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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
  • Section 182(1) read with Sections 184 and 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 138 of the NI Act
  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India
  • Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
  • Section 182(1) read with Sections 184 and 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 138 of the NI Act
  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India
  • Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee filed a public-interest writ petition asserting that a large number of complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) were pending before Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi even though those courts lacked territorial jurisdiction. The sole nexus to Delhi in these complaints was that statutory demand notices under the proviso to Section 138 had been issued from Delhi. Relying on Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. v. National Panasonic India (P) Ltd., the Committee contended that issuance of notice alone does not confer jurisdiction.

A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court agreed and, exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 CrPC, directed that all such complaints be returned to the complainants for presentation before courts having proper territorial jurisdiction.

An advocate of the Delhi High Court and Indiabulls Financial Services Ltd. obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The matter was heard by a three-Judge Bench, tagged with the Court’s decision in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, and culminated in the present judgment dismissing the appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether courts in Delhi acquire territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of offences under Section 138 of the NI Act merely because the statutory demand notice was issued from Delhi or received in Delhi.
  2. Whether the Delhi High Court, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 482 CrPC, was justified in directing the return of all such complaints to courts of competent jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. v. National Panasonic India (P) Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 720 Issuance of statutory notice by itself does not confer territorial jurisdiction under Section 138 NI Act. Formed the foundational basis for the High Court’s and Supreme Court’s conclusion that Delhi courts lacked jurisdiction when only the notice originated from Delhi.
K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999) 7 SCC 510 Earlier view that multiple places, including where notice was issued, could confer jurisdiction. Distinguished and overruled in effect by the larger Bench in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod; used by some complainants but rejected by the Court.
Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129 Offence under Section 138 is committed at the place where the drawee bank dishonours the cheque; jurisdiction lies only there. Supreme Court relied on this concurrent judgment to affirm that Delhi courts lacked jurisdiction absent dishonour within Delhi.
Dwarka Nath v. ITO, AIR 1966 SC 81 Scope of High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. Cited to uphold the High Court’s power to remedy docket congestion by returning complaints filed without jurisdiction.
Air India Statutory Corpn. v. United Labour Union, (1997) 9 SCC 377 Expansive interpretation of High Courts’ powers under Article 226. Supported the High Court’s authority to issue the impugned directions.
Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal, (2004) 7 SCC 338 Magistrates lack power to recall process once summons have been issued. Explained why Magistrates needed a higher-court directive to return complaints rather than dismiss them suo motu.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court’s order merely required Metropolitan Magistrates to return complaints where their only link to Delhi was the issuance or receipt of statutory notices. Drawing extensively from the three-Judge Bench decision in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod, the Court reiterated that:

  • An offence under Section 138 is complete upon dishonour of the cheque, but cognizance is deferred until statutory pre-conditions are met.
  • The facts constituting the cause of action (presentation, notice, non-payment) are not ingredients of the offence and therefore do not determine territorial jurisdiction.
  • Applying Section 177 CrPC, jurisdiction lies only where the drawee bank dishonours the cheque, unless covered by special joinder provisions under Sections 182 or 220 CrPC.

Consequently, the Court held that neither the issuance of notice from Delhi, deposit of the cheque in a Delhi bank, nor receipt of notice in Delhi confers jurisdiction on Delhi courts. It endorsed the High Court’s pragmatic remedy of directing return of complaints and instructed Magistrates to apply the principles stated in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod when scrutinising jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS DISMISSED.

Immediate Effect: The Delhi High Court’s direction stands; Metropolitan Magistrates must examine pending Section 138 complaints and return those lacking territorial jurisdiction for presentation before competent courts.

Broader Implications: The judgment re-affirms the larger Bench ruling in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod, consolidating the principle that territorial jurisdiction in cheque-dishonour cases is confined to the location of the drawee bank. No new precedent is created, but the decision reinforces uniform application of the law and alleviates docket congestion in courts improperly seized of such matters.

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    Vinay Kumar Shailendra v. Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee And Another

    T.S Thakur, J.— Leave granted. These appeals arise out of a judgment dated 23-9-2009 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) (2009) 83 AIC 820 (Del) whereby the High Court has invoked its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 CrPC and directed return of all complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in which the Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi have taken cognizance only because the statutory notices in terms of proviso to Section 138 of the Act have been issued to the drawers of the cheque from Delhi.

    2. The matter arose out of a writ petition filed by the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee in public interest pointing out that a very large number of complaints under Section 138 of the Act were pending in the Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi in which cognizance had been taken although the courts concerned had no territorial jurisdiction to do so. The Committee's case before the High Court was that such complaints were filed among others by financial institutions and banks only on the ground that the statutory notices demanding payment against the dishonoured cheque had been issued from Delhi. Issue of a notice demanding payment of the dishonoured cheque was not, however, sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the courts in Delhi, argued the Committee. Reliance in support was placed upon the decision of this Court in Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. v. National Panasonic India (P) Ltd. (2009) 1 SCC 720

    3. The Committee's grievance was that notwithstanding a clear exposition of law on the subject by this Court in Harman case (2009) 1 SCC 720, complaints had been filed and cognizance taken by the courts in Delhi, relying upon the decision of this Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (1999) 7 SCC 510. It was in terms contended before the High Court that in the light of the pronouncement of this Court in Harman case (2009) 1 SCC 720 the complaints could not have been entertained nor could the accused persons be summoned for trial in the courts in Delhi. It was also argued that number of such complaints is so large that the Magistrates in Delhi were unable to handle and effectively manage the docket explosion and attend to what was otherwise within their jurisdiction and called for their immediate attention.

    4. The contentions urged by the Committee found favour with the High Court which relying upon the decisions of this Court in Dwarka Nath v. ITO AIR 1966 SC 81 and Air India Statutory Corpn. v. United Labour Union (1997) 9 SCC 377 held that the Constitution did not place any fetters on the extraordinary jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court in a situation where courts are flooded with complaints which they had no jurisdiction to entertain. The High Court further held that a direction for return of the complaints for presentation before the competent courts was in the circumstances necessary, as Magistrates who had issued the summons were unable to dismiss the complaints suo motu in the light of the decision of this Court in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal (2004) 7 SCC 338. The High Court accordingly allowed the writ petition with the following directions: (Delhi High Court Legal Service Committee case (2009) 83 AIC 820 (Del), AIC p. 823, para 11)

    “11. Consequently, in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we direct return to the complainants for presentation in the court of competent jurisdiction all those criminal complaints filed under Section 138 of the NI Act that are pending in the courts of Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi in which cognizance has been taken by them without actually having territorial jurisdiction.”

    5. The appellant who is a practising Advocate of the High Court of Delhi has, with the permission of this Court, filed this appeal which was referred for hearing to a three-Judge Bench by an order dated 3-11-2009 (2014) 9 SCC 129 (F1). That is precisely how the present appeal along with the connected appeal filed by Indiabulls Financial Services Ltd. against the very same order passed by the High Court have come up before us.

    6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. The order (2009) 83 AIC 820 (Del) passed by the High Court simply directs return of complaints in cases where the same have been filed only because the statutory notices have been issued from Delhi. The direction proceeds on the basis that issue of statutory notices from Delhi by itself is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Delhi courts to entertain the complaints. Reliance has been placed for that proposition upon the decision of this Court in Harman case (2009) 1 SCC 720.

    7. In Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 9 SCC 129, (2014) 9 Scale 97 we have had an occasion to consider whether the view expressed by this Court in K. Bhaskaran case (1999) 7 SCC 510 was sound and whether complaints under Section 138 could be maintained at a place other than the place where the drawee bank is situate. Answering the question in the negative this Court held that an offence under Section 138 is committed no sooner the cheque issued on an account maintained by the drawer with a bank and representing discharge of a debt or a liability in full or part is dishonoured on the ground of insufficiency of funds or on the ground that the same exceeds the arrangements made with the banker. Prosecution of the offender and cognizance of the commission of the offence is, however, deferred by the proviso to Section 138 till such time the complainant has the cause of action to institute such proceedings. This Court found that the proviso to Section 138 does not constitute ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138.

    8. The legal position on the subject was summed up in the following words: (Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod case (2014) 9 SCC 129, (2014) 9 Scale 97)

    “58. To sum up:
    58.1 (i) An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is committed no sooner a cheque drawn by the accused on an account being maintained by him in a bank for discharge of debt/liability is returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds or for the reason that the amount exceeds the arrangement made with the bank.
    58.2 (ii) Cognizance of any such offence is however forbidden under Section 142 of the Act except upon a complaint in writing made by the payee or holder of the cheque in due course within a period of one month from the date the cause of action accrues to such payee or holder under clause (c) of proviso to Section 138.
    58.3 (iii) The cause of action to file a complaint accrues to a complainant/payee/holder of a cheque in due course if
    (a) the dishonoured cheque is presented to the drawee bank within a period of six months from the date of its issue.
    (b) if the complainant has demanded payment of cheque amount within thirty days of receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the dishonour of the cheque, and
    (c) if the drawer has failed to pay the cheque amount within fifteen days of receipt of such notice.
    58.4 (iv) The facts constituting cause of action do not constitute the ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Act.
    58.5 (v) The proviso to Section 138 simply postpones/defers institution of criminal proceedings and taking of cognizance by the court till such time cause of action in terms of clause (c) of proviso accrues to the complainant.
    58.6 (vi) Once the cause of action accrues to the complainant, the jurisdiction of the court to try the case will be determined by reference to the place where the cheque is dishonoured.
    58.7 (vii) The general rule stipulated under Section 177 CrPC applies to cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Prosecution in such cases can, therefore, be launched against the drawer of the cheque only before the court within whose jurisdiction the dishonour takes place except in situations where the offence of dishonour of the cheque punishable under Section 138 is committed along with other offences in a single transaction within the meaning of Section 220(1) read with Section 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is covered by the provisions of Section 182(1) read with Sections 184 and 220 thereof.”

    9. In the light of the above pronouncement of this Court in Dashrath case (2014) 9 SCC 129, (2014) 9 Scale 97 we have no hesitation in holding that the issue of a notice from Delhi or deposit of the cheque in a Delhi bank by the payee or receipt of the notice by the accused demanding payment in Delhi would not confer jurisdiction upon the courts in Delhi. What is important is whether the drawee bank which dishonoured the cheque is situate within the jurisdiction of the court taking cognizance. In that view, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court which simply requires the Magistrate to examine and return the complaints if they do not have the jurisdiction to entertain the same in the light of the legal position as stated in Harman case (2009) 1 SCC 720. All that we need to add is that while examining the question of jurisdiction the Metropolitan Magistrates concerned to whom the High Court has issued directions shall also keep in view the decision of this Court in Dashrath case (2014) 9 SCC 129, (2014) 9 Scale 97.

    10. With the above observations these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.

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    Vinay Kumar Shailendra v. Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee And Another
    (Sep 4, 2014)