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Disposition
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Acts
  • Section 7-A of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1947
  • Section 7-A of the Act
  • Article 32 of the Constitution
  • Constitution of India (year not specified)
  • Article 235 of the Constitution
  • Article 226
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 227 of the Constitution
  • Sections 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 7-A of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1947
  • Section 7-A of the Act
  • Article 32 of the Constitution
  • Constitution of India (year not specified)
  • Article 235 of the Constitution
  • Article 226
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 227 of the Constitution
  • Sections 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent 1 joined the Bihar Judicial Service as a Munsif on 13 January 1955. He was dismissed on 15 January 1972 on the High Court’s recommendation, but this Court quashed that dismissal in 1973 (Madan Mohan Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1973 4 SCC 166) for want of an enquiry, leading to his reinstatement.

Subsequently, he was twice suspended, and departmental proceedings were initiated. Those proceedings were ultimately set aside by this Court in 1981 with liberty to issue amended charges. Fresh proceedings culminated in a second show-cause notice dated 12 January 1983 proposing his removal; meanwhile he was due to retire on 31 August 1983.

Respondent 1 filed a series of writ petitions (CWJC No. 1924 of 1982; CWJC No. 2059 of 1984; CWJC No. 4862 of 1987; CWJC No. 6538 of 1990) and special leave petitions (SLP (C) Nos. 8923 of 1983, 8621 of 1985) seeking promotions and monetary benefits that had been given to his juniors. Each earlier petition was either dismissed or withdrawn, and the only substantive relief ever granted to him by this Court was restoration of pension and retirement benefits (order dated 25-11-1986 in SLP (C) No. 8621 of 1985).

The impugned judgment dated 27 June 2008, passed by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in CWJC No. 6538 of 1990, nevertheless directed the High Court on its administrative side to consider Respondent 1’s promotional claims and consequential benefits. The present appeal by special leave challenges that direction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Respondent 1’s claim for retrospective promotions and consequential benefits was barred by res judicata, delay, laches and non-joinder of necessary parties.
  2. Whether the Supreme Court’s ex parte order condoning an eight-day delay in filing the present SLP violated Order 16 Rule 10(1) proviso of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.
  3. Consequent to the above, whether the High Court’s directive to reconsider Respondent 1’s promotions could stand.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments (High Court of Patna)

  • The writ petition of 1990 was filed seven years after Respondent 1’s superannuation and should be rejected for delay and laches.
  • Earlier orders—particularly the dismissal/withdrawal of SLP (C) No. 8923 of 1983 and SLP (C) No. 8621 of 1985—bar any fresh claim for promotion by the doctrine of res judicata.
  • Respondent 1 had never been confirmed even in the cadre of Munsif; hence promotion to higher cadres was legally impermissible.
  • Promotional benefits could not be examined without impleading juniors who had already been promoted.

Respondent 1’s Arguments (in person)

  • The present SLP was itself time-barred; condonation without notice contravened the proviso to Order 16 Rule 10(1) of the Supreme Court Rules, requiring dismissal of the appeal.
  • Despite earlier litigation, he remains entitled to promotions and monetary parity with his juniors.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Madan Mohan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1973) 4 SCC 166 Dismissal without enquiry is illegal; respondent’s earlier reinstatement. Recounted as part of respondent’s service history; distinguished as granting no right to retrospective promotions.
P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (1975) 1 SCC 152 Stale claims for promotion should not be entertained; challenge must be made within six months to a year. Used to hold respondent’s 1990 writ petition, seeking promotions from 1971–1978, was hopelessly delayed.
Ram Lal Kapur & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Ram Nath AIR 1963 SC 1060 (Constitution Bench) Observations that delay in special-leave petitions should ordinarily not be condoned ex parte. Court reviewed these observations while analysing respondent’s objection to ex parte condonation; nevertheless upheld the condonation.
Commissioner of Customs v. Rangi International (2003) 11 SCC 366 Leave granted after ex parte condonation can be revoked if delay is inadequately explained. Referred to illustrate that the Court retains power to revisit condonation; applied by examining and affirming the sufficiency of the appellant’s explanation for eight-day delay.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed the preliminary objection to limitation. Relying on Ram Lal Kapur and the proviso to Order 16 Rule 10(1), it acknowledged that notice is generally advisable, yet found that ex parte condonation of an eight-day delay was justified because the appellant’s explanation was “plausible and acceptable,” causing no prejudice to Respondent 1.

Turning to the merits, the Court noted that Respondent 1 had earlier sought identical relief in CWJC No. 1924 of 1982; that writ petition was dismissed, and the resulting SLP (C) No. 8923 of 1983 was withdrawn, rendering the matter final. That finality, combined with this Court’s limited relief in SLP (C) No. 8621 of 1985 (restoration of pension only), operated as res judicata.

Applying P.S. Sadasivaswamy, the Court emphasised that attacks on promotions of juniors must be brought within a reasonable time. Respondent 1 sought promotions granted in 1971, 1974 and 1978, yet filed the impugned petition only in 1990—well beyond the permissible period.

Substantively, Respondent 1 had never been confirmed even as a Munsif, making higher-cadre promotions untenable. Moreover, none of the junior officers whose promotions were challenged were impleaded, making adjudication impossible.

Consequently, the High Court’s 2008 order was deemed legally erroneous, having entertained a stale, barred and procedurally defective claim.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed and the High Court’s judgment dated 27 June 2008 is set aside.

Immediate Effect: The Patna High Court is relieved of any obligation to reconsider Respondent 1’s promotional claims; Respondent 1 receives no further service benefits beyond those already ordered in 1986.

Broader Implications: The Court reaffirms the bar of res judicata in service matters, underscores the principle that stale promotion claims will be rejected, and clarifies that ex parte condonation of minor delays in SLPs remains permissible where justified, notwithstanding the proviso to Order 16 Rule 10(1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.

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    High Court Of Judicature Of Patna v. Madan Mohan Prasad And Others

    J.M Panchal, J.— Leave granted. This appeal by grant of special leave, is directed against the judgment dated 27-6-2008, rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature of Patna in Madan Mohan Prasad v. State by which the High Court of Patna on its administrative side is directed to consider the case of promotion of Respondent 1 as also grant of consequential benefits to him in accordance with law.

    2. Respondent 1 was appointed to the Bihar Judicial Service as Munsif at Hajipur on 13-1-1955. On 9-5-1970, the High Court of Patna recommended to the State Government the dismissal of Respondent 1 from service. On the basis of recommendation made by the High Court, the State Government issued a Notification dated 15-1-1972, dismissing Respondent 1 from service. Thereupon, Respondent 1 filed WP No. 121 of 1972 under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging his dismissal from service before this Court. The petition filed by Respondent 1 was allowed vide judgment dated 23-2-1973 (1973) 4 SCC 166 on the ground that the termination of service was stigmatic and was ordered without holding an enquiry.

    3. It may be mentioned that the judgment of this Court rendered in the petition filed by Respondent 1 is reported in Madan Mohan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1973) 4 SCC 166. In view of the abovementioned judgment of this Court, Respondent 1 was reinstated in service. However, he was suspended from service on 12-4-1974 and departmental proceedings were initiated against him. The suspension order was challenged by him by filing CWJC No. 820 of 1974 and initiation of departmental proceedings was challenged by filing CWJC No. 593 of 1975 in the High Court of Patna. Both the writ petitions were dismissed in the year 1977 by the High Court. Thereupon, he had filed SLP (C) No. 4344 of 1977 challenging dismissal of the writ petition filed against suspension order and SLP (C) No. 4345 of 1977 challenging the decision in CWJC No. 593 of 1975 by which his prayer to set aside departmental proceedings was rejected.

    4. During the pendency of above-numbered two SLPs another Notification dated 30-1-1978 was issued by the High Court suspending him from service. On 1-3-1978 this Court admitted both these special leave petitions which were then converted into CAs Nos. 525 and 526 of 1978 respectively.

    5. This Court by the judgment dated 24-9-1981 directed the High Court of Patna to withdraw the suspension order dated 30-1-1978 passed against Respondent 1 as well as departmental proceedings initiated against him and granted liberty to the High Court to amend the charge-sheet before initiating departmental proceedings and to consider the question of his suspension from service afresh.

    6. By the Notification dated 12-10-1981, Respondent 1 was posted at Sasaram as Additional Munsif, which is the lowest post in judiciary and which post he had joined initially on 13-1-1955. Another Notification was issued on 10-12-1981 posting him at Darbhanga as Additional Munsif. Meanwhile he made various representations to release his dues and to keep one post of appropriate rank reserved for him. He did not receive any reply to those representations. Therefore, he filed CWJC No. 1924 of 1982 on 6-5-1982 for quashing Notification dated 10-12-1981 issued by the High Court posting him as Additional Munsif at Darbhanga and prayed to direct the High Court on its administrative side to give him promotions from the dates when his juniors named in the petition were promoted during the period 1970 to 1981, with all increments and other benefits. He also prayed to direct the High Court to issue a revised notification incorporating therein all the promotions to be given to him from due dates and to post him as a District Judge.

    7. After necessary amendment in the charge-sheet, fresh departmental proceedings were initiated against him on 19-8-1982. No reply was filed by Respondent 1 before the inquiry officer. After inquiry, the inquiry officer submitted his report dated 10-12-1982 holding that the charges levelled against him were proved. Thereupon, the notice dated 12-1-1983 with copy of the report of the inquiry officer was served upon him calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service. Respondent 1 did not file reply to the show-cause notice.

    8. When CWJC No. 1924 of 1982 had come up for hearing before the Court on 24-2-1983, the learned Additional Advocate General had informed the Court that the departmental proceedings had concluded and second show-cause notice was served upon him, calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service. Thereupon, the Court had expressed the view that the writ petition had become infructuous and dismissed the same accordingly by order dated 24-2-1983.

    9. After receipt of the show-cause notice dated 12-1-1983 Respondent 1 instituted CWJC No. 2059 of 1984 to quash (i) the Notification dated 19-8-1982 issued by the High Court initiating departmental proceedings against him, (ii) the inquiry report dated 10-12-1982 forwarded by the District Judge, Darbhanga, and (iii) the notice dated 12-1-1983 calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service.

    10. The learned Additional Advocate General who appeared for the Patna High Court in CWJC No. 2059 of 1984 had informed the Court on 26-2-1985 that Respondent 1 had retired from service on 1-9-1983 and after his retirement the High Court had considered the question of penalty to be imposed on him and by a memorandum dated 11-6-1984, he was directed to show cause as to why the High Court should not make a recommendation to the State Government for withholding his pension permanently, and as no cause was shown by Respondent 1, the High Court had recommended to the State Government for withholding his pension permanently but no final decision was yet taken by the State Government in that respect.

    11. The Division Bench hearing CWJC No. 2059 of 1984 was of the view that the writ petition as filed had become infructuous and an opinion was expressed that Respondent 1 should wait till the final decision was taken by the State Government about finalisation of pension. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed as having become infructuous by the judgment dated 26-2-1985 reserving liberty to Respondent 1 to renew his prayer for monetary claims after finalisation of pension matter.

    12. The grievance of Respondent 1 was that his claim for promotion from the various dates when his immediate juniors were promoted was not considered by the High Court nor was he paid benefits. Under the circumstances, he had approached this Court by filing SLP (C) No. 8923 of 1983 against order dated 24-2-1983 dismissing CWJC No. 1924 of 1982, as having become infructuous. The said SLP was listed for hearing on 30-8-1983. It was brought to the notice of this Court that a second show-cause notice had been issued to Respondent 1 and that Respondent 1 was to retire from service on 31-8-1983 i.e the next day when SLP (C) No. 8923 of 1983 was taken up for hearing on 30-8-1983. Respondent 1 had thereupon stated before the Court that the SLP had become infructuous and sought permission to withdraw the same. In view of the statement of Respondent 1, the SLP was disposed of as withdrawn by order dated 30-8-1983.

    13. Thus, there is no manner of doubt that order dated 24-2-1983 passed by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in CWJC No. 1924 of 1982 refusing to grant relief of promotion with deemed dates and monetary benefits had attained finality when SLP (C) No. 8923 of 1983 filed against the said order was unconditionally withdrawn by Respondent 1 on 30-8-1983.

    14. Again Respondent 1 had filed SLP (C) No. 8621 of 1985, against the order dated 26-2-1985 dismissing CWJC No. 2059 of 1984 as having become infructuous. During the pendency of the said SLP, Resolution 10383 dated 11-8-1985 was passed forfeiting permanently pension payable to Respondent 1. The said resolution was produced on the record of SLP (C) No. 8621 of 1985 on 25-11-1986. This Court had passed the following order on 25-11-1986 in SLP (C) No. 8621 of 1985:

    “The special leave petition is dismissed, but we would direct the State of Bihar to restore within six weeks the pensions payable to the petitioner with arrears due on the basis that he had superannuated from service from the date of superannuation. The provident fund, gratuity and leave salary as may be admissible to him on superannuation will also be paid to the petitioner.”

    The abovequoted order makes it evident that the special leave petition which was against order dated 26-2-1985 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in CWJC No. 2059 of 1984 was dismissed.

    15. The learned counsel for the petitioner states at the Bar that Respondent 1 was a judicial officer and therefore, when it was brought to the notice of this Court that his pension had been forfeited permanently, this Court had shown compassion, concern, sympathy and clemency to Respondent 1 and had directed the State of Bihar to restore pension payable to him and pay arrears due on the basis that he had superannuated from service from the date of superannuation, and a direction was given to pay him the provident fund, gratuity and leave salary as might be admissible to him on superannuation. However, it is relevant to notice that no direction was given to the appellant to consider the case of Respondent 1 with retrospective effect with all benefits.

    16. According to Respondent 1 his pension matter was finalised on 14-7-1987. After finalisation of pension matter, he filed CWJC No. 4862 of 1987 in the High Court for lawful claims as were given to his juniors. The said petition was disposed of on 9-11-1989 with a direction to Respondent 1 to submit representation to the High Court on its administrative side for legitimate claims as were given to his juniors. Pursuant to the abovementioned direction, Respondent 1 had submitted representation dated 12-2-1990. The said representation was considered by the Standing Committee of the Patna High Court and was rejected on 30-3-1990.

    17. Again Respondent 1 had sent representation dated 30-4-1990 repeating his prayer to grant him his lawful claims as were given to his juniors. The same was rejected by the High Court on its administrative side vide order dated 25-5-1990. Respondent 1 had made third representation dated 23-6-1990 to the same effect which was rejected by the High Court vide the communication dated 17-9-1990. Thereupon Respondent 1 had filed CWJC No. 6538 of 1990 in the High Court of Patna. The Division Bench hearing the same has directed the appellant High Court to consider the case of promotion of Respondent 1 as also consequential benefit in accordance with law vide judgment dated 27-6-2008 which has given rise to the instant appeal.

    18. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the appellant and Respondent 1 who has appeared in person. The Court has also considered the documents forming part of the appeal.

    19. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the writ petition was filed by Respondent 1 on 10-11-1990 i.e seven years after he had superannuated from service, and therefore, the writ petition should have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, cannot be accepted. The impugned judgment nowhere shows that such a point was argued by the appellant before the High Court. No grievance is made in the memorandum of SLP that point regarding delay and laches was argued before the High Court but the same was not dealt with by the High Court when impugned judgment was delivered.

    20. Further, from the facts noticed, it becomes evident that by order dated 9-11-1989, passed in CWJC No. 4862 of 1987, the High Court had directed Respondent 1 to submit representation to the High Court on its administrative side claiming benefits which were given to his juniors but were denied to him, pursuant to which Respondent 1 had filed last representation on 23-6-1990 which was rejected by the High Court on 17-9-1990. The question of delay and laches will have to be considered from the communication dated 17-9-1990 by which claim made by Respondent 1 to give him benefits which were given to his juniors was rejected and not from the date of superannuation. Thus, Respondent 1 is not liable to be non-suited on the ground of delay and laches in filing writ petition after his superannuation from service.

    21. However, there is no manner of doubt that Respondent 1 is claiming promotions to different cadres from the post of Additional Munsif as well as promotional benefits from the due dates as were given to his juniors in the years 1971, 1974 and 1978. In Madan Mohan Prasad v. State from which the present appeal arises the petitioner had claimed the following relief in Para 20 of the writ petition:

    “It is therefore respectfully prayed Your Lordship may be graciously pleased to admit this writ petition and may be pleased to direct Respondents 1 and 2 to give all the service claims of this petitioner as given to his juniors during the period he was illegally kept out of service and adequate compensation for having ruined the career of the petitioner as fully stated in Paras 1 and 4 of this writ petition and may be pleased to pass such other order or orders as may be considered fit and proper.”

    22. If one looks to the averments made in the petition it becomes at once clear that the petitioner is claiming promotions to the post of Civil Judge, Senior Division, thereafter to the post of Additional District Judge and finally to the post of District Judge when his juniors were given such benefits in the years 1971, 1974 and 1978 respectively. The record shows that till Respondent 1 had superannuated from service on 31-8-1983, he was discharging duties as Additional Munsif and was never confirmed in the cadre of Munsif. Therefore, his claim for promotion to higher post could not have been considered unless and until he was confirmed on the post of Munsif. On this ground alone, the writ petition filed by him was liable to be dismissed.

    23. There is no manner of doubt that claim of promotion made in Madan Mohan Prasad v. State was a stale one and could not have been entertained by the High Court. Further juniors to Respondent 1 who were given benefits of promotion in the years 1971, 1974 and 1978 were not impleaded as respondents in the petition. In their absence, claim advanced by Respondent 1 could not have been examined by the High Court. Thus, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside on the ground that stale claim of promotions to different cadres was advanced by Respondent 1 after great delay and that too without impleading his juniors.

    24. In P.S Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N (1975) 1 SCC 152, this Court has laid down a firm proposition of law that a person aggrieved by an order promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within 6 months or at the most a year of such promotion and the High Court can refuse to exercise its extraordinary powers under Article 226 in case the person aggrieved does not approach the Court expeditiously for appropriate relief and puts forward stale claim and tries to unsettle settled matters. Therefore, CWJC No. 6538 of 1990 in which stale claim of promotion was made by Respondent 1 was liable to be dismissed.

    25. The contention of Respondent 1 that Interlocutory Application No. 1 of 2009 was filed for condonation of delay in filing SLP and delay was condoned without issuing notice to him though it is mandatorily provided in the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of Order 16 of the Supreme Court Rules that there shall be no condonation of delay without notice to the respondent and therefore, the SLP should be dismissed as barred by limitation has no substance.

    26. The office report on limitation dated 24-12-2008 which was placed before this Court along with papers of SLP indicated that there was delay of eight days in filing SLP and delay of nine days in refiling the petition. The SLP was placed for preliminary hearing before the Court on 9-2-2009 and after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, the following order was passed:

    “Delay condoned. Issue notice.
    There shall be interim stay of the impugned order until further orders.”

    27. In order to deal with the contention raised by Respondent 1 it would be necessary to refer to the scheme envisaged by the Supreme Court Rules, 1950, which was subsequently amended and the scheme contemplated by the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 as well as certain relevant decisions on the point.

    28. The Supreme Court of India, in the exercise of its rule-making powers, and with the approval of the President, had made the Supreme Court Rules, 1950. Order 13 of the 1950 Rules dealt with appeals by special leave. Rule 1, which is relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue raised in this appeal by Respondent 1, was reading as under:

    “1. A petition for special leave to appeal shall be lodged in the Court within sixty days from the date of refusal of a certificate by the High Court or within ninety days from the date of the judgment sought to be appealed from, whichever is longer:
    Provided that
    (i) in computing the period of ninety days the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment sought to be appealed from shall be excluded;
    (ii) where the period of limitation claimed is sixty days from the date of the refusal of a certificate, the time taken subsequent to the date of refusal in obtaining a certified copy of the judgment (in cases where no certified copy of the judgment had been obtained prior to the date of such refusal) shall be excluded in computing the period of sixty days;
    (iii) where an application for certificate made to the High Court is dismissed as being out of time the period of limitation shall count from the date of the judgment sought to be appealed from and not from the date of the dismissal of the said application;
    (iv) where an application for leave to appeal to the High Court from the judgment of a Single Judge of that Court has been made and refused, the period from the making of the application to the rejection thereof shall be excluded in computing the period under this Rule;
    (v) the Court may for sufficient cause extend the time on application made for the purpose.”

    29. The Supreme Court Rules, 1950 were published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary dated 28-1-1950 and amended by the Supreme Court of India Notifications dated 25-4-1950, 5-7-1950, 19-8-1950, 18-6-1951, 6-5-1952, 16-1-1954, 10-7-1954, 12-4-1955, 19-3-1956, 14-7-1956, 11-7-1957, 22-11-1957, 9-1-1958 and 8-4-1959. After amendment Order 13 Rule 1 provided as under:

    “1. Subject to the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) a petition for special leave to appeal shall be lodged in the Court in a case where a certificate for leave to appeal was refused by the High Court within sixty days from the date of the order of refusal and in any other case within ninety days from the date of judgment or order sought to be appealed from.”

    30. Till the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 were made by the Supreme Court, it was the practice of this Court to condone the delay caused in filing the special leave petition, without issuing notice to the respondent.

    31. At this stage, it would be relevant to notice a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Ram Lal Kapur and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Ram Nath AIR 1963 SC 1060. In the said case the first respondent Ram Nath was owner of a building in Delhi of which the appellant Company was one of the tenants. The appellant moved the Rent Controller, Delhi under Section 7-A of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1947 for fixation of the fair rent of the portion in its occupation. The Rent Controller, Delhi computed the fair rent for the entire building at Rs 565 per month and the fair rent payable by the appellant at Rs 146 per month. The respondent landlord preferred an appeal against the order of the Rent Controller to the learned District Judge, Delhi, but the appeal was dismissed. Thereafter, he moved the High Court of the Punjab under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the correctness and propriety of every finding by the Rent Controller and of the District Judge on appeal.

    32. The petition in Ram Lal Kapur case AIR 1963 SC 1060 came on for hearing before a learned Single Judge of the High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court had sometime previously held in another batch of cases that Section 7-A was unconstitutional and void. Following this decision the learned Single Judge allowed the petition of the first respondent Ram Nath and set aside the order of the Rent Controller as without jurisdiction, without considering the other matters which would arise if the section was valid and the Rent Controller had jurisdiction. From this decision of the learned Single Judge the appellant preferred an appeal under the Letters Patent to a Division Bench. Meanwhile, the judgment of the Division Bench holding that Section 7-A was unconstitutional was brought up by way of appeal to this Court. As the said appeal was getting ready to be heard, the appellant i.e M/s Ram Lal and Sons (P) Ltd. applied for and obtained special leave to appeal to this Court though the appeal filed by the appellant before the High Court was pending. The letters patent appeal was thereafter withdrawn by the appellant. An appeal against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court holding that Section 7-A was unconstitutional was heard by this Court and the same was allowed by the judgment dated 2-8-1961 and this Court held reversing the judgment of the High Court that Section 7-A of the Act was valid.

    33. It would thus be seen that the only point which the learned Judge in Ram Lal Kapur case AIR 1963 SC 1060 considered and on which the revision petition of the respondent landlord was allowed no longer subsisted and hence the appellant was entitled to have the appeal allowed. As the learned Single Judge did not consider the other objections raised by the first respondent to the order of the Rent Controller fixing the standard fair rent payable by the appellant, the appeal had to be remanded to the High Court for being dealt with according to law. However, a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal was raised by the learned counsel for the respondent landlord. His submission was that the special leave which was granted by this Court ex parte should be revoked as having been improperly obtained. The judgment of the learned Single Judge to appeal from which the leave was granted was dated 5-1-1955 and the application to this Court seeking leave was made on 5-1-1959 i.e after a lapse of four years. It was obvious that it was a petition which had been filed far beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the Rules of this Court.

    34. The learned counsel for the respondent in Ram Lal Kapur case AIR 1963 SC 1060 urged that there were no sufficient grounds for condoning that long delay and that this Court should, therefore, revoke the leave. The Constitution Bench of this Court was not disposed to accede to this request for revoking the leave. The learned counsel had drawn the attention of the Constitution Bench to a few decisions in which leave granted ex parte was revoked at the stage of hearing of the appeal on an objection raised by the respondent. However, the Constitution Bench did not consider that the facts of the appeal before it was bearing any analogy to those in the decisions cited. The five Judge Constitution Bench was of the opinion that in fact the grant of special leave in the circumstances of the case merely served to shorten the proceedings and this Court had acceded to the petition for leave obviously because the appeal in this Court from judgments in the cases where view was taken that Section 7-A was unconstitutional, were getting ready for hearing and there was some advantage if the appellant was in a position to intervene in those other appeals.

    35. However, the Constitution Bench made the following pertinent observations in para 9 of the reported decision. They are as under: (Ram Lal Kapur case AIR 1963 SC 1060, AIR p. 1062)

    “9. Nevertheless, we consider that we should add that, except in very rare cases, if not invariably, it should be proper that this Court should adopt as a settled rule that the delay in making an application for special leave should not be condoned ex parte but that before granting leave in such cases notice should be served on the respondent and the latter afforded an opportunity to resist the grant of the leave. Such a course besides being just, would be preferable to having to decide applications for revoking leave on the ground that the delay in making the same was improperly condoned years after the grant of the leave when the Court naturally feels embarrassed by the injustice which would be caused to the appellant if leave were then revoked when he would be deprived of the opportunity of pursuing other remedies if leave had been refused earlier. We would suggest that the rules of the Court should be amended suitably to achieve this purpose.”

    36. The Rules framed in the year 1950 were replaced by the present Rules, which are known as the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. They came into force with effect from 15-1-1966. The weighty recommendations made by the Constitution Bench in Ram Lal Kapur and Sons (P) Ltd. case AIR 1963 SC 1060 were taken into consideration and proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of Order 16 was enacted, which reads as under:

    “10. (1) Unless a caveat as prescribed by Rule 2 of Order 18 has been lodged by the other parties who appeared in the court below, petitions for grant of special leave shall be put up for hearing ex parte, but the Court if it thinks fit, may direct issue of notice to the respondent and adjourn the hearing of the petition:
    Provided that where a petition for special leave has been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed therefor and is accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, the Court shall not condone the delay without notice to the respondent.”

    37. Naturally, the proviso requires that when a petition for special leave has been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed therefor and is accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, the Court should not condone the delay without notice to the respondent. However, it is noticed that it is consistent practice of this Court even after framing of the Rules of 1966 that delay is condoned ex parte without issuing notice to the respondent, if the Court hearing the special leave petition is of the opinion that sufficient cause is made out for condonation of delay and the petitioner has good case on merits. There is no manner of doubt that once the Court forms an opinion that sufficient cause is made out for condonation of delay then issuance of notice to the respondent calling upon him to show cause as to why delay should not be condoned may become an empty formality and in order to see that the respondent has not to incur unnecessary expenditure for coming to Delhi from far-off places and engage an advocate for contesting application for condonation of delay, delay is condoned ex parte.

    38. However, in view of the requirements of proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of Order 16 of the 1966 Rules, it may be prudent to issue notice to the respondent before condoning the delay caused in filing the special leave petition. However, if the respondent is not noticed, then a right would be available to him at the stage of hearing to point out that the Court was not justified in condoning the delay and that the leave, if granted, should be revoked or notice issued should be dismissed.

    39. In Commr. of Customs v. Rangi International (2003) 11 SCC 366, the SLP from which the appeal arose was filed after a delay of 246 days. When the matter came up for preliminary hearing, it was found that without noticing the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules in regard to the condonation of delay, this Court on 12-7-2000, had condoned the delay ex parte and granted leave. On 2-4-2002, when the respondent appeared before the Court, a preliminary objection was raised that the condonation of delay was contrary to the Supreme Court Rules. Therefore, the Court hearing the appeal had looked to the papers. The Court found that proper particulars were not given in the application for condonation of delay. Therefore, the Court hearing the appeal had called upon the appellant to file an additional affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay. Accordingly, the appellant had filed the additional affidavit. To this the respondent had filed a counter pointing out that the explanation given by the appellant even in the additional affidavit did not explain the delay satisfactorily nor had the appellant been diligent in filing the appeal. This Court heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the respondent and having considered the reasons given for condonation of delay in the original affidavit as well as in the additional affidavit filed by the appellant was of the opinion that the appellant had not satisfactorily explained the delay in preferring the appeal. Therefore, accepting the contention of the respondent this Court had revoked the leave granted on 12-7-2000 and consequently dismissed the SLP as barred by limitation.

    40. In view of the course adopted by this Court in the abovementioned decision this Court had heard the appellant and the respondent to satisfy itself as to whether sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay of eight days. At the beginning, Respondent 1 had attempted to argue that there was unexplained delay of seven months and not of eight days, as was mentioned in the office report, but he could not make his submission good. It could not be pointed out to this Court that the calculation of delay of eight days made by the registry was erroneous. The explanation offered by the appellant High Court in the application for condonation of delay is plausible and acceptable. The averments made in the application for condonation of delay would not indicate that the appellant High Court was either negligent or not diligent in prosecuting the matter nor the record indicates that the High Court had given up lis and acquiesced in the impugned judgment of the High Court.

    41. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case this Court is of the opinion that this Court was justified in condoning the delay when the special leave petition was placed for preliminary hearing and was also justified in issuing notice to the respondent. Thus, this Court does not find any substance in the contention raised by Respondent 1 relating to condonation of delay, which was caused in filing the special leave petition and, therefore, the same is hereby rejected.

    42. Coming to the merits of the matter this Court finds that earlier Respondent 1 had filed CWJC No. 1924 of 1982 in the High Court of Patna claiming promotions from retrospective dates with all claims, benefits and increments in various cadres from various dates as and when they had accrued and were given to his immediate juniors. His prayer was to direct the High Court on its administrative side to issue a revised notification incorporating all the promotions to which he was entitled to from various dates as they had accrued when his immediate juniors were promoted and to post him as District Judge. His another prayer in the writ petition was to quash Notification dated 10-12-1981 by which he was posted as Additional Munsif at Darbhanga. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court vide order dated 24-2-1983 as having become infructuous. Feeling aggrieved, Respondent 1 had filed SLP (C) No. 8923 of 1983 in this Court which was dismissed as withdrawn by order dated 30-8-1983. Thus the order dated 24-2-1983 passed in CWJC No. 1924 of 1982 had attained finality when SLP filed against the said order was dismissed as withdrawn. There is no manner of doubt that the order dated 24-2-1983 passed in CWJC No. 1924 of 1982 refusing to grant promotions with retrospective dates read with order passed by this Court in SLP (C) No. 8923 of 1983, would operate as res judicata.

    43. It is well settled that promotion is not a matter of right much less a fundamental right, more particularly when promotion in the subordinate judiciary is to be dealt with by the High Court which has complete control over the subordinate judiciary in view of Article 235 of the Constitution. All rights and claims of Respondent 1 got crystallised when this Court passed the order dated 25-11-1986 in SLP (C) No. 8621 of 1985 read with the order dated 30-8-1983 passed by this Court in SLP (C) No. 8923 of 1983. If Respondent 1 had any other claim he ought to have made the same before this Court when the above-numbered special leave petitions were disposed of. In fact both the special leave petitions were dismissed and therefore all his claims stood finally rejected, except the direction given to pay him the pension, etc. mentioned in the order dated 25-11-1986 passed in SLP (C) No. 8621 of 1985.

    44. No grievance was made by Respondent 1 in CWJC No. 6538 of 1990 that the direction given by this Court on 25-11-1986 in SLP (C) No. 8621 of 1985 were not complied with by the appellant. Neither at the time of disposal of SLP (C) No. 8923 of 1983 nor at the time of disposal of SLP (C) No. 8621 of 1985 Respondent 1 had claimed any other relief and had not obtained permission to claim relief of promotion in future. Therefore, the relief claimed in Madan Mohan Prasad v. State could not have been granted by the Court.

    45. It is evident that, CWJC No. 6538 of 1990 was filed for the same reliefs which were claimed in CWJC No. 1924 of 1982 and were rejected, and therefore, it could not have been entertained. Further, SLP (C) No. 8621 of 1985 which was filed by Respondent 1 against the judgment and order dated 26-2-1985 of the High Court of Judicature of Patna in CWJC No. 2059 of 1984 was dismissed and the only relief granted by this Court was to direct the State of Bihar to restore pension payable to him with arrears due on the basis that he had superannuated from service from the date of superannuation and a further direction was issued to pay him the provident fund, gratuity and leave salary as might be admissible to him on superannuation. This Court had never directed that the High Court of Patna on its administrative side should consider the claim of Respondent 1 regarding deemed promotions.

    46. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the High Court has erred in law in directing the original Respondent 2 i.e present appellant to consider the case of promotion of Respondent 1 as also the consequential benefits in accordance with law by the impugned judgment. Thus the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.

    47. For the foregoing reasons the appeal succeeds. The judgment dated 27-6-2008 rendered by the Division Bench of High Court of Judicature of Patna in Madan Mohan Prasad v. State, directing the present appellant to consider the case of Respondent 1 for promotion as also consequential benefits, is hereby set aside. The appeal accordingly stands disposed of.

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    High Court Of Judicature Of Patna v. Madan Mohan Prasad And Others
    (Sep 5, 2011)