Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • 45, Rule 1, C. P. C. (corresponding to order 47, Rule 1 indian)
  • 7, Rule 11 (c), C. P. C.
  • section 151, C. P. C."
  • 7, Rule 11 (c)
  • 7, Rule 13
  • 7, Rule 11
  • 20, Rule 3
  • 47, Rule 1
  • 7, Rule 19
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • 45, Rule 1, C. P. C. (corresponding to order 47, Rule 1 indian)
  • 7, Rule 11 (c), C. P. C.
  • section 151, C. P. C."
  • 7, Rule 11 (c)
  • 7, Rule 13
  • 7, Rule 11
  • 20, Rule 3
  • 47, Rule 1
  • 7, Rule 19
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs 1 to 3, junior members of a Nair sub-tarwad, filed a suit on 29th March 1125 in forma pauperis seeking (i) a declaration that a 1107 partition deed executed by adult members was not binding, (ii) to set aside alienations made under that deed, and (iii) recovery of properties with mesne profits. During the suit, the plaintiffs compromised with most alienees. However, defendant 4 petitioned to dispauper the plaintiffs due to non-payment of deficit court fees. The plaintiffs paid only Rs. 25 of Rs. 240 due by 23rd November 1953, leading to dismissal of the suit on 7th December 1953. Plaintiffs applied on 6th January 1954 to restore the suit upon payment of Rs. 55 and sought reduction of plaint valuation. The court directed full payment and dismissed the restoration application on 23rd September 1954 due to non-compliance. Plaintiffs later paid the balance Rs. 160 and had the restoration application restored. Defendant 4 objected to the maintainability of the restoration, which the court below upheld, prompting this revision by plaintiffs 1 to 3.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a plaint rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(c), CPC can be restored by the court.
  2. Whether restoration can be granted if a fresh plaint under Order 7, Rule 13 CPC would be barred by limitation.
  3. Whether the court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC can be exercised to restore the plaint depriving the defendant of the limitation defense.
  4. The applicability and scope of the 'one opportunity rule' where junior members fail to file suit in time.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rameshvardhari Singh v. Sadhu Saran, AIR 1923 Pat 354 Order 7, Rule 11(c) CPC: Rejection of plaint operates as a decree; inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC cannot alter perfected orders except by review. Supported the view that plaint rejection under Order 7, Rule 11(c) is final and not subject to inherent jurisdiction for restoration.
Bibi Aliqunissa v. Md. Shafique, AIR 1950 Pat 358 Considered extension of the rule in AIR 1923 Pat 354 to second appeals dismissed for default of court fees. Distinguished the case but did not extend the rule fully.
Radhanath v. Bacha Lal, AIR 1955 Pat 370 (Full Bench) Section 151 CPC: Application under inherent jurisdiction not competent; remedy is by review under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC with payment of court fees. Confirmed that restoration by inherent jurisdiction is not allowed; review is proper remedy.
Ram Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1956 Pat 20 Affirmed the full bench view in AIR 1955 Pat 370. Reinforced the limitation on inherent jurisdiction for restoration.
Bachan Singh v. Dasarath Singh, AIR 1935 All 985 Order 7, Rule 19 CPC & Section 151 CPC: Court can treat restoration application as fresh plaint and allow old court fees to count towards new plaint. Supported a more liberal approach allowing restoration by treating the application as a fresh plaint.
Hubraj Singh v. Mt. Rama Dasi Kuer, AIR 1954 All 719 Inherent power to restore suit if good cause shown; suit deemed instituted on original date per Section 149 CPC. Allowed restoration without limitation bar issue arising; suggested inherent jurisdiction could be exercised even if limitation might bar fresh plaint.
Saratchandra v. Mrityunjay, AIR 1935 Cal 336 Section 151 CPC: Court must consider interests of both parties and not deprive defendant of limitation rights. Emphasized balancing interests when exercising inherent jurisdiction.
Mahomed Yunus v. Sugha Begum, AIR 1955 Hyd 156 Section 151 CPC: Same principle as AIR 1935 Cal 336 regarding limitation and inherent jurisdiction. Supported principle that inherent jurisdiction should not override limitation rights.
John v. Kuriyan, 26 Trav LJ 932 Inherent jurisdiction can be invoked when review is not maintainable; refusal only when other effective remedy exists. Supported exercise of inherent jurisdiction for restoration when no other remedy available.
Chhaju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 Interpretation of Order 45, Rule 1 CPC (corresponding to Order 47, Rule 1 Indian CPC): Review remedy limited for plaint dismissal for deficit court fees. Indicated limited scope of review for plaint dismissal on court fee grounds.
Narayanan Potti v. Sekharan, 1950 TCLR 467 (AIR 1950 Trav-Co. 57) (FB) Rule that if no suit is instituted in time by a sui juris member, the cause of action is lost for the entire tarwad. Applied to hold that suit restoration was barred as senior plaintiffs were sui juris and failed to sue in time.
Radhakrishna Menon v. Chandrasekhara Menon, 1955 Ker LT 681 (AIR 1956 Trav-Co 78) Same principle as Narayanan Potti regarding loss of cause of action in tarwad suits. Reinforced the bar on restoration due to failure of sui juris members to sue timely.
Krishnan v. Geevarghese, 30 Trav LJ 872 ‘One opportunity rule’: Junior members failing to take advantage of opportunity are deemed to have failed without fraud or collusion. Applied to reject argument that junior plaintiff’s minority could allow restoration despite seniors’ laches.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed whether a plaint rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(c) CPC can be restored and whether such restoration can override limitation defenses. It reviewed divergent high court precedents: Patna High Court’s strict view disallowing inherent jurisdiction for restoration, Allahabad High Court’s more liberal approach permitting restoration treated as a fresh plaint, and Calcutta and Hyderabad High Courts’ emphasis on protecting defendants’ limitation rights.

The court adopted a balanced principle from the Allahabad, Calcutta, and Hyderabad High Courts: a restoration application with payment of deficit court fees under Section 151 CPC can be treated as a fresh plaint under Order 7, Rule 13 CPC, allowing prior court fees to count towards the new plaint. However, this is subject to limitation law.

Applying this, the court found that the senior plaintiffs, who were sui juris, had become over 21 years old by the time of the restoration application, rendering a fresh suit barred by limitation. Since no timely suit was instituted by any sui juris member, the cause of action was lost for the entire tarwad. The court also rejected the argument that the junior plaintiff’s minority could override this bar, citing the ‘one opportunity rule’ which precludes relief absent fraud or collusion when the opportunity was missed.

Consequently, the court upheld the lower court’s dismissal of the restoration application as proper.

Holding and Implications

The revision is dismissed with costs.

The decision directly results in the plaintiffs’ restoration application being denied, confirming that a plaint rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(c) CPC cannot be restored if a fresh suit would be barred by limitation, especially where sui juris members have failed to sue timely. No new precedent is established; rather, the court aligns with established principles balancing restoration powers with limitation protections and the ‘one opportunity rule’ in tarwad suits.

    Gopalakrishna Pillai v. Narayanan

    Varadaraja Iyengar, J.:-

    (1) this revision is by the plaintiffs 1 to 3 against an order of the court below refusing to restore their plaint which had been rejected for default of payment of deficit court - fees.

    (2) the plaintiffs 1 to 3 were junior members in a nair sub - tarwad consisting of themselves and defendants 1 to 3. They laid this suit on 29th march 1125 in forma pauperis (i) for declaration that a deed of partition of 1107 and executed during their minority by the adult members was not binding on the sub - tarwad, (ii) for setting aside various alienations executed by the adult members in favour of defendants 4 to 10 on the strength of the partition deed, And (iii) to recover the properties on behalf of the sub - tarwad with mesne profits. During the course of the suit, The plaintiffs were able to compromise with most of the alienees, Hut this brought on a petition by the 4th defendant dated 9 - 10 - 1953 to dispauper them. The plainiffs agreed to pay the court - fees but by 23 - 11 - 1953 they paid only rs. 25 out of the total of rs. 240 due. The court therefore dismissed the suit on 7 - 121953. On 6 - 1 - 1954 the plaintiffs filed their application herein to restore the suit on payment of rs. 55/ - and seeking to reduce the plaint valuation for the purpose. The court however directed payment in full and en default of the plaintiffs to comply dismissed the application to restore on 23 - 9 - 1954. Subsequently the plaintiffs paid the balance of rs. 160 and got the restoration application of 6 - 11954 restored. On the application being again taken up, The 4th defendant objected to its maintainability. This objection the court below upheld and hence this revision.

    (3) in arriving at its decision as above, The court below proceeded on the basis that the dismissal of the suit herein on 7 - 12 - 1953 amounted to the rejection of plaint under order 7, Rule 11 (c), C. P. C. And consequently the application for restoration filed by the plaintiff could be allowed if at all, Only in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court and that again, Only when a fresh plaint under p. 7, Rule 13 c. P. C. Would not be barred by limitation if instituted on the dale of the application. And as the plaintiffs application of 6 - 1 - 1954 did not satisfy this latter test the court below felt itself bound to reject it. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs complains that the test laid down by the court below as above is too narrow and that in any event it has not been properly applied in the case.

    (4) now the question whether a plaint rejected under order 7, Rule 11 (c) c. P. C. Can be restored to file and whether it could be so done as to deprive the defendant of his right to plead limitation has been the subject of acute controversy in the courts. For example, The patna high court has consistently taken this view that section 151 cannot at all apply in the matter. Thus in rameshvardhari singh v. Sadhu saran, Air 1923 pat 354, Das, C. J., With whom kulwant sahay, J., Agreed observed:

    "the order rejecting the plaint under order 7, Rule 11 (c) of the code, Operated as a decree, And order 20, Rule 3 provides: that a judgment once signed shall not afterwards be altered or added to save as provided by section 152 or on review. ' there can be no doubt, In my opinion, That once an order of the court is perfected, There is absolutely no power in that court under its inherent jurisdiction either to alter or add to that order save as provided by section 152 or on review."

    the doubt was raised subsequently in bibi aliqunnissa v. Md. Shafique, Air 1950 pat 358, Whether the rule as so laid down should be extended in a case of second appeal which had been dismissed for default of payment of court - fee due on the plaint and the memorandum of appeal in the lower appellate court and the view was? expressed that air 1923 pat 354 was only a case where a plaint was dismissed for default in paying the deficit court - fee on the plaint itself. However in the later full bench case of radhanath v. Bacha lal, (s) air 1955 pat 370, The position was made quite clear that an application under section 151 c. P. C. Was not competent even in the case contemplated by air 1950 pad 358. The learned judges of the full bench held that the proper remedy of the plaintiff was by way of an application for review under order 47, Rule 1 c. P. C. On payment of proper court - fee on such application. This view has been affirmed in the latest case in that court in ram das v. Ganga das, Air 1956 pat 20.

    (5) the allahabad high court has taken a more liberal view. Thus in bachan singh v. Dasarath singh, Air 1935 all 985 it was held:

    "that the court could treat such restoration application as a fresh plaint under order 7, Rule 19 and it can allow the old court - fee paid on the rejected plaint to be computed towards the court - fee on the fresh plaint, Under section 149, And under is inherent powers derived under section 151, C. P. C."

    in that case the suit would not have been barred if it had been filed on the date of the restoration application. In the latest case in that court hubraj singh v. Mt. Rama dasi kuer, Air 1954 all 719, The entire case - law was reviewed and the learned judges held that the court had inherent power to restore the suit if good cause was shown. No definite opinion was expressed by the learned judges as to whether such a power could be exercised even if a fresh plaint that might be filed under order 7, Rule 13 would be barred by limitation. There was no question of such bar in that case. However they repelled the argument that in spite of the restoration order, The suit must be deemed to have been instituted on the date of the application and not on the original date of institution of the suit and relied for the purpose on section 149 c. P. C. The question whether even if the plaint is barred on the date of the restoration application inherent jurisdiction could be so exercised would seem to nave come up for consideration in the allahabad high court itself in an unreported case of 1937 referred to in air 1954 all 719 just cited and decided by sulaiman, C. J., And harries, J. The learned judges found no difficulty in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction even in such case.

    (6) the calcutta and hyderabad high courts were however quite clear that the jurisdiction under section 151 should not be exercised so as to deprive a defendant of the right obtained by him by virtue of the law of limitation. See saratchandra v. Mrityunjay. Air 1935 cal 336 (2) and mahomed yunus v. Sugha begum, (s) air 1955 hyd 156. The principle was emphasised in these cases that

    "in exercising its powers under that section, The court has to keep in view not only the interest of the applicant but also that of the other party who may be affected by this order."

    (7) reference may also be made to a case in the travancore high court, John v. Kuriyan, 26 trav lj 932, Which held that the inherent jurisdiction could be invoked on the ground that application for review could not be maintained. The learned judge observed:

    "the inherent power vested in a court can be refused to be exercised only when there is any other effective remedy given to the party aggrieved, Under the provisions of the code. The effect of interpreting order 45, Rule 1, C. P. C. (corresponding to order 47, Rule 1 indian) in the manner propounded by the privy council in chhaju ram v. Neki, Air 1922 pc 112 will lead to the result that a plaintiff whose plaint is rejected for failure to pay the deficit court - fee therein cannot successfully have the order or dismissal set aside by way or review, Except probably in cases where his failure to pay such deficit court - fee was due to a mistake or error committed by him in making the valuation for his suit. In other cases, He has no right to come by way of review, On the strength of the privy council ruling. It cannot be that the code renders no remedy to aggrieved parties in such cases."

    (8) no authority of this court was brought to my notice. But it seems to me that without prejudice to either party and for the furtherance of substantial justice, The principle accepted by the allahabad, Calcutta and hyderabad high courts can well be adopted. That is to say, Where the plaint is rejected under order 7, Rule 11 and the plaintiff subsequently files an application under section 151 c. P. C. With a deposit of the deficit court - fee, For restoration of the plaint, There is nothing to debar the court from treating the application as a fresh plaint under order 7. Rule 13 (sic) the old court - fee paid on the rejected plaint can be computed' towards the court - fee on the fresh plaint under section 149 c. P. C. This is practically the rule which the court below thought might properly be applied to this case but in the actual circumstances found it not possible to do so.

    (9) in the plaint, The ages of the 1st plaintiff and 2nd plaintiff were put down as 20 and 19 respectively and 3rd plaintiff was shown, To be a minor, So by the time the restoration application was filed, The 1st plaintiff and 2nd plaintiff were more than 21 years old and a suit by them would be barred. A suit without them would also be barred by the principle of the rule that where no suit was instituted in time by an available member who was sui juris, The loss of the cause of action is the loss of the entire tarwad and no subsequent suit could be brought by anybody else. See narayanan potti v. Sekharan. 1950 tclr 467: (air 1950 trav - co. 57) (fb) and radhakrishna menon v. Chandrasekhara menon, 1955 ker lt 681: air 1956 trav - co 78). There was therefore nothing improper in the dismissal by the court below of the restoration application filed by the plaintiffs herein. Learned counsel attempted to say that the negligence or laches of the first two plaintiffs in not applying earlier, Might not bind the 3rd plaintiff and as he had not completed 21 on 'he date of the application, Restoration should have been ordered. But no such argument was raised in the court below and even otherwise it is not enough to get over 'one opportunity rule' above stated. See krishnan v. Geevarghese, 30 trav lj 872, Where it was laid down that if in the absence of fraud and collusion the junior members failed to take advantage of the opportunity they should be deemed to have raised the objection and failed.

    (10) the revision is therefore groundless and it is dismissed with costs

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Gopalakrishna Pillai v. Narayanan
    (Jul 1, 1958)