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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 83
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 498-A and 304-B of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 83
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 498-A and 304-B of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (A-1) married the deceased, Manjula, about six years before the incident. On 8-2-1999 she was admitted to Gandhi Hospital, Hyderabad, with severe acid burns to her throat. The Sub-Inspector of Police (PW-9) received information at 6:45 p.m., visited the hospital, and later deputed Head Constable PW-3, who recorded a statement of the deceased (Ex. P-2) on 13-2-1999. A requisition was made to Metropolitan Magistrate PW-4, who recorded a formal dying declaration (Ex. P-4) after obtaining a doctor’s certification of the patient’s fitness. PW-9 also recorded another statement (Ex. P-13) of the deceased. Manjula died on 9-4-1999; her body was exhumed on 13-4-1999 for inquest and post-mortem.

Upon investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against A-1 (husband) and A-2 (mother-in-law) under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC. The IVth Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, convicted both accused, sentencing each to rigorous imprisonment for one year (Section 498-A) and seven years (Section 304-B) plus a fine. On appeal, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh acquitted A-2 but affirmed the conviction of A-1. A-1 sought further relief before the Supreme Court, which delivered the present decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the dying declarations (Exs. P-2, P-4, and P-13) were reliable and admissible so as to constitute the sole basis for conviction.
  2. Whether, on the evidence on record, the convictions of A-1 under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC were sustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Magistrate’s testimony (PW-4) regarding the dying declaration (Ex. P-4) should not have been relied upon because the medical evidence did not establish that the deceased was fit to make any statement.
  • Consequently, the dying declaration lacked reliability and could not sustain a conviction.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The three statements of the deceased—Exs. P-2 (before PW-3), P-4 (before PW-4), and P-13 (before PW-9)—were consistent in asserting that A-1 poured acid into Manjula’s mouth, causing her death.
  • The consistency of these declarations, coupled with corroborating circumstances, justified the conviction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474 Comprehensive principles governing reliance on dying declarations. Used as the primary framework summarising eleven guiding propositions on dying declarations.
Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. (1976) 3 SCC 104 No rule of law or prudence mandates corroboration of a dying declaration. Court affirmed that corroboration is not a legal prerequisite.
State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985) 1 SCC 552 If true and voluntary, a dying declaration alone can sustain conviction. Relied on to uphold conviction without additional corroboration.
Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1983) 1 SCC 211 Same principle as above—conviction can rest solely on a trustworthy dying declaration. Cited in reinforcing acceptance of the declarations.
K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618 Need for careful scrutiny to rule out tutoring, prompting, or imagination. Court found no indication of tutoring; declarations accepted.
Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. (1974) 4 SCC 264 Suspicious dying declarations require corroboration. Held not applicable as declarations were not suspicious.
Kake Singh v. State of M.P. 1981 Supp SCC 25 Dying declaration inadmissible if the declarant was unconscious. Distinguished; medical endorsement showed consciousness.
Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 654 Infirm dying declarations cannot form basis of conviction. Declarations viewed as free from infirmities.
State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu 1980 Supp SCC 455 Brevity of a dying declaration is not a ground for rejection. Supported acceptance of the concise statements.
Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar 1980 Supp SCC 769 Short declarations may themselves guarantee truthfulness. Used to counter argument on lack of detail.
Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. 1988 Supp SCC 152 Eyewitness certification of fit mental condition can override medical doubt. Magistrate’s certification and observations considered adequate.
State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan (1989) 3 SCC 390 Discrepancy between prosecution version and dying declaration undermines reliability. No material discrepancy found; principle distinguished.
Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700 When multiple dying declarations exist, earliest trustworthy one is preferred; all may be accepted if consistent. Court noted consistency among all three declarations.
Mohan Lal v. State of Haryana (2007) 9 SCC 151 Restatement of consolidated principles on dying declarations. Served as immediate authority guiding final analysis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court began by restating the settled legal principles governing dying declarations, drawing heavily on the eleven-point summary in Paniben and related authorities. Applying those principles, the Court found:

  • The deceased was certified by a doctor and by the recording Magistrate to be conscious, coherent, and in a fit mental state at the time of Ex. P-4.
  • There was no evidence of tutoring, prompting, or imagination; the statements were consistent across three independent recordings (Exs. P-2, P-4, P-13).
  • Any absence of elaborate detail did not detract from credibility; brevity can enhance reliability.
  • The medical endorsement and eyewitness observations outweighed the appellant’s contention that Manjula was medically unfit to speak.
  • Given the trustworthiness of the dying declarations, corroboration was unnecessary; they could serve as the sole basis of conviction.

Accordingly, both the trial court and the High Court were held to have correctly relied on the dying declarations in convicting A-1 under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED – Conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC affirmed.

Practical Effect: The appellant continues to serve the sentences of one year and seven years’ rigorous imprisonment (with fine) as imposed by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court. The judgment reiterates, but does not alter, existing jurisprudence on dying declarations; no new legal precedent is created beyond reaffirming settled principles.

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    Varikuppal Srinivas v. State Of Andhra Pradesh .

    Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.

    2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”). The learned IVth Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad had convicted both the accused persons for offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC and sentenced each to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and seven years respectively and to pay a fine of Rs 200 with default stipulation. In appeal, A-2 was acquitted by the High Court.

    3. The prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:

    A-1, the present appellant is the son of A-2 who married Manjula (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”), the daughter of PWs 1 and 2 about six years prior to the date of incident. Sub-Inspector of Police (PW 9) of Osmania University Police Station received a message at 6.45 p.m on 8-2-1999 from Gandhi Hospital stating that one Manjula was admitted in the hospital allegedly having consumed unknown acid at her residence on the said date. He entered the same in GD, went to the hospital and found that the deceased was unable to speak due to acid burns in her throat. All his visits on subsequent dates proved futile. Therefore, he deputed a constable (PW 3) on 13-2-1999 to the hospital. Accordingly, he went to the hospital at 11 a.m and recorded her statement, Ext. P-2 and handed over the said statement to PW 9.

    4. On the basis of the said statement PW 9 registered a case as Cr. No. 34 of 1999 under Sections 498-A and 307 IPC and issued FIR, Ext. P-12 to all concerned. He visited Gandhi Hospital and recorded statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) of the deceased under Ext. P-13. He further examined PWs 1, 2 and others, visited the scene of offence, which is the house of the deceased at Manikanteswar Nagar, but did not find any incriminating material at the scene of offence and examined the neighbours.

    5. PW 9 sent a requisition, Ext. P-3 to PW 4, XXIInd Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad for recording the dying declaration of the deceased. On receipt of requisition the Magistrate visited the hospital at 7.20 p.m and after obtaining endorsement of the doctor that patient was conscious and coherent and also after putting some preliminary questions he recorded the dying declaration (Ext. P-4). Thereafter, PW 9 arrested the accused on 23-3-1999 and sent them to the court, subsequently on 13-4-1999 on the instructions of the Assistant Commissioner of Police he along with PWs 8 and 7 proceeded to Golanukonda Village and exhumed the dead body of the deceased; PW 7, the MRO conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased and Professor (PW 8), Forensic Medicine, Kakatiya Medical College, Warangal conducted the post-mortem examination. After completion of investigation police laid the charge-sheet for the offence as aforementioned. On committal, charges were framed against the accused, read over and explained to them in Telugu and they pleaded not guilty.

    6. The prosecution in order to prove its case examined PWs 1 to 13 and marked Exts. P-1 to P-16. No oral or documentary evidence has been adduced on defence side. The learned Sessions Judge after evaluating the evidence on record found the accused guilty and convicted for the offence, as aforementioned.

    7. The trial court relied primarily on the statement made before the Head Constable (PW 3). The statement recorded by him is Ext. P-2. The Magistrate (PW 4) recorded the dying declaration. Placing reliance on the evidence more particularly on the dying declaration, the conviction was recorded.

    8. In appeal, the primary stand was that the evidence was insufficient to convict A-2 and that the dying declaration should not have been acted upon. The High Court found substance in the plea that the evidence was not sufficient to convict A-2, but found the evidence to be sufficient so far as A-1 i.e the present appellant is concerned.

    9. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of the Magistrate (PW 4) should not have been accepted so far as the dying declaration is concerned. The medical evidence does not show that the victim was in a position to give any statement.

    10. In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the statements made by the deceased, that is, Exts. P-2, P-4 and P-13 are consistent with regard to A-1 pouring acid in the mouth of the deceased which resulted in her death. The deceased breathed her last on 9-4-1999. The dead body was exhumed on 13-4-1999.

    11. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused by the trial court was the dying declarations.

    “9. … The situation in which a person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence.
    10. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474, AIR 1992 SC 1817:
    (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P (1976) 3 SCC 104, (1976) 2 SCR 764)
    (ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of U.P v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985) 1 SCC 552, AIR 1985 SC 416 and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1983) 1 SCC 211, AIR 1983 SC 164.)
    (iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618, AIR 1976 SC 1994.)
    (iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P (1974) 4 SCC 264)
    (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P 1981 Supp SCC 25, AIR 1982 SC 1021)
    (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P (1981) 2 SCC 654)
    (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu 1980 Supp SCC 455, AIR 1981 SC 617.)
    (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar 1980 Supp SCC 769, AIR 1979 SC 1505.)
    (ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P 1988 Supp SCC 152, AIR 1988 SC 912)
    (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P v. Madan Mohan (1989) 3 SCC 390, AIR 1989 SC 1519.)
    (xi) Where there is more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700, AIR 1982 SC 839.)”

    (See Mohan Lal v. State of Haryana (2007) 9 SCC 151)

    12. In the background of the principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the trial court and the High Court have rightly convicted the appellant for offence punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC.

    13. The appeal is without merit, deserves dismissal, which we direct.

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    Comments

    Varikuppal Srinivas v. State Of Andhra Pradesh .
    (Jan 28, 2009)