Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.:— Chintapalle Achaiah is the petitioner in these three petitions for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. On 14th October, 1966, we pronounced a common judgment dismissing the petition in each of three main proceedings. The petitioner felt aggrieved with the order of dismissal and filed these petitions against each of them.
2. S.C.L.P No. 94 of 1966 is filed against the judgment so far as it related to C.M.P No. 13247 of 1965, and C.M.P No. 10504 of 1966 is for stay of all further proceedings in O.S No. 44 of 1965, on the file of the 1st Additional Chief Judge, ‘City Civil Court, Hyderabad pending the disposal of the above S.C.L.P, C.M.P No. 10505 of 1966 is for stay of all further proceedings in O.S No. 41 of 1965 on the file of the 1st Additional Chief Tudge, City Civil Court, pending the disposal of S.C.L.P No. 94 of 1966.
3. S.C.L.P No. 95 of 1966 is filed against the judgment so far as it related to C.R.P No. 221 of 1966. S.C.L.P No. 96 of 1966 is filed against the judgment so far as it related to W.P No. 1360 of 1965.
4. C.M.P No. 10503 of 1966 is to consolidate all the three leave petitions, S.C.L.P Nos. 94 to 96 of 1966 for the purpose of security deposit for costs and printing. The sole respondent in each of these petitions and in the main proceedings is P. Gopalakrishna Reddy, whom we shall refer to for convenience hereafter in this order as landlord. Similarly, we shall refer to for convenience the petitioner Chintapalli Achaiah, as tenant.
5. The relevant facts are as follows
6. The Landlord is the owner of premises known as Brindavan Hotel (hereafter referred to for convenience as the case premises) situated in Hyderabad within its Municipal Limits. He leased it under a lease deed dated 11th January, 1961 for a period of two years according to him, to the tenant. At that time, the Andhra Pradesh Lease, Eviction and Rent Control Act (XV of 1960) (hereafter referred to as the new Act) was in force. Prior to it, the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act (XX of 1954) (hereafter referred to for convenience as the old Act) was in force. section 32 (b) of the new Act-exempted from the operation of that Act buildings which had been constructed after 26th August, 1957. It is beyoad dispute that the case premises was constructed after that date (26th August, 1957). If that provision of law was valid, the case premises would not be affected by the new Act. The landlord desired that the tenant should vacate the building at the end of the lease period but the tenant desired the contrary. So, the tenant filed a suit (OS. No. 19 of 1963) in the Court of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court on 31st October, 1963 for a declaration that, notwithstanding section 32 (b) of the new Act which was void, he as a tenant was entitled to the benefit of the new Act, (XV of 1960). On 1st November, 1963, the landlord filed O.S No. 20 of 1963, in the same Court for eviction of the tenant alleging that the lease had expired. Ultimately, O.S No. 19 of 1963, became O.S No. 44 of 1965 and O.S No. 20 of 1963 became O.S No. 41 of 1965, on the file of the learned Additional Chief Judge, Hyderabad.
7. On the pleadings, various issues were framed; one of them was as to whether section 32 (b) of the new Act was unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative in view Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.
8. The tenant filed I.A No. 91 of 1964, contending that the suits raised substantial questions as to the interpretation of the Constitution and praying, on that ground that the question involved may be referred to the High Court for decision under the proviso to section 113 Civil Procedure Code. The learned Additional Chief Judge passed an order rejecting that request. Against that order, the petitioner filed of C.R.P No. 1679 of 1964.
9. The tenant also filed directly in the High Court C.M.P No. 4906 of 1964, under Articles 227 and 228 of the Constitution regarding the validity of section 32 (b). A Bench of this Court heard that G.R.P and Civil Miscellaneous Petition and passed an order holding that section 32 (b) of the new Act was valid and did not offend in any manner Article 14 or any other Article of the Constitution and that the new Act did not apply to the buildings constructed after 26th August, 1957. This Court also directed the disposal of the suits as early as possible.
10. The petitioner filed S.C.L.P Nos. 64 and 65 of 11965, against the judgment for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court but they were dismissed. He filed Special Leave Applications Nos. 500 and 502 of 1965, in the Supreme Court and they were rejected on 23rd March, 1965, as withdrawn by the tenant. Upto that stage, the tenant was relying on the new Act for relief except for challenging the validity of exemption granted under section 32 (b) of that Act.
11. Meanwhile, the tenant also instituted R.C 23-FR-1964 before the Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad for fixation of rent under the New Act. The Rent Controller refused relief on the ground that he had no jurisdiction as the case premises-was a new building covered by section 32(b). The tenant filed an appeal before the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, Hyderabad in R.A No. 123 of 1964. It was dismissed on the same ground. The tenant filed a Civil Revision Petition against that order in the High Court which also ended in dismissal.
12. The tenant then got his plaint in O.S No. 44 of 1965, amended so as to question the validity of the entire new Act on the ground that the new Act related mainly to markets and ‘development’ which were items mentioned in Schedule I to the Andhra Pradesh Regional Committee Order, 1958 issued by the President of India and that, consequently, the Bill which ultimately became the new Act, should have been referred to the Telangana Regional Committee before it could be finally passed by the State Legislature and because law and that such mandatory procedure was in fact not followed and that, therefore, the new Act in its entirely was invalid.
13. As a result of these amended pleadings, two additional issues were framed as follows:
“(i) Whether Act XV of 1960 of Andhra Pradesh is ultra vires of the Constitution ?
(ii) If so, whether Act XX of 1954 of former Hyderabad State is still in force and consequently whether the defendant is a tenant under the former Hyderabad State Act XX of 1954 ?”
14. The petitioner filed I.A No. 1580 of 1965, in O.S No. 41 of 1965, under section 113 Civil Procedure Code, before the trial Court praying for reference of the case to the High Court. The learned trial Judge rejected the application by an order dated 7th December, 1965, holding that the term ‘market’ covered the case premises and also reference of the Bill to the Telengana Regional Committee was not mandatory. Against that order of dismissal, the tenant filed C.R.P No. 221 of 1966.
15. The tenant also filed directly in this Court C.M.P No. 13247 of 1965 under Article 228 of the Constitution with prayer that this Court should withdraw the suits, O.S Nos. 41 and 45 (sic) of 1965, and determine the questions of law which arose on the two additional issues already referred to by us.
16. The tenant also filed W.P No. 300 of 1965, questioning the validity of the new Act on substantially the same ground which he urged in I.A No. 1580 of 1965, and C.M.P No. 13247 of 1965, as regards the new Act.
17. All these three matters involved the same questions of law namely, the validity of the new Act. By common consent, we heard all these three proceedings together and delivered a common judgment on 14th October, 1966 holding that the new Act was valid, that it did not contravene any provision of the Constitution and that it did not suffer from any infirmity. Accordingly, we dismissed all these three petitions. It is this judgment which is now sought to be appealed against in the Supreme Court.
18. In our judgment, we have clearly held that the new Act is valid. In view of that decision, which is binding on the trial Court as regards the validity of Act XV of 1960 i.e, the new Act, there cannot hereafter be any scope for any reference by the trial Court to this High Court under section 113, Civil Procedure Code, as prayed for by the tenant in I.A No. 1580 of 1965, before the trial Court and in C.R.P No. 221 of 1966 in this Court. There is also no scope for the Supreme Court holding that a reference should be made under section 113 Civil Procedure Code, to this Court by the trial Court or that this Court should withdraw the suits as prayed for in C.M.P No. 13247 of 1965.
19. Therefore, S.C.L.P Nos. 94 and 95 of 1966 have to be dismissed.
20. There remains S.C.L.P No. 96 of 1966.
21. Article 133(1) of the Constitution runs as follows:—
“(i) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any Judgment, decree or final order in a Civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies—
(a) that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less thin twenty thousand rupees or such other sums may be specified in that behalf of Parliament by law; or
(i) that the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value; or
(c) that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.”
22. In Ramesh v. Gendalal . 1966 2 S.C.J 762; A.I.R 1966 S.C 1445 at page 1449., their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows:—
“We are concerned here with the exercise of extraordinary original civil jurisdiction under Article 226. Under that Jurisdiction, the High Court does not hear an appeal or a revision. The High Court is moved to intervene and to bring before itself, the record of a case decided by or pending before a Court or tribunal or any authority within the High Court's Jurisdiction. A petition to the High Court invoking this jurisdiction is a proceeding quite Independent of the original controversy. The controversy in the High Court, in proceedings arising under Article 226 ordinarily is whether a decision of, or a proceeding before, a Court tribunal or authority should be allowed to stand or should be quashed, for want of jurisdiction or on account of errors of law apparent on the face of the record. A decision in the exercise of this jurisdiction, whether interfering with the proceeding impugned or declining to do so, is a final decision in so far as the High Court is concerned because it terminates finally the special proceeding before it……. The answer to the question whether the order is final or not will not depend on whether the contraversy is finally over but whether the controversy raised before the High Court is finally over or not. If it is, the order will be appealable provided the other conditions are satisfied, otherwise not.”
23. Dealing with the material relevant to that case, their Lordships observed thus:
“In the present case, the question raised was whether the commissioner had jurisdiction to set aside the discharge of the debt ordered by the Claims Officer the High Court decided to dismiss the petition and the order that was passed must be regarded as final for the purpose of appeal to this Court.”
24. In this case, the substantial question raised in the Writ Petition was whether the new Act was null and void. The prayer in the Writ Petition which is a Civil Proceeding, was
‘to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or directions in the nature thereof for declaring the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, (XV of 1960) as null and void and to direct the Government of Andhra Pradesh to appoint a Rent Controller, as per the provisions of Act (XX of 1954) and pass such other and further orders as the Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case’.
25. This Court held that the Act was not null or void and consequently did not give any direction as prayed for in the Writ Petitior. Therefore, so far as the question raised in the Writ Petition is concerned, the order of this Court is final, unaffected by the fact that the suits are still pending, for the purpose of Article 133(1) of the Constitution.
26. The present petition (S.C.L.P No. 96 of 1966) is filed under Article’133(1)(6) and (c) and also under Article 132 of the Constitution. (It also mentions sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code and Order 45, rule 3, Civil Procedure Code), Article 132 runs thus:—
“(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any Judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in the territory of India, whether in a civil or other proceeding, if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution.
Explanation: For the purposes of this article, the expression ‘final order’ includes an order deciding an issue which, if decided in favour of the appellant, would be sufficient for the final disposal of the case.”
27. The petition itself, as such, does not mention clause (a) of Article 133(1). It is: obvious that clause (a) cannot apply in view of the fact that the prayer in the Writ Petition is for a declaration of invalidity of a statute and for appointment of a Rent Controller and such subject-matter of dispute cannot be said to have a value in terms of money.
28. Shri Narasaraju, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant has contended that clause (b) to Article 133(1) applies to this case. For this purpose, he contends that our judgment sought to be appealed against involved directly or indirectly claim or question respecting property i.e, the case premises which is worth of value such more than Rs. 20,000.
29. In Central Talkies v. Dwarka Prasad, the Allahabad High Court held that although the right of tenancy which the applicant claimed might be worth less than Rs. 20,000, he was laying claim to possession over a building of the cinema house which was considerably worth more than Rs. 20,000 and that, therefore, sub-clause (b) of Article 133(1) applied. This decision relied on the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Kastur Bhai Mani Bhai v. Hiralal, and Maneklal v. Homusji . A.I.R 1945 Bom. 113., and differed from the decision of the Lahore High Court in Dharma Mal v. Lala Moti Sagar . A.I.R 1923 Lah. 286 2..
30. The decision of the Allahabad High Court in Central Talkies v. Dwarka Prasad . A.I.R 1956 All. 348. was approved in Ram Lakshman Singh… v. Girindra Mohan Hazra…. . A.I.R 1963 Cal. 13..
31. The decision of the Lahore High Court in Dhanna Mal v. Lala Moti Sagar had also been dissented from in Maneklal v. Hormusji.
32. In Shaik Ali Bin Hassan v. The State of Andhra Prasdesh, (Order of this Court in S.G.L.P No. 7 of 1965 dated 10th February, 1965) a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Basi Reddy and Gopal Rao Ekbote, JJ., held that their decision, which they had given for upholding a scheme for nationalisation of road transport of a route, did not involve directly or indirectly any claim or question respecting property. The learned Judges also observed as follows;
“Be it noted that the words used are ‘directly or indirectly’ and not ‘remotely or incidentally’”
33. On that basis, they held that sub-clause (b) of Article 133(1) did not apply. This decision of a Division Bench is binding on us in preference to the decisions of other High Courts. We respectfully agree with the view, of this Court in the above mentioned decision.
34. In these cases, the prayer in the Writ Petition is for a declaration regarding the validity of the new Act and the appointment of a Rent Controller to fix the fair rent. In our opinion, the judgment cannot be said to involve directly or indirectly the claim of tenancy regarding the case premises. If at all, it can be said to involve only remotely or incidentally. We find that Article 133(1)(b) does not apply to any of these cases.
35. So far as the order concerned in I.A No. 1580 of 1965, against which C.R.P No. 221 of 1966 is filed, it is an order arising from two additional issues in a suit (O.S No. 41 of 1965) which is still pending. The learned Advocate for the petitioner draws our attention to the explanation to Article 132 and contends that, if the additional is sues 1 and 2 were decided in favour of the tenant, he cannot be evicted and, therefore, the decision would be sufficient for the final disposal of the suit concerned. But, the explanation makes it clear that it applies only for the purpose of Article 132 and that will not apply to Article 133. We find that none of the cases involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution so as to grant a certificate under Article 132(1) of the Constitution.
36. We are of the view that these are not fit cases for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court so as to attract clause (c) of Article 133(1) of the Constitution.
37. We are not satisfied that there is sufficient ground for issuing a certificate as prayed for in each of these Leave Petitions under any of the provisions of law mentioned therein.
38. In the view we have taken, there is no necessity for consolidating all the three Leave Petitions for the purpose of security deposit for costs and printing. We, therefore, dismiss S.G.L.P Nos. 94 to 96 of 1966 with costs in each. Advocate's fee Rs. 15 in each.
39. Petitions dismissed.