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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 12
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
  • Section 35-A of the Code
  • Section 35 of the Code
  • Article 136
  • Sections 35 and 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 12
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
  • Section 35-A of the Code
  • Section 35 of the Code
  • Article 136
  • Sections 35 and 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner instituted a civil suit seeking specific performance of an alleged agreement of sale dated 15-7-2003. The trial court dismissed the suit on 19-5-2008, concluding that no concluded contract existed and that the petitioner had not approached the court with clean hands. On 29-9-2008 the High Court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal, echoing the trial court’s findings and further remarking that both parties had lied on oath. Instead of ordering prosecution for perjury, the High Court imposed exemplary costs of Rs 1,00,000 on each side, directing payment to the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed special leave petitions before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Supreme Court should grant leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the courts below rejecting the suit for specific performance.
  2. Whether the High Court was justified, under Sections 35 and 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, in levying exemplary costs of Rs 1,00,000 on the petitioner (and the respondents) payable to the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee.
  3. Whether, having found potential perjury, the High Court could substitute prosecution with heavy costs because of court congestion.
  4. To whom such exemplary costs should lawfully be directed— the State or the Legal Services Committee.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The imposition of Rs 1,00,000 as costs was unwarranted and excessive.
  • In civil appeals the awarding of costs is governed strictly by Sections 35 and 35-A CPC, which set clear limitations; compensatory costs for vexatious litigation cannot exceed Rs 3,000.
  • The Code envisages costs being paid by the losing party to the successful party, not to the State, especially when court-fee has already been paid at filing.

The opinion does not record any detailed argument submitted on behalf of the respondents.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first examined the merits of the dispute and found no ground to interfere with the concurrent factual findings of the trial court and the High Court that no enforceable contract existed and that both sides had approached the court without clean hands. Consequently, it declined to grant leave under Article 136.

On the question of costs, the Court reviewed the statutory framework:

  • Section 35 CPC vests discretion to award costs but subjects it to “conditions and limitations” prescribed by law.
  • Section 35-A CPC allows compensatory costs for vexatious litigation but caps them at Rs 3,000.

The Court noted two jurisprudential views: one that inherent powers allow higher costs in appropriate cases, and a “more sound” view that the discretion under Sections 35 and 35-A limits such awards. It acknowledged that exemplary costs of the magnitude imposed are more typical in writ or public-interest litigation, not ordinary civil suits. Nonetheless, exercising its own discretion under Article 136, the Supreme Court chose not to disturb the High Court’s order because no manifest injustice resulted and the respondents had already deposited their share. Time for the petitioner to deposit costs was extended by one month.

The Court expressed reservations on two ancillary aspects:

  1. Whether a finding of perjury can be waived merely by imposing costs due to judicial workload—an issue left open.
  2. The mismatch between the High Court’s stated intention to reimburse the State and its direction to pay the Legal Services Committee. The Supreme Court clarified that, once received, the sum of Rs 2,00,000 must be remitted by the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee to the State Government.

It cautioned courts against using large cost orders to create funds for Legal Services Authorities or charitable bodies, suggesting that only uniform token costs for minor defaults might appropriately be directed to such entities.

Holding and Implications

Special leave petitions dismissed.

The Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit and the imposition of exemplary costs, while extending the petitioner’s time to pay by one month and redirecting the eventual recipient of costs to the State Government. The decision leaves intact the High Court’s cost order but signals that, in ordinary civil litigation, courts should respect the statutory limits of Sections 35 and 35-A CPC and exercise caution when diverting costs to Legal Services Authorities. No new binding precedent is formally established, but the Court’s observations may influence future cost-awarding practices in civil matters.

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    Ashok Kumar Mittal v. Ram Kumar Gupta And Another

    R.V Raveendran, J.— Mrs Amita Gupta, learned counsel, appears for the respondents and waives notice.

    2. The petitioner filed a suit for specific performance of an alleged agreement of sale dated 15-7-2003. The trial court dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated 19-5-2008. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's appeal on 29-9-2008. Both the courts held that the petitioner had not approached the court with clean hands and that he had failed to prove any concluded contract for sale.

    3. The High Court found that the defendants in the suit were also not above board in their conduct. It found that both sides were guilty of having lied on oath and deserved to be prosecuted. On the ground that courts were overburdened with litigation, the High Court decided that instead of directing prosecution, heavy costs should be levied on both the petitioner and the respondents “to be paid to the State which spends money on providing the judicial infrastructure”. It then proceeded to impose exemplary costs of Rs 1,00,000 on the petitioner and Rs 1,00,000 on the respondents, and directed that the costs should be deposited with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee.

    4. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of his appeal, the petitioner is before this Court. On merits, we find that the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court do not warrant interference and therefore this is not a fit case for grant of leave.

    5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that levying costs of rupees one lakh against the petitioner was not warranted. He submitted that as the appeal before the High Court arose out of a civil suit, costs were governed by Sections 35 and 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the Code”, for short) and cannot exceed what is leviable under those provisions.

    6. Under Section 35 of the Code, award of costs is discretionary but subject to the conditions and limitations as may be prescribed and the provisions of any law for the time being in force. Under Section 35-A, compensatory costs for vexatious claims and defences may not exceed Rs 3000. Further, the primary object of levying costs under Sections 35 and 35-A CPC, is to recompense a litigant for the expense incurred by him in litigation to vindicate or defend his right. It is therefore payable by a losing litigant to his successful opponent. When an appellant or a plaintiff has already paid the prescribed court fee in regard to the appeal or suit, to the State at the time of institution, it is debatable whether any costs can be awarded to the State by way of penalty, in a litigation between two private parties. Courts will have to act with care while opening new frontiers.

    7. One view has been that the provisions of Sections 35 and 35-A CPC do not in any way affect the wide discretion vested in the High Court in exercise of its inherent power to award costs in the interests of justice in appropriate civil cases. The more sound view however is that though award of costs is within the discretion of the Court, it is subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed and subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force; and where the issue is governed and regulated by Sections 35 and 35-A of the Code, there is no question of exercising inherent power contrary to the specific provisions of the Code.

    8. Further, the provisions of Section 35-A seem to suggest that even where a suit or litigation is vexatious, the outer limit of exemplary costs that can be awarded, in addition to regular costs, shall not exceed Rs 3000. It is also to be noted that huge costs of the order of rupees fifty thousand or rupees one lakh, are normally awarded only in writ proceedings and public interest litigations, and not in civil litigation to which Sections 35 and 35-A are applicable. The principles and practices relating to levy of costs in administrative law matters cannot be imported mechanically in relation to civil litigation governed by the Code.

    9. The present system of levying meagre costs in civil matters (or no costs in some matters), no doubt, is wholly unsatisfactory and does not act as a deterrent to vexatious or luxury litigation borne out of ego or greed, or resorted to as a “buying-time” tactic. More realistic approach relating to costs may be the need of the hour. Whether we should adopt suitably, the western models of awarding actual and more realistic costs is a matter that requires to be debated and should engage the urgent attention of the Law Commission of India.

    10. We do not however propose to examine or decide the above issues here, except to observe that courts should not exceed or overlook the limitations placed by the Code with reference to costs in civil litigation. Insofar this case is concerned, even though the order relating to costs may not strictly be correct, we do not propose to interfere with the same, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136, as the order has not resulted in any injustice. It is stated that the respondents have already deposited the costs. The time for deposit of costs by the petitioner is extended at his request by a month from today.

    11. We would however like to refer to two aspects of the order of the High Court relating to costs. The first is, whether a court, having reached a conclusion that a party deserves to be prosecuted for perjury, should let him off with what it considers to be a stiff penalty by way of costs, on the ground that courts are overburdened with work. We propose to leave open for the present, this question involving moral and ethical issues.

    12. The second aspect relates to the recipient of the costs. In para 38 of the impugned judgment, the High Court specifically stated that it had decided to saddle the parties with heavy costs to be paid to the State which spends money on judicial infrastructure. Having said so, in para 39, the High Court directed that the costs should be paid to the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee. The High Court Legal Services Committee, a statutory authority under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, is not the “State” that spends money on providing judicial infrastructure, referred to in the earlier para. Once the Court held that costs had to be paid to the State, it should have directed payment of the costs to the State and not the High Court Legal Services Committee.

    13. No litigant should be made to feel that heavy costs are being levied in some cases by Judges to create a corpus or expense fund for the High Court Legal Services Committee or the State Legal Services Authority. While levy of a uniform token sum, as costs payable to the Legal Service Authority/Committee by way of a deterrent fine, in regard to non-compliance with procedural requirements, delays in representation of papers, etc. may not be objectionable, levy of huge amounts as costs in selected cases, made payable to the Legal Service Authorities, may invite adverse comments and evoke hostility to legal services in general. We have also come across cases of costs being levied and made payable to some non-party charitable organisations. Levy of such costs should be avoided.

    14. The Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee when it receives the sum of rupees two lakhs as costs from the parties, shall make over the same to the State Government as directed in para 38 of the impugned judgment. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee, for compliance.

    15. With the abovesaid observations regarding costs, the special leave petitions are dismissed.

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    Comments

    Ashok Kumar Mittal v. Ram Kumar Gupta And Another
    (Jan 9, 2009)