part; but the Court held that the Legislature did not intend clause (c) to operate without the conceptual limitation that a landlord may only evict where the purpose for which the landlord requires the portion corresponds with the purpose for which the tenant uses it (i.e., residential vs non-residential alignment).
  • The Court reasoned that if clause (c) were intended to permit eviction regardless of the purpose mismatch, the Legislature would have drafted it without the qualifying language used; the statutory phrasing ("whether residential or non-residential" and "if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be") indicates an intent to preserve the residential/non-residential limitation.
  • Applying the Dakshinamurthy test, the Court found the tenant’s portion to be non-residential (based on the purpose for which it was let) while the landlord’s portion was used for residential purposes. Because of this mismatch, the landlord could not properly invoke s.7(3)(c) to evict the tenant for residential needs.
  • The Court additionally noted that the Proviso to s.7(3)(c) requires the Controller to reject an application if the hardship to the tenant outweighs the advantage to the landlord. The Court observed that none of the courts below applied the Proviso in their consideration of the respondent’s claim and that, as a matter of logic, weighing hardship against advantage is practicable mainly where the uses are of the same character (both residential or both non-residential); it is impracticable where the two portions serve different purposes.
  • Given the dual conclusions — (i) no wilful default, and (ii) s.7(3)(c) cannot be used by a residential landlord to evict a non-residential tenant occupying the remaining portion — the Court found the respondent had no statutory right to evict under section 7(3)(c) in the present facts.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Civil Revision Petition is allowed.

Implications and direct effects (as stated in the opinion):

  • The Court found no evidence of wilful default by the tenant; mere arrears did not amount to wilful default in the circumstances where the tenant had attempted payment by the agreed mode and subsequently paid outstanding sums.
  • The Court held that section 7(3)(c) must be read consistently with the residential/non-residential purpose limitation implicit in section 7(3)(a)(i) and (iii); a landlord occupying a residential portion cannot invoke s.7(3)(c) to evict a tenant who occupies a portion used for non-residential purposes when the landlord requires the premises for residential purposes.
  • The Proviso to s.7(3)(c) (requiring rejection if hardship to tenant outweighs advantage to landlord) had not been applied by the courts below; the opinion emphasises that this Proviso is substantive and relevant to any proper exercise of jurisdiction under s.7(3)(c).
  • No order as to costs was made by the Court.

The opinion does not purport to set a new expansive precedent beyond its statutory construction and application to the facts before the Court; the decision turns on statutory construction of section 7 and the application of existing authority to the facts (as summarized above).

Disposition: Revision allowed. (No order as to costs.)

    Shajehan Saheb v. Yukub Khan Saheb .

    1. This Revision Petition is directed against the Judgment and Order of the District Judge's Court, Chittoor, made under section 12-B of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, hereinafter referred to as the Act.

    2. The facts leading up to this Revision may be briefly noticed. The petitioner in this Revision is the tenant of the respondent in respect of a portion of a house belonging to the respondent bearing Door No. 181/11 in what is known as the ‘Invalid Lines’ in Chittoor town. The portion of the building in the possession of the petitioner was let out to him some four or five years prior to the petition, by the respondent, for the purpose of the petitioner carrying on the business in the manufacture of beedies. In the remaining portion of the house, the respondent himself resided with his family, which consisted of his two wives and eight children.

    3. The respondent filed a petition H.R.C No. 16 of 1958 before the Rent Controller Chittoor, on 7th March, 1958, for evicting the petitioner under section 7 of the Act. The grounds on which the petition was sought to be supported are: (1) that the petitioner had wilfully defaulted in the payment of rent and on the date of the petition was in arrears of rent for the months of December, 1957 and January, 1958; (2) that the respondent is a man of a large family comprising of two wives and eight children, that the family had grown since the time the premises was let to the petitioner, that the respondent was unable to keep his wives and children in the portion of the house occupied by him and that therefore he wanted the premises occupied by the petitioner. It is not disputed that the portion of the house in the possession of the petitioner consisted of one room and a verandah, while the rest of the house consisted of two fairly large rooms and a verandah and kitchen, etc.

    4. The petitioner contended in his counter that there is no truth in the allegation that the portion of the house in the possession of the respondent was insufficient for his family, that it was not true that he was in arrears of rent or that he committed wilful default in the payment of the same; instead, he contended, that he was very regular in the payment of rent and never committed any default. He further raised the question that he was doing business in the premises and that therefore, the letting out of the portion in his possession was for non-residentia) purposes and that therefore, that portion of the building should be regarded as a non-residential building and that he would suffer great hardship if he was disturbed.

    5. The learned Rent Controller, who enquired into the matter, came to the conclusion that there was wilful default in the payment of rent by the petitioner, and that the respondent is in need of additional accommodation, and accordingly he ordered eviction of the petitioner from the premises in question. Against this judgment and order of the Rent Controller, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Subordinate Judge, Chittoor, to whom the appeal lay under the Act. The learned Subordinate Judge on appeal, examined the case in its bearings and came to the conclusion that there was no proof in the case that the petitioner committed wilful default in the payment of rent, that there was no conscious violation or supine indifference on the part of the petitioner in the payment of rent, and therefore even if there was any default in the payment of rent, it could not have been wilful. In doing so, he followed a decision of this Court in Amura Rathniah…* v. Mysore Kasamma…. . 1958 1 An. W.R 518.. On the other question whether the landlord required the premises for his own use, the learned Subordinate Judge held that as the portion of the building in the possession of the petitioner is non-residential, any eviction therefrom could have been effected by the landlord only if he required that portion for the purpose of his own business, and as the respondent admittedly required the premises for residential purposes and not for non-residential purposes, he could not evict the petitioners. In this connection, he placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Dakshinamurthy V. Thulja Bai2. Having thus reversed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on the two points, the learned Subordinate Judge set aside the order of the learned Rent Controller and dismissed the application filed by the respondent.

    6. Against this judgment and order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Chittoor the respondent preferred a Revision to the District Judge under section 12-B of the Act. The learned District Judge in Revision, apparently scrutinised the evidence, and instead of accepting the findings of fact reached by the learned Subordinate Judge as binding on him, as he normally ought to have done, re-examined the evidence and came to the conclusion that there was wilful default in the payment of rent on the part of the petitioner, that the respondent was in need of additional accommodation, and hence his claim was bona fide. He further held that it was not necessary to entitle the respondent to evict the petitioner, in the circumstances of the case before him, to show that the respondent needed additional accommodation for non-residential purposes. In doing so, he held that the limitation or the restriction contained in section 7(3) (a) (i) and (iii) did not apply to a case like the present one under section 7(3)(c) of the Act, and so holding he set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and restored the order of the Rent Controller and directed eviction of the petitioner from the suit premises. Hence the present Revision.

    7. Mr. Venugopala Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the finding of the learned District Judge, that there was wilful default is unsustainable as (1) he should not in Revision have interfered with the finding reached by the learned Subordinate Judge; (2) that there was in fact no proof in the case that there was any default at all; and if so, that that default was wilful within the meaning of the Act; and (3) that as the premises in the possession of the petitioner was a non-residential building, before the respondent could evict the petitioner from that portion, he should establish, firstly, that he was in need of additional accommodation; secondly, that he did not own any non-residential building other than the one in the possession of the petitioner; thirdly, that he required the non-residential building in the possession of the petitioner for a non-residential purpose; and fourthly, that the hardship which the petitioner would suffer by reason of the eviction is outweighed by the advantage which the respondent would obtain by obtaining the additional accommodation.

    8. Mr. Vaidyanathan, the learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand contended that there was in fact default in this case in the payment of rent and that it has been established that that default was wilful, and that the learned District Judge was right in the conclusion he reached that the principles involved in section 7(3) (a) (1) and (iii) of the Act are not applicable to the operation of section 7(3) (c), and that therefore, whether the respondent required the premises in the possession of the petitioner for residential purposes or for non-residential purposes, he could still evict the petitioner from the portion of the house, provided he has satisfied the requirements of section 7(3) (c). He fairly conceded that in satisfying the requirements of section 7(3) (c), it must be established that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by eviction would be outweighed by the advantage which the respondent would receive and that this aspect of the matter had been lost sight of by all the Courts below, and that, if his contention on the question of wilful default is accepted, and if the case had to be decided on the second point, namely, that the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant because he required the premises as additional accommodation, the matter would have to be sent back to the Court of first instance, namely, the Rent Controller, to enable him to apply his mind to the matter contained in the Proviso and reach a decision.

    9. Before I deal with the respective contentions relied on by the learned counsel on either side in this case, it is necessary to make a reference to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 7 of the Act deals with the conditions and circumstances in which eviction of tenants could be ordered from the buildings under the Act by the Rent Controller. The relevant protions of section 7 are extracted:

    7. (1) A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section.

    xxxxxx

    (2) A landholrd who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied—

    (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building, within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable, or

    xxxxxx

    the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application:

    Provided that in any case falling under clause (i) if the Controller is satisfied that the tenant's default to pay or tender rent was not wilful, he may, notwithstanding anything contained in section 7-A, give the tenant a reasonable time, not exceeding fifteen days, to pay or tender the rent due by him to the landlord upto the date of such payment or tender and on such payment or tender, the application shall be rejected.

    (3)(a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building—

    (i) in case it is a residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation and if he is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned;

    xxxxxx

    (iii) in case it is any other non-residental building if the landlord is not occupying for purpose s of a business which he is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise;

    xxxxxx

    (c) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, may, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.

    xxxxxx

    (e) The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application:

    Provided that, in the case of an application under clause (c) the Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord.

    xxxxxx

    10. It may be seen from a consideration of the provisions quoted above that so far as the instant case is concerned, the respondent would be entitled to evict the petitioner if he had successfully established: (1) that the petitioner had committed default in the payment of rent and that that default was wilful; or (2) that the requirements of clause (c) of sub-section (3) of section 7 are fulfilled and further that (i) in the opinion of the Controller the claim of the landlord is bona fide; and (ii) that the Controller is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the petitioner is in fact outweighed by the advantage which the landlord receives by obtaining the additional accommodation.

    11. I shall first deal with the first question, namely, the question of wilful default. It is in evidence that the petitioner has been remitting the rent to the respondent by money-order for a long time and practically throughout the period of the tenancy, in spite of the fact that the respondent and the petitioner were occupying different portions of the same house, the reason given being that they were not on good terms. Whatever the reason be, the fact is beyond dispute that the tenant followed the mode of remitting rent by money-order and the landlord has been accepting the rent so remitted to him; so that it would be fairly reasonable to assume that both treated that mode of payment as the proper and the agreed mode The petitioner had sent money-orders as evidenced by Exhibits R-6 and R-7 on 13th June, 1957 and 24th August, 1957, the former for Rs. 5 and the latter for Rs. 9-85 deducting the money-order commission, being the rent for two months. Admittedly these money orders came back to the petitioner with an endorsement of refusal. This had been explained by the respondent in his registered notices Exhibits R-1 and R-3. The money orders went back because he was absent from the place on business. The exact words used are as follows—

    “It is a pity that you are in arrears of rent, probably on the score that the monthly rental remitted by you three months back was not acknowledged by me. Please note that it was due to my absence from the place on business since I am a businessman.”

    12. In the circumstances, It is unnecessary to consider whether the money-orders in question were in fact refused or had merely come back as the addressee was not found. In either case, the fact remains that the petitioner had remitted the rent by money order which is the usual course and method of payment agreed to between the parties. Subsequently, he remitted the money order (Exhibit R-5) for the rent due and oustanding till then amounting to a sum of Rs. 29.25 nP. This amount admittedly included the amount covered by Exhibits R-6 and R-7. Hence the course of conduct of the petitioner indicates an anxiety on his part to remit the rent to the respondent following a method agreed upon between the parties. The learned District Judge makes much of the fact that the procedure indicated in section 6-A (2) of the Act had not been followed. It is unnecessary to examine this matter because, when once the parties agree on a mode of payment, the procedure indicated in section 6-A (2), in my opinion, does not require to be followed. In this connection, it would be useful to refer to Exhibit R-1, which is the registered notice issued by the respondent to the petitioner, wherein he stated that the petitioner should remit the monthly rental by money order in future. Where there is such a direction by the landlord, the tenant's duty is to follow that direction. Further, there is no evidence placed in this case whether the respondent had a Bank at all where he had his account, into which the money could be remitted. In the circumstances, it is completely unnecessary to follow the procedure indicated in section 6-A (2) of the Act. That apart, in this case, it is not difficult to hold that the petitioner had followed the requirements of section 6-A (4). There is therefore no force in the observations of the learned District Judge that the petitioner should have followed the procedure under section 6-A (2) of the Act.

    13. It is true that by the date of the filing of the petition before the Controller, namely, 7th March, 1958, the petitioner was in arrears for two months. But I this amount, he immediately deposited into the Subordinate Judge's Court and the landlord (respondent) has drawn the same.

    14. The further question to consider is, even assuming that there was some sort. of default on the part of the petitioner in the payment of the rent regularly, is there material from which it could be concluded that this default was wilful, for, unless the default is shown to be wilful, the landlord would not be justified in asking for eviction of the tenant. In this connection, attention may be invited to a decision of this Court reported in Amura Rathniah…* v. Mysore Kasamma…., a judgment of my learned brother Srinivasachari, J., wherein it was laid down that ‘wilful default’ connotes that the default or omission has been the result of deliberation and supine indifference. It was held in that case that

    “In order to arrive at a finding of the tenant being in wilful default, the only fact of the tenant being in arrears of rent would not be enough, but the Court would have to consider as to whether there was a conscious violation of the obligation to pay rent or that he had exhibited a supine indifference.”

    15. I am fully in agreement with the above observations. In order that a drastic consequence of eviction should be faced by the tenant, the Legislature assumes that there should be some kind of serious reluctance on his part to honour the terms of the tenancy, and this conclusion is apparent from a consideration of the other circumstances in which the tenant could be asked to be evicted by the landlord, such as, that he had committed acts of waste or impaired materially the value or utility of the building, that the tenant had been guilty of such acts and conduct which operated as a nuisance to the occupiers of other portions in the same building or of buildings in the neighbourhood, that the tenant had denied the title of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such denial or claim was not bona fide. A reading of the various clauses of the section, makes it abundantly clear that some serious neglect or misconduct is necessary on the part of the tenant before he could be evicted, and in a case of default, it should be of such a character as to indicate the tenant's indifference to abide by the terms of the agreement in the matter of payment of rent. As indicated in the above section, there must be a deliberate and wilful omission in the matter of payment of rent, which omission must be of a character which would indicate utter callousness on the part of the tenant in the matter of paying the rent in compliance with the directions of the tenancy.

    16. I experience no difficulty in holding that there is no circumstance at all in this case, from which it could be inferred that the default, if any, of the tenant in payment of rent was deliberate and wilful and was an outcome of an abject indifference to the claims or the rights of the landlord.

    17. It would, therefore, be necessary to consider whether the respondent's petition to evict the petitioner should be granted by reason of the provision contained in section 7(3) (c) of the Act. In construing this sub-section, the point that arises for consideration is whether the principles laid down by the Legislature in the matter of the application of section 7(3) (a) (i) and (iii) would also be applicable to section 7(3) (c) of the Act. It is conceded by Mr. Vaidyanathan, the learned counsel for the respondent, that under clauses (i) and (iii) of sub-section (3) (a) of section 7, a landlord can evict a tenant from a residential building when he requires it for residential purposes and he owns no other residential building in the town; and similarly, he could also evict a tenant from a non-residential building if he required that building for non-residential purposes and if he did not own or possess a non-residential building in the city, town or village. In other words, it is conceded that a landlord cannot evict a tenant from a non-residential building if he required it for residential purposes and vice versa. In the Act, the definition of ‘building’ includes a portion of a building as may be seen from the definition extracted below:

    “2. (1) ‘Building’ means any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential parposes………….”

    18. So that, section 7(3) (a) (i) and (iii) of the Act would, prima facie, having regard to the definition of ‘building’ in the Act, apply to portions of residential or non-residential building, and, apparently, the Legislature wanted to make a specific provision in the case of a building occupied in portions by the landlord and the tenant, and hence we find clause (c) which deals specifically with a case where a landlord is occupying only a part of a building and the rest of the building is in the occupation of the tenant. It is because a prima facie reading and application of section 7(3) (a) (i) and (iii) would also apply to portions of building, in view of the definition of ‘building a separate provision had to be made, the object being that where a portion of the building is in the occupation of the landlord and another portion in the occupation of the tenant, he could ask for vacating the portion in the possession of the tenant, if he required that as additional accommodation for residential purpose or non-residential purpose, as the case may be. A reading of this sub-section, in my opinion, clearly indicates that the Legislature did not want to depart from the general principles contained in sub-clause (a)(i) of sub-section (3) of section 7 namely, that a landlord could ask for eviction from a non-residential building only if he required the building for non-residential purposes, and he could ask for eviction of a residential building only if he required for residential purposes. In other words, the landlord cannot evict a tenant from a residential building when he required it for a non-residential purpose and from a non-residential building when he required it for residential purposes; similarly, he could only evict a tenant from a portion of the building which is used for non-residential purpose by the tenant, only if he required that portion for non-residential purpose and not when he required for residential purpose. Similarly, if the portion of the building in the occupation of the tenant is used for residential purpose, the landlord could evict him only if he required that portion for a residential purpose. He cannot ask for eviction of the tenant from that portion because he wants to extend his business. In other words, even under section 7(3) (c), the right of eviction of the landlord is restricted to the same conditions contained in sub-clauses (i) and (iii) of section 7(3) (a)- In the instant case, it is admitted that the respondent is using the portion of the house for residential purposes and that the petitioner is using his portion of the house for non-residential purposes. This being the case, it would appear, logically applying to section 7(3) (c) the principles laid down in section 7(3) (a) (i) and (iii), that it would not be open to the landlord to evict the tenant as he does not require that portion for the purpose of business that is carried on by him. Any doubt in the matter may be regarded as set at rest by the Legislature employing the words in the beginning of the clause “whether residential or non-residential” and later towards the end of the section “if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be”. If, as contended by Mr. Vaidyanathan, there is no such restriction in the matter of the application of sub-clause (c) of section 7(3), then nothing could have been simpler than the Legislature to have drafted the section as follows:—

    “A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole: or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation.”

    19. Hence, I am clearly of opinion that in the instant case the landlord had no right to apply under section 7(3) (c) for evicting the petitioner from the portion of’ the house in his occupation.

    20. The law, as regards the nomenclature employed, namely, whether a certain premises is a non-reyidential building or a residential building, is laid down in clear terms by a Full Bench Decision of the Madras High Court reported in Dakshinamurthy v. Thulja Bai, wherein it was held that the test to determine whether a building is a residential one or not, is the purpose for which the building was let to the tenant in occupation at the time of the application for eviction If the letting out was for a non-residential purpose, even if the building is structurally fit for residential purposes, it would still be regarded as a non-residential building for the purpose of the Act, and similarly, if the building is let out for residential purposes and it is structurally fit also for non-residential purposes, still it would be regarded as a residential building In this case, it is obvious that the portion of the house in the occupation of the petitioner is non-residential within the meaning of the Act. It is surprising to notice that although the Proviso to sub-section (c) lays down in clear terms that the Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting the application to evict him would outweigh the advantage to the landlord, none of the Courts below have taken care to bear this provision in mind and to apply it to the facts of the case; with the result that neither the Controller, nor the Subordinate Judge, nor the District Judge examined the case put forward by the respondent under sub-section (c), bearing in mind the conditions contained in the Proviso. The existence of the Proviso, in my opinion, also supports the conclusion reached by me earlier, as regards the scope of sub-section (c), because the hardship that would result to a businessman by reason of his having to be evicted from a portion of the building cannot be weighed against the advantage which a landlord would get by getting a little more accommodation for his residential purposes. The question of weighing one, i.e, the hardship of the tenant against the advantage of the landlord, is only possible and practicable where the two portions of the building used by the landlord and the tenant are for the same purpose. If the landlord is using one portion for non-residential purpose and the tenant is using the other portion for non-residential purpose, then it would be possible for a Court of law to put the hardship of one against the convenience of the other, but such a thing, as is pointed out already, is not possible or practicable in the case where the two portions are used for two different purposes, one residential and the other non-residential.

    21. In view of the findings reached by me on the other question arising in the case, it is unnecessary to consider the question whether the case should be sent back to the Court of first instance for applying the Proviso to the facts of the case.

    22. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. But in the entire circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.

    23. Revision allowed.

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