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  • Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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  • Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, an Indian Administrative Service officer, was served with a charge-sheet dated 22-7-2011 containing five charges alleging violation of Rules 3, 7, 8 and 17 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968. An enquiry officer appointed on 27-2-2012 submitted a report on 30-8-2012 exonerating the appellant of all charges, but the report was never supplied to him.

On 9-9-2012 a Selection Committee considered the appellant’s promotion to Super Time Scale-II; its recommendation was kept in a sealed cover because of the pending disciplinary proceedings. The appellant’s representation seeking promotion went unanswered, prompting OA No. 381 of 2012 before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT).

On the very day that application was filed—26-9-2012—the State of Uttar Pradesh passed an order rejecting the enquiry report and, invoking Rule 8(3) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, constituted a two-member Inquiry Board to conduct a fresh enquiry. The appellant challenged this order in OA No. 395 of 2012, which was dismissed by CAT on 20-12-2013. His writ petition (Service Bench No. 87 of 2014) met the same fate before the Allahabad High Court on 3-4-2014, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

The disciplinary charges stemmed from the appellant’s role as a co-petitioner in Writ Petition (C) No. 37 of 2010, Julio F. Ribero v. Union of India, which alleged governmental inaction regarding “black money”.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after an enquiry officer has exonerated a delinquent officer, the disciplinary authority can discard that report and order a fresh enquiry by constituting a multi-member board under Rule 8(3) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969.
  2. Whether the reasons cited by the State—viz. that the first enquiry report was “cursory”, violated procedural sub-rules 8(15), 8(16), 8(20) & 8(24), and failed to “properly investigate the facts”—justify a second enquiry.
  3. Whether the appellant’s participation in a public-interest writ petition amounted to misconduct under Rules 3, 7, 8 and 17 of the Conduct Rules.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Invocation of Rule 8(3) was illegal; that provision merely gives an initial option either to appoint a single enquiry officer or a board, not to restart proceedings after an adverse report.
  • The State cannot switch to the mechanism contemplated in the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 simply because it dislikes the original findings.
  • Alleged violations of sub-rules 8(15), 8(16), 8(20) and 8(24) were unspecified and, in any event, irrelevant because the appellant never disputed the factual allegations.
  • Since all facts were admitted, there was nothing for the enquiry officer to “investigate”; the only question was whether those facts constituted misconduct.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The first enquiry was conducted in utter non-compliance with sub-rules 8(15), 8(16), 8(20) and 8(24); therefore the disciplinary authority was entitled to discard the report.
  • Rule 8(3) expressly empowers the State to appoint a board, and such appointment was within the authority’s discretion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.R. Deb v. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, (1971) 2 SCC 102 There can ordinarily be only one disciplinary enquiry; a fresh enquiry is permissible only in limited situations, e.g., serious procedural defect or unavailability of evidence, not merely because the report is unfavourable to the disciplinary authority. Constitution Bench principles were applied to hold that ordering a second enquiry solely because the first report exonerated the officer is impermissible.
Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 1 Background context: Supreme Court directions for a probe into “black money” following public-interest litigation filed by, inter alia, the present appellant. Cited to note that the underlying allegations in the writ petition were ultimately found weighty by the Court, undermining the State’s charge of misconduct.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court undertook a rule-by-rule examination of the Discipline Rules:

  • Rule 8(1) permits a major penalty only after an enquiry held either under the Discipline Rules or the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850. Rule 8(2) allows the disciplinary authority to choose either path at the outset, not mid-stream.
  • Rule 8(3) merely describes the composition of a multi-member “Board” and does not import the 1850 Act automatically.
  • Drawing on K.R. Deb, the Court emphasised that a second enquiry cannot be ordered merely because the first report is unfavourable to the employer.

The four reasons given by the State for rejecting the first report were individually analysed:

  1. “Failure to investigate facts” – untenable because the appellant admitted all facts; the issue was purely legal.
  2. “Cursory report” – irrelevant once the conclusions are otherwise sound; length or style is immaterial.
  3. Violation of sub-rules 8(15), 8(16), 8(20), 8(24) – the Court found these provisions inapplicable as they concern evidentiary procedures triggered only when facts are disputed or a presenting officer seeks to file briefs, neither of which occurred.
  4. Alleged breach of Conduct Rules 3, 7, 8, 17 – the Court held that participation in a public-interest writ petition alleging maladministration does not violate those provisions; indeed, Rule 8(3)(b) expressly exempts evidence given in judicial proceedings.

The Court further condemned the State’s action as a strategy to intimidate whistle-blowers, noting selective targeting (another co-petitioner faced no disciplinary action) and the constitutional right of civil servants to seek judicial redress.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED. The judgment of the Allahabad High Court and the orders of the CAT and State Government dated 26-9-2012 were quashed; OA No. 395 of 2012 was allowed as prayed. The respondents were ordered to pay joint and several costs of ₹5,00,000 to the appellant.

Implications: The decision reinforces that disciplinary authorities cannot institute successive enquiries simply to secure a desired finding, thereby safeguarding procedural fairness for civil servants. It also affirms the right of public servants to engage in public-interest litigation without fear of reprisals, but does not create new statutory precedent beyond applying existing Supreme Court jurisprudence.

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    Vijay Shankar Pandey v. Union Of India And Another

    Jasti Chelameswar, J.— Leave granted. The unsuccessful petitioner in Writ Petition No. 87(S/B) of 2014 on the file of the High Court of Allahabad is the appellant herein. By the impugned judgment dated 3-4-2014 Service Bench No. 87 of 2014 the said writ petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court.

    2. The appellant is an officer of the Indian Administrative Service. On 22-7-2011 he was served with a charge-sheet consisting of five charges. All the charges are to the effect that the conduct of the appellant is contrary to Rules 3, 7, 8 and 17 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 (hereinafter called “the Conduct Rules”). After certain correspondence (the details of which are not necessary for the present purpose), the disciplinary authority appointed an enquiry officer on 27-2-2012. The appellant submitted his reply on 5-3-2012. The appellant challenged the charge-sheet before the Central Administrative Tribunal in OA No. 623 of 2012 which was eventually dismissed on 29-8-2012. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court but withdrew the same subsequently. The order of the Central Administrative Tribunal became final.

    3. The enquiry officer submitted his report on 30-8-2012 exonerating the appellant of all the charges. The copy of the said report is not served on him.

    4. On 9-9-2012, the meeting of a Selection Committee for considering the cases of officers of the Indian Administrative Service for promotion to Super Time Scale II (ASTS II) was held. The case of the appellant was considered and the decision was kept in a sealed cover. The appellant, therefore, submitted a representation to the Chief Secretary of the State of Uttar Pradesh on 11-9-2012 requesting that in view of exoneration by the enquiry officer, he be promoted to Super Time Scale II (ASTS II). As there was no response to the representation, he approached the Central Administrative Tribunal on 26-9-2012 once again in OA No. 381 of 2012 with prayers as follows:

    “(a) to issue an order or direction commanding the respondents to take a final decision on the enquiry report which has already been submitted by the enquiry officer;
    (b) to issue an order or direction commanding the respondents to open the sealed cover of the recommendations of the Selection Committee and to forthwith issue promotion orders in respect of the applicant;
    (c) such other orders as this Tribunal may deem just, fit and proper be also passed in the interest of justice.”

    5. On the same day i.e 26-9-2012, an order (hereinafter referred to as “the impugned order”) invoking Rule 8(3) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as “the Discipline Rules”) came to be passed by the State of U.P rejecting the enquiry report dated 30-8-2012 (referred to supra). The relevant portion of the order reads as under:

    “2. Enquiry Officer, Shri Jagan Mathews sent the enquiry report vide his letter dated 30-8-2012. On examining the enquiry report of the enquiry officer at government level it was found that the enquiry officer had submitted a cursory report without observing the mandate of Rules 8(15), 8(16), 8(20) and 8(24) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 as criticism has been levelled in the writ petition of the Central Government filed through Shri Vijay Shankar Pandey before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and as such it is a clear violation of Rule 3(1), Rule 7, Rule 8(1) and Rule 17 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968. Therefore the enquiry officer has failed to properly investigate the facts in the enquiry proceedings.
    3. Therefore, in the matter of Shri Vijay Shankar Pandey IAS 1979, the Hon'ble Governor, after rejecting the enquiry report of Enquiry Officer Shri Jagan Mathews, constitute in his place a two-member Inquiry Board under sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, comprising of Shri Alok Ranjan, Agricultural Production Commissioner, Government of U.P and Shri Anil Kumar Gupta, Infrastructure and Industrial Commissioner, Government of U.P in order to enquire into the charges imposed against him.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    6. Challenging the order dated 26-9-2012, the appellant again approached the Central Administrative Tribunal by filing OA No. 395 of 2012. The earlier OA No. 381 of 2012 was dismissed by the Central Administrative Tribunal on 16-4-2013 on the ground that it had become infructuous. OA No. 395 of 2012 was also dismissed on 20-12-2013 with certain directions. The latter decision was challenged by the appellant herein in Writ Petition No. 87(S/B) of 2014, in which the order under appeal herein (hereinafter referred to as “the order under appeal”) came to be passed dismissing the writ petition.

    7. The background facts of this case are that Writ Petition (C) No. 37 of 2010 titled Julio F. Ribero v. Govt. of India including the appellant herein, came to be filed under the name and style of India Rejuvenation Initiative, a non-Government organisation (NGO). The said writ petition along with another culminated in a judgment of this Court in Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India (2011) 8 SCC 1. All the charges against the appellant are in connection with the filing of the said writ petition on the ground that the conduct of the petitioner is violative of the various Conduct Rules. Charge 1 is on account of certain statements made in the said writ petition against certain senior officers of the Government of India. The second charge is that the appellant failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 13 of the Conduct Rules whereunder he is obliged to give information to the respondent within one month of becoming a member of the such organisation (NGO). The third and the fourth charges are based on the allegation made in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 37 of 2010. The substance of the charges is that those allegations tantamount to criticism of the action of the Central as well as State Governments and of giving evidence without the previous sanction of the Government and, therefore, contravention of Rules 7 and 8 respectively of the Conduct Rules. Charge 5 is that the appellant violated Rule 17 of the Conduct Rules.

    Charge 1

    8. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 37 of 2010, Julio F. Ribero v. Govt. of India has been filed through India Rejuvenation Initiative, NGO before the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein you are also a petitioner. In the aforementioned writ petition on behalf of the petitioners (which also included you) an additional affidavit has been filed by Shri Jasbeer Singh wherein Para 4 of the allegations made by Shri S.K Dubey against senior officers of the Enforcement Directorate in his letter to the Hon'ble Prime Minister have been endorsed, which was not expected of you, being a member of the All India Services. This conduct of yours is contrary to Rule 3 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 and you have violated the aforesaid Rule.

    Charge 2

    9. Before becoming member of the institution named India Rejuvenation Initiative, you did not inform the Government, whereas as per Rule 13 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 information is to be given within one month of becoming a member. This conduct of yours is contrary to Rule 3 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 and you have violated the aforesaid Rule.

    Charge 3

    10. In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 37 of 2010, Julio F. Ribero v. Govt. of India filed by you before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by way of an additional affidavit filed by the petitioners (which also included you), senior officers of the Government of India were criticised, whereas the members of the All India Service are prohibited from criticising, in the media or in the press, the actions of both the Central as well as the State Government, either in their own or in another person's name. As such you violated Rule 7 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968. This conduct of yours is contrary to Rule 7 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 and you have violated the aforesaid Rule.

    Charge 4

    11. In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 37 of 2010, Julio F. Ribero v. Govt. of India filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by way of an additional affidavit filed by the petitioners (which also includes you), officers of the Enforcement Directorate of Government of India were criticised, whereas as per Rule 8 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968, members of the All India Service are not allowed to depose in any enquiry wherein the Central or the State Government may be criticised. This conduct of yours is contrary to Rule 8 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 and you have violated the aforesaid Rule.

    Charge 5

    12. In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 37 of 2010, Julio F. Ribero v. Govt. of India filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, no permission of the State Government was sought for filing the additional affidavit which was filed by the petitioners (which also includes you), whereas members of the All India Service are not allowed to give any such information without prior permission of either the Central or the State Government which brings disregard to the Central or the State Government. As such you failed to observe Rule 17 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968. This kind of your conduct is against Rule 17 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 and you are guilty for violating the aforesaid provision.

    13. The appellant herein never disputed the fact that he was one of the petitioners in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 37 of 2010 (referred to supra in para 7) nor did he disown statements (allegations) made in the said writ petition. The enquiry officer exonerated the appellant of all the charges. The second respondent rejected the report of the enquiry officer on two grounds; that the enquiry officer submitted a cursory report without observing the mandate of Rules 8(15), 8(16), 8(20) and 8(24) of the Discipline Rules; and failed to properly investigate the facts. Interestingly, the impugned order, states that the conduct of the appellant as recorded in the charge-sheet “is in clear violation of Rules 3(1), 7, 8(1) and 17 of the 1969 Rules”. Therefore, the second respondent ordered to constitute a two-member Inquiry Board to again enquire into the charges framed against the appellant.

    14. Mr Pallav Shishodia, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant attacked the impugned order dated 26-9-2012 on two grounds:

    14.1 That invocation of Rule 8(3) of the Discipline Rules is wholly illegal. It is submitted that the said Rule only enables the State to make a choice between the two courses of action available in case it decides to conduct an enquiry contemplated under the Rules:

    (i) Appointing an officer to enquire into the misconduct of the public servant; or
    (ii) Appoint an authority or board under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850.

    14.1.1 It is further submitted that the State cannot resort to the provisions of the 1850 Act after having had appointed an enquiry officer under the Discipline Rules merely because the State is not able to agree with the report submitted by the enquiry officer.

    14.1.2 The learned Senior Counsel further argued that the reason given (by the State for rejecting the enquiry officer's report) that the enquiry was conducted in violation of the mandate contained in Rules 8(15), 8(16), 8(20) and 8(24) of the Discipline Rules, is wholly unsustainable in law—for the reason that the order dated 26-9-2012 fails to specify the exact violations of the abovementioned Rules, committed by the enquiry officer. On the other hand, none of these provisions are attracted in the case on hand as each one of the abovementioned Rules pertain to the procedure to be followed while conducting an enquiry. Rules 8(15) and 8(16) of the Discipline Rules, incorporate the rule of audi alteram partem to enable both the delinquent officer as well as the State to adduce evidence in support of their respective stands on the various charges set out in the charge-sheet. Rule 8(20) of the 1969 Rules only enables the enquiry officer to either receive written briefs or hear both the presenting officer and the delinquent. The Rule does not mandate either causes of the action unless the parties desire so. It is not the case of the State at any stage that the presenting officer either wanted to be heard in person or to file a written brief, therefore, there cannot be any infraction of Rule 8(20) of the 1969 Rules.

    14.1.3 Lastly, it is submitted that Rule 8(24) of the Discipline Rules only prescribed the format in which the report is to be submitted. The non-compliance, if any, with the format (because the appellant is unable to make any submission as the copy of the report itself is not made available to the appellant), is not fatal to the validity of the report. According to the learned counsel Rule 8(24) of the Discipline Rules is to be construed only as recommendatory but not as mandatory.

    14.2 The ultimate conclusion of the State in rejecting the enquiry report dated 30-8-2012 is that the “enquiry officer has failed to properly investigate the facts”. The learned counsel submitted that there are no facts in dispute which require to be investigated. All facts alleged in the charge-sheet against the appellant are admitted by the appellant. The enquiry officer is required only to record a conclusion whether, in his opinion, the admitted facts constitute any misconduct under any of the Conduct Rules referred to in the charge-sheet.

    15. On the other hand, Shri K.V Viswanathan, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent submitted that the order under appeal does not call for any interference as the order of the enquiry officer is in utter non-compliance with Rules 8(15), (16), (20) and (24) of the Discipline Rules. The learned counsel also submitted that the decision of the State is well within the authority conferred under Rule 8 sub-rule (3) of the Discipline Rules.

    16. The Division Bench based its conclusion, that the impugned order dated 26-9-2012 cannot be faulted, on two factors. They are:

    (i) That the enquiry officer submitted his report dated 30-8-2012 without following the procedure prescribed by law under Rule 8 of the Discipline Rules;
    (ii) More interestingly, the High Court accepted the submission on behalf of the State that the initial order of the appointment of enquiry officer under Rule 8 is unsustainable in law. Such a flaw was realised by the State only at the stage of considering the said enquiry officer's report.

    17. The High Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the State Government is justified in law to appoint a Board of Enquiry, contemplated under Rule 8(3) of the Discipline Rules.

    18. Now, we proceed to consider the submissions.

    19. The first submission of the appellant is to be examined in the light of Rules 8(1), (2) and (3) of the Discipline Rules. Rule 8 as far as is relevant is extracted:

    “8. Procedure for imposing major penalties.—(1) No order imposing any of the major penalties specified in Rule 6 shall be made except after an inquiry is held as far as may be, in the manner provided in this Rule and Rule 10, or, provided by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850), where such inquiry is held under that Act.
    (2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a member of the Service, it may appoint under this Rule or under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, an authority to inquire into the truth thereof.
    (3) Where a Board is appointed as the inquiring authority it shall consist of not less than two senior officers provided that at least one member of such a Board shall be an officer of the service to which the member of the Service belongs.”

    20. It is apparent that Rule 8(1) prohibits imposition of any major penalty without holding an enquiry either in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Rules or under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850.

    21. Rule 8(2) specifically authorises the disciplinary authority to appoint an authority to enquire into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a member of the service if the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds to inquire into. Such an authority could be appointed either in exercise of the power conferred under the Rules or under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850.

    22. Rule 8(3) contemplates appointment of a Board as an inquiring authority and stipulates that such Board shall consist of not less than two senior officers of whom at least one should be an officer of the service to which the delinquent officer belongs. The expression “Board” is not defined under the Rules. The only conclusion that can be drawn from the scheme of Rules 8(2) and (3) is that the expression “enquiring authority” implies either a single member authority or Board consisting of two or more members.

    23. All the parties—the appellant, the respondents and the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court proceeded on the basis that the impugned order constituting a two-member Enquiry Board under Rule 8(3) of the Discipline Rules is an order constituting such a Board under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850. We do not see any basis for such a conclusion. The impugned order nowhere refers to the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, nor is there anything in Rule 8(3) which suggests that whenever a multi-member Board is appointed as an enquiring authority, such a Board could be appointed only under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act. The language of Rule 8(2) is wide enough to enable the disciplinary authority to appoint either a single member enquiring authority or a multi-member Board to inquire into the misconduct of a delinquent officer.

    24. Be that as it may, the question is whether the disciplinary authority could have resorted to such a practice of abandoning the enquiry already undertaken and resort to appointment of a fresh enquiring authority (multi-member)? The issue is not really whether the enquiring authority should be a single member or a multi-member body, but whether a second inquiry such as the one under challenge is permissible. A Constitution Bench of this Court in K.R Deb v. CCE (1971) 2 SCC 102, examined the question in the context of Rule 15(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. It was a case where an enquiry was ordered against a Sub-Inspector, Central Excise (the appellant before this Court). The enquiry officer held that the charge was not proved. Thereafter the disciplinary authority appointed another enquiry officer “to conduct a supplementary open inquiry”. Such supplementary inquiry was conducted and a report that there was “no conclusive proof” to “establish the charge” was made. Not satisfied, the disciplinary authority thought it fit that “another enquiry officer should be appointed to inquire afresh into the charge”.

    25. The Court in K.R Deb (1971) 2 SCC 102 held that:

    “12. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the disciplinary authority may ask the enquiry officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the inquiring officer or officers does not appeal to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9.
    13. In our view the Rules do not contemplate an action such as was taken by the Collector on 13-2-1962. It seems to us that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself, was determined to get some officer to report against the appellant. The procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the Rules but was harassing to the appellant.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    and allowed the appeal of K.R Deb (1971) 2 SCC 102.

    26. It can be seen from the above that the normal rule is that there can be only one enquiry. This Court has also recognised the possibility of a further enquiry in certain circumstances enumerated therein. The decision however makes it clear that the fact that the report submitted by the enquiring authority is not acceptable to the disciplinary authority, is not a ground for completely setting aside the enquiry report and ordering a second enquiry.

    27. The scheme of Rule 8 of the Discipline Rules and Rule 15 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 are similar. Therefore, the principle laid down in Deb case (1971) 2 SCC 102, in our opinion, would squarely apply to the case on hand.

    28. Therefore, it becomes necessary for us to examine the legality of the impugned order in the light of the law laid down in Deb case (1971) 2 SCC 102 i.e whether a further enquiry is really warranted on the facts of the case. We shall proceed for the purpose of this case that such further enquiry need not be by the same officer who initially constituted an enquiring authority and could be by a multi-member board.

    29. The respondents recorded four reasons for ordering a fresh inquiry by a Board, under the impugned order.

    (i) The inquiry report dated 30-8-2012 is cursory.
    (ii) The inquiry was conducted in violation of Rules 8(15), (16), (20) and (24) of the Discipline Rules.
    (iii) The contents of Writ Petition (C) No. 37 of 2010 on the file of this Court constitutes a criticism of the Central Government, and therefore, is a clear violation of Rules 3(1), 7, 8(1) and 17 of the Conduct Rules.
    (iv) That the enquiry officer failed to properly investigate the facts before submitting his report.

    30. The legality of the impugned order depends on the tenability of the above. We shall first deal with the last of the abovementioned four reasons.

    Fourth reason

    31. It is an absolutely untenable ground, since there was nothing for the enquiry officer to investigate regarding the facts of the various allegations in the charge-sheet. The appellant herein never disputed the factual correctness of the allegations. He admitted that he was a petitioner in Writ Petition (C) No. 37. He never disowned any one of the allegations made in the said writ petition. Therefore, there were no facts to be investigated into.

    First reason

    32. Coming to the first reason—that the report is a cursory report. A copy of the report is not made available to the appellant. The content of the said report is not known. The only admitted fact about the report is that the appellant was exonerated of all the charges made against him. If such a conclusion is otherwise justified, whether the report is cursory or elaborate, should make no difference to the legality of the report. What matters is the correctness of the conclusions recorded, not the length or the elegance of the language of the report which determines the legality of the conclusions recorded in it. Therefore, this ground is equally untenable.

    Second reason

    33. The second reason stated is that the enquiry officer did not observe the mandate of Rules 8(15), (16) and (24) of the Discipline Rules. We deem it appropriate to examine the content and scope of these Rules and record our conclusion regarding the applicability of each of the Rules to the facts of the case on hand.

    34. Rule 8(15) provides that both the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved by the disciplinary authority shall be produced on the date fixed for the enquiry; witnesses on behalf of the disciplinary authority may be examined both in chief as well as cross, etc. It is obvious from the Rule that the Rule cannot have any application where the delinquent officer admits the correctness of the factual allegations against him.

    35. Rule 8(16) speaks of adducing additional evidence and the procedure thereof. For the reasons mentioned in the context of sub-rule (15), sub-rule (16) will equally have no application, where the delinquent officer does not contest the factual correctness of the allegations made against him.

    36. Rule 8(20) enables the enquiring authority to hear both the presenting officer on behalf of the disciplinary authority and the delinquent officer, after recording of the evidence is complete. In addition, it enables the enquiring authority to permit written briefs by both the parties, in case they desire so.

    37. Application of Rule 20 thus depends upon the existence of two factors:

    (i) the appointment of a presenting officer;
    (ii) the presenting officer desires to file a written brief.

    38. We could not find any categorical assertion on the record by the State that a presenting officer was in fact appointed and such officer desired to file a written brief or make oral submissions, but was prevented from doing so by the enquiring authority. Therefore, even this reason must fail.

    39. Coming to Rule 8(24), the sub-rule reads as follows:

    “8. (24)(i) After the conclusion of the inquiry, a report shall be prepared and it shall contain—
    (a) the articles of charge and the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour;
    (b) the defence of the member of the Service in respect of each article of charge;
    (c) an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge; and
    (d) the findings on each article of charge and the reasons therefor.
    Explanation.—If in the opinion of the inquiring authority the proceedings of the inquiry establish any article of charge different from the original articles of charge, it may record its findings on such article of charge:
    Provided that the findings on such article of charge shall not be recorded unless the member of the Service has either admitted the facts on which such article of charge is based or has had a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against such article of charge.
    (ii) The inquiring authority shall forward to the disciplinary authority the records of inquiry which shall include—
    (a) the report prepared by it under clause (i);
    (b) the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the member of the Service;
    (c) the oral and documentary evidence produced in the course of the inquiry;
    (d) written briefs, if any, filed by the Presenting Officer or the member of the Service or both during the course of the inquiry; and
    (e) the orders, if any, made by the disciplinary authority and the inquiring authority in regard to the inquiry.”

    40. Rule 8(24) stipulates as to what should be the content of the report. From a reading of the above Rule, it is clear that the Rule will have virtually no application to a case where the delinquent employee does not dispute the factual correctness of the allegations contained in the articles of charge. Therefore, it follows that this reason also is wholly untenable.

    Third reason

    41. Coming to the third reason given in the impugned order that the content of Writ Petition (C) No. 37 of 2010 is critical of the Government of India, and therefore, violative of Rules 3(1), 7, 8(1) and 17 of the Conduct Rules, we are of the opinion that this ground is equally untenable.

    42. Rule 17 of the Conduct Rules reads as follows:

    “17. Vindication of acts and character of members of the Service.—No member of the Service shall, except with the previous sanction of the Government, have recourse to any court or to the press for the vindication of any official act which has been the subject-matter of adverse criticism or any attack of a defamatory character.
    Provided that if no such sanction is conveyed to by the Government within twelve weeks from the date of receipt of the request, the member of service shall be free to assume that the sanction sought for has been granted to him.
    Explanation.—Nothing in this Rule shall be deemed to prohibit a member of the Service from vindicating his private character or any act done by him in his private capacity. Provided that he shall submit a report to the Government regarding such action.”

    We fail to understand how this Rule could be said to have been violated, in the background of the allegations contained in the charges framed against the appellant. In our opinion, this Rule has no application whatsoever to the allegations contained in the charge-sheet. The Rule only prohibits a member of the Service from having recourse either to a court or to the press for vindication of the official acts of such member which have been the subject-matter of adverse criticism or a defamatory attack. It is not the content of any one of the charges against the appellant that he sought to vindicate any one of his official acts by filing WP (C) No. 37 of 2010.

    43. Rule 7 of the Conduct Rules reads as follows:

    “7. Criticism of Government.—No member of the Service shall, in any radio broadcast or communication over any public media or in any document published anonymously, pseudonymously or in his own name or in the name of any other person or in any communication to the press or in any public utterance, make any statement of fact or opinion—
    (i) which has the effect of an adverse criticism of any current or recent policy or action of the Central Government or a State Government; or
    (ii) which is capable of embarrassing the relations between the Central Government and any State Government; or
    (iii) which is capable of embarrassing the relations between the Central Government and the Government of any foreign State:
    Provided that nothing in this Rule shall apply to any statement made or views expressed by a member of the Service in his official capacity and in the due performance of the duties assigned to him.”

    44. Clearly, Rule 7 only prohibits criticism of the policies of the Government or making of any statement which is likely to embarrass the relations between the Government of India and a foreign State or the Government of India and the Government of a State. Allegations of maladministration, in our opinion, do not fall within the ambit of any of the abovementioned three categories. The entire burden of song in Writ Petition (C) No. 37 of 2010 is regarding maladministration.

    45. Rule 8 of the Conduct Rules reads as follows:

    “8. Evidence before committees, etc.—(1) Save as provided in sub-rule (3), no member of the Service shall, except with the previous sanction of the Government, give evidence in connection with any inquiry conducted by any person, committee or other authority.
    (2) Where any sanction has been accorded under sub-rule (1) no member of the Service giving such evidence shall criticise the policy or any action of the Central Government or of a State Government.
    (3) Nothing in this Rule shall apply to—
    (a) evidence given at any inquiry before an authority appointed by the Government, or by Parliament or by a State Legislature; or
    (b) evidence given in any judicial inquiry; or
    (c) evidence given at departmental inquiry ordered by any authority subordinate to the Government.”

    In substance the Rule prohibits a member of the Service to give evidence in connection with any inquiry conducted by any person, committee or other authority except with the previous sanction of the Government. However, sub-rule (3)(b) makes a categorical declaration that nothing in the Rule shall apply to evidence given in any judicial inquiry. Writ petition filed in public interest before the highest court of the country cannot be an inquiry contemplated under Rule 8(1). This is apart from the fact that sub-rule (3)(b) expressly excludes evidence given in any judicial inquiry. Dehors such an exception, Rule 8 would be subversive of the basic freedom of the citizens of this country, detrimental to the norms of good governance and antithetical to the liberal democratic structure of the Constitution.

    46. Rule 3(1) reads as follows:

    “3. General.—(1) Every member of the Service shall at all times, maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and shall do nothing which is unbecoming of a member of the Service.”

    47. We are at a loss to comprehend how the filing of the writ petition containing allegations that the Government of India is lax in discharging its constitutional obligations of establishing the rule of law can be said to amount to either failure to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty or of indulging in conduct unbecoming of a member of the Service.

    48. Even otherwise, the impugned order, in our opinion is wholly untenable. The purpose behind the proceedings appears calculated to harass the appellant since he dared to point out certain aspects of maladministration in the Government of India. The action of the respondents is consistent with their conduct clearly recorded in Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India (2011) 8 SCC 1. The whole attempt appears to be to suppress any probe into the question of black money by whatever means, fair or foul. The present impugned proceedings are nothing but a part of the strategy to intimidate not only the appellant but also to send a signal to others who might dare in future to expose any maladministration. The fact remains, that this Court eventually agreed with the substance of the complaint pleaded in Writ Petition (C) No. 37 of 2010 and connected matters; and directed an independent inquiry into the issue of black money.

    49. The Constitution declares that India is a sovereign democratic republic. The requirement of such democratic republic is that every action of the State is to be informed with reason. State is not a hierarchy of regressively genuflecting coterie of bureaucracy.

    50. The right to judicial remedies for the redressal of either personal or public grievances is a constitutional right of the subjects (both citizens and non-citizens) of this country. Employees of the State cannot become members of a different and inferior class to whom such right is not available. The respondents consider that a complaint to this Court of executive malfeasance causing debilitating economic and security concerns for the country amounts to inappropriate conduct for a civil servant is astounding.

    51. There is another factor which brings the respondents virtually within the ambit of legal malice, to say the least Mr Suneel Kumar, another employee of the respondent was also a co-petitioner in the civil writ filed in this Court. However, no action is taken against him. This leaves much to be desired and makes bona fides of the respondents suspect.

    52. The appeal is allowed. The judgment under appeal is set aside. Consequently, the OA stands allowed as prayed for. The respondents are liable jointly and severally to pay costs to the appellant which is quantified at Rs 5,00,000 (Rupees five lakhs). It is open to the respondents to identify those who are responsible for the initiation of such unwholesome action against the appellant and recover the amounts, if the respondents can and have the political will.

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