Chandra Reddy, C.J.:-
(1) This appeal under clause (15) of the letters patent is filed against the judgment of seshachelapati, j. , in s. A. No. 543 of 1958 with his leave and it raises a question relating to the interpretation of section 47 of the indian registration act.
(2) The controversy that has arisen in this case is as to which of the two sale deeds - one executed on 11th february, 1950 but registered about a month later, i. E. , on 17th march, 1950 and the other made on 21st february, 1950 and registered on the same date - should prevail. The first document, marked as exhibit b - 1, was a conveyance of a one - fourth share in the suit house for a sum of rs. 285 while the second instrument purported to be a sale deed of the same property for a higher consideration, i. E. , rs. 400 marked as exhibit a - 1. The plaintiff in o. S. No. 140 of 1950 (d. M. C. , masulipatam) , the second buyer, immediately after he obtained the sale deed, issued a notice to the vendor and the vendee under exhibit b - 1 for partition of the property. As there was no compliance with his demand, the suit was filed for partition and separate possession of the one - fourth share conveyed under exhibit a - 1. That is how the question as to the applicability of section 47 of the indian registration act has arisen.
(3) The two courts below and our learned brother, seshachelapati, j. , thought that it was the first sale deed that should take precedence over the second notwithstanding the fact that registration of the second document was earlier than the first. It is this view that is canvassed in this letters patent appeal. As the point debated in this case has to be decided in the light of section 47, it is useful to quote it here.
"a registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration."
(4) The language of this section establishes the proposition that, if there is a competition between a document executed earlier in point of time and registered later and a document that came into existence later but was registerd earlier than the first document, the first document prevails over the second. This construction was adopted by chandrasekhara aiyar, j. , in duraiswami reddi v. Angappa reddi,1945 1 m. L. J. 425. The learned counsel for the appellant thought that there is conflict between this decision and of the calcutta high court in gobardhan v. Gunadhar. A. I. R. 1941 cal. 78 at 80.
(5) This is the result of a misapprehension of the scope and effect of gobardhan v. Gunadhar. The calcutta high court did not lay down a different proposition. On the other hand, it lays down the rule that section 47 of the indian registration act operates in favour of the earlier document though registered later. All that the learned judges said was that, the concept of priority as between the two documents does not hold good in regard to a third person who is not a party to these documents. Say their lordships at page 80 of the report :
"much stress has been laid by the opposite party on
section 47, registration act. It is undoubtedly true that as between the transfer or and the transferee the registered document takes effect from the date of execution ; and if there is a competition between two documents relating to the same property both of which are registered, the one executed earlier in point of time will have priority, but as regards third party the point of time at which the deed is to be effective is when it is registered."
(6) It is clear from the passage extracted above that the learned judges of the calcutta high court thought that section 47 was inapplicable to the case of a third person - not a party to either of the two documents or claiming under them. There is, therefore, no conflict between duraiswami reddi v. Angappa reddi and gobardhan v. Gunadhar. Even if it is possible to read a conflict in them, we cannot but agree with the principle enunciated by chandrasekhara aiyar, j. , in duraiswami reddi v. Angappa reddi, 1945 1 m. L. J. 425. As it is in consonance with the letter and spirit of section 47. It is not possible to read that section in any way other than that indicated by us. We will now come to the pronouncement of the supreme court in ram saran v. Domini kuer, 1963 1 s. C. J. 646 : a. I. R. 1961 s. C. 1747 called in aid by the appellant. The question debated there was whether the preliminary demand issued by a person exercising the right of preemption before registration of the sale could help him in the exercise of his right of pre - emption. It is in that context that their lordships of the supreme court had to consider as to when a sale was completed. They held that the instrument became a sale only after it was registered and that until then there was no sale, after which alone a notice of preliminary demand was to issue to the vendor. Under the mohammadan law of pre - emption, the right of pre - emption arises only out of a valid, complete and bona fide sale. Since the demand was made before registration of the document, it was held that this demand did not give rise to a right of pre - emption. Their lordships, in the course of judgment, referred to section 47 and said that the statutory provision did not have the effect of passing title to the property before the registration of the document and that section 47 applied to a document only after it was registered and had nothing to do with the completion of the registration or the completion of the sale when the instrument was one of sale. They also observed that section 47 of the registration act did not say when a sale would be deemed to be complete, that it only permitted a document, when registered, to operate from a certain date which may be earlier than the date when it was registered and that the object of the section was to decide which of two or more registered instruments in respect of the same property was to have effect.
(7) These remarks leave no room for doubt that the consequence that flows from section 47 is that, when there is a competition between two documents, the document executed earlier takes precedence over the later though the earlier one was registered later. Thus the pronouncement of the supreme court, far from rendering any assistance to the appellant militates against the theory propounded by him.
(8) It follows that the decision under appeal is correct and has to be affirmed and the appeal dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.